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Introduction 
The volume The Dialectics of Modernity - Recognizing Globalization. Studies on 
the Theoretical Perspectives of Globalization is the product of a work of that 
quarter of the century, which has been continuing, since 1989 up today, the true 
beginning of the globalization. 
 
Therefore, because that concept was not existing at that time, the work is not yet 
directed, in the first years, on the globalization itself. As it can be seen, this concept 
pushed through only in the second half of the nineties, when the concept could also 
be already statistically revealed in the world press. 
 
How a group of researchers from Hungary was enquirying during the nineties, 
according to partners of conversation at home and abroad, with whom one could 
talk about how the new world emerging with 1989 can actually be described, is a 
long story, the theory of which consists in the fact, that we apparently live in a 
world, where the most part of the people, even worse, even most of the intellectuals 
are hardly interested in how this one really looks like. 
 
On looking for partners, the circle of the authors of this volume was created. In 
Hungary, we quickly reached our limit (which much later did not prevent us from 
appearing, such as if we had always been living in the theoretically worked 
globalization). The French group around Jacques Poulain reacted the fastest way 
(and later around Francois de Bernard, with his particularly valuable homepage 
www.mondialisations.org), not much later the contact with the Russian colleagues 
around Alexandr Shumakov was  created, in which Encyclopedia of the 
Globalization our contribution could already appear in 2003. On these traces, we 
came to the productive relationship with Leonid Grinin and Andrey Korotayev. 
 
Finally, we mention the Fürstenfeld's initiative, founded since 2009 with Melitta 
Becker's help in the framework of the Centre for the Interdisciplinary Research in 
this Austrian city. A relevant part of the author / inside this book participated from 
the beginning in the work of the group. 
 
The individual contributions to this volume are linked together by a common 
interest in knowledge. This is the theoretical view of the phenomenon of the 
globalization. From the beginning, it was not further defined or limited to certain 
approaches, particularly an independent theory of the globalization was not 
intended. We started from the fact, that every legitimately revealed theoretical 
approach can contribute legitimately to a later theory of the globalization. 
 
In this way, the further contacts with Nico Stehr and the members of the Dresden 
group for the investigation of the security problems arose, mainly with Ernst Woit. 
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Hegel defined the philosophy as the flight  of the Owl of Minerva, which "begins 
its flight only with the falling twilight". Through the theoretical investigation of the 
globalization always becoming interdisciplinary, we wanted by no means to debate 
about this incomparable aphorism. We simply started from  the conviction, that a 
new reality should not remain without any description. 
 
Budapest, October 2014 
 
Endre Kiss  
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Introduction 
Le volume Dialectique de la Modernisation, à propos de la Théorie de la 
Globalisation , est le produit d’un travail de ce quart de siècle, qui poursuit, depuis 
1989 jusqu’à aujourd’hui, le véritable commencement de la globalisation. 
 
C’est donc pourquoi, ce concept n’existant pas à cette époque, le travail n’est pas 
dirigé, dans les premières années, vers la globalisation elle-même. Comme on peut 
le voir, ce concept s’imposa seulement dans la seconde moitié des années quatre-
vingt dix, lorsque le concept put aussi être déjà statistiquement être révélé dans la 
presse mondiale. 
 
Comment un groupe de chercheurs de Hongrie s’enquiérait durant les années 
quatre-vingt-dix, selon des partenaires de conversations du pays et de l’étranger, 
avec lesquels on pouvait parler de comment le nouveau monde émergeant avec 
1989 peut être vraiment décrit, est une longue histoire, dont la théorie consiste dans 
le fait, que nous vivons apparemment dans un monde, où la plupart des gens, bien 
pire, la plupart des intellectuels ne sont guère intéressés par ce à quoi celui-ci 
ressemble réellement. 
 
Cherchant des partenaires, le cercle des auteurs de ce volume fut créé. En Hongrie, 
nous atteignîmes rapidement notre limite (ce qui beaucoup plus tard ne nous 
empêcha pas d’apparaître comme si nous avions toujours vécu dan la globalisation 
théoriquement travaillée). Le groupe français autour de Jacques Poulain réagit au 
plus vite (et plus tard autour de François de Bernard avec sa homepage 
particulièrement de grande valeur www.mondialisations.org), pas beaucoup plus 
tard le contact avec les collègues russes autour d’Alexandr Shumakov fut créé, dans 
l’Encyclopédie de la Globalisation duquel notre contribution put déjà apparaître en 
2003. Sur ces traces, nous en arrivâmes à la productive relation avec Leonid Grinin 
et Andrey Korotayev. 
 
Finalement, nous mentionnons l’initiative de Fürstenfeld, fondée depuis 2009 avec 
l’aide de Melitta Becker dans le cadre du centre de recherche interdisciplinaire de 
la ville autrichienne. Une partie pertinente de l’auteur/dans ce volume participa 
depuis le début au travail du groupe. 
 
Les contributions individuelles à ce volume sont liées ensemble par un intérêt 
commun au savoir. C’est la vue théorique du phénomène de la globalisation. 
Depuis le début, il ne fut pas davantage défini ou limité à certaines approches, en 
particulier une théorie indépendante de la globalisation ne fut pas envisagée. Nous 
sommes partis du fait, que toute approche théorique légitimement révélée peut 
légitimement contribuer à une théorie ultérieure de la globalisation. 
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De cette façon, les autres contacts avec Nico Stehr et les membres du groupe de 
Dresde pour l’investigation des problèmes de sécurité apparurent, surtout avec 
Ernst Woit.  
 
Hegel définit la philosophie comme le vol de la Chouette de Minerve, qui 
"commence son vol seulement au crépuscule tombant". Par l’investigation 
théorique de la globalisation devenant toujours interdisciplinaire, nous ne voulions 
en aucun cas débattre à propos de cet incomparable aphorisme. Nous sommes 
simplement partis de la conviction, qu’une nouvelle réalité ne devrait pas demeurer 
sans description. 
 
Budapest, Octobre 2014 
 
Endre Kiss  
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Einleitung 
Der Band Dialektik der Modernisation. Über die Theorie der Globalisation ist das 
Produkt einer Arbeit von jenem Jahrhundertviertel, das seit 1989, dem wahren 
Anfang der Globalisation, bis heute andauert.  
 
Die Arbeit richtete sich in den ersten Jahren noch deshalb nicht auf die 
Globalisation selbst, weil dieser Begriff damals noch nicht existierte. Wie 
ersichtlich, setzte sich dieser Begriff erst in der zweiten Hälfte der neunziger Jahre 
durch, als der Begriff in der Weltpresse sich auch schon statistisch nachweisen 
liess. 
 
Wie eine Forschergruppe aus Ungarn im Laufe der neunziger Jahre nach 
Gesprächspartnern im In-und Ausland umschaute, mit denen man darüber reden 
konnte, wie die mit 1989 aufkommende neue Welt überhaupt beschrieben werden 
kann, ist eine lange Geschichte, deren Lehre darin besteht, dass wir scheinbar in 
einer Welt leben, in welcher die meisten Menschen, schlimmer noch, auch noch die 
meisten Intellektuellen sich kaum dafür interessieren, wie diese wirklich ausschaut. 
 
Auf der Suche nach Partnern entstand auch der Autorenkreis dieses Bandes. In 
Ungarn erreichten wir schnell unsere Grenze (was viele später nicht daran hinderte, 
so aufzutreten, wie wenn wir seit je schon in der theoretisch durcharbeiteten 
Globalisation gelebt hätten). Am schnellsten reagierte die französische Gruppe um 
Jacques Poulain (und später um Francois de Bernard, mit seinem besonders 
wertvollem Homepage www.mondialisations.org), nicht viel später entstand der 
Kontakt zu den russischen Kollegen um Alexandr Shumakov, in dessen 
Enzyklopädie der Globalisation unser Beitrag bereits 2003 erscheinen konnte. Auf 
diesen Spuren kamen wir zu der produktiven Beziehung zu Leonid Grinin und 
Andrey Korotayev. 
 
Zuletzt erwähnen wir die Fürstenfeld-Initiatíve, die seit 2009 mit Hilfe von Melitta 
Becker im Rahmen des Zentrums für Interdisziplinäre Forschung in dieser 
österreichischen Stadt gegründet wurde. Ein relevanter Teil der Autor/innen dieses 
Bandes nahm von Anfang an an der Arbeit dieser Gruppe teil. 
 
Die einzelnen Beiträge dieses Bandes werden von dem einen, gemeinsamen 
Erkenntnisinteresse zusammengehalten. Es ist die theoretische Sicht auf das 
Phänomen der Globalisierung. Von Anfang war es nicht näher definiert oder auf 
bestimmte Ansätze beschränkt, insbesondere war eine selbständige Theorie der 
Globalisation nicht beabsichtigt. Wir gingen davon aus, dass jeder legitim 
erwiesene theoretische Ansatz zu einer späteren Theorie der Globalisation legitim 
beitragen kann. 
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Auf diesem Wege entstanden die weiteren Kontakte mit Nico Stehr und den 
Mitgliedern der Dresdener Gruppe für die Erforschung der Probleme der 
Sicherheit, vor allem mit Ernst Woit.  
 
Hegel definierte die Philosophie als den Flug von Minervas Eule, die „erst mit der 
einbrechenden Dämmerung ihren Flug beginnt“. Durch die theoretische und immer 
interdisziplinärer werdende Untersuchung der Globalisation wollten wir uns 
keineswegs mit dieser unvergleichlichen Sentenz auseinandersetzen. Wir gingen 
einfach von der Überzeugung aus, dass eine neue Wirklichkeit nicht ohne 
Beschreibung bleiben dürfte. 
 
Budapest, im Oktober 2014 
 
Endre Kiss  
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PART 1 
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“Global issues, global studies, research on globalization(s) are certainly neither 
obsolete nor outdated. The more ‘globalisation’ is perceived as a mere ‘fact’ that 
we should only accommodate, the more it proves a suspect, ambiguous and 
deceiving concept upon which we need to mobilize all the critical resources of 
Philosophy and the Humanities. “ 
François de Bernard 
10 Thesis about the Present Meaning and Orientation of Global Research 
 
“…the idea that globalization has been planned and implemented by someone, that 
it has been initiated by someone, that it can be stopped, reversed and so on, seems 
to be beyond serious criticism. Such ideas may be found, nevertheless, not only at 
the level of mass consciousness but also in serious academic books. This only 
demonstrates that people discussing such issues are nothing but amateurs in the 
sphere of global studies.” 
Alexander N. Chumakov 
Recognizing Globalization 
 
“The globalization is therefore not a new, yet unknown centre of power, not a 
world-government, but in principle it is a qualitatively new system of the relations 
of all actors…This fundamental contradiction is also paradoxical: in a global world 
that is being constituted by a type of universal values that embody universal 
operation, every particular individual might evidently become an actor. But such 
dialectics of transformation to independent and monadic actors might become self-
destructive. It is because the globalization is only capable of regulating the rules of 
vindicating particular interests to a limited extent. There might start a new 
historical era of “wars of every man, against every man”. 
Endre Kiss 
The Dialectics of  Modernity. A Theoretical Interpretation of Globalization 
 
“Although political theory is not yet an ideology or a party program, it defines the 
framework in which these alternatives can be formulated. A political theory, that 
would emerge on the basis of Luhmann’s theory, would not provide too many 
possibilities for forming such alternatives. We can get to know from Luhmann that 
the functioning of the society is shaped by macro-level, impersonal processes, 
which are beyond human control. We cannot effectively intervene in the 
functioning of the society; the negative effects of our attempts can exceed the 
positive ones.” 
Balázs Brunczel 
Niklas Luhmann’s Political Theory 
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“The world history in new ways means the search for an alternative to a Western 
conceptualisation of the world as a cumulative history of the nations. The question 
of communication between historians of various civilisations and cultures is 
crucial… A new global history should begin by inquiring into the global variety in 
terms of historical conceptualization of the past. A world historiography with a 
mapping of the variety of methodological entanglements and separations in 
attempts to conceptualize the past provides the sine qua non point of departure for 
any world history with ambitions to transgress a Western perspective.” 
Bo Strath 
Towards a Global History. A New History beyond the Cultural Turn : a Master 
Narrative without a Cause and without a Centre ? 
 
”Complexity globally multiplies via space-time compression and can only be 
communicated methodically, but it cannot be ‘controlled’ by socio-economic 
engineering. In addition, global scaling and topological measuring are not logical 
identities, but are governed by universal natural laws of space, time and 
energy…Socialism for the rich and capitalism for the poor is no solution (private 
gain = public loss), i.e. organized pockets of wealth vs. disintegrated pools of 
poverty; the land/natural resource and state/tax monopoly has to be reviewed 
scientifically, but it is radically more important to rethink the private monetary 
monopoly of fiat credit (x interest) and public monetary politics.“ 
Stephen I. Ternyik 
Global Wave Compression 
 
“The environmental pollution and the pollution conditions are a global, rather than 
a local problem, even if the pollution typically results from local processes.” 
István Deák 
Sustainability is Conditional on Globalization 
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Francois de Bernard 
10 Thesis About the Present Meaning and Orientation of Global Research. 
Against the Unending Sleep of “Obviousness” 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2008, as in 1999 (the Seattle WTO’s meeting moment), what we were used to 
call “globalization” — following Bill Clinton, Mikhaïl Gorbachev, Arjun 
Appadurai or Joseph Stiglitz — remains an extraordinarily complex, multi-faceted 
and confusing issue. The profit and loss account of economic globalization remains 
fiercely debated by “pro” and “anti”. The major social, cultural, environmental, 
epidemiologic and financial disasters contemporary of the ongoing globalization 
wave are widely considered as its “results” or side effects, but other analysts 
strongly deny such an interpretation. More and more, globalisation is conceived as 
a “well known” process, phenomenon or subject. More and more, it is used as a 
striking argument or universal explication: an unlimited source of ready-to-wear 
“answers”... But less and less, it looks problematic per se. On the contrary, the so-
called “globalization debate” appears as nothing more than a new realm of 
obviousness. That is why I would like to propose a critical and trans-disciplinary 
discussion of the ten following theses. 
 
 
1
st
 Thesis 
 
Global issues, global studies, research on globalization(s) are certainly neither 
obsolete nor outdated. The more “globalisation” is perceived as a mere “fact” that 
we should only accommodate, the more it proves a suspect, ambiguous and 
deceiving concept upon which we need to mobilize all the critical resources of 
Philosophy and the Humanities.  
 
2
nd
 Thesis 
 
“The End of Globalization” motto should be heard as the expression by its 
promoters of the following wish: that with such a “globalisation death”, decree will 
simultaneously cease every critical investigation, every comparative approach, 
every philosophical enquiry, every scientific revaluation of conflicting 
globalization figures and processes.  
 
3
rd
 Thesis 
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On the reverse, we should sustain this standpoint, that the considerable field of 
“Research and studies on globalization(s)” — field which has been invested by 
critical thinking for no more than a decade — currently experiments only its initial 
phase.  
 
4
th
 Thesis 
 
What has been achieved worldwide for about ten years by different individual 
contributions and collective work — be they academic or not —, is not to be 
neglected: i.e. an already impressive de-construction work (sub-field by sub-field), 
associated with a deeply rooted conceptual discussion, completed by a decisive 
reformulation of the globalization(s) conceptual vocabulary, and therefore of its 
critical dictionary.  
 
5
th
 Thesis 
 
The limits that have been reached by this multilateral, trans-national, trans-
disciplinary movement of critical thinking, weakly organised but lively and 
performing, were above all: i) an insufficient circulation of concepts and research 
produced within the media, political and economical spheres; correlatively: ii) a 
poor capacity to modify normative paradigms on globalisation used by journalists, 
political and economical leaders — and subsequently also: a poor capacity to 
generate inflexion of their vision and management of “global affairs”. 
 
6
th
 Thesis 
 
The future of  “Research and studies on globalization(s)” is nothing but obvious, 
first of all due to the point emphasized in Thesis n°2. Not only these research and 
studies motivate very few people — even within the academic world —, but they 
are also widely perceived as useless, even within the so-called “progressive” 
groups and parties. Such a statement implies, that the next step should be focussed 
on a quasi lobbyist strategy, aimed at circulating core ideas developped for the last 
decade and at convincing more and more people of the pertinence and 
indispensability of the global research. 
 
7
th
 Thesis 
 
The huge and compulsory trans-disciplinary effort that it requires proves to be a 
very strong limit to the expansion of such research field. Indeed, we do not live in 
the times of Diderot, Condorcet, Kant, Hegel and their like, who would have been 
much better intellectually equipped than we are in order to “think globalization(s)”, 
due to their multilateral Bildung. What appears critical for the advancement of the 
global research is therefore both i) to become individually more and more “trans-
disciplinary”, and ii) to convince usually reluctant universities to change their mind 
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about trans-disciplinary studies, so that they support such studies particularly 
concerning the globalizations’ field of investigation. 
 
8
th
 Thesis 
 
Emphasis on the multilingualism issue is also critical for a profitable development 
of the global research out of its normative expansion way. Indeed, it looks daily 
more dangerous to approach global issues through the sole bias of English, German 
or French. “Globe”, “Welt”, “monde”, “globalización”, “globalização”, 
“mondialisation”, aside their translation in other Indo-European languages, need to 
be confronted with their “equivalent” and their “different” in the Buddhist, Islamic, 
Guarani, Yoruba or Inuit traditions — a confrontation to be carried out in the long 
run. 
 
9
th
 Thesis 
 
We should never forget that “globalization” is a cultural issue — i.e. i) it is first of 
all a cultural issue and ii) it is a cultural issue. First of all, it means that the 
perception, understanding, description of “globalization” is cultural before being 
economical, political, social… Cultural means that the substance, features or 
evolution of the “globalization” are intimately linked to cultural references and 
cultural debates. 
 
 
 
10
th
 Thesis 
 
The future of the “Research and Studies on Globalization(s)” is not written. As of 
now, it may even look “open”. But it will soon be judged on the capacity of such 
research and studies of modifying the own judgement of non-intellectual leaders 
about the diverse and contradictory globalization projects. And of providing these 
leaders with objective and serious reasons of privileging the emergence of a true 
“Cosmopolitical citizen” (Weltbürger) rather than of a mere “global consumer”.  
 
 
Final note 
 
What is and remains at stake in this process would be a shared understanding of the 
ontological difference existing between, on the one side: i) an authentic “world” 
(mundus politicus) where plural “mondialisations” (mundializations?) could be 
experimented, respectful of human rights, human dignity and cultural diversity, 
and, on the other side: ii) a pure “globe” where a unique and lethal pattern of 
globalisation could reign – without alternative. 
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This paper, written following a friendly request from Professor Endre Kiss, was 
conceived as a short contribution to the ENG conference to be held in Fürstenfeld 
on 28
th
 and 29
th
 March 2008 
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Alexander N. Chumakov 
 
Recognizing Globalization 
 
The term “globalization” was introduced by R.Robertson in 1983. Nevertheless, it 
remained unnoticed by the philosophical community. Even the database of the 
Library of the US Congress contained no books using this term in their headlines 
till 1997. Only in the first half of the 1990s when the new power balance was 
emerging on the international arena, interest to globalization processes came to the 
foreground. The number of books and articles about it started to grow quickly and 
this growth have become uncontrollable by the beginning of the 21
st
 century.  
 
Globalization has become one of the most topical issues of modernity – this 
statement is confirmed by the fact that last 20 years world philosophical 
community during its World Congresses was paying extended attention to global 
problems. For one of the last congress that took place in August 2003 in Istanbul, it 
was fully dedicated to the topic of «Philosophy Facing World Problems». 
 
Thus, by now both separate countries and humankind as a whole have accumulated 
significant theoretical and practical material allowing to understand problems 
common for the whole of humankind. This interest to the issue of globalization 
remains high. Nevertheless, even now not many scholars are able to provide a 
precise definition of this complex phenomenon. Most are unable to approach 
globalization not only as a collision of interests and a struggle of various 
international actors but as an objective process dating back to past centuries. The 
latter approach seems more adequate because globalization did not begin in the 20
th
 
century when globalization-engendered global problems became a real threat to 
humankind and attracted universal attention. It began much earlier, at the 
intersection of the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries, in the era of the Great Geographic 
Discoveries. The first circumnavigation undertaken by Magellan had finally 
demonstrated that the Earth was orbicular and that man’s living-space was limited. 
Since that moment the world land and the world ocean had become accessible, first 
of all, for Europeans and then for all people of the planet. The fact that 
globalization is a universal phenomenon was rather obscure in the beginning but 
from the mid-19
th
 century it was becoming more and more visible. The actual force 
and multifacetedness of globalization have become apparent only by the very 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. Now this phenomenon is discussed throughout the 
world.  
 
The first attempts to understand the world as an organic whole may be found 
already in the second half of the 18
th
 century. Of course, at that moment no one 
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spoke about globalization. Everything said in this regard was rather premonition 
than clear understanding of the world’s holism and interconnectedness. In the 
works by Lamarck, Malthus, Kant, Marx, Engels, Danilevskii, Spengler and others 
one may only find intuitive insights regarding the universal interconnectedness of 
the animate, the inanimate and the social. They stood at the threshold of the 
concept of the world as an organic whole. 
 
In this regard one may point to Thomas Malthus’ idea of natural regulation of 
population numbers, to Immanuel Kant’s idea of everlasting peace, to Lamarck’s 
concept of biosystemic evolution and man’s role in it. Apart from targeting specific 
problems and separate trends trespassing national borders this period is 
characterized by the first attempts to represent the whole world history as a self-
regulating and progressively evolving process. Such a position was typical for Kant 
with his universal history concept. However, only Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
were able to make full use of this approach in their materialistic historical 
constructions. 
 
Karl Marx was the first one to undertake an attempt of deeper analysis of 
economic, political and cultural globalization in various countries and 
communities. He did it in the period when globalization was not as visible as 
nowadays and its results impacted separate spheres of social life only indirectly. 
 
Talking about pioneer works in the sphere of global studies, there is no doubt that 
Karl Marx is, in fact, the first scholar, theorist and systemic thinker who tried to 
embrace historical process in its wholeness and unity. He studied it from the 
viewpoint of economic transformations of society. His theory of socio-economic 
formations is nothing else but the first historical attempt to shape a pattern of social 
development from its primordial prehistoric forms to the emergence of a united, 
holistic, planetary society embracing all peoples. Marxism presented this attempt as 
a theoretical plan of building a Communist society where all countries and peoples 
would finally make an organic whole free of antagonistic contradictions.  
 
The issue of how realistic this plan was is beyond the scope of this presentation. It 
is important to emphasize, that as early as in the 19
th
 century Marx and Engels 
understood not only that economic relations were becoming global but also that 
international relations and even the sphere of spiritual life were becoming 
universal. They did not use the very term “global relations” but, in fact, wrote 
about them. Already in 1848 in the Communist Manifesto they stressed the 
universal nature of capitalist relations: “The bourgeoisie has, through its 
exploitation of the world market, given a cosmopolitan character to production and 
consumption in every country…In place of the old local and national seclusion and 
self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence 
of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual 
creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness 
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and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the 
numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.”1 It took 100 
years for this thought revealing the essence of globalization to become evident for 
broader public consciousness.  
 
The issue of globalization is so controversial now that methodological principles of 
approaching historical process formulated by Marx and Engels acquire special 
significance. They urge to understand globalization as, first of all, an objective 
consistent pattern. Marx mentioned that not human consciousness determines 
human existence, but human existence determines human consciousness.
2
 Of 
course, collusion of various interests and struggle of various social forces strongly 
impacts the nature of globalization and its specific forms. It is important to stress 
that no efforts and wishes of private citizens (or states, or other social actors) will 
be able to reverse globalization or to redirect it in accordance with their demands, 
because globalization is a necessary result of the historical process and an essential 
feature of social development from the moment of the emergence of capitalist 
relations. 
 
One may conclude, that globalization is underlined and determined not by the 
subjective factor, but by the objective trends of world development. They are, of 
course, influenced by the subjective factor but this influence is not arbitrary and 
limitless – it occurs within limits determined by given historical and concrete 
socio-political circumstances. In the other works, globalization is, essentially, no 
less an objective process than sunrise. When the Sun rises, it makes the one staying 
in the shadow feel comfortable; the one who happens to be unshaded feels 
uncomfortable and even bad. Still, no one dares to be “for” or “against” such a 
development because the celestial body is not responsible for who and why has 
happened to be in worse or better conditions. These are problems of another type: 
social problems related to the issue of equality, social justice, etc. Therefore, one 
should confront not natural developments, but unjust social relations. At the same 
time, one should have in mind that, in spite of the objective and the subjective to be 
interconnected into the organic whole, the subjective factor is not able to dominate 
the natural development. It, nevertheless, play an important, sometimes even 
decisive role in human destiny.  
 
The role of the subjective factor in the above-mentioned developments is, thus, 
rather substantial. However, it is performed in different ways and is, at the end, 
essentially determined by the objective course of natural events, which human 
beings are not able to reverse arbitrarily. For the same reason, they are not able to 
reverse globalization. 
                                                 
 
1
 K.Marx, F.Engels. Sochinenia. Moscow, 1956. Vol. 4. P. 427-428. 
2
 K.Marx, F.Engels. Izbrannie proizvedenia v 3 tomakh. Vol. 1. P. 537-536. 
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In this regard, the idea that globalization has been planned and implemented by 
someone, that it has been initiated by someone, that it can be stopped, reversed and 
so on, seems to be beyond serious criticism. Such ideas may be found, 
nevertheless, not only at the level of mass consciousness but also in serious 
academic books. This only demonstrates that people discussing such issues are 
nothing but amateurs in the sphere of global studies. 
 
What are aims of sunrise, of a lightning, of environmental pollution? There are no 
aims here, only natural course of events. Aims are formulated by human beings and 
most of them are tightly connected with the objective reality that becomes 
transformed, changed as a result of human rational activity. That is why it is so 
important to define what is a cause and what is a result, what results from human 
conscious activity and what happens regardless of human will and wishes. 
 
There can be various opinions about Karl Marx himself and about his theory, but in 
the context of this presentation one may not help recognizing his undeniable merit 
of being the first one to demonstrate the objectivity of historic development, to 
show how capitalism becomes a universal (global) phenomenon. He managed to do 
it in the period when capitalism to a great extent meant small patriarchal 
businesses. He was the first one to envision the future of humankind as a united, 
indiscrete whole. Thus, he provided methodological foundations for systematic 
globalization studies based on understanding the patterns of human development in 
the past. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that, in accordance to their principle of uniting theory 
and practice, Marx and Engels wrote in 1848 the Communist Manifesto clearly 
demonstrating the international nature of the communist movement. They ended 
this document with their famous call: “Workers of the world, unite!” In its form 
and contents the Manifesto was the first attempt to unite a small part of the 
humankind – those involved into manufacturing labor – but based on a very firm 
ground. Before no one understood that such unity was now achievable. In spite of 
this call being essentially destructive because of its intention to unite only the 
members of a single social class to fight irreconcilably the other social class, it 
already embraced general trends and contradictions of global processes in the 
sphere of both economy and politics. 
 
Marxism always called for unity of theory and practice. This unity was realized in 
the First International initiated by Marx and Engels in 1864. This organization 
resulted from an imperious need for consolidation of various political and 
economic actors at the global level. The International was one of the first 
forerunners of numerous international organizations that would multiply later, 
especially from the beginning of the 20
th
 century.  
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Now these organizations are an integral part of the international community and 
their number continues to grow. Being a product of globalization, they are, at the 
same time (as well as states), active participants of global relations studied with the 
framework of a new branch of scientific knowledge – global studies. 
 
Global studies as a specific field of knowledge have emerged within the last 30 
years and by the moment they have become a relatively clear-cut and well-defined 
sphere of knowledge. In the narrowest sense, global studies are an interdisciplinary 
sphere of scientific research aimed at understanding the meaning of globalization, 
finding its causes and developmental trends, analyzing globalization-engendered 
global problems and finding ways to sustain the positive and to overcome the 
negative circumstances of globalization from the viewpoint of men and biosphere. 
In a broader sense the term “global studies” refers to the whole complex of 
scientific, philosophical, cultural and applied research dealing with various aspects 
of globalization and global studies. It also refers to the results of such a research 
and to the practical activity aimed at carrying these results into practice in 
economic, social and political spheres, both at a state level and internationally. 
 
To avoid misleading analogies and methodological confusion, it should be stressed 
that global studies are not a specific science or scientific discipline like numerous 
new sciences emerging as a result of differentiation of scientific knowledge or at 
the intersection of nearby disciplines. It is not a systemic knowledge in the sense, 
for example, physics, chemistry or mathematics are. Global studies have been born 
thanks to integrative processes typical for modern science. It is a sphere of research 
and knowledge where various scientific disciplines and philosophy tightly 
interconnection with one another analyze various aspects of globalization and 
problems it engenders (each from the viewpoint of its subject matter and 
methodology). Global studies should also provide solutions for global problems 
studied both separately from one another and as a holistic system. 
 
Finally, we should stress that this new interdisciplinary sphere of scientific 
knowledge is a domain for specialists from all disciplines. This principally 
differentiates global studies from specific disciplines where “specialists” speak a 
language often understandable only for a limited group of the like professionals. 
Under the umbrella of global studies, specialists in various theoretical and practical 
spheres study world processes and problems engendered by them from the position 
of such or such natural or human science. This predetermines diversity of opinions 
about what globalization is. Scholars of natural sciences are often carried away by 
details and separated facets of this complex process, while scholars of humanities 
mostly concentrate on subjective factors and struggle of various interests. 
 
Cultural and civilizatorian specifics of various countries also influence our 
understanding of contemporary world developments. One may distinguish between 
Western, Eastern, Eurasian, Islamic and other approaches to globalization. 
24 
 
 
Differences between them may be found in their primary theoretical principles, 
values, established traditions, etc. 
 
For example, a specific feature of the Western approach is understanding 
globalization as a positive development, after all. It is explainable because the most 
developed countries, in comparison with less developed countries, benefit more 
from the current situation. They dominate practically all spheres of social life. 
Countries of the East, especially the most prosperous of them, also benefit from 
globalization and, as a result, do not oppose it. Nevertheless, they are sensitive to 
events and phenomena undermining their traditional lifestyles. 
 
The Eurasian approach is slightly different. Market relations here are not firm 
enough and that is why globalization provides many opportunities for illegal 
business activities, capital outflow, international crime. Attitudes to globalization 
vary from unequivocal acceptance to full denial. As for the Islamic world, it 
experiences serious pressure from the mass culture, values and way of life of the 
Western civilization and has no chance oppose it in the period of information 
revolution. It considers globalization, first of all, as a source of threats to its values, 
beliefs and even independence. 
 
This only strengthens interest to what globalization is. Different authors define it in 
different ways: some as a process, some as a situation, some as a phenomenon; 
some equalize globalization with modernization, some consider it as a myth. There 
are numerous discussions between opponents and supporters of globalization. 
 
With regard to the above-said, I define globalization as a multi-aspect natural 
historical process leading to the emergence of planetary holistic structures and 
connections. Globalization is immanent to the world community and covers all 
basic spheres of human life. It becomes the more visible, the more humankind 
moves along the way of scientific and technological progress and socio-economic 
development. Globalization is a process having no time limits. It connects the past, 
the present and the future. Today we are passing through a new stage of 
globalization. It does not just become visible, but requires corrections made via 
rational human intervention, i.e. people should take responsibility for the nature 
and consequences of globalization that remains an objectively evolving process. 
 
Such an intervention, however, requires, at minimum, resolving some principal 
issues related to the essence of globalization and the nature of its evolution. One 
should mention that modern scholars are far from common opinion with regard to 
these issues. For example, some prominent scholars (I.Wallerstein, A.I.Utkin, 
V.I.Pantin and others) think that the globalization has stages or waves, that it 
becomes sometimes more and sometimes less intense. This position seems too 
narrow. The globalization may look like this in case we observe this complex and 
multi-aspect process from one side only: for example, from the viewpoint of 
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economic globalization which is, indeed, uneven. Sometimes it becomes more 
intense (in the periods of economic booms) and sometimes – less intense (during 
large-scale crises of the majority of national economies). Thus, viewing the 
globalization exclusively as an economic process, we necessarily find waves, 
periods and stages. 
 
In reality, however, things are not so simple. The globalization does not only occur 
during economic booms but also during recessions, when it may seem that it slows 
down. It does not. During recessions, an additional impulse is given to the other 
elements of this complex process, such as political, socio-cultural, ecological, 
informational and the other aspects of the globalization. All of them, taken from 
different perspectives, make the globalization multi-aspect. Some of them 
periodically increase and step to the foreground in order then to slow down. Thus, 
it is not the objective process of the globalization that has waves, but some of its 
aspects. The globalization as a whole only increases and constantly strengthens. 
 
Humankind was ruminating on the issue of the globalization for a long time. We 
can point out at several stages of such reflections. Basing on problems being in the 
focus of attention in a given historical period is on the sphere of life fully 
dominated by globalization in that period, one may distinguish between five stages 
in understanding the globalization. Three of them are already over; the fourth stage 
is taking place at the moment. As for the fifth stage, it has not yet come but is 
expected to begin in the foreseeable future (to the best of our knowledge). 
 
The first stage was the longest one; each subsequent stage happened to be shorter 
than the previous one. This fact correlates with the law of acceleration of the socio-
economic development that has become most visible during the last two centuries. 
Concentrating on the most significant distinguishing features of the above-
mentioned stages, one may say the following: The first stage covers the period 
from the second half of the 18
th
 century to the 1920s. It was, first of all, 
concentrated on understanding social problems of the world that had finally 
become an organic whole geographically and then (generally speaking) 
economically and even politically. We have already pointed out that K. Marx and 
Fr. Engels, as well as Th. Malthus, N.Ia. Danilevskii, O. Spengler and others 
played the most important part in understanding the globalization at this stage of 
historical development. 
 
The second stage in understanding global trends took place in 1920s – 1960s. It 
was characterized by the theoretical focus on the issues of interrelations between 
society and nature. By that moment the world had been economically and 
politically “closed” and became to shrink ecologically. Here, one should mention 
the concepts of biosphere and noosphere worked out by E.Leroit, T. de Chardin 
and V. Vernandskii, the authors of the famous Manifesto (B. Russell and A. 
Einstein) and the scholar of civilizational problems, A. Toynbee. 
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The third stage lasted from the end of the 1960s to the end of the 1980s and may be 
regarded as a period of “discovering” and studying global problems of modernity. 
At this stage, the world was “closed” ecologically and a trend towards its 
informational “finalization” emerged. What was the most important were well-
publicized reports of the Club of Rome founded by A.Peccei and numerous studies 
conducted under the aegis of the UN (for example, the report prepared under the 
leadership of G.H.Brundtland or the report of the Brandt Commission). 
 
The fourth stage began at the end of the 1990s and continues up to now. It is 
focused on understanding the globalization as a process. By now, the world has 
already been “closed” informationally. It seems logical to suggest that it will also 
be “close” in the civilizational sense. 
 
The fifth (hypothetical) stage is still invisible in terms of external symptoms. But it 
seems justified to theorize that it will also come with time. The term for it already 
exists: it is “post-globalization”. One may theorize that in this case it would will to 
become “closed” ideologically, then socio-culturally, morally and, finally, grow 
into an organic whole as a truly global humankind.  
 
The world will become global in the full sense after it becomes “closed” in terms of 
all basic spheres of life. Then globalization as a process will “exhaust” itself as 
well as by the beginning of the 1960s it has exhausted itself geographically. The 
most important of the above-mentioned spheres of life are: geography, economy, 
politics, ecology, information, civilization (law), ideology, culture, spirituality 
(morality and ethics), mentality (globalization of consciousness). In some of these 
spheres (apart from geography where the globalization is already over) the process 
of globalization has mostly finalized. In the other spheres this process has a long 
distance ahead before its finalization.  
 
Of course, there are many other spheres in which the world should finally be 
“rolled up”, i.e. become united, holistic. It is important to stress that “closing” of 
the world in such or such sphere of life and real unity of humankind in the same 
sphere are not the same. “Finalization” refers to spreading over the globe, to 
embracing the world as a whole regardless of whether it leads to reconciliation of 
different outlooks, positions and interests of various peoples or to their greater 
confrontation and collision. Real unity implies true reconciliation or, at least, 
tolerant co-existence of various outlooks and positions typical for various peoples 
conditioned by balance of interests and consequent social stability and 
sustainability. For example, in 1948, after the world had been politically “closed”, 
K. Jaspers mentioned that political unification of the planet is a question of time. 
He was right because he took historical reality into consideration. 
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It also explains why, even after “finalization” of the world, the globalization 
continues in all spheres of the life, except geography. It provides dynamic 
transition from formal unification achieved to real unity of humankind. The latter, 
we should mention, so far may not be found in its final shape in any sphere of 
material or spiritual existence of the global community. Moreover, while 
“finalization” of the world is practically beyond doubt (or is a question of time), the 
possibility of genuine human unity (even in some separated spheres of life) remains 
disputable. At the moment it would be overoptimistic to suggest that such unity 
will be necessary achieved in the future. 
 
We would like to stress that the globalization in such or such sphere of the life is 
not over after “finalization” of the world in the same sphere. It continues to achieve 
real unification of humankind in a given sphere. One may suggest that, following 
the achievement of new levels of integration and unity, the intensity of the 
globalization will exhaust. The more the above-mentioned unity becomes reality, 
the closer to zero that intensity is.  
 
At the same time, even being an integrated system, the humankind will remain 
internally contradictive. It will always experience inherent problems and 
contradictions, conflicts and threats of both external and internal nature.  
 
Nevertheless, humankind as a whole, as well as separate communities or separate 
individuals, always wants to get rid of its problems (or, at least, to make them less 
noticeable). If we distract from details and look at the past to find what people 
always lusted for in the recent 20
th
 century or even earlier, we will find a very 
simple thing – they always and first of all lusted for Paradise on Earth. Or, 
otherwise, they lusted for ideal state of society. 
 
Many centuries ago, when people directly felt their dependence on nature, they 
providently placed their “Golden Age” in the past. Thus they were able to preserve 
their ideals and not to set a task of bringing them into real life. However, growing 
achievements of technological civilization have enhanced human self-esteem, our 
clandestine desire to build Paradise on Earth. From approximately the Renaissance, 
we see not sporadically emerging social utopias (like in the Antiquity) but a series 
of ideal constructions of an earthly Paradise presented by Th. More, Th. 
Campanella, Th. Münzer, etc. Utopias of the period of bourgeois revolutions may 
be found in the works by J. Meslier, G. Mably, Morelli, A. Saint-Simon, F. Fourier, 
R. Owen, etc. One may well include into this list the Communist ideas by K. Marx 
and F. Engels if we do not understand these ideas as a theoretical ideal of social 
relations but as goals and tasks achievable through revolutions and social 
cataclysms. 
 
A new outburst of utopian projects may be found in the beginning of the era of 
“conquering” space. People enthusiastically ruminated on “beautiful and fantastic 
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worlds” supposed to exist on the other planets, on limitless opportunities for 
colonization of outer space, etc. Such ideas originate from “Russian Cosmism” 
represented by N. F. Fedorov, K. E. Tsiolkovskii and others. For example, Fedorov 
thought that the problem of overpopulation on Earth would be resolved through 
settling people on the other planets. He believed that outer space might become a 
source of minerals and energy for the growing population and that Earth would be 
reshaped into a space ship “Earthmobile”. Tsiolkovskii also thought that outer 
space is a “bottomless storehouse” of various resources for humankind and that in 
the future the next generations would be settled there. He believed that having 
exhausted Earth resources people would “conquer” all perisolar space to build there 
“islands of ether” or “space colonies”. 
 
So, in spite of many disappointments in the possibility of building Paradise on 
Earth by human efforts, people always had an illusion of some heavenly, 
supernatural Paradise or of some pleasant conditions for human life in outer space. 
Now it is time to acknowledge that humankind has too little historical time left for 
enjoying fruitless dreams while it needs conscious and responsible actions. We 
should openly declare that people have always been misled and, moreover, 
deceived dreaming about better life somewhere outside our planet… 
 
There has never been and never will be in the whole Universe any other Paradise 
apart from the one we already have on Earth. Our earthly world is that very 
Paradise – a Paradise for each real, living and not imagined human being. It ideally 
satisfies all vital human needs (material and spiritual), all human wishes and hopes, 
caprices and whims, dreams and the most brave fantasies. It is the only world 
where human beings may feel themselves comfortable and wealthy. 
 
If this world turns out into a hell for people, it is not a problem of nature, but a 
problem of people. They, intending to build an ideal society, mistreat those who 
disagree, mistreat natural environment. As a result, the output is something 
contrary to what they lusted for. The largest philosopher of the 20
th
 century, K. 
Jaspers mentioned in this regard, that we could look for the heavenly city in the 
past or in the future, we could call “back to nature” or “forward to the world of 
love and beauty” but all these things would appeal to our emotions, not to our 
reason. Even the noblest desire to create Paradise on Earth might turn it into a hell 
that only people are able to make for their fellow creatures.
3
  
 
Human beings do not need building Paradise on Earth. It already exists because 
here, on our planet, even without human creative and transforming activities, we 
have everything what we need for happy and joyful life: abundance of water and 
fantastic choice of foods; rich energy and mineral resources and, finally, the 
                                                 
 
3
 K. Popper. Otkritoe obshchestvo i ego vragi. T. 1. – М., 1992, P. 211. 
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broadest variety of climatic and natural conditions. The latter, if needed, may be 
maintained at the ideal level for any time needed with the help of modern scientific 
and technological achievements. What human beings should have done (and what 
they will have to do, if it is possible in principle) is to sort out their own feelings 
and their relations with the other people and with the environment to make full use 
of what earthly nature has given to us so bountifully. 
 
Nowhere in the world, we would find conditions equal to what we have on the 
Earth, not to mention any better, truly paradisian conditions, that would allow 
human beings to fully realize themselves as biological (feeling) and social 
(thinking) creatures. Human beings are products and children of this nature; they 
fully correlate with its natural conditions and parameters. And vise versa: human 
beings ideally “fit” the environment. People, “cut out” or “sculptured” of natural 
material, not only descend from nature but also return to it… 
 
One of the largest modern specialists in global studies E. László mentioned, that 
the emerging paradigm of social sciences correlates with the newest discoveries in 
physics and biology. This new paradigm testifies that there are constant 
connections and communication between cosmic and biospheric objects and that 
human consciousness is an evolving part of this network of interconnections 
covering our planet. László suggested that we are inseparable from one another and 
from the environment. All of us participate in natural activities: interacting with 
one another we influence the biosphere that, in its turn, is uprooted in the 
Universe.
4
 Moreover, even here, on the Earth, each person feels most comfortable 
where he or she was born and grew up, where he or she passed through childhood, 
maturity, personal growth. For example, for a Bedouin hot climate and desert are 
much more attractive than frost and snowy winter. At the same time, Northern 
people prefer chill to warm climate and snow to hot sand.  
 
Any attempt to resettle human beings into “better” environment would mean, in 
fact, inevitable worsening of the environment that used to be familiar and, thus, 
comfortable. At best any change of environment should be followed by an 
adaptation period. As a rule such an adaptation is unwelcome and has some sequels 
for any living organism; it also has limits beyond which one faces, at minimum, 
discomfort or degradation, or even death. 
 
Of course, like any other living organism, both separate human beings and whole 
societies always had, have and will always have problems. Elimination of these 
problems is only possible at the expense of the life of a living organism. Therefore, 
the harmonization of human relations with the environment and minimalization of 
problems and difficulties is the major task for separate individuals and for society 
                                                 
 
4
 E. László. Makrosdvig. М., 2004, P. 163-164. 
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as a whole. It still needs to be studied whether this task is achievable and what is 
“the golden middle” of human satisfaction.  
 
Today we should not ignore that the human domination on the Earth and the human 
increasing activity undermine natural foundations of our own existence and of the 
life on the planet as a whole. This problem is not new. As early as in the 19
th
 
century, Fr. Engels has said what is now stated in any textbook on ecology. He 
wrote, that people who unrooted forests in Mesopotamia, Greece or Asia Minor in 
order to get arable land never dreamed that they thus laid foundation for current 
desertification of these areas, because centers of collecting and preserving water 
had disappeared with the forests. They never understood that by doing this they 
would for the most of the year leave their mountain springs without water and that 
as a result these springs in the rain period would pour to valleys fervent streams of 
water.
5
   
 
Since this had been written a century and a half ago these words were not once 
repeated and seemingly grasped. Our vision of interaction between nature and 
society has changed and human ability to transform the nature has substantially 
increased. However, our attitude to the nature, to those foundations of the life, 
which may not be restored anywhere apart from the Earth in case of their 
destruction, has not changed. Or, within this period of prolonged dynamic 
evolution, the humankind has not made necessary conclusions, has not learnt its 
lessons. A well-known Russian scholar, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada writes ironically, that 
“in the course of the human history, up to the latest years, people mostly treated 
their mother – the earthly nature – as little kids treat an evil step-mother. They were 
afraid of her, they asked her for mercy but they tried to win a small victory over 
here wherever it was possible. It is right that nature has not always pampered 
people with pleasant surprises. Often she mercilessly eliminated whole villages and 
cities, whole tribes and peoples.”6 
 
Concluding this presentation, we should mention that human problems are 
changing and dynamic. The human evolution, the growing complexity of the social 
organization and exploration of territories changed the nature of these problems. 
The population grew, new territories were discovered and involved into the 
economic activity, the social power grew as well as its technological capabilities. 
Consequently, the nature of problems changed as well. At the same time, current 
difficulties and concerns are still here. Moving towards the global condition 
humankind will by definition have new problems, now of world significance. In the 
prehistoric times, when people lived separately, they had local problems. Regional 
problems emerged after social networks and relations had embraced whole regions. 
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 K. Marx, F.Engels. Sochinenia. T. 20. P. 496. 
6
 I.V.Bestuzhev-Lada. Mir nashego zavtra. М.: Misl, 1986, P. 171. 
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Now, the global humankind has global problems and to set a task of their 
elimination as some scholars and politicians still do, does not mean to understand 
what goes on.  
 
“To overcome global problems”, “to eliminate global problems”, “to get rid of 
global problems” – these calls are not realistic. These wrong formulas are 
responsible for the subsequent misunderstanding of the situation and for the 
insufficient program of practical actions. Finally, this delusion may happen to be 
not so harmless. It does not just lead to no positive achievements but entails loosing 
precious time, disappointment and loss of belief in ourselves because in this case 
we set a task having no decision in principle. It is no surprise that many authors 
who stick to this position often write about a “dead-end” for modern humankind, 
about a “trap” of global contradictions we should get out of. But it is not the 
humankind but our consciousness, which has found itself in a dead-end. Our 
consciousness, nevertheless, is able not only to explain, but to reshape the world 
making it more or less acceptable for the normal human life. Whatever this world 
may become, it will never be conflictless, free of contradictions and problems, 
including universal ones. 
 
These conclusions are based on our analysis and fully correspond with the most 
important methodological principles formulated by Marxism: a) human beings 
should not only explain the world but change it as well; b) all social processes, as 
well as human interactions with the environment, are contradictive by nature; 
human beings have to acknowledge these contradictions and, at minimum, not to 
exacerbate them by their thoughtless actions; c) human strength means knowing 
objective laws and acting in accordance with these laws. 
 
It is important to understand that neither the globalization can be eliminated, nor 
global problems engendered by the globalization can be resolved once and for all. 
Having once emerged, they will always accompany the world community and we 
will have to solve them constantly. We should learn living with them because an 
insufficient attention to global problems entails great troubles, if not a catastrophe. 
This is a new reality, a new condition of the transformed humankind (new). Even 
those who resist need to acknowledge that the global humankind will necessarily 
deal with various problems including global ones. The point is to make these 
problems not threatening and not undermining the foundations of the life on the 
Earth. This is a performable task, but not for separated communities or states but 
for the humankind as a whole. 
 
Concluding our analysis of the topic in question, we would like to say that the main 
question for the globalization is not to be or not to be, but what it should be like; 
who plays and who will play key roles in the globalization.  
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Endre Kiss 
 
The Dialectics of the Modernity 
A Theoretical Interpretation of the Globalization 
 
According to a widely accepted great interpretation, the globalization is a field of 
the most extensive problems, each of which concerns everyone, and the humanity 
in general as well, in new, qualitative, and in their tendencies existential ways. In 
this sense, the legitimate fields of the globalization are e.g. the issues of ecology, 
raw materials, migration, the global health problems of the world, the global 
positive or negative tendencies of population, energy, arms trading, the drug crisis, 
or dilemmas of integration and world economy. There is another huge 
interpretation as well – and that is what we follow in our present attempt –, which 
does not bind the problems and phenomena of the globalization to concrete and 
singularly appearing “global” issues, but examines structural and functional 
connections of the whole new global situation. 
  
The grades of the process of globalization have always manifested throughout the 
history of the 20
th
 Century as radical and irrevocable transformations in history and 
society. The grades of the globalization before the 20
th
 century should be taken by 
their proper value, as for example the telegraph already fulfilled the opportunity of 
global action and communication, and had immeasurable effects on international 
politics and finance even before the 20
th
 century. The correctly interpreted history 
of the globalization is of an extraordinary importance for every scientific and other 
kind of research, because it might distract the scientific and everyday 
consciousness from the intellectual forced course according to which every 
generation, every decade, every world-political turn, or significant step in 
civilization is the proper victory of the globalization (!) over a “not-yet-global” 
preceding state.  
  
The above thoughts nevertheless do not contradict our definite starting thesis that 
says the world-historical turn of 1989 is a unique and outstanding stage in the 
evolving of globalization indeed. The primary cause of this is the fact that up to 
1989, the mere existence of the two world regimes restricted the process of 
globalization in the centre, between concrete, down-to-earth limits.  
 
When analysing the great mutation of the globalization in 1989, we must remember 
that the possible and future globalization and Existing Socialism have influenced 
one another mutually right from the beginning. For it was not only that the dynamic 
forces of the globalization shattered the Iron Curtain more and more violently, but 
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there was an opposite tendency as well, as members of the elite of the Existing 
Socialism became more and more anxious about the more and more triumphant 
achievements of the globalization and they felt that they would irrevocably fall 
behind if they had not join in these processes. 
  
The image of the globalization mainly appears both for the everyday consciousness 
and the intelligentsia as a new system of power and domination. This fundamental 
vision is right and appropriate in several aspects, and it is also not a coincidence 
that the ones who took the first signs of the globalization with the less enthusiasm 
were the ones who possess some kind of concrete and real power (which of course 
was not considered ‘global’). Yet the real model of the globalization is 
fundamentally different than these visions. The globalization is not a new, rigid and 
utopian structure of (global) power most of all, but its main point is the fact that the 
economical, political, cultural and social processes can only take place within the 
framework of the global reality. The primary consequence of this is not an abstract 
and unintelligible new system of power and dependence, but a new world with a 
new kind of functioning, a world that is not simply “multi-polar”, but straight 
infinitely polarized (Kiss, 1997.b). 
 
The real globalization creates new social states of affairs in every aspect. The 
access to the ocean of globalization is at stake in the fight between subject and 
subject, subject and group, group and group, or smaller and larger groups 
(Schmied-Kowarzik, W. (ed.) 2002). The structuring power of the globalization 
penetrates all strata of the social life. 
  
One of the most important and also most difficult fields of the social-philosophical 
research of the globalization is the continual way in which its functional and non-
functional elements and moments are interconnected, like the cogs of a machinery. 
The more the global processes fulfil their global character, the more obviously they 
feature “clearly” functional characteristics in their operations (Luhmann, N. 1973). 
For example, the more obviously “global” the structure of the world economy gets, 
the more clearly the functional theoretical definitions do prevail. From a theoretical 
aspect, functional and non-functional elements are heterogenic, but from a practical 
aspect, they fit into one another in an organic and homogeneous manner. 
  
The globalization is therefore not a new, yet unknown centre of power, not a 
world-government, but in principle it is a qualitatively new system of the relations 
of all actors. One of its specific trains is the possibility of access to the global 
processes and networks in a rather “democratic” way. It would absolutely make 
sense to describe the fundamental phenomenon of globalization with the criteria of 
access and accessibility. But this is also the field where we can find the weakest 
points of the globalization. The globalization demolishes a whole row of particular 
differences and limits by ensuring in principle the total accessibility. In this sense, 
it is therefore “democratic”: the participation in global processes could even outline 
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a new concept of “equality”. The globalization, that builds from elements of 
discrimination in its dynamic progress, would be a contradiction not only in a 
theoretical, but in a practical sense as well. The world-historical balance of 
globalization shall prevail in this connection. This balance will depend on the final 
proportions between the democracy moreover, the equality of accessibility, and the 
discriminative moments, i.e. the self-destructive real social processes in the field of 
the forces of these two tendencies. 
  
It is however namely only one side of the coin that the globalization establishes 
new relations in a qualitative and manifold sense, while the qualitatively new 
character of the relations is made up right by the fact that the mediums and strata, 
that used to separate the individual from global affairs, drop out, and the individual 
can access to the multi-faceted communication of the global networks directly, just 
like any other actor. But the other side of this coin is the question whether really 
new resources will evolve there on the side of the globalization, which shall be able 
to fulfil the increasing demands that the accessibility generates. The triumphant 
breakthrough of the globalization increases the number of resources by itself, but to 
a much smaller extent than the possible “amount of resources” required for the 
world of more and more perfect accessibility. The fail of access requirements 
namely critically deforms the well-built system of global networks. This negative 
vision resembles the kind of mass-communication that offers a wide variety of TV-
channels, while it fails at increasing the “resources” of entertainment and culture in 
a qualitative sense parallel with the growing accessibility, therefore all it can offer 
for the increasing demand is low-standard programs. 
 
Understanding the real globalization and its functional (sub-) systems is an 
exceptional challenge for the human everyday consciousness (s. Lefebvre, H, 
1972). The representation of the global reality is an immensely huge “extensive” 
task for the social actors, but secondly, it is also a new, “qualitative” task of 
representing the new functional and abstract qualities of the globalization in the per 
definitionem non-functional and non-abstract dimensions of the social and political 
communication. The globalization as a whole, as a new world order, or a system of 
new structural relations cannot appear in the global flow of information in the same 
way than particular global problems (e.g. the drug issue) do it.  
 
The problem of decoding the new codes also divides the society by the capacity of 
“decoding”. For “decoding” can be interpreted as evolving a capacity to “access” 
the processes of globalization to some extent, i.e. a capacity to use the 
opportunities that the information systems offer. At this point, the situation of 
information systems is exactly like that of the modern art at the time when the 
modern functional systems appeared. Bertolt Brecht expressed this phenomenon by 
the example that a photo of the building of AEG says nothing about the endless 
various functional processes that take place inside the building. 
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Shaping the spatial and temporal structure of the globalization 
 
The globalization is the most extended framework of the interpretation of the 
present. It is a high-level theoretical generalization, and at the same time also an 
empirical reality, which anyone can experience. Re-thinking the problem of the 
historical space and time might be an objective measure of progression  
(Kaempfer, W. 2005.). 
  
This new, threefold aspect also possesses a coercive discursive - logical force. For 
in the evolutionary systems theory, the total absence of coercive power and 
coherence in each particular connection and statement was really relevant. 
“Reality”, “future”, and “progress” do not lie in the intellectually risky cognition 
of new and unknown facts, but simply in tautologically forcing the evolutionary 
systems theory upon certain facts or phenomena. 
  
Many trains of the phenomenon of globalization, but most of its whole actor 
structure is the reason why this extremely coercive and coherent theory and logic 
have to face the significant contingency of future processes, the strongly limited 
opportunities of real foresight, and the extraordinary measures of some relevant 
degrees of real existing actorial freedom. 
  
The present is: a mixture of the space-time-relations of (global) structures, and the 
space-time-relations of actors. Therefore, the society of globalization in its 
theoretical and abstract form does not fit into the heuristic space of the traditional 
theories of democracy or bureaucracy, or even traditional social issues any more, 
right for this shift in the structure of space-time. Because for example, neither the 
principle, nor the representations of the liberal and democratic political structure do 
suffer any harm by the fact that both the urging power of the creation of 
simultaneities and the possibility of unlimited spatial relocation lead to a 
devaluation of all spatial factors, or a higher value of all factors that possesses the 
power of creating total simultaneity in the time or perpetual spatial movement that 
also converges to simultaneity. Globalization is the final, dynamic form of the 
(social) temporalization of the (social) space. 
  
Neither the traditional, nor the new problem of the historical-social space-time can 
be solved by the analogy of sciences. And beside the traditional concepts of space 
and time, new concepts appear as well, which are becoming more and more 
decisive from the aspects of the globalization.  
  
We have no intention of making an ontological judgement on the true character of 
the reality. We would prefer to describe this new kind of reality as one of an 
“uncertain” character (according to Heisenberg), but we accept the attributes like 
“chaotic”, “non-linear”, or even “soft” as well. Our concrete accomplishments will 
not be directly determined by these theoretical considerations, as the functional 
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systems of the globalization, their dynamic structures and space-time-relations, and 
most of all, the measure of the latitude of the “actors” gives a sufficient positive 
explanation in the definitions of this character of “uncertainty”. 
 
The globalization raises a row of alternatives, all of which need to be interpreted, 
on the field of ideology as well as the state, society, and culture. From the aspect of 
the theory of science, the theory of globalization is a theory of society, and no 
matter how many unprecedented new definitions are on the phenomenon of 
globalization, it is neither necessary, nor possible to create a new model of theory 
building for any of them. 
 
As we have seen, the real globalization is neither a new and unknown centre of 
power, nor a world government, but a qualitatively new system of the relations of 
every actor. The relationship of the East and the West changes in the global world-
society; the roles of debtors and creditors, winners and losers get interwoven in 
this new world order that is based upon new interdependencies. In respect to social 
capital, we have to mention the tendency of a “downward spiral”, which was 
induced by the globalization, and which means that the types of social capital that 
the society invests into individuals reduce both in quality and quantity. This is 
mainly the consequence of the crisis of the public sphere, according to which the 
right interpreted knowledge society could be a remedy for this problem.  
 
The fall of the Existing Socialism put the neo-liberal complex of politics and 
economy in a hegemonic position, and this led to the theoretically illegitimate 
identification of neo-liberalism and liberalism.  
 
The structural and functional characteristics of the global world are being 
definitively shaped by this neo-liberal complex. In this context, Anthony Giddens’ 
and Tony Blair’s Third Way appears as the unequal relation between neo-
liberalism and social democracy. 
 
The globalization gets fulfilled in the universe of post-modern values (Kiss, E 
2002. b.). We do not attempt to define the main characteristics of the post-
modernism by its contrast to the modernism. We break up with the widespread 
contrast of modernism and post-modernism, because we firmly believe that the 
essence of the post-modernism can be revealed alone in its relations to 
structuralism and neo-Marxism. These two streams were emblematic of the 
philosophy of the sixties. Sometimes they amplified one another, and sometimes 
they got polemic with each other. By the mid-seventies, the neo-Marxism ceased to 
exist as abruptly as a natural disaster, and around that time, the structuralism also 
recognized its failure.  
 
As the post-modernism was born on the ruins of the neo-Marxism and the 
structuralism, it took over the achievements, but at the same time it also dismissed 
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their positive aspirations for the intellectual reconstruction. Therefore, the post-
modernism is the use of the discourse of cognition without any intention of 
intellectual reconstruction. 
  
But the post-modernism is not the only hegemonic stream (now in a narrower, also 
philosophical sense) nowadays (Meier, H. (ed.) 1990. and Kiss, E. (ed.) 2003.). By 
the fall of the neo-Marxism, the neo-liberal-neo-positivistic philosophical 
methodology got into a strategically decisive position in politics as well as in 
economy and philosophical methodology. Therefore, the today’s philosophy is 
under the twofold hegemony of the post-modernism and the neo-liberalism-neo-
positivism. The most important symmetry-relation between these two streams is the 
attempt to re-regulate the whole process of thinking by the recognition and object 
constitution. Their heuristic strategies are opposite to one another: the neo-
liberalism-neo-positivism sets a reductive verification as its chief requirement, 
while the post-modernism makes the verification legitimate. However, these two 
streams have one more thing in common: both the limitation of the scope of the 
rules of the philosophical verification and its total elimination did not get realized 
through the power-free inter-subjective discourses, but in the medium of the 
interpersonal power. 
  
There is a simple but so far neglected, however quite decisive fact, namely that the 
launch of the processes of globalization and the post-communist regime change 
took place practically at the same time. In our opinion this is not a coincidence, but 
there is a manifold relation behind this simultaneity.  
 
The socio-theoretical concept of globalization does not mean a new, rigid structure 
of the (world) power, but a new framework and context of social action, in which 
economy, politics, culture, and all other actors of society are shaping their relations 
in a new and unprecedented global context.  
 
The decisive processes of the globalization are part of the development of the 
modern rationalism. Rationalization, Max Weber’s “disenchantment of the world” 
(Entzauberung der Welt) or even the “Dialectics of Enlightenment” of Adorno and 
Horkheimer must appear in a new context. All critiques of the modern rationality 
were stated because of the emancipation that had not taken place, although its 
necessity was increasing parallel with the progress of rationalization. The omission 
of emancipation might put the process of rationalization and globalization into a 
critical danger.   
  
The relation to modernity in a history-philosophical sense is decisive not only from 
the aspect of potential enemies and enemy images. In a positive sense, it is decisive 
because in several important aspects, the globalization, which in fact sprung out 
from the soil of the modernity intends to eliminate the so far most important 
achievements of the modernity as well.  
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The downward spiral of the social capital is also a consequence of this concrete 
structure of the globalization. And right because this phenomenon is a consequence 
of the globalization, it is global as well. We are not trying to ignore the numerous 
impressive civilizing accomplishments, “success stories” of the globalization. But 
right the actually manifested structural characteristics of the globalization are the 
cause of the fact that the upward spiral of great civilizing accomplishments and the 
downward spiral of social capital for social reproduction do not cross each other. 
The knowledge component, that operates in the modern production, is part of a 
broader concept of knowledge capital, while the social capital, which is being 
invested in successive generations does not reproduce itself on the level of the 
human civilization. This also means that the future shall become the field of the 
new battle of the (global) civilization and the (social) barbarism, even if none of 
the definitions of these terms will remind of the concepts of civilization or 
barbarism that have occurred in the history so far.  
 
While the globalization – for functional and structural reasons – pushes the less 
versatile and overloaded state backwards and makes the spiral of the social capital 
move downwards, it provides the new historical actors with a real space for the 
action down to the level of the individual. Under the circumstances of the 
globalization, the latitude and freedom of the action of actors can be extreme. 
  
It is not easy to reconstruct adequately the actor side into the theory of the 
globalization. First, because it is seemingly extremely trivial; it is often difficult 
even to make it accepted that the free and seemingly contingent action of singular 
actors could be a legitimate part of scientific research. Second, because the 
importance of the actor side is ab ovo a less theoretical element. Third, because the 
actor side in its arbitrariness does not always reveal the dynamic structures and 
functions behind it, therefore stressing it might even seem a misinterpretation. The 
actor side underlines the specific “uncertainty” (in Heisenberg’s sense) of the 
theories of the globalization (and the future), while the functional systems of the 
globalization, their dynamic structures and space-time relations, and most of all, 
the extent of the latitude of the actors might provide sufficient objective 
explanation for a positive and objectively founded description of this “uncertainty” 
character. 
 
While the globalization provides an enormous latitude for the action of the actors, 
there are hardly any global actors for the representation of social formations. The 
problem of missing actors is completed with the problem of missing groups of 
representation and competence. The task of global competence does not possess 
any actors, and the global actor does not possess competence. Neither traditional 
forecast, nor traditional consensus-building, nor traditional bureaucracy 
(administration), nor any traditional “institutions” are appropriate or able to 
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develop an optimal global competence legitimately. This increases the possibility 
that global decisions might be the most irrational. 
  
Another important element of the new order of the international politics (the “new 
world order”) is the new interpretation of “identity” and “difference”. By 1989, the 
logic of neo-liberal identity and difference exchanged the basic semantics of 
identity and difference of socialism, as well as those of the Christianity. This means 
that neither the solidarity of the socialism, nor the brotherly love of the Christianity 
can diminish the brutal power of the difference. The neo-liberal identity consists in 
nothing else but the unconditioned respect and guarantee of the freedom and the 
rights of the individual (which rights might become merely formal at a certain 
extent of social differences). In such cases, the difference is not a mere difference, 
value, or ideology, but it might even become an essential feature of the social 
existence. 
  
The exceptionally great importance of the difference-moment is made up by the 
fact that in our age, a divided world has been replaced by a one-polar one. While in 
the divided world, the difference was founded by the hidden identity, the concrete 
contents of the neo-liberal equality of human rights are ensured by no reconciled 
differences. The power of the difference is the final character of the difference, and 
its absolute measure. The power of the difference over the identity establishes rigid 
and static states of affairs. If the measure of the difference exceeds a certain extent, 
the dimensions of mediation are eliminated, therefore the two poles of the 
difference-relation cannot get into interaction with each other. The total freedom of 
every actor and a system of rigid oppositions inapt for communication – this 
duality is the most important one of the problems that bind the present to the future. 
  
The bias of the self-destruction 
 
The end of the Soviet World Regime, Gorbachev’s of the Soviet Union as a 
superpower and its ideology, became not only a decisive, but also an irrevocable 
fact of the today’s universal history. As ultima ratio, it might appear in a different 
colour in each different interpretation of historical eras. However, its self-evident 
final world-historical value could hardly be traced back to any other process. 
Although this concrete fact of the end of the history has not yet lost its universal 
quality, it seems like this macroscopic, Gorbachev’s “end of history” (Kojeve, A. 
1947) itself is a part of a higher and also universal transformation process. With the 
end of the divided world, which took place in the blink of an eye, all ideological 
bias disappeared. At the same time, a new vision emerged: the vision of a self-
destructive society. 
  
Gorbachev’s “end of the history” blasted the “moment of truth” in the society of 
the Existing Socialism. But it is also a cosmic and colossally ironic gesture, a ruse 
of the reason (“List der Vernunft”), that this moment of truth has become reality for 
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Western societies as well. As the Great Enemy bade farewell, the self-image of 
Western society was also removed from its overall determining framework of 
bipolarity, which had provided the Western part of the world with a position of 
comfortable and unchallenged superiority. 
 
A fundamental tendency of a self-destructive society is an extent of state debt that 
makes it impossible for the economy to catch up with it even by the most 
favourable economical growth. Achilles cannot pass the turtle. The self-destructive 
society is therefore a society that is unable to maintain the highly developed 
welfare level of the civilization. It is originally a question of budget and economy, 
it is still not simply a question of economy.  
 
Even a bankruptcy in economy is not necessarily self-destructive, while a 
bankruptcy of institutions that used to be supported by the state is necessarily self-
destructive. Therefore the fundamental problem of the self-destructive society is 
not simply an economic one. The state debt is not equal to economic recession. The 
self-identity of the state, the society and the citizen are seriously questioned from 
this aspect. Therefore the state, the society, or the citizen either do not have an 
opportunity to materialize all-human values, or they are even bound to use up, or 
even directly destroy these values.  
 
On the 31
st
 of March 2004, a Bolivian miner blew up himself in front of the 
Bolivian parliament. The direct cause of his action was that he got no pension, and 
his argumentation was flawless. He demanded a sum he had gradually paid as taxes 
for the state of Bolivia during his working decades, and he did not do it without any 
rightful ground. 
 
The self-destructive society is the new and extensive reality. The “West”, the 
developed part of the world should be considered as the winner of Gorbachev’s 
farewell and it drew profit from the global transformation of the world economy. 
On the other hand, even this “West” had to struggle against the consequences of 
self-destructive society, also because of the growing importance of the debt 
challenge. At the same historical time, the former “second” world did not get the 
financial support it needed to establish its new political democracy and new 
competitive market economy. At the same period, the old or new “third” world 
reached the bottom at mass migration and poverty (Bernard, Fr. de 2002). In this 
“post-historical” history, a new question has arisen: can the politically hegemonic 
liberalism as liberalism break away from the downward-circling spiral of self-
destructive society? 
  
The double function of the post-socialist transformation 
  
The states and societies of the former real socialist part of the world had to solve 
several, not only different, but straight fundamentally antagonistic problems. First, 
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they had to evolve a real and reliable democratic political system, with all known 
problems of this “project”. Second, these states and societies had to take successful 
and effective measures to reduce or even gradually bridge the critically deepening 
economic and humanitarian gaps between the West and the East by shaping their 
own competitive economy on the basis of the self-destructive society. These two, 
in the major aspects antagonistic tasks have been calling for an international and 
conscious solution right from the start. The all-time western partners have clearly 
stated that they did not want to think of such a solution. In the post-socialist 
societies however, these two huge projects (building out a democracy that works, 
and handling the problem of state debt) remind of the necessity of such an 
international and conscious solution time after time. 
 
This antagonistic relation fundamentally re-shapes and revaluates even the basic 
functions of post-socialist democracy. Such a democracy cannot realize the ideal 
type of the democratic system. So it becomes the most important function of the 
post-socialist democracy to bail out the economic heritage of the Existing 
Socialism. It becomes the real function of the post-socialist democracy in the 
circumstances given, to manage the whole debt problem of the former Existing 
Socialism. The post-socialist democracy loses its privileged and singularly 
fortunate character of a general liberation and unveils its extraordinary character. 
Right after this democracy was born to success, it could get into a Weimar type 
crisis; a row of political crises caused by the failing bailout, or – on the contrary – 
huge humanitarian shocks following successful bailouts. 
 
The two simultaneous and in many aspects antagonistic functions of the post-
socialist democracy clash particularly sharply the term legitimacy. The post-
socialist democracy – as every post-totalitarian democracy – is one of the most 
legitimate political structures right from the beginning. But it would be foolish to 
think that the actual reality that follows from the bailout function of democracy 
would not have any influence on the legitimacy of the same democracy. In this 
pressing tension namely, two concepts of legitimacy outline and turn against one 
another, i.e. the (immaculate) classical political-theoretical concept of legitimacy 
and the (deficient) practical problem-solving legitimacy. 
 
Globalization and politics as a subsystem  
  
Every research of the actual society is starting out from totally new and 
unprecedented universal characteristics of the globalization. On the other side, 
contrary to the still unmapped significance and magnitude of these unprecedented 
new trains stands the concrete appearance of the global everyday life. This 
unbelievable distance of a holistic and theoretical approach and the microscopic 
and particular everyday practice creates a specific space of theory and practice. 
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In this framework, it would be necessary to analyze also the actual relationship of 
globalization and politics. But we are excused from this task by the fact that 
politics, the political subsystem, and political classes slowly seem to find their 
proper new places in the world of the globalization (and the new world of the 
economy).  
 
The double face of the democracy becomes a fundamental issue of the 
globalization. On the one side, this is a commonly functional and structural 
moment. It is because a global operation can (could) only evolve and operate on the 
basis of the democratic liberalism or liberal democracy. In this sense, the liberal 
democracy is the “modus vivendi” of the globalization. But, on the other side, its 
functional and structural foundation shall not make us forget the immanent and 
original value components of the liberal democracy, which used to ensure 
exceptionally strong legitimacy for the political system even before the functional 
and structural dimensions were developed or even completely reflected. The 
fundamentally democratic character of the political face of the globalization got 
expanded by a row of new functions not yet clarified. The democratic values left 
the realm of founding values and became pragmatic and constructive components 
of concrete structures and functions. 
 
If we define the liberal democracy by its aspect that the party that wins the 
elections controls the operation of the state administration and redistribution for a 
cycle, we can clearly realize a new trend of modern democracies. Possessing the 
totality of the state power means power of a smaller extent and a narrower scope of 
action than before the globalization. The dimension of the political power is 
smaller, yet the role it plays in answering global challenges is more important than 
before. A state in the hands of the ruling political party can no more possess 
instruments of production, neither does it produce. It redistributes the taxes of other 
producers and it tries to fulfil its tasks that no other player was willing to 
undertake. But contrary to the weakening power and competence of the state stand 
the (both absolutely and relatively) renewing demands and pretensions of insatiable 
individuals and groups. 
 
The present model of the world should be considered as the mature form of the 
globalization. Its decisive train is the phenomenon of state debt, which 
phenomenon fundamentally defines the economic and political framework of the 
globalization for the societies and for the human life. This is the general model, in 
which the extremely extensive process of accession to the EU is taking place. 
These multiple functions cause that even the lack of a theory has its own victims.  
  
The most important characteristics of the theoretical starting situation created by 
the globalization can be fully examined in this conflict. The demolishment of the 
welfare state does not basically appear as an economic or political problem in this 
discourse (although it might still be controversial in this context as well), but as a 
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humanitarian, modern, cultural, and society-building factor. The context of the 
globalization does not erase the validity (Gültigkeit) of the individual subsystems, 
but it positions new, general and painfully concrete “global” i.e. general and 
universal contexts above their rationality.   
 
Therefore is one of the great challenges of the future made up by problems of the 
state. The starting point is the relationship between the globalization and the nation 
state. The great problematic dimension of the future (and the row of questions to be 
decided) springs from the fact that the state is not a neutral actor that can be 
characterized solely by functional characteristics, but since the modern state after 
1945 (or even already after Louis Bonaparte or Bismarck!), it undertook social 
tasks and the challenges of civilization at an extreme measure totally unknown 
before, which tasks can only be lifted from the bonds of the indebted state shattered 
by the processes of globalization by destroying huge “areas” in the social network. 
The states are the losers in this process. But there is also another tendency, which 
also has its first strong signs already in the today’s global and European processes. 
There are namely also fortunate (nation) states, which could use the achievements 
of the globalization and even the integration to realize their original ends and 
pretensions as nation states, or even their long forgotten aspirations to expand as 
nation states. They use European resources for national goals. These nation states 
are already the winners of the expansion of the EU in multiple aspects, which can 
also be interpreted as a process of globalization.  
 
The problem of the systemic difference of the political sphere (das Politische) and 
economy shows also the new quality of the globalization. It is a question of theory 
of systems (Systemtheorie). If we examined the phenomena solely from the one 
(the political) or the other (the economical) viewpoint, we would not get to any 
special conclusion. In this case we would make the new complexes of present 
phenomena – shaped by globalization – the subject of a past, pre-globalization kind 
of language and reconstruction. Instead of using the language the new complexes 
would require, both one-sided approaches (the economical or the political 
discourse) would use the language of (exceeded and suspending) normality. If we 
used the traditional political terminology as medium of the inquiry of the 
globalization, we would get to one of idyllic normality. It emanates the vision of 
the victory of liberal values, and the worldwide spreading triumph of the 
democratic order. But if we used the traditional economic terminology, the image 
of the globalizing world might no more seem so idyllic, but in any case “normal”. 
All details, aspects and dimensions of the economic and political qualities of 
globalization can be described by the language of normality – except for the fact of 
the globalization itself. And it is so, because the philosophical difference between 
the self-destructive character of globalization and the affirmative character of the 
language of normality.  
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The specific problem by the reconstruction on the micro-level of the globalization 
is the fact that while anyone can sense and understand this micro-level directly, one 
can only acquire models and patterns that make the well-known micro-level 
recognizable as the micro-level of the globalization. There is a set of phenomena, 
which could be characterized as the micro-sphere of globalization, but its specific 
micro-sphere can be identified as part of the globalization just after a whole 
interpretation of the macro- and medium levels of the globalization. 
  
It is the medium sphere that occupies a privileged position in the theoretical 
reconstruction of globalization. The medium sphere does not simply show a new 
side of the phenomenon of globalization, but it shows its most relevant new side, 
because globalization appears in this environment as the decisive determining 
factor of the whole social life. On this level, the new functional systems of 
globalization broadly confront with the real social life. It is the virtual, but also 
physical area, which system-theoretical functioning penetrates historical 
frameworks of non-functional nature, like values, contracts or tradition. As defined 
earlier, the globalization is a state of exceeding a critical mass of functionally 
operating systems. Now we can understand, why the most dramatic confrontation 
takes place in the medium sphere, for here the functional sphere overlaps the non-
functional sphere.  
 
In the philosophical tradition, the semantics of all decisive terms of political 
philosophy and political practice was shaped when the real existing political 
subsystem was far identical to the matters of social theories in general. In the 
globalization qualified by functional operation and no more solely by (non-
functional, therefore system-theoretically different) politics, the real existing 
political subsystem is no more identical to the matters of general social theory. 
What about the theory of Social Contract or the original Human Rights in a 
situation when the unconditioned respect towards them although remains, but at the 
same time, in the real conditions of global monetarism, these rights are obviously 
violated, while nobody can be made responsible for it either morally or politically!  
 
On this decisive medium-level of globalization, the relative devaluation of the 
political subsystem leads to the revealing of so far hidden genealogical dimensions. 
Who knew on the Earth that the Marxism, starting to decline critically after the 70’ 
– 80’s, was still carrying a considerable measure of humanitarian and utopian 
potential? Who knew on the Earth that it was the framework of the nation state that 
secretly carried the functions of the welfare state? Who knew that it did it in such a 
self-evident way that as soon as the nation states shattered financially, the whole 
future of the institutional framework of social politics shattered? Thus the relative 
devaluation of the political subsystem has already shown that the collapse of the 
political sphere also means the devaluation of the “society” in connection of 
shaping the most important relations (N.N. (eds). 1998.). Moreover, there are some 
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signs that indicate that the collapse of the political sphere might even lead to the 
devaluation of the mankind. 
  
The relative weakening if not decline of the system of politics – despite naive 
expectations – will not liberate the society from the conventional organization 
power and repression of the state. This is because it is right another decisive 
consequence of the globalization-monetarism that the economy, like several other 
subsystems, can escape from the legal interventions of the state critically 
impoverished by the omnipresent networks of common debts (Ehrke, M. 2004.).  
On the one side, the impoverished state will no more be able to control the function 
of the subsystems within its territory. On the other side, paradoxically, it must use 
all of its energies to control the functions of which existence and reproduction it 
can no more influence. 
  
Globalization and Modernization  
  
The fundamental rise of modern rationality cannot be reconstructed without a 
historical analysis of emancipation. Rationality, “disenchantment” (Entzauberung), 
“the Dialectic of Enlightenment” must appear in a new context. Thus the 
phenomenon and the issue of emancipation must appear in the historical and 
philosophical discourse of the “farewell to the myths” as well. This refers to 
liberalism as a political concept on a theoretical level and the concretization and 
manifestation of modern rationality.  
 
Modern liberalism is the political face of modern rationality. The indifference 
towards various issues of emancipation was the great failure of liberal politics. As 
an integrating political concept, it should have integrated the immanent and 
necessary moments of emancipation in its modern rationality. Instead of having 
done that, the present neo-liberalism obviously even protests against issues of 
emancipation with its indifference and ignorance. The lack of emancipation might 
thrust the whole process of rationalization into critical dangers.  
 
The global world represents the basic dimensions of the problem of universal 
values. Its political and social triumph is due to the worldwide victory of the neo-
liberalism that is based on human rights, and which values it had made universal in 
a most evident and seemingly natural manner. The functioning new world order 
embodies universal real dimensions, and it does it in the trivial existentially 
bounded (seinsverbunden) manner of factuality.  
  
The classically new basic situation, i.e. the “universality of particularities”, the 
process of every individual and group becoming a global actor is in a sharply 
antagonistic position to the rule of universal values. Without a doubt, it is a grave 
new contradiction of today’s globalization that this omnipresence of particular 
universalism makes the global pretension of particular interests a horrible near 
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danger. This fundamental contradiction is also paradoxical: in a global world that is 
being constituted by a type of universal values that embody universal operation, 
every particular individual might evidently become an actor. But such dialectics of 
transformation to independent and monadic actors might become self-destructive. 
It is because the globalization is only capable of regulating the rules of vindicating 
particular interests to a limited extent. There might start a new historical era of 
“wars of every man, against every man”. 
  
Liberalism and Monetarism 
  
In the ‘70s and the ‘80s re-shaped liberal ideas had been defined by special 
political and ideological characteristics. Existing Socialism was in defensive, and it 
could not find its proper place among the co-ordinates of a new, already 
globalizing reality. It was the Real Socialism that shaped the whole political, social 
and also the hermeneutical horizon, ahead of which classical, human rights-based 
liberalism and monetarist restriction could and did appear as two essentially 
connected consequences of one and the same theory. It was namely the “order” of 
the Existing Socialism itself, in which the “neo-liberalism” of the criticism of the 
state redistribution did not differ from the human rights idealism of classical 
liberalism!  
 
Before the horizon of the Existing Socialism, the really “liberal” description of the 
modern market economy seemed to be fully isomorphic with its “monetarist” 
description, which new isomorphism accepted an existing political and economic 
state (i.e. monetarist restriction) of the continually existing Western capitalism 
(apprehended from the embedded anti-totalitarian perspective) as “liberalism”. On 
such a hermeneutical basis, the actual politics of monetarist economy was called 
“liberalism” as an opposite of both the Existing Socialism and the Western-type 
redistribution.  
 
Therefore that statement “liberalism = monetarism” is not only a wrong use of 
terminology, but it is extremely harmful and misleading as well (Kiss, E.1999). 
The economic policy of monetarist restriction was introduced first in England, then 
in the United States, actually by conservative politicians and parties, as a response 
to the Keynesian policy that was considered in another sense too “liberal” that time. 
To consider Maggie Thatcher or Ronald Reagan “liberal” from any real aspect of 
liberalism would be quite an absurd assumption indeed. By this, again, we arrive to 
the fact that the complex of monetarist restriction is essentially incompatible with 
any basic vision of liberalism. 
 
In the global context, by monetarism we mean the uniform fundamental complex of 
the today’s political and fiscal order. It entails the international order of both 
inwards and outwards indebted states, in which the policy of monetarist restriction 
prevails both internationally and in the framework of the nation state. This is the 
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complex we shall call “monetarism” in the following, independent from the 
strongly different various views whether the state of indebtedness is only 
temporary or not. In the international political and economic terminology, there is 
no other special term for this extensive ruling global economic system. It is an 
evidence for the fact that even other important actors consider the today’s world 
economy and the system of world politics bound to it “normal”. While it cuts back 
social functions of the state (including several functions that had been taboo 
before), it strengthens the state’s debt-managing forced functions (what is totally 
anti-liberal), radically redefines politics that had been an intact and most important 
sphere of society for the fundamental vision of liberalism before.  
  
Monetarism makes – in a functional and system-theoretical sense – a theatre out of 
the central political environment that should have been the central subsystem from 
the aspect of the political liberalism. It thrusts the whole system of politics on a 
course of a programmed failure. The other reason why monetarism is not liberalism 
is that at certain points of the financial system, it makes regulating and conscious 
(state) intervention possible even into the seemingly most spontaneous processes. It 
is not only against its own ideology, but it even contradicts its own deeper 
definition as a system of a free play of free forces.  
 
Within the framework of the Existing Socialism, the indebtedness of the state meant 
necessarily increasing personal freedom – but it is no wonder that so many things 
were considered progressive in the captivity of the Existing Socialism. The 
Hungarian financial politics, for example, could manage to take new credits in 
whatever world political or world economical context, ideological course, or case 
of emergency. Meanwhile, the Hungarian political class was obviously less 
resourceful (and what is more important, less successful) at elaborating a concept 
to mobilize the productive powers of the society. Therefore, there was a point, 
when the row of credits as a supposed starting point of future constructive 
economical processes inevitably turned to a destructive phase. But even past the 
critical point, neither economists, nor politicians could manage to get the economy 
off the forced course of this vicious circle. Moreover, in the meanwhile, an 
insightful outsider could not escape the suspicion that neither the political class, nor 
the opinion-making economists were aware and conscious of the further 
consequences of the fatal debt problems. 
  
Globalization and its Actors 
  
The actors of the globalization are often missing and it is shown clearly in 
comparison with the new specific global functions. The case of missing actors 
occurs when political or other processes of globalization create new and strong 
functions, but at the same time, there are no equally strong, socially legitimated and 
responsible actors to fulfil these functions. The empty places and functions of 
missing actors either remain unrecognized or tricky interest groups push 
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themselves into this vacuum (Michels, R. 1987). The basic model is simple: an 
interest group pushing into the vacuum can only be called an actor in one specific 
sense, i.e. that it follows solely its own interests. To achieve this end, it must shape 
the political space to some extent, but it does not do it as a legitimate and 
constructive actor, therefore its activity inevitably implies the destruction of the 
political space. 
  
The actor aspect in general is a theoretically attractive new component of the 
globalization. Although his term can also be used for the political and social reality 
of the pre-globalization era, yet the globalization opens a new era in the history of 
this term, mainly because the globalization liberates individual actors from the 
organizational and original interconnectedness of bigger political and social 
integrities, mostly organizations and it arranges the universe of the actors in a new 
way. We are actors both in a theoretical and in a practical sense. Unfortunately, we 
still identify this new side of the globalization rather with the actually existing 
“cesarian” components of the actor dimension, than with its also actually existing 
democratic components. The global competence itself also lacks adequate actor 
foundation. Neither traditional forecast, nor traditional consensus-making, nor 
traditional administration, nor any other traditional institutions are capable of 
shaping competence legitimately.  
 
The relation to modernity in a history-philosophical sense is decisive not only from 
the aspect of potential enemies and enemy images. In a positive sense, it is decisive 
because in several important aspects, the globalization, which in fact sprung out 
from the soil of the modernity intends to eliminate the so far most important 
achievements of the modernity as well. 
 
Therefore, on these bases, the sensible consequences of the deeply interdependent 
relationship of globalization and liberalism/neo-liberalism are getting crystallized 
around the issue of the state. Now we can clearly see that the state as a “buffer” is a 
central element of the battlefield of the globalization, but of course, only if we 
consciously insist on the actual achievements of modernity and emancipation. 
Pointing out these criteria is not an unnecessary theoretical enterprise nowadays. It 
is namely not included in the expectations concerning morals, society or even good 
manners that beyond pursuing one’s own particular interests, one had any duties in 
order to preserve the achievements of civilization, emancipation, or modernization. 
 
The neo-liberalism has arrived to a great change. After its worldwide victory, it 
remained as the only regulator of the globalization on the political-ideological 
scene. And past the acme of its exclusive hegemony, it became identical to the 
whole of the existing social and economic world order in common political 
consciousness. It is a not yet achieved high-level realization of the present world 
order, globalization and rationalization that also amplifies the tendencies, that 
follow from “bidding farewell” to the myths. If the neo-liberalism is really an 
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outcome of such a height of rationalization in this theoretical framework, it must 
not pass by the development of new forms of emancipation. 
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Balázs Brunczel 
 
Niklas Luhmann’s Political Theory 
 
 
The topic of this paper is Niklas Luhmann’s idea on political theory. Luhmann uses 
the term “political theory” in a quite special sense; thus, before expounding why I 
deem his ideas problematic, I explore for what this concept stands. 
 
To understand the use of the term of political theory and its reasons in Luhmann, 
we need to distinguish between two kinds of descriptions of the political system. 
On the one hand, politics can be described by the scientific system; this is the 
scientific examination of politics. Science accomplishes this from a position 
outside politics; this means that this kind of observation of politics has to be 
adapted to the logic or criteria of science. There is another kind of describing 
political system, namely the self-description or self-reflection of the political 
system. As opposed to the scientific one, the self-description of politics does not 
aim to comply with scientific criteria but with political ones; thus, the key of its 
success is not scientific truth but applicability in political practice. Luhmann calls 
this self-reflection of political system political theory (politische Theorie), 
distinguished from the former case, from the theory of politics (Theorie der Politik) 
(Luhmann 1990a: 24–25, 2005a: 329–330; cf. Arato 1994: 135–136; Karácsony 
2000: 107–110). Thus, in what follows, we deal with the description of political 
system based on not scientific but political criteria, that is, with the self-reflection 
of the political system, with political theory. 
 
The distinction between the two types of description means first of all that 
Luhmann draws a clear line between science and politics. Scientific results do not 
automatically and directly become part of the political practice because the two 
systems deal with different criteria of success. This is also true for the applied 
research; moreover, it is true for the case when the possibilities of practical 
applications of scientific research become a subject of research themselves 
(Luhmann 1990a: 107). By sharply separating the two systems, Luhmann 
emphasizes, among other things, his opposition in particular to critical theory and 
in general to theories that define the objective of the scientific research as a 
criticism and improvement of social conditions. In his view, it is impossible to 
realize a direct connection between science and politics because they operate 
according to different criteria. 
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Another important message of these thoughts is that for the efficient functioning of 
politics, there is a need for a theory orienting the practice; that is, there is a need for 
a relatively coherent idea of what constitutes politics. It is not easy to say what is 
exactly meant by the political theory. The political theory cannot be an explicit 
theory, that is, expounded in detail and written in studies or books because in this 
case it would be a scientific theory. Therefore, the name “theory” is a bit 
misleading because it suggests this kind of explicit and systematized form. By 
political theory we rather mean ideas on politics, that are not put in a theoretical 
framework, but provide a coherent notion of the nature of politics and thus 
determine political processes. According to Luhmann, all the most important 
constitutional achievements of the modern state — such as the principles of 
sovereignty and representation, the mechanisms of controlling power, or the human 
rights — have been realized with the help of such theories (Luhmann 2005a: 330). 
At the beginning of the modernity, the political theory meant ideas on the absolute 
state, then conceptions of the constitutional, democratic state, and finally the notion 
of the welfare state (Luhmann 1990a: 25–27). 
 
This already indicates that the state plays an important role in the political theory 
(Luhmann 1990b: 141–144, 2005c: 114–116). One of Luhmann’s definitions of the 
state reads that the state is a self-description of the political system, and we have 
defined the political theory exactly in the same way. Thus, we can mainly 
characterize political theories as reflections on the features and functions of the 
state, reflections that determine the political practice. 
 
Luhmann examines the political theory, because he thinks that today we do not 
have a theory that could suitably fill this role (Luhmann 2005a: 332). He claims 
that a proper self-reflection of the welfare state is lacking because the recent ideas 
ignore the limits of political actions, which lead to the overburdening of politics 
(Luhmann 1990a: 105). 
 
From this definition and characterization of the political theory it follows that it has 
to comply with two requirements that can be opposed to each other. The function 
of the political theory is to orient the political practice; that is, this theory serves as 
a kind of framework for the political programs. In the democracy, these programs 
have to compete for the electors’ votes. Consequently, political theories, on the one 
hand, have to underlie programs that are attractive for the voters. On the other 
hand, however, these programs have to be realizable and workable;  that is, they 
have to comply with several economic, organizational, and other requirements. 
While the former requirement can be regarded as popular — both in the positive 
and the negative senses of this word — the latter is a scientific one. The present 
situation of the welfare state shows the best that there is a great gap between 
popularity and feasibility; thus, Luhmann’s statement that a proper political theory 
is lacking seems to be plausible. 
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The political theory has a quite paradoxical relation to science. It needs the science 
in order to be able to provide workable programs, but at the same time, it cannot 
listen to the advices of the science completely because it has — even if not directly 
but through political programs —to find favor with the electors, who often do not 
vote in accordance with scientific criteria. Nevertheless, politics has no choice but 
to look for “possible advice from science” (Luhmann 1990a: 107). However, what 
appears as a political theory in politics is never a scientific theory but at the very 
most — in Luhmann’s words — a “scientifically subvented theory” (Luhmann 
1990a: 110). From the point of view of science, we also face the problem of the 
impossibility of transition between the two systems. The fact that a theory is 
scientifically prominent is not a guarantee for its success as a political theory. Thus, 
scientists, however respectable scientific theories they may provide, cannot 
determine the direction of the political processes. Even in the best possible case, 
they can only hope that their scientific researches trigger resonances in the political 
system and initiate or modify certain political processes. But the question of when 
and how this happens is always decided by the criteria of the politics, which are 
incalculable for the science (Luhmann 1990a: 107). 
 
Although Luhmann does not broach this topic, I think it is important to distinguish 
the political theory from another kind of meeting point of politics and science. I 
mean the cases when politics uses the scientific knowledge to achieve certain 
political aims. For the economic politics, one obviously needs the branches of 
economics; for the social politics, the social sciences are necessary; for the 
administration, the organization theory; and political campaigns are also based on a 
number of psychological researches. In my opinion, all this does not belong to what 
Luhmann calls the political theory. In these cases, politics uses scientific theories 
referring to other societal subsystems, to organizations, or to the people, while the 
political theory means the self-reflection of politics. The subject of political theory 
is the whole political system, its characteristics and options; thus, the political 
theory forms the aims of the politics. Scientific theories used for political aims, 
however, can rather be regarded as tools to achieve these political aims. 
 
It is also worth touching upon the question of the relationship between political 
theory and ideologies because the kind of relation existing between them may be 
unclear. Luhmann does not discuss this question, but we can find some basis in his 
theory for reconstructing the relationship between the two concepts. In my view, 
the political theory is, in a certain sense, a wider category than ideology. The 
political theory provides a conceptual framework in which the opposing 
alternatives, the different party programs can be formulated. The political theory in 
itself is not yet a program, a guidance for the political action, but it influences the 
range of possible political programs through certain conceptual arrangements and 
suggestions. With the help of the political theory, political alternatives can be 
shaped more clearly, and ideological standpoints can be separated from one 
another. Without mentioning ideologies, Luhmann formulates that the politics’ 
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“premises, options and their alternatives appear more clearly” (Luhmann 1990a: 
109) with the help of the political theory. If there is no proper political theory, the 
ideological alternatives are also not clearly distinguishable. 
 
At the same time, Luhmann’s findings suggest a different kind of relationship 
between the political theory and ideologies as well. According to Luhmann, the 
achievements of the modern politics, such as democracy or human rights — 
Luhmann has not mentioned them, but I think we can also classify the social and 
welfare achievements among them — were able to be realized exclusively with the 
help of political theories. These achievements, however, can be also attributed to 
ideologies. Accordingly, there is a close relationship between political theory and 
certain ideologies, which may be called progressive ones. Their relationship could 
be conceived in such a way that political theories have been introduced and 
stabilized in politics by means of certain ideologies. This formulation does not 
contradict what we said above about the relationship between the political theory 
and the ideologies. We can say that progressive ideologies have implemented a 
political theory in the political practice, and from then on this political theory did 
not serve only as a framework for the ideology that produced it but for other 
ideologies as well. 
 
Let us now examine the role assigned by Luhmann to his own theory in this 
context. First, he makes clear — and I think it is obvious — that his own theory 
observes the society and the politics from the scientific system, so his theory 
cannot be regarded as a political theory (Luhmann 2005a: 333). From the 
beginning of his career, Luhmann emphasized that he only endeavoured to describe 
the society and not to change it. This served, on the one hand, as a demarcation 
from the critical theory, and on the other hand, for defending his theory from 
criticisms stating that applying systems theory as a theory of society serves 
conservative ideological aims. In his answer to Habermas’s criticism of this kind 
Luhmann mentioned humorously that “systems theory can have a good chance to 
remain purely academic because it is beyond comprehension” (Luhmann 1971: 
403; my translation). 
 
At the same time, however, we cannot say that Luhmann intended his theory 
exclusively for the scientific sphere. Although his theory is not a political theory, 
he expected the emersion of a political theory suitable for the recent societal 
requirements with its help. He is a bit skeptical whether this can succeed because 
anything he writes would remain a scientific theory, while the political theory has 
to be created by the politics (Luhmann 1990a: 115). At the same time, he clearly 
holds that a political theory suitable for the present society has a chance to emerge 
only if the wider scientific public, inspired by his findings on the theory of the 
society, changes its views on politics, and then, as a consequence of this change, 
the political system resonates and creates a political theory complying with the 
present requirements of the society (Luhmann 1990a: 112–114). In other words, the 
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aim of Luhmann’s work is not only to provide a proper description of the society 
for the scientific public, but he also holds that his theory of the society is suitable to 
be a basis for an emerging political theory, that fits the recent challenges and 
fulfills an orientation function in the political system. 
 
In this light, the opposition between Luhmann’s aims and the endeavours of the 
critical theory seems to be not so sharp. According to both the participants of the 
debate and the interpreters, one of the most important aspects of this opposition 
was that while the critical theory, through the construction of a theory of society, 
endeavoured to change the society, that is, strove to achieve aims outside the 
science, Luhmann held that the exclusive objective of the theory is to describe the 
society. Now, however, we can see that Luhmann, in fact, expected his theory to 
change the political practice and to channel it in the direction he thought to be 
right. Although in his view this can only happen in an indirect way and beyond the 
control of the science, this is rather a difference in degree, and I think the adherents 
of the critical theory would accept this uncertainty of the practical applicability of 
the theories. 
 
Thus, Luhmann’s criticism of researching the possibilities of application of applied 
researches also loses its radicalism. Although in his theory we can never acquire 
indisputable knowledge on the practical implementation of scientific theories, his 
thoughts presented here can be regarded as researches on this topic. The reason of 
his holding the theory of autopoietic systems to be an important research program 
is that with its help we can obtain a more exact notion of how scientific theories 
can be implemented into the practice (Luhmann 2005a: 333–335, 2005b: 383). 
 
Nevertheless, these aspects are not making me consider Luhmann’s views on the 
political theory as problematic. My critical remark refers to Luhmann’s idea that 
his theory can stimulate the birth of a new political theory. In my opinion, his 
theory is not suitable to be the basis of an emerging new political theory adequate 
to the recent societal conditions. 
 
Let us first examine what the main characteristics of a political theory based on 
Luhmann’s theory of society would be. On the one hand, Luhmann provides some 
instructions for this question; on the other hand, this can be deduced from his 
theory. According to Luhmann, a proper political theory should take into account 
that the modern society consists in autonomous, closed, and uncontrollable 
functional subsystems. From the point of view of the politics, this means that it 
cannot steer the other subsystems. Political intervention will never reach the effects 
intended because the results of the intervention depend on the regularities of the 
other subsystems. The most important characteristic of a political theory based on 
Luhmann’s theory of the society should be that it limits the range of politics to the 
issues in which politics is competent, that is, to the production of collectively 
binding decisions. Luhmann holds that we need a political theory showing that 
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politics cannot remedy the problems which solution depends on other subsystems. 
These problems include, in his view, that the economy exhausts the natural 
resources, that the education system does not produce suitably motivated people, or 
that some people have problems with the way of living. He characterizes his own 
standpoint as approximately coinciding with the liberal views on the roles of the 
state (Luhmann 1990a: 113–114). In what follows, I examine the question whether 
this kind of political theory would be operable. 
 
As we have seen above, the political theory has to comply with two requirements: 
it has to make possible the elaboration of political programs that are, on the one 
hand, technically realizable and workable, and on the other hand, attractive for the 
public. In my opinion, Luhmann’s theory can only comply with the first 
requirement. His systems theory thoroughly examines and explains what can and 
what cannot be realized in the modern society. He, however, does not discuss how 
a political program declaring that we have to renounce most of our welfare, 
ecological, or other claims on the state could be presented as attractive. 
 
In his works on the welfare state, Luhmann regards the formation of newer claims 
on the state as a necessary consequence of modernity and democracy. And now he 
expects to give them up. How could these claims be silenced? In the democracy, 
the only possibility is to convince people of the indefensibility of their claims, that 
is, to expect people to become aware of certain regularities of the modern society 
and to vote in the elections accordingly. A faith like this in people’s rationality, 
however, would be very contrasting to Luhmann’s ideas. As we have seen, when 
reinterpreting the key concepts of politics, Luhmann endeavoured to replace the 
explanations based mostly on people’s rationality by sociological conceptions. An 
argument based on the rationality is completely understandable on the part of the 
liberals because this is one of their most important methodological presuppositions. 
This argument can be supplemented by the liberals’ faith in progress, that is, by the 
idea that if people have enough freedom, it will result in a development that is 
advantageous for the whole society.  
 
Liberals can be considered consistent regarding the relation between these  
presuppositions and their proposals for the political practice. Luhmann, however, 
does not only reject the ideas on people’s rational capacities but also the liberals’ 
faith in progress. He does not think that a free functioning of subsystems would 
result in a development beneficial to the whole society; for example, he does not 
hold that the free functioning of the economic system would produce beneficial 
effects for everyone. Luhmann should reinforce his liberal-style proposals for 
political practice in such a way that — as opposed to the liberals — he cannot use 
arguments like people’s rationality or the generally advantageous effects of the free 
functioning of the economy or other subsystems. 
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The fact that Luhmann’s theory is not suitable to be the basis of a proper political 
theory follows, in my view, from its peculiarity that can be called the 
“disenchantment” of societal phenomena.7 The disenchantment consists in the fact 
that Luhmann endeavours to demonstrate that our most important political 
institutions fulfill completely different functions than it is commonly — or even in 
the scientific discussions — thought. The supposed and the real functions can be 
described by the two levels or two aspects mentioned in connection with the 
legitimation process, that is, by distinguishing between symbolic and operative 
levels. For example, in the case of the procedure of election, the symbolic level is 
the declaration of the will of the people, but on operative level, one of the functions 
of election is to ensure the separation of the political system, that is, to ensure that 
politicians can govern undisturbed while the citizens’ discontents are channeled by 
filling out the ballots in every four years. Or taking another example, on the 
symbolic level the basic rights embody our unalienable universal rights, while on 
the operative level they fulfill the function of preventing the ceasing of the 
autonomy of the functional subsystems. On the symbolic level we can find 
approximately the same ideas by which the tradition of Enlightenment described 
the functioning of the modern society, while the operative level consists in socio-
logical explanations complying with Luhmann’s program of sociological 
Enlightenment. 
 
These two levels are not two separate entities but two aspects of one societal 
phenomenon. Furthermore, neither is the symbolic level less important for the 
functioning of the society than the operative one. Although the semantic 
descriptions fulfilling symbolic functions do not describe the real societal 
mechanisms, the institutions could not work properly without them. Although 
democracy is not the rule of the people, it would not work without this belief. Thus, 
according to Luhmann, we are under illusions regarding politics, but these illusions 
play an important role in the functioning of society.  
 
By the disenchantment of societal phenomena, I mean that Luhmann deconstructs 
the symbolic aspects of these phenomena, and — what is very important — 
without creating new symbolic contents instead of them. In the case of a scientific 
theory, there is no problem with this. Why would it be objectionable for a scientist 
to prove that our concepts do not describe the reality, and they are only illusions? 
And why should we expect him to build new meanings in place of the demolished 
ones? But if Luhmann intends his theory to serve as a basis for the political theory, 
the lack of these symbolic elements will be all the more conspicuous. When 
Luhmann lists the achievements that have been established with the help of 
                                                 
 
7
 Habermas gave the title “The Sociological Disenchantment of Law” to the section of his book 
Between Facts and Norms, in which he discusses, among others, Luhmann’s theory (Habermas 
1996: 62–78). 
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political theories, he, without exception, mentions examples that have very 
important symbolic aspects. The institutionalization of sovereignty, democracy, or 
human rights would have been impossible without their symbolic meanings not 
describing the real mechanisms. If these achievements — as Luhmann claims — 
owe their institutionalization to the political theories, we can conclude that 
according to the lessons drawn from the history, those political theories were 
successful that made possible the formation, acceptance, and stabilization of ideas 
that, besides the fact that they complied with the operative requirements of society, 
constituted attractive aims for people in virtue of their symbolic meanings. Political 
theories, in fact, played the role of a connecting link between the operative and the 
symbolic levels of the functioning of society. 
 
This characteristic is missing from Luhmann’s theory. If he intends his theory to be 
the basis of a political theory, he can be expected to provide a description of the 
society on the basis of which certain directions or proposals can be formed for the 
solution of the actual social problems. Although political theory is not yet an 
ideology or a party program, it defines the framework in which these alternatives 
can be formulated. A political theory, that would emerge on the basis of 
Luhmann’s theory, would not provide too many possibilities for forming such 
alternatives. We can get to know from Luhmann that the functioning of the society 
is shaped by macro-level, impersonal processes, which are beyond human control. 
We cannot effectively intervene in the functioning of the society; the negative 
effects of our attempts can exceed the positive ones. The promise of a commonly 
accepted moral order is finally over, and neither can our problems be solved by 
letting the economy work freely. On the basis of these theoretical findings — even 
if they are scientifically plausible — we can hardly formulate any alternatives, that 
could compete for the votes of people with a good chance of success. 
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Bo Strath 
 
Towards a Global History 
A New History beyond the Cultural Turn : a Master Narrative without a Cause and 
without a Centre ? 
 
This workshop aims at exploring the preconditions of writing the world history in 
new ways transgressing the methodological nationalism, which has been a hallmark 
of academic historiography since the nineteenth century. The world history in new 
ways means the search for an alternative to a Western conceptualisation of the 
world as a cumulative history of the nations. The question of communication 
between historians of various civilisations and cultures is crucial. The workshop is 
explorative and tentative and the aim is to initiate an agenda for the next years 
rather than providing precise answers. Rather than a presentation of seminar papers 
in a conventional sense, the meeting will be organised as a number of panels with 
brief and concise argumentative inputs from the panellists with time for discussions 
despite a studied schedule.  
 
While recognising the problems of the old type of the macro explanatory social 
history, which at the end provoked the massive post-modern criticism of the 
modernisation theories with a global and universal pretension, and drawing on the 
crucial insights, that the cultural or linguistic turn brought, such as a constructivist 
perspective and the understanding, that the world can only be described and 
analyzed through the language, an understanding which opens up for alternative 
interpretations rather than singular explanations, the focus of this conference is the 
question of a world history and a global narrative, which would be an alternative to 
the economistic globalisation story, and which would describe the emergence of 
interpretations and interactive influences of institutional intertwinements in its 
global variety. The time dimension in this global perspective on the past should be 
much longer than one that begins with the industrial capitalism.  
 
When we talk about a new narrative, we do so recognizing the scepticism of the 
today’s historians with regard to grand narratives in general and the justified 
criticism of historians putting themselves as the omniscient force imposing their 
narrative order upon disorder and the multiplicity of histories ignoring or erasing 
other narratives and silencing other voices. 1. However, we also raise the question 
of an alternative world history and global narrative against the backdrop of the fact 
that the historians kept silent and refused to comment on the unfolding economistic 
globalization narrative.  
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A new global history should begin by inquiring into the global variety in terms of 
historical conceptualization of the past. A world historiography with a mapping of 
the variety of methodological entanglements and separations in attempts to 
conceptualize the past provides the sine qua non point of departure for any world 
history with ambitions to transgress a Western perspective. The conference will 
begin by Georg Iggers and Edward Wang presenting their new book on the world 
historiography.  
 
A new global history must build on the integration of perspectives from all parts of 
the world. The crucial question is to what extent the European or Western view can 
be relativized. Dipesh Chakrabarty in his post-colonial criticism seems to argue 
that this is a rather impossible undertaking. 2. Although he recognizes the 
Enlightenment values as a European achievement for the world, and that no Indian 
history can be written without integrating the colonial experience, his prescription 
for “provincializing Europe” is to reject such a history and write an alternative 
story independent of Europe, which would mean a communicational rupture. It is 
easy to agree with Chakrabarty’s view that the colonialism produced a world 
image, where it became “normal” to think of England as a rich country and India as 
a poor country. His argument, that he and other historians of Asia (and one could 
add Africa) must pay attention to the academic production of their European 
colleagues, who must not consider the scholarly production in Asia and Africa is a 
serious criticism.  
 
Lynn Hunt has argued that, at least for the US, the fervour of methodological 
debates has started to fade away in the recent years. However, in the future it might 
be well, that the world history or trans-cultural history will experience more 
disputes between rivalizing research approaches, political positions and overall 
world views than a conventional historiography centred on the national 
frameworks. The exploration of spaces beyond nation states makes it urgent to 
critically reconsider the structures and guiding principles of the historiography. 
Nationally organized scholarly communities may be ill-equipped to handle 
transnational or global research geographies. The questions of which world history, 
which perspectives and historiographic traditions are being applied, will become 
more pertinent than in the case of more localized research orientations. World 
historians will hardly be able to distance themselves from intellectual and political 
questions, that may be understood as the great themes of the global civil society in 
the offing. There will be a need to debate the value-systems, experience bases and 
research traditions, that underlie the historical research and narratives at a global 
level. The calls for multi-perspectivity and ecumenical narratives certainly point in 
that direction, although behind these key words are very complex realities.3. 
 
A crucial problem in any world history is the issue of the Eurocentrism. Arif Dirlik, 
for instance, has argued that world historical outlooks need to be basically 
understood as privileged centric perspectives of the past. The purported desire to 
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develop multi-angled world historical versions cannot overcome this situation since 
Eurocentrism can rather be described in terms of inclusiveness than exclusiveness.  
 
According to Dirlik, the effort to fit different societies or regions into an 
overarching narrative is impossible without ranking and filling them according to 
allegedly universal standards. For example, world histories tend to operate with 
Western categories such as “nation”, “culture” or “civilisation”, which are 
implicitly or explicitly presented as the subjects and not the products of the history. 
As opposed to such views, Jerry Benley has argued, that historians can transcend 
their original limitations and that rather than being a static set of world visions their 
fields of construction are dynamic and open with a potential for self-correction. 
Dominic Sachsenmaier has emphasized, that the “world” in the world history must 
not necessarily be understood as a Hegelian nexus requiring totalizing narratives, 
but should rather be seen as an open research field that encourages the pursuit of 
trans-local themes as much as a comparison of nations and civilisations. He looks 
for solutions in the direction of an ecumenic historiography. The historical 
scholarship certainly must become more multi-angled in its confrontation with the 
challenges of a more global world but this in fact, in the eyes of Sachsenmaier, 
requires more than a paradigm change. There is a need for new kinds of world 
historical scholarship, which are more dialogical in nature and which can only be 
conceivable if new structures and patterns within the global academic landscape are 
developped. At the moment, world historians theorize a lot about trans-cultural 
spaces, but in their academic practices and communities, national (or European) 
boundaries and public spheres remain the main point of reference. From a more 
long-term perspective, the ecumenical world history is only conceivable within a 
more ecumenical scholarly community. This, in turn, requires more reflection on 
the global sociology of academic knowledge production.4.  
 
Transgressing a Eurocentric view on the world requires a new historical 
underpinning under a clear demarcation to ideas of linear teleological progression 
and value continuities over centuries or even millenniums. Such a new history 
should emphasize the world as permanent redefinition and transgression of borders, 
and as permanent redefinition of past experiences and their translations into future 
horizons of expectations.  
 
The excentric definition of Europe, as Rémi Brague sees it, through continuous 
alienation from its Asian origins, became centric in the end when the look 
backward and eastward turned forward and westward following the discovery of 
America. 5. In a next step, ever since the American independence three centuries 
after the discovery, the Eurocentrism became a Western centrism with a complex 
and ambiguous Euro-American entanglement, which contained extremes, such as 
the two largest genocides in the history of the mankind, on the native Americans 
and the Jews, and the intellectual construction of theories on the universal human 
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rights. A key-question, developped by Vivienne Boon and Gerard Delanty, is how 
we can again construct a cultural distance and a decentralization.6.  
 
Europe consists in different civilisational heritages and is not the expression of a 
single Western civilisation. Europe is a constellation of civilisational traditions, 
which emerged out of an interaction with each other. The crucial dimension is the 
interactions and relations rather than any imagined underlying cultural foundations.  
 
The making of Europe in cultural terms can in a long historical perspective be seen 
as a constellation of constantly changing centres and peripheries under changing 
relations between Self and Other. Only in such a way can Europe be 
conceptualized in a world history. The subsequent question is how to conceptualize 
Europe in the global context.  
 
Rémi Brague argues that Europe is Roman, and that to be Roman means to transmit 
and assimilate the Jewish and ancient Greek heritages in the form, in which they 
were incorporated in the Catholic Christianity. This, however, is a narrow 
understanding of Europe, excluding as it does the East Roman (Orthodox, 
Byzantine) and Muslim traditions. When he argues that Europe cannot be just a 
free trade zone but must become Roman again, Brague ends up in a Roman 
centrism of the kind he wanted to avoid through his perspective of transmission and 
assimilation of the Asian origin.7. The concept of Europe in cultural terms is bound 
to shift away from its geographical sense towards a more general set of cultural 
references, which would embrace not only the American side of the Atlantic but 
also Slavic Orthodoxy and Turkish and Arabic Islam. With Garth Fowden, we can 
ask whether it will eventually become part of a Euro-Asiatic civilisation where 
Asia is understood as the continent’s mainly Muslim western sector, bordering in 
the East on China and India with different historical experiences.8. Western Asia 
becomes Europe at the same time as Europe is Asianized. At this point, India and 
China will begin to exercize a gravitational pull on the European culture and at this 
point Braque’s Roman Catholic understanding of Europe will look like an 
antiquarian curiosity.  
 
The so far perhaps most systematic attempt to transgress the historical eurocentrism 
and Enlightenment as the decisive temporal divide is the comparative civilisational 
analysis in a weberian perspective under the label of multiple modernities with 
Shmuel Eisenstadt as its protagonist. The arguments, brought forward within this 
approach to a global history, provide important insights for any more ambitious 
attempt to relativize Europe and the Occident.  
 
Moving the focus in this long historical view on the world onto the most recent 
centuries, the question is to what extent widely different experiences of social 
injustice and attempts to overcome it can be communicated into a global 
experience, certainly experiences of diversity, experiences in plural, but 
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nevertheless in some sense globally shared. What prospects are there of a history of 
social protest, for instance, in industrialising and post-industrialising societies? No 
doubt that we are living in an era of growing global communication. Which 
mediating capacity has a growing global public sphere? To what extent is it 
justified to talk about a global public debate today? Which historical connections 
can be discerned between market penetration, social protest and political 
legitimacy? Which are the power relationships in the global debate and which are 
the prospects to change them? What does the global mean in terms of 
communication today and historically? The emergence of public spheres in Europe 
in the wake of the Enlightenment criticism had a clear political dimension and it 
was this dimension that moulded the nation states, criticism and crisis in the 
formulation of Reinhart Koselleck. A global public sphere without a world 
government? Or can the world government emerge through the social criticism?  
 
Questions like those are examples of what could be discussed at the conference. 
They would transgress the sterile dichotomy between the European capacity to 
colonize and enslave on the one side, and the narrative of European triumph due to 
an alleged uniqueness in terms of “work, thrift, honesty, patience [and] tenacity” on 
the other side. 9. Such questions could be seen as an attempt to decentralize the 
Western view instead of taking it as the starting point of the debate.  
 
The conference should hopefully contribute to new ways of thinking, to a more 
encompassing global history going beyond the globalisation rhetoric with place for 
the social and the political, a global history which cannot mean a return to the 
positivist approach with images of causative laws. The objective is to think a 
macro-historical and long-term social development in new ways of global 
entanglements as well as diversity, under dynamic interactions between the 
political, the social and the economic, whereby the communicative capacity to 
intellectualize and mediate these dynamics is crucial.  
 
A new global history should begin by inquiring into the global variety in terms of 
historical conceptualisation of the past. The workshop will, as mentioned, begin by 
Georg Iggers and Edward Wang presenting their new book on the world 
historiography.  
 
The conference will end with a reflection by Hayden White on the tension between 
post-modern and post-colonial views, which deny the possibility of cohesive 
narrative structures (Lyotard, Chakrabarty), and attempts to conceptualize the 
world in an ordered form.  
 
The overall aim of the conference is, as it was stated at the beginning of this 
outline, to open up a theoretical view on the world in a long historical perspective, 
which goes beyond the world history as just a Western compilation and 
accumulation of data into a global aggregate. The envisaged next step will be a 
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more systematic invitation of academic representatives from other cultures. The 
conference, also in more specific terms, serves as first theoretical reflection in an 
enterprise aiming at a socially informed alternative narrative to the globalisation 
story, an alternative that transgresses the Western centre.  
 
The conference is possible thanks to a generous contribution of the Bank of 
Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. This contribution is gratefully acknowledged.  
 
The aim of the conference is, as it has been mentioned, to contribute to the 
initiation of a future research agenda. There are therefore no immediate feelings of 
publication pressure.  
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Stephen I. Ternyik 
 
Global Wave Compression 
 
Every major economic crisis of human productivity is also a social reoccurrence of 
resembling historical events as a psychopathological and political déjá vu, leading 
to extreme income inequality, radical societal conflict, public revolution and 
imperial inter-state war; the reason for the social disillusionment of the 7 billion 
people agenda among all existing political systems, including the small number of 
liberal democracies, is the not to well-known or ignored fact that politics is actually 
about the distribution of living chances in this earthly realm where death is real and 
loss is not only an accounting category. An aggressive over-expansion and 
superdominance of the financial industry sector in a monetary production economy 
and the resulting progressive collective centralization (1:25%-10:90%) of wealth 
and income among a low digit (1-10%) of a population are recipes for ethical and 
economic failure of the human race on a global ecological scale. The big data are 
showing the same extremes as around 1929, but this time everything appears even 
a great bit sharper in the process phenomena of curves, diagrams and graphics, but 
also big data science analytics cannot compute away the mathematical and 
statistical anomalies of economic production and distribution. The new economy 
illusion lost its psychological momentum ultimately at the end of 2000, regarding 
data of real GDP growth, new orders for durable goods, industrial production and 
non-financial corporate profits; the profits of the Nasdaq-firms collapsed 
completely. In any case, quantitative economics and quantified data are historical 
approximations of real events in a post-mortem style, but seem to give us in fact 
very limited insight about the happenings of the future or the immediate present. 
This methodical type of forecasting is too deterministic and futures research should 
be about the methodological freedom of human choice; consequently, we are 
investigating into the basic pattern recognition and prediction of the human socio-
economic action ; our social life is about value priorities and time preferences as 
individuals and as collectives of learning and action. 
 
Furthermore, it is an empirical fact, that most scientifically collected and 
academically administered knowledge bodies about economic life cycles are 
directed at the productive maximization of property via credit and interest, 
especially instructing about how to operate profitably in the market of a national 
politics. At least the professional literature is dealing with this kind of economic 
inquiry. As stated before, the methodical tools are mainly based on a mathematical 
hermeneutics that implies strong a posteriori power and condenses big data better 
than linguistic word chains, but a lot of the lacking foresight is caused by this naive 
belief in numeric modeling. Although the yuppies of the City preferred the Porsche 
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911 since 1995, it is not reasonable to assume a numerological connection to the 
terror of 9/11 ; however, the timing of this uncivilized murder act is more 
frightening the author today than at the actual moment, because of the analyzed 
criminal sophistication perceived in the retroperspective analysis of the (global) 
financial data series. 
 
Unfortunately, the economics and management professions have still not arrived at 
a truly scientific theory and method to integrate the many scattered practical 
knowledge pieces; this can only be done via a scientific learning process, where 
dogmatic canonization does not dictate the road of research and development into 
new economic ideas, that go far beyond the a posteriori balance sheets of static 
accounting and dynamic forecasting. We are following the spiral theory of human 
history, all social change is cyclical, not merely repetitive and linear projections 
cannot catch these continuous creative and destructive changes of cyclical 
hierarchies, from the beginning to the end of this world, pointing to the origin and 
nature of space, time, energy, matter and organized life itself. In addition, any 
backward reading of time or temporal re-construction carries the methodical 
problem, that the cyclical intervals of temporal quanta are becoming shorter with 
the spiral course of the history, i.e. if we count back from year 2000 to 1950, we 
get the numerical value of 50, but this does not comply with the physical evidence 
of modern cosmology and temporology. The mathematical measurement of global 
wave patterns like Schumpeterian and Kondratieff cycles for a world economic 
science cannot ignore the socio-dynamic fact of physical space-time compression 
or spatio-temporal acceleration; the scientific methodical recognition and 
prediction of socio-economic wave patterns starts with physical evidence, must 
incorporate psychological preferences and cannot avoid philosophical ethics. 
Economics is also about the heuristic art to make the best of our lives and there is a 
definite calculus between personal greed and mutual prosperity; or to compute it 
into more exact terms: book-keeping techniques ‘create’ economic facts. The 
physical entropy of an economic (quantum) system is directly affected by the 
accounting method (from stones to electronic digits), i.e. there is no economic 
alchemy or monetary metaphysics; furthermore, there is no natural law that an 
economy shall or could satisfy all human needs and wants. All that exists in the 
economic sphere of commercial transactions is physical demand and the monetary 
power to pay for need and want; it is exactly typical for our economic (quantum) 
stage, that all human needs are reduced or simplified into the need for money. 
 
The quantitative economic history reveals, that the advent of industrial capitalism 
led to ever lower reserve requirements on demand deposits (also cash reserve ratio 
or minimal capital ratio), this monetary practice evolved with Goldsmith and 
Lombard techniques of economic deposits as precious metals, gems, etc. in 
combination with written receipts; the most advanced monetary production 
economies arrived at 0 or 1%, emerging economies like Brazil or China are around 
20%. Central banks became planning agencies to control the empty credit 
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emissions and interest collecting of commercial banks; such a monetary practice is 
an attack on the growth of the market economy and checks the economic 
productivity. The economic production quantizes time and money quantizes 
economic production time, i.e. the empty credit(x interest) emissions are the root 
cause of the global economic crisis and no monetary agency can check this toll on 
economic production as money is actually a market replicator. 
 
What makes this economic scenario even worse is the fact that about 70% of the 
empty emissions are fiat credits for real estate, being propelled by the land value 
speculation in urbancenters, i.e. an eminent mass of future productive capital is 
directed at a piece of land and housing. Under these financial conditions, the 
economic production cycle is shortened and a temporal acceleration to point zero is 
foreseeable. Only a new politics of money can amend this systemic error and 
methodical mischief as all human needs are reduced or simplified into the need for 
money as production and distribution mechanism. Thus, we propose some kind of 
optimal (narrow) reserve banking system for the future, to channel a maximal 
capital ratio into real economic investment for private entrepreneurship and public 
infrastructure. 
 
The new economy illusion also led to a misperception and misreading of the 
electronic informatization of the global village; the computer technology does not 
signal a new economy, but it can create a perfect information machinery and 
finalize the industrialization process as a global wave in form of a technological 
automation and automata. However, such innovations have at first to go through a 
painful human learning curve and an economic gain in real capitalization is almost 
a generational learning process of skills, competences and changing life styles, i.e. 
an investment into people and human capital is a social learning program. In 
addition, also new management arts and entrepreneurial alertness do not fall from 
heaven and many people will have human problems with open source learning and 
knowledge sharing as they are conditioned by the old ways of doing the business 
(of life and work). 
 
Contrary to the new economy speech, the old natural laws (quantum motion & 
development) of the economy will govern in the future and this is the reason why it 
makes sense to recognize and predict the wave patterns of the human economic 
behavior (time-value-decisions) which must always be guided by explicit ethical 
principles (‘spiritual physics’). It is this existential interaction of the internal state 
of our minds with physical constraints that makes the economic research so 
exciting and vitally interesting. 
 
The last century was the century of the greatest inflations of paper money ever seen 
in the human economic history, while the 19th century was a period of monetary 
deflations backed by precious metals. Is the quantum of inflation the entropic 
indicator of an economic system ? We claim that the real causes of this quantum 
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movements and developments, that direct the degree of socio-economic order or 
disorder, are scientifically not well understood or precisely researched. The 
cognitive framework or mental state of the economic mind that 
tries to explain human progress via the mathematized maximization of property via 
(fiat) credit (x interest) does simply not allow for such a perception of social 
systemic processes, i.e. it is a technically competent profession, but not a science. 
Quantum thought tries to comprehend the human economic action as the dual 
interplay of micro- and macrokinetic processes of human thermodynamics (macro) 
and mechanics (micro) that causes meta-cyclical motion; it diagnoses the 
psychophysiology of the body economic as a hologram. Every single act of 
payment (micro=mechanical level) directs total production (macro=thermodynamic 
level); however, these economic actions do happen in a meta-cyclical framework of 
natural law as progressive space-time compression or spatio-temporal acceleration 
(Carmeli 2002; and: arXiv:astro-ph/0103008v1 : Lengths of the First days of the 
Universe). The universal economic clock flows in relative cosmological time (with 
a special metric of elastic backward motion) and directs the contractive and 
expansive cybernetics of the open global economic clock and the many closed local 
clocks, i.e. the universal hologram (4D) records the economic workings of the 
geometric globe (3D) and the arithmetic locations (1-2D). Consequently, there is a 
precise methodical distinction between the technical perspective of world economic 
science and the practiced economist professions; it was Levi-Strauss (1961: 397) 
who first coined the term entropology for the entropic actions of the human race, a 
process theory that studies the dynamic disintegration and increasing disorder of 
highly evolved social systems: it was no coincidence, that these entropo-logical 
observations were actually formed in the 1930s in the Brazilian rain forest and as 
visiting research scholar at Sao Paulo University, being together with F.Braudel on 
a French cultural ‘mission’. In any case, the economic relationship between 
entropology and money in the last 250 years has to be studied in more scientific 
depth, but our methodical intuition points to an enigmatic monetary mechanism, 
concerning the entropy of our human economy. In our perception, entropology is 
driven by the following core factors: 
 
A :  Population (dynamics), 
B :  Innovation (patterns), 
C :  Energy (consumption), 
D :  Money (reserves), 
E :  Complexity (acceleration). 
 
These entropological factors occur in a specific temporal order of events and imply 
a sequential causal chain; the historical, empirical and prospective reading of these 
basic quanta is the methodical key to decipher the meaning of the hidden motion in 
the order of space, time and human action via the data science, big analytics and 
visual modelling. The outcome will not be a world formula or theory of everything, 
but future economics in application. G. Plekhanov taught, that the criterion of any 
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human ideal or idea is economic reality and that intellectual beauty cannot be 
equated with scientific truth; the macro-kinetic order in the cyclical and spiral 
nature of hierarchical processes is closer to Kondratieff wave theory of innovation 
than to a Bolshevist end game of history, but the socio-economic evolution and 
selection procedures move in cybernetic feedback temporality and this objective 
systemic algorithms do not ask for subjective pain of victims and human suffering 
as the non-reversibility is the process class.  
 
The instant suspension of the gold reserve standard in WW1 was not a Wallerstein 
bifurcation;  it was a sudden mutual event of the German Kaiser Reich and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain on August 4, 1914: only paper money could 
make for a longer war, postponing all ideal aspirations of universal human 
emancipation, installing war as a special case of global systems evolution. In the 
economic reality, the orbit of the market forces deviates extremely from any ideal 
mathematized equilibriums and only a reasonable politics (of money) can balance 
the antagonistic market capacities of the competing political economies, i.e. the 
market can activate the funeral service if the patient is dying and the most 
expensive economic service is the state funeral. The temporal metaphor of 
Kondratieff wave motion and development can be understood as statistical 
hermeneutics of socio-economic systemic processes in the polity and the market; it 
is the temporal order of sequential factors (population/dynamics, 
innovation/patterns, energy/consumption, money/reserves and 
complexity/compression) and their possible fractalization where the methodical 
rules of empirical statistics are no more applicable in the usual reading of events.  
 
After WW1 it was indeed foolish to restore old gold parities as the economic 
parameters had forever changed; institutions like the gold commission of the 
League of Nations and afterwards the Bank of International Settlements were 
mentally simply not prepared for a methodical shift to new monetary standards. We 
are sure that this non-reversible event can be studied by the social scientific method 
and that it can be interpreted statistically via the mechanical and thermodynamic 
entropy of the quantum system of the world economy as fractal stage. Of course, 
this immediately calls for an applicable theory of bifurcation in extreme income 
inequality, radical social conflict, public revolution, imperial inter-state war and 
hopefully world peace for trade and change; it also implies the unavoidable 
question of human liberty and solidarity and their relatively limited degrees of 
freedom in social inter-action, i.e. the dynamic and efficient interplay of physical 
constraint and human economic action (or our internal state of minds). 
 
An ideological overestimation of the human freedom of action in the social world 
generally finalizes in the unreasonable notion that social science should 
methodically not be tight to the application or higher order of natural law, to 
achieve a more exact or precise discipline. We do not think that the socio-economic 
research and development can be solely built upon hermeneutic interpretation and 
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mathematized artifacts; on the contrary, we propose to empirically extract abstract 
information (patterns) and modelling (regularities) from big data science and 
knowledge discovery in data set bases. Statistical interpretation and data 
visualization are at the core of this mathematical creativity, concerning the data 
mining and decision tree learning of regular patterns as discrete classification or 
continuous regression of events/parameters on a temporal scale.  
 
The quantization and quantification of qualitative entropic tendencies identify the 
uncertainty and randomness of systemic processes in the order of time; general 
formulae for data redundancy measurement do exist as social entropy indexes, e.g. 
for income inequality research. Thus methodical ingenuity can open up new social 
research ways into the global scientific analysis of economic wave patterns, 
regularities and space-time. The statistical learning problem of regular inference 
and prediction in pattern recognition is the background program for the methodical 
detection of discrete waves and continuous elements on the economic radar of the 
social evolution in the history and future of the world system. 
 
The empirical intelligence of methodical statistics and probability is field and path 
dependent; the precise observation of rapid evolutionary change in human social 
systems is therefore bound to the exact methodical distinction between regular and 
non-regular statistics, i.e. every form of counting is finite, but different velocities or 
time-scales do apply for measuring the clock signals of distinct data sets. 
 
Disease, disaster and death are real human bifurcations of order or chaos; 
E.Schrödinger insisted permanently on the empirical fact, that a rapidly progressing 
degree of entropy causes the mortal crisis of the organized life. Advancing 
methodical mathematics beyond intellectual beauty works by heuristic intuition and 
finally via logical proof; cybernetic signal processing in living social systems can 
better be researched into by non-deterministic maths and intuitive modelling. In the 
living case of process-learning, cause and effect are not always proportional; the 
non-linear relationships may depend on simple initial conditions accompanied by 
extreme high sensitivity of a process momentum. Pattern recognition is bound to 
data as vectors of multiple dimensions; data dimensionality estimation models of a 
mathematical set become therefore empirically crucial. In addition, the statistical and 
probabilistic interplay of local data samples with whole data sets calls for a 
methodical integration of topological and global scaling. Consequently, multi-fractal 
meters of complexity change are always signaling changes in detail and scale at the 
same time; however, low cardinality and high dimensionality in the same 
mathematical set of data remain an open measuring problem and more methodical 
exactness in measuring techniques is still a creative guess. The economic 
management of physical bifurcation and chaos in a complex social system depends 
on the precise perception, observation and exact measurement of the appropriate 
general time-scale and specific ‘data clocks’; this is the great methodical challenge 
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of the social scientific research in our current age of global wave compression in the 
social economy of the world humanity. 
 
Will we be all buried in Polya’s urn? A Chinese restaurant or Indian buffet process 
is preferable, but what can be done ? Any human social system is an open and non-
reversible thermodynamic set and the entropic acceleration of the political 
economy in the world system started in the early 1970s, with the monetary fiat big 
bang. Since then, population dynamics and energy consumption doubled in total 
terms, the driving innovation pattern became auto-electronic information 
processing and the monetary reserve requirement ratio points to minus 0, with the 
exception of some ‘emerging’ economies. 
 
Complexity globally multiplies via space-time compression and can only be 
communicated methodically, but it cannot be ‘controlled’ by socio-economic 
engineering. In addition, global scaling and topological measuring are not logical 
identities, but are governed by universal natural laws of space, time and energy. 
Peace, health and prosperity are dependent on a social balance of liberty and 
solidarity, i.e. free association and social ethics. Therefore, it is decisive to revive 
modern liberal thought for political economics and social philosophy.  
 
Socialism for the rich and capitalism for the poor is no solution (private gain = 
public loss), i.e. organized pockets of wealth vs. disintegrated pools of poverty; the 
land/natural resource and state/tax monopoly has to be reviewed scientifically, but 
it is radically more important to rethink the private monetary monopoly of fiat 
credit (x interest) and public monetary politics. 
 
The author has the powerful metaphor in mind, of a triangular formation body of 
birds, where the strongest flies in front and creates the waves, that carry those 
behind who are weaker or tired; another natural metaphor is stork thermic: even the 
carnivore stork knows how to use the thermodynamic waves, where every 
organism can realize his full potential and where great group cooperation is of 
more evolutionary benefit than unnatural over-competition. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The universal clock reading in the topological measuring and global scaling of 
socio-economic data is a methodical problem-generation of pattern recognition and 
prediction. The key factors and indicators of global wave compression are 
identified, with special attention to global monetary wave theory and quantum 
economic science as world historic bifurcation. Decision tree learning and data 
science strategies are discussed for dynamic communication with the natural 
hierarchy, sequence and temporality of entropic order or chaos, pointing to a 
distinction between ‘general’ and ‘specific’ statistical learning. The role of the 
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entropology as a natural metaphor for the integrated perception, observation and 
measurement of the psychophysical body of the human social economy is exactly 
defined and a precise methodical thought is elaborated for the economic theory and 
management practice. 
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István Deák 
 
Sustainability is Conditional on Globalization. 
 
Globalization does not apply for a visa 
 
The “globalization” is one of the most frequently used terms nowadays; some see it 
as the way out; others define it as a dark tunnel terminating in a dead-end. There 
are few thinkers without an opinion on or a definition of the globalization. It is 
often linked to the emergence of the demographic problems of overpopulation, the 
deteriorating conditions of the environment, and the constantly decreasing – still 
extractable – fossil fuel reserves on the Earth. Globalization is not a modern 
phenomenon: such endeavours already appeared in the ancient times. In 2001, the 
Encarta Encyclopaedia defined the globalisation as follows: “The integration and 
democratization of the culture, economy and infrastructure of the world through the 
impact of transnational investments, the rapid spread of information and 
communication technologies, and the free market on local, regional, and national 
economies.”8  
 
The globalisation does not apply for a visa when, after crossing a developped 
country, it arrives at the border of a developping or undevelopped country. It does 
not even slow down, ask any questions, or care about the direction of the changes 
its arrival will cause. It brings the message of the globalized world and begins 
colonization using its tools for uniformization. The question of convergence to the 
vanguard of the world is a very important issue and ambition; however, local 
interests also exist, and success may depend on recognizing, accepting, and 
respecting those. The waves of globalization, that reach our country, will most 
likely not adjust to (and carry forward) our tried and tested systems and processes, 
or only to a marginal extent – it is (or would be) our task to incorporate elements, 
achievements, and innovations, that arrive from the outside and are positive for us 
into our everyday operation. 
 
The globalisation distributes developped technologies and innovations as products, 
most of which are aimed at improving the efficiency of  the  human life, relieving 
its burdens, or making it more comfortable. These values and products take control 
of our lives and reorganize them without we notice it, and we usually only become 
aware of this when suddenly they are unable to fulfil their previous functions and 
                                                 
 
8
 “Globalization”. Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2001 http://encarta.msn.com (19 
Aug. 2001) 
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perform their tasks. Just think of the annoyance and problems that a broken mobile 
phone can cause us. It carries half of our life !  
 
I think that the duality mentioned above definitely exists in connection with the 
globalization and its effects (consequences), partly due to the complexity of this 
process or phenomenon, and partly due to heterogeneous conditions in the material 
world. The advance of the globalization as a worldwide phenomenon is highly 
visible; we generally also notice its fruits and achievements – the part that is harder 
to see and is less tangible consists in the latent impact of the latter on our lives and 
the points of connection. What initially simplifies our life and relieves our burden 
can, over time and in extreme cases, directly or indirectly lead to the development 
of dependencies. The globalization accelerates our life.  
 
The globalisation is a necessary (and inevitable) process, which can have both 
positive and negative consequences. Trying to stop the spread of the fruits of 
technology, inventions, innovations, etc. created and realised as a result of diverse 
experiments and research – with the aim of stopping or slowing down the 
globalization – is a collection of useless efforts all in vain, and also goes straight 
against the idea of progress. The key to the spread and rate of the globalization is 
the development and change of technologies. The globalization changes the life 
and living conditions of people and their communities, often re- or overwriting 
established value systems. The emergence of a global shift in priorities from 
productive activities towards services offers objective evidence of the paradigm 
shift on the globalization. The globalization can lead to the formation of so-called 
transnational dependencies between the countries of the world, which could result 
in more intensive – cross-border – mutual dependence between various countries.  
 
Our efforts have always carried the intention of making the world and its processes 
transparent; these, however, have become virtual in the meanwhile. Our opinion 
about values has changed, and so have our value systems. Dimensions, scales, and 
index numbers have also changed. In former times, the total wealth of the world 
would have filled dozens of airplane hangars; today, it would all fit onto a plastic 
card (bank card). Virtuality also provides a certain kind of discretion, as for 
example we are unable to tell about two bank cards placed next to each other which 
one has funds and which one is “empty”. Coins rattling in our pockets and wrinkled 
banknotes are being completely replaced by electronic signals, while merry social 
gatherings are substituted by electronic transactions and interactions launched 
simultaneously from diverse geographic locations and areas. It is as if we needed 
this weightlessness and intangibility! Reality has become bipolar, building from 
light and darkness. 
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The link between sustainability and environmental protection 
 
According to the definition given by the ancient Romans, the sustainability can be 
described as the existence without interruption or diminution, a never-ending, 
stable condition.    
 
The UN World Commission on Environment and Development, led by the 
Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland defined the sustainable 
development in the following way in its report entitled “Our Common Future”, 
published in 1987: “The sustainable development is a development (of land, cities, 
businesses, societies, etc.) that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”9 The 
report outlined a possible new era of economic growth, which relies to a great 
extent on the global implementation of a sustainable development, while also 
keeping a sharp focus on the importance of preserving natural resources. This could 
be the recipe for success, which at the same time offers hope of winning the battle 
against ever-growing poverty in the majority of developping and undevelopped 
countries. Another important issue, still to be tackled, is the wear of the 
environment; this, however, must be realized without forsaking the economic 
growth and without damaging or distorting the principles of social equality and 
justice. The continuity must not be broken: the conditions that ensure the survival 
of future generations must be created in the present. The today’s mankind actively 
shapes the fate of the coming generations, who could become passive sufferers of 
wrong decisions or irresponsible behaviour in the present.      
 
As the Declaration of the World Academies of Science defined it: "The 
sustainability is meeting the present needs of the mankind, while simultaneously 
preserving the environment and natural resources for future generations."
10
 Here 
too, the emphasis is on continuity;  in addition to preserving natural resources, I 
would consider their renewal and the search for alternative sources of energy 
important as well. I believe that the sustainability is more than simply preserving 
the present conditions for future generations. There must be a potential, a reserve in 
the system, which can ensure the survival of the generations that follow us. All 
scientific research the result and outcome of which is still unknown at present 
constitutes such reserves. If we start feverish research when there is already a 
burning need for a solution, it is usually too late. Just as we must start saving, when 
we still have money. 
                                                 
 
9
 "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". (UNITED, N. (1987). 
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press p. 43.) 
10
 Transition towards sustainability ; Declaration of the World Acadamies of Science, Tokyo, 2000. 
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Herman Daly defined this as follows: "sustainable development is attaining 
permanent social welfare without growth beyond the capacity of the ecological 
sustainability". The growth is an important issue: since we cannot increase the size 
of the Earth, and so the quantity of its natural treasures, either, we must inevitably 
become more efficient. The constantly increasing population and the consumption 
it generates can only be sustained by increasing efficiency or introducing new 
technologies, always assuming that no one wants to make an ascetic change to their 
consumption habits.  
 
The three fundamental pillars of the sustainable development relate to social, 
economic, and environmental aspects. If we wish to elaborate any sort of 
development strategy or program, we must examine these pillars jointly and assess 
the relations and interactions between them. Only after this, we can (could) develop 
specific programs and measures.    
 
According to the Dalai Lama : “a clean environment is a human right like any 
other. It is therefore part of our responsibility towards others to ensure that the 
world we pass on is as healthy, if not healthier, as we found it.”11 (Piburn 1990: 
107). The socialization of burdens and privatization of benefits make sustainability 
into more of a moral issue, which is one more reason why we should not examine 
the questions about sustainability solely from environmental and economic aspects. 
 
As a result of the changes caused by its activities that pollute and destroy the 
environment, the mankind, too, became more vulnerable. It is not possible to 
pollute the environment without consequences, as by contaminating it we are 
making ourselves ill. The harmful human impact on the environment is constantly 
intensifying; initially, nature responds at a local level, for example in the form of 
acid rain or undrinkable water supplies, and over time the constantly escalating 
burden on the environment could lead to the emergence of global phenomena such 
as climate change. Humans are organic creatures, who obtain from the environment 
the materials and resources required for the survival. Polluted or poisoned 
environment can also make man fall ill – both the environment and humans possess 
an immune system that is capable of absorbing the unwanted by-products of 
various activities to a certain extent. Just like in the case of man, the capacity of the 
nature to absorb and transform pollutants is limited and finite. If these are 
overloaded, the ecosystem becomes damaged, potentially exposing the species that 
live in it – including the mankind – to the risk of harm. Severe harm to any of the 
elements of the water-air-soil triumvirate will quickly damage the other two, and 
man itself, as well. Healthy soil watered with polluted water becomes polluted, and 
                                                 
 
11
 The Dalai Lama. “A Question of Our Own Survival” 12. An Ethical Approach To Environmental 
Protection p. 107. 
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if we inhale polluted air into our lungs, healthy water and soil will not save us. The 
extent and probability of the mankind’s vulnerability is directly proportional to the 
increase in environmental pollution. The more polluting elements surround us in 
greater quantities, the more likely it becomes that we will lose our health.     
 
The population growth can be regarded as the root of the environmental pollution 
as a global problem, since the principle of “more people consume more” can offer a 
rational explanation. This, however, is not the sole explanation, as the mankind’s 
irresponsible behaviour, hedonistic desire for more assets, and irresponsible, short-
sighted, “carpe diem” type of decisions have greatly contributed to the present 
situation. Pointing fingers at each other and engaging in fancy-sounding, grandiose 
campaigns based on “hooray optimism” without a real desire to act, are of no help 
anymore. 
 
Since man is usually considered tiny in terms of both scale and opportunities in 
comparison with society and the world, he can only start environmentally a friendly 
consumption and attitude on a small scale. However, it is not certain that the small 
contributions will add up and amount to a large one. “Each single everyday act of 
ours that serves the interest of environmentally friendly consumption is an important 
manifestation of a ‘conscious lifestyle’. On a daily basis, they remind us of precious 
things, but also of the tasks ahead of us that are becoming increasingly more 
difficult. Despite this, these individual acts are dwarfed by future challenges, and 
cannot result in the change that is already so sorely needed.”12 (Maniates 2012 : 
245). Feelings of either “I am too small for this and cannot do it” or “what does it 
matter on a universal scale what I do” could easily overcome us, and either of them 
places a burden on the individual that blocks his initiatives or stops those before they 
could even start. Environmentally friendly consumption and change are favoured as 
long as they are “wallet-friendly”.  
 
The spread of environmental awareness and of an environmentally friendly attitude 
are extremely important, as they can take us in the desired direction on both the 
short- and long runs. However, environmental pollution cannot be eliminated from 
one day to the next, even if every single person in the world suddenly became 
environmentally conscious. This is impossible due to modern-day technology and 
the consumption by the mankind necessary for the survival.  
 
Covering geographical distances, heating homes, and producing the basic tools 
necessary for life are largely based on fossil fuels. The meaning and importance of 
the environmentally friendly attitude of an individual is not that it will completely 
eliminate pollution, but that the individual will undergo a change of philosophy, as 
a result of which he will value develop a conscious and economical relation with 
                                                 
 
12
 from 2012, available at www.storyofchange.org (downloaded on: 03.03.2014, 23:37)  
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the environment. It is this change of attitude that an individual can achieve in his 
own environment, and that can have a positive impact in the future. The value of 
this is more than simply recycling newspapers instead of throwing them in the 
rubbish. Countering global pollution requires techniques and tools that work on a 
global scale. Everyone must be conscious in their attempt to protect the 
environment. The point is not simply ensuring that people return empty bottles to 
the bottle bank and throw empty aluminium cans in the recycling machine – 
although these, too, are important and significant.  
 
The optimal situation would be, if they realized, that they must act because the 
planet Earth can no longer bear their wasteful ways. An important aspect in the 
return of bottles is the change in attitude, which must be global; that is, it must take 
extend to an ever larger area – and the globalization, that has taken place, provides 
an opportunity for this. For this reason, too, the view that the individual is just a 
grain of sand in the world, and so it makes no difference if they return a few 
bottles, as this will not help with anything and is without significance is 
unacceptable. It is unacceptable that they do not do it because they consider 
themselves and their acts too small and too marginal compared to the whole (the 
world).  
 
This means that the problems caused during the globalization through ignoring the 
environment must be limited and resolved within the framework of and using the 
opportunities provided by the globalization. 
 
The environmental pollution and the pollution conditions are a global, rather than a 
local problem, even if the pollution typically results from local processes. Controls, 
methods, techniques, technologies, and consequences, however, point far beyond a 
specific location. Similarly to the energy problems of the world, the question of the 
environmental pollution cannot be resolved globally. Local initiatives and 
measures are necessary for their efficient and effective operation. According to the 
most recent relevant research, the monetary value of the current environmental 
damage amounts to approx. 6.7% of the global GDP.  
 
The mass spread of motorisation has led to an increase in the number of cars on the 
roads, and since more cars consume more fuel, the burden they place on the 
environment is also increasing. It is also easy to see that, if these cars travel 
everywhere, they will also pollute the air everywhere. This, however, is only true in 
theory, as thanks to technical and technological advances, vehicles on the roads are 
increasingly more economical and environmentally friendly, so despite their larger 
number, harmful emissions may decrease. The emission of harmful substances of a 
modern truck is lower than that of a less modern scooter, despite the fact that the 
cylinder capacity of the first is nearly 300 (!) times that of the second, and in terms 
of horsepower, too, there is a factor of at least 100 between them. And we have not 
yet mentioned the size and weight of the load they transport. We need them: at 
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present there is no alternative or solution that could fully replace them. The issue of 
reducing the environmental pollution cannot be tackled by banning vehicles with 
internal combustion engines. Just as we cannot close nuclear power plants from one 
day to the next claiming that they are dangerous and that their waste materials 
represent a huge burden on the environment – although this is true, currently we do 
not possess the technology or an alternative that would allow us to produce the 
amount of energy generated by nuclear power plants. And then we have not yet 
discussed other political issues (e.g. reducing the energy dependency), which 
further limit our options. As a result of the explosive spread of electronic, 
entertainment, household, computer and other IT devices and appliances there is 
hardly a household today where we would not find these. Due to the ever faster 
innovation and efficient marketing, the life cycle of products is decreasing, that is, 
we are replacing our TVs, mobile phones, washing machines, computers, etc. with 
increasing frequency. Parts of these can be recycled, while other parts end up as 
waste. More and more people are buying such devices or appliances, which leads to 
the generation of a vast amount of waste even with the most efficient recycling 
methods.  
 
Naturally, the solution cannot be a ban. It is not possible to forbid people to drive 
cars, to shut nuclear power plants immediately, and to declare that no one may buy 
a new mobile phone. 
 
The spread of cars, nuclear power plants, televisions, mobile phones, washing 
machines, computers, etc. can all be linked to the globalization; accordingly the 
answer related to them in terms of limiting environmental pollution will also be 
provided by the globalization. The spread of electric and hybrid cars also attests 
this, and the vehicles of the future will (perhaps) run on hydrogen and/or nitrogen. 
Serious research is being conducted in connection with the utilisation of alternative 
sources of energy; the use of hydro/wind/solar etc. energy will eventually replace 
nuclear power plants. Renewable and other alternative sources of energy will gain 
ground, overtaking fissile and fossil fuels. The question of reusability is already a 
primary consideration in the production of televisions, mobile phones, washing 
machines, computers, etc. – as a result, these products contain an increasing 
number of parts made from recycled materials and the percentage of the products 
that can be recycled is also increasing.  
According to Einstein: “We cannot solve problems by using the same kind of 
thinking we used when we created them.”  
 
The examples given above show that the cause of the problem is not the 
globalization itself, even if, simplifying connections, we often like to blame it for 
this process. What has actually happened is that a widespread lifestyle, which has 
become the norm under different circumstances, or in other cases a particular 
philosophy or value system did not have a positive impact in the new globalized 
world, and in fact made a certain kind of waste evident. This mistake can only be 
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regarded as natural as long as we do not accept it, since adapting to the economic 
and technological changes is a slow process, and man is only capable of changing 
his value system slowly. However, we cannot ruin the next generations with our 
slowness and our insistence on an unsuitable value system - we must heed the 
words of Einstein and change our attitude. 
 
A difficult question concerns the extent to which the problems caused by the 
globalization can be solved within the framework of the globalization, or perhaps 
through the new situation. What determines whether a problem can be solved, and 
which are those problems? Is there a general rule?  
 
The globalization is firstly integration, secondly a system of mutual dependencies, 
and thirdly a process that organizes social, political, and economic players into 
networks. Local initiatives and changes can be part of the globalization as much as 
changes on a global scale, and are often equivalent to the latter, which can be 
traced back to the revaluation of the role of geographic locations.  
 
Positive results/prospects of the globalization can include: 
 
A united and strong global governance could emerge more efficient adaptation to 
climate change through market mechanisms use of alternative/renewable sources of 
energy, decrease in the use of fossil fuels change of paradigm - the so-called 
“techno-optimistic”13 school of thought gaining ground. 
 
These would not hinder the economic growth; on the contrary, the achievements, 
solutions, and results of the globalization promote the growth of processes. 
 
The principal driving force of development is the competition and the economic 
growth; the world is transforming into a global society. 
 
Negative results/prospects of the globalization in a specific society could be: 
 
Extreme climatic conditions; the mankind will be unable to cope with extreme 
weather and its consequences: 
- unsustainability, decreasing biodiversity, 
 
- decelerating economic growth, “escaping” capital, 
 
- deteriorating living standards and conditions, 
                                                 
 
13
 The techno-optimistic viewpoint, which holds that technology is not neutral, but essentially 
beneficial and good, was born in the modern era and industrial societies, in conjunction with the 
mechanistic world view.  
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- anarchy in national governments, 
 
- collapse of supply systems,  
 
- re-drawing the map of the world (conflicts, riots, armed clashes), 
 
- social and environmental obstacles to finding a technical solution to various 
problems,  
 
- serious difficulty in finding a solution,   
 
- lack of an alternative or technology that could replace or fully substitute 
fossil fuels once they are exhausted. 
 
David Held defines three groups of thoughts on globalisation: 
 
- (Hyper)globalist: the globalization is a fundamentally new and radical series 
of changes, which will eventually lead to the creation of a global society 
and economy, that encompass the entire world. A global society, in which 
nation-states, national economies, and national cultures no longer have a 
place. 
- Sceptical: the strengthening of internationalisation – not on a global scale, 
though. Neither nation-states nor national economies and cultures will 
disappear. What is happening today is in fact triadization, that is, increasing 
integration between the three large regional blocks of the world economy. It 
is about increasingly closer cooperation between three major regions, not 
about social and economic integration on a global scale. 
- Transformational viewpoint: it lies between the two extremist viewpoints, 
and holds that the globalization will lead to a host of economic, social, and 
cultural changes and transformations, which will create a new system of 
conditions for economic, social, and political players, with each player 
creating a new role for themselves according to the new rules of the game. 
 
Globalization, localization, glocalization 
 
Through the figurative dissolution and transparency of political borders, the 
boundaries of social and cultural systems, too, became virtual, which led to the 
acceleration and increase of the speed and number of interactions between different 
nations. The new, computerized industries and production cultures created by 
innovation and technological development represent the (new) centres of gravity of 
the world economy.  
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It may seem that the globalization will create new opportunities for global 
economic growth, and thereby for attaining a higher standard of living, fostering 
the convergence and integration of poorer countries. In reality, however, poorer 
countries suffering setbacks is the more frequent scenario. 
 
According to Bakonyi, “Instead, the glocalization refers to the fact that people’s 
identity has already changed: they see their own situation and themselves 
differently, and react to an external impact, namely, the process of globalization in 
the spirit of post-national citizenship, rather than national sovereignty.” (Bakonyi 
2005: 96) This may also mean that people and their communities are no longer 
passive participants in the process of glocalization, not passive “victims” of these 
events, but are shapers and makers of their own lives. “If every member of every 
community carefully strives to find a human, democratic, and global solution to 
their own local problems, we can expect to see significant changes in the areas of 
preserving the environment and preventing famine, natural disasters, diseases and 
other global and local catastrophes, and we may even count on finding solutions to 
certain problems.” (Tóth 2001: 89) In its reply to the challenges of the future, the 
mankind must find the united and well-functioning role of the global and the local, 
must embrace global and local contents together and at the same time. At present, 
the global is usually in contrast to the local.  
 
According to glocalization, which lies behind the slogan of “think globally, act 
locally”, global problems or the risk that such will emerge can be greatly reduced 
through correct local decisions. This, too, shows that the activities of local 
communities and the developments coordinated by them have a major role and 
importance.    
 
The localization and the globalization are not mutually exclusive expressions: even 
though their effects are opposite, they shape the life and latitude of local societies 
jointly.   
 
The localization is the totality of processes “that can offer powerful protection to 
regions that form an autonomous part of the world against processes that 
homogenize everything, be they integration, colonization or globalization.” (Tóth 
2001: 88-89). The glocalization as a concept and goal does not mean replacing the 
local values eliminated with global ones, but offers a proposal for solving local 
problems with a global frame of mind.  
 
The glocalization was born from the harmonization/juxtaposition of the 
globalization and the localization, and involves global governance in affairs, that 
concern all of the mankind, but leaves the freedom of decision and measures at the 
local level. As a result of two partial processes – globalization and localization – 
the glocalization, on the one hand, refers to the global nature of products created 
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locally and used worldwide, and on the other hand, shows the process of 
adaptation, as a result of which the globally circulated product is adjusted to the 
expectations of the local cultural environment, becoming once again local in the 
process. In a narrower sense, the glocalization can be defined as a marketing 
strategy, the main task of which is to customize global products to local markets. In 
a wider sense, it is a strategy for developping the society and the economy, that 
build on the interaction between local and global resources, and result in an 
opportunity for combining those.      
 
The role of the individual and of technology in sustainability and environmental 
protection. 
 
In terms of the existence and functioning of the globalization, productive activities 
and technologies are extremely important factors. Without them, there would be 
nothing to globalize and no tools that could carry out the globalization. Another 
very important aspect is morality, which, however, is insufficient in itself – 
technical solutions are necessary. Without technology there is no globalization. If 
the globalization is based on the technology, then the environmental pollution is 
also global.    
 
The fruits of the technology and the innovation are in most cases attractive to the 
individual, and most people are generally inclined to purchase them. The intention 
is therefore usually present, and if it is coupled with the purchasing power, the 
innovation can become practically self-supporting, with functioning automatic 
mechanisms. Just as long as there is someone to invent new things…  
 
An integral part of the issue of the sustainability concerns the wasteful use of raw 
materials, such as the widespread use of cars, which in our age is virtually the first 
tool of the globalization, also in the sense that it causes pollution globally. We live 
in a society of information; therefore, we must not underrate the polluting power of 
the information either.    
 
The average person – although her role is crucial – is typically inexperienced with 
regard to the issues of the sustainability and environmental protection. Most people 
try to buy a car with lower fuel consumption, and can understand and accept the 
importance of selective waste collection. They consider the use of recyclable or 
bulk packaging materials important, and buy natural products instead of artificial 
ones, if they can. These decisions are still mostly based on economic aspects; it is 
often cost-effectiveness that makes the individual environmentally conscious. They 
favour environmental awareness as long as it is economically advantageous to 
them, but face a dilemma when they would already have to make a sacrifice for the 
sustainability and environment. A simple and clear situation, a series of simple 
decisions. 
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A shift in attitude, which will most likely happen slowly and gradually (if at all) is 
very important, and so is a direction of the technological development that must 
and will act against the environmental pollution. There is no other solution. To take 
the example of the internal combustion engine, we must find those methods, 
techniques, and technologies that can solve the global problem of pollution from 
exhaust gases on a global level. Until revolutionary techniques and technologies 
(electric, hybrid, hydrogen, nitrogen, helium, etc. drives) become widespread and 
force out classic, internal combustion vehicles from the markets, an invention is 
needed to reduce the environmental damage caused by exhaust gases. A new fuel 
type or composition or a new method of filtering out pollutants must be invented. 
However, this invention or new tool will then have an impact everywhere, because 
people will need it to keep using their cars. It is true that pollution occurs at 
specific locations. Making busy stretches of one-way roads could be a local 
solution, as it could even halve traffic and the environmental burden. However, 
these local solutions only treat the symptoms (these are important in this respect), 
and do not tackle the roots of the problem. The ultimate solution could be a 
technique or technology that will result in cars in their present form no longer 
polluting our environment.        
 
“We must therefore recognize, that it is the technological development that 
globalizes the world in the sense that every society uses the same tools, regardless 
of its structure. Through this, they connect to the operating system of the world.” 
(Tóth 2001: 82) 
 
The globalization will also bring the latest technological achievements to the 
poorer countries and regions of the world, if there is a demand for this. This 
demand is simply the desire of less developped regions to integrate with and 
become alike to more developped ones. A shepherd in a poor (disadvantaged) 
country may use the same ultramodern, premium category mobile phone as a 
hotshot banker on Wall Street. The globalization is not selective, it will not refuse 
to enter somewhere saying that nobody there needs what it is offering. It offers the 
opportunity to obtain goods, and can therefore play an important role in realizing 
the convergence – the fact that masses of people cannot obtain those due to internal 
or external obstacles is a different matter.   
 
“Certain types of political and economic systems are more likely to aggravate 
environmental problems, while others react better to an emerging or present 
environmental crisis.” (Stover–Vinck 2008: 729). Just think of the difference in the 
reaction to a natural disaster and the crisis situation it creates and the tools 
available for tackling these between the governments of the United States of 
America and that of a poor country. Due to its extensive and developped industrial 
activity the first is more likely to cause a natural disaster than the latter, and 
therefore will more likely be able to solve it, as well. It is prepared, with crisis 
plans, connections, capital, and tools. The globalization creates the possibility of 
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environmental pollution, but pollution is committed by man, who therefore bears 
the primary responsibility for it.  
 
It is not enough if a single country or region attempts to find a solution to the 
pollution that threatens our entire world and its further spread. Since pollution 
knows no borders, the solution must also transcend them. The globalization 
provides a basis for such a new form of collective thinking and cooperation. 
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„Im Gegensatz zu den Erwartungen und der Überzeugung, die aus der Vorannahme 
totaler Kommunikationstransparenz das Nonplusultra des Geschichtsbewusstseins 
gemacht hatten, sollte sich das konsensuelle Bewusstsein als genauso erblindet 
herausstellen, wie das der am Zusammenbruch des Konsenses beteiligten 
Individuen. Das Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein sieht sich genauso wenig in der 
Lage, bedingungslos seine Rechte geltend zu machen, wie das 
Gerechtigkeitsbewusstsein, von dem die Legitimation der Programmierung sozialer 
Entwicklung erwartet wurde. Denn eines entpuppte sich als zunehmend verdächtig: 
die Richtigkeit dieser kollektiven Faszination, die das Gerechtigkeitsideal ausübt.“ 
Jacques Poulain 
Das globalisierte Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein und die Grenzen des modernen 
Gerechtigkeitsideals 
 
« Le paradoxe dévoilé se résout ainsi dans la mise en tension entre des projets 
(celui de « la globalisation » et celui des mondialisations) dont le rapport aux 
droits de l’Homme constitue comme la ligne de démarcation. » 
François de Bernard 
Le paradoxe de «la globalisation», des mondialisations et des droits de l’Homme 
 
“The ability to lose elections, to acknowledge the value of rules of the democratic 
game irrespective of who comes to power, to wait for consequent elections and 
work hard to win – these are actually the essential signs of social readiness for 
democracy.”  
Leonid E. Grinin and Andrey V. Korotayev 
Revolution and Democracy in the Context of Globalization 
 
“…since the globalization is uneven, the majority of the traditional societies react 
defensively against it in the form of counteracting the process of integration as well 
as conducting the politics of localization and support to local cultures in every 
possible way.” 
Alexander N. Chumakov 
Social Aspects of Globalization 
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“A social enterprise is a business that can hardly be sold later as a business. At this 
early stage, there is no calculable market value of it, only its goodwill and other 
intangibles, at least – quite beyond of accounting, as yet. Its value-added is hidden 
in its network it helps animating…No purchaser can animate that – say proprietary 
– network. Social capital is not transferable. Ironically enough, the proven 
availability of a usable personal network usually qualifies one for a bank credit to 
the tune of micro financing. Because social entrepreneurs operate within a social 
context rather than the weak-bonds interwoven business world, they have limited 
access to other means of raising capital. Social capital is therefore – to this limited 
extent - convertible to capital without strings.” 
András Kelen 
The Distinctive Role of Collaborative Networks in the Social Economy. Towards a 
More Operational Definition of Social Entrepreneurship 
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Jacques Poulain 
 
Das globalisierte Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein und die Grenzen des modernen 
Gerechtigkeitsideals 
 
Als Wahrzeichen der neuen – und ebenso der alten – Weltunordnung zeigt die 
Globalisierung, ohne sie verbergen zu können, die Schwierigkeiten einer 
Umstrukturierung der Gesellschaft, die sich um die Achtung der Gerechtigkeit 
bemüht, um die proportionalen Verteilungsverhältnisse von Aufgaben und Gütern 
allein auf der Basis einer Ethik der Solidarität, der Verantwortung und des 
gemeinschaftlichen Einvernehmens zu regulieren. 
 
Zwar haben die Menschenrechte in fast allen Ländern der Welt tatsächlich Eingang 
in die Verfassung gefunden, und sie scheinen über den politischen 
Kräfteverhältnissen zu stehen. Doch hat sich die eigentliche Umsetzung dieser 
Rechte zunehmend als von der realen Fähigkeit der Länder abhängig erwiesen, sich 
als Schiedsrichter zwischen den politischen Kräften und den multinationalen 
Unternehmen zu bewähren. Mit dem zunehmenden Einfluss des ökonomischen 
Experimentierens zu Lasten der politischen Regulierung der ökonomischen 
Beziehungen ist es den Staaten faktisch unmöglich geworden, die unter dem 
Rentabilitätskriterium entstandenen, bzw. verstärkten Ungerechtigkeiten zu 
kompensieren. Indem so viele Bürger wie nur möglich von der Sozial- und 
Krankenversicherung und vom Bezug von Arbeitslosengeld ausgeschlossen und so 
Vielen wie nur möglich die Mittel entzogen werden, sich Bildung und Wohnung 
verschaffen zu können, haben die Staaten zahlreiche Nicht-Bürger erzeugt, d.h. 
Menschen, die der realen Ausübung ihrer privaten und bürgerlichen Rechte beraubt 
sind. 
 
Demnach hat die kapitalistische Dynamik der Unterwerfung das letzte Wort 
bekommen, und zwar allen liberalen Ansprüchen zum Trotz, die Gleichheit von 
jedem im Respekt seiner Meinungsfreiheit und im Horizont einer brüderlichen 
Solidarität zu garantieren. Wie kann aber unter diesen Umständen die Basis eines 
liberalen Rechtsstaates errichtet und zugleich diese politisch-wirtschaftliche 
Organisationsform als die einzige theoretisch rechtfertigt werden, die fähig ist, den 
Benachteiligten so zu dienen, wie es sich Rawls wünschte? 
 
Die Rückkehr der Nationalismen und der interethnischen Konflikte im Europa und 
Afrika der 1980er und 1990er Jahren, die Ausbrüche von Rassenhass in den 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und in Afrika, sowie, zeitnäher, der erneuerte 
Rückfall in religiöse oder politische Fundamentalismen sind nichts anderes als ein 
irrationaler Versuch, Nation, Rasse, Staat oder Religion zu verabsolutieren, um die 
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Krisen der sozialen und ökonomischen Ungerechtigkeit wie durch Zauberei über 
einen Konsens, der zum Garanten des Fortbestandes der Völker gemacht wird, zu 
meistern. Die von der Moderne geerbten juristischen, moralischen und politischen 
Organe erscheinen unfähig, diesen Rückfall in den archaischen Totemismus 
aufzuhalten. Weil er die erzwungenen Befriedungspakte zu Papierleichen macht 
und radikal genug ist, den Streitparteien erteilte Ratschläge und Drohungen nichtig 
zu machen, hebelt dieser Rückfall die Vernunft aus, indem er ihr ganzes 
Selbstvertrauen, sowie ihr Vertrauen darauf zerstört, Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit 
voranzubringen. 
 
Im Gegensatz zu den Erwartungen und der Überzeugung, die aus der Vorannahme 
totaler Kommunikationstransparenz das Nonplusultra des Geschichtsbewusstseins 
gemacht hatten, sollte sich das konsensuelle Bewusstsein als genauso erblindet 
herausstellen, wie das der am Zusammenbruch des Konsenses beteiligten 
Individuen. Das Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein sieht sich genauso wenig in der 
Lage, bedingungslos seine Rechte geltend zu machen, wie das 
Gerechtigkeitsbewusstsein, von dem die Legitimation der Programmierung sozialer 
Entwicklung erwartet wurde. Denn eines entpuppte sich als zunehmend verdächtig: 
die Richtigkeit dieser kollektiven Faszination, die das Gerechtigkeitsideal ausübt. 
Hat man der Menschheit nicht die größtmögliche Ungerechtigkeit angetan, die ihr 
angetan werden konnte, als man ihr Heilsideal in eine Instanz sozialen Glücks 
verwandelte, in ein moralisches Urteil, wonach jeder seinen Vorteil erkennen 
musste, glücklich zu sein: glücklich darüber, sein Glücksgefühl mit dem durch die 
Erfüllung seiner sozialen Pflichten und Rollen verdienten Glück harmonisiert zu 
sehen? Setzt nicht diese Verkettung jedes Einzelnen mit den Wünschen aller, um 
sich zu legitimieren, ein kollektives Wissen der Bedürfnisse, der Normen und des 
Glücks voraus, ein zwar gemeinschaftlich geteiltes Wissen, aber dennoch ein 
Wissen, von dem keiner behaupten könnte, es für sich zu besitzen? 
 
Wenn es dieses kollektive Wissen nicht gibt, bleibt kaum mehr übrig als das 
allgegenwärtige Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein, das gegenüber der Geschichte 
empfunden wird. Es stellte sich dann heraus, dass diese Verkettung aller mit der 
Handlung seit jeher nur eine kollektive Versklavung unter eine als allgemein 
angenommene Wahrnehmung war, die Wissenschaft genannt wurde, unter eine 
undurchschaubare Verteilung der sozialen Aufgaben und Rollen, sowie unter die 
Suche nach einem willkürlich festgesetzten privaten oder kollektiven 
Konsumverhalten. 
 
Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit an sich wäre nur immer gewesen und sollte immer nur 
ein ideologisches gemeinschaftliches Verkettungsmittel zur Erschaffung eines an 
sich selbst und durch sich angeketteten Menschen sein. Die Menschheit hätte ihren 
Glauben an die Geschichte mit dem Opfer ihrer Freiheit an dieses Ideal der 
gemeinschaftlichen Verkettung erbracht: durch eine Heteronomie, die vor der 
Handlung, vor der Wahrnehmung und dem darin empfundenen Glück das Denken 
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selbst befallen hätte. Diese Heteronomie des Denkens hätte damit jeden 
gezwungen, sein eigenes Urteil den theoretischen und praktischen Vorurteilen der 
Gemeinschaft und ihrer Konsumgewohnheiten zu unterwerfen. 
 
Nötigen dieses massive Scheitern der politischen Vernunft und die Wiederkehr 
dieser Zivilisationsübel, die man als überholt ansah, dazu, das moderne Bestreben 
nach Rationalisierung von Kräfteverhältnissen mittels eines die Autonomie der 
Individuen und Gruppen achtenden Gerechtigkeitsideals als irrational zu 
verwerfen? Reicht es aus, die herbeigerufene internationale militärische Gewalt der 
Nationalstaaten umsichtig zu organisieren, um jegliche Gewalt zwischen Ethnien 
oder Gemeinschaften zu neutralisieren und eine friedliche Koexistenz zwischen 
den Gesellschaftsklassen und Rassen, sowie eine Begrenzung des 
Immigrationsrechts zu erzwingen, gerade so, als wäre der Mensch bereits der Feind 
seiner selbst, den jeder in seinem eigenen Inneren zu bekämpfen hätte? Sollte man 
dieses von der modernen Religionsphilosophie der allmächtigen Götter ererbte 
Bestreben nach rationaler Macht aufgeben? Bezeugen nicht tatsächlich die 
nationalistischen, rassistischen und fundamentalistischen Phänomene, dass das 
moderne Bild des Menschen insofern falsch war, als es ihm einen Kampf gegen 
seine Begierden und die Suche nach Selbstbeherrschung verschrieb, anstatt die 
Objektivität seiner Wünsche abzuwägen? 
 
Das distributive Gerechtigkeitskonzept, auf dem die nordamerikanischen Rechts- 
und Politik-Institutionen beruhen, ist einem objektiven Honorierungsmodell im 
Tausch entlehnt, das im Rahmen des Paradigmas des Kommunikationsaustauschs 
und am Beispiel des Vertrags zwischen freiwilligen freien Individuen entworfen 
wurde. Ausgerechnet in dem Bestreben, das im Vertrag enthaltene 
Gerechtigkeitsideal zu verwirklichen, wird die Schwäche des Begriffs eines 
gemeinschaftlichen Engagements offensichtlich, dessen Scheitern den 
unvermeidbaren und zugleich irrationalen Charakter der Forderungen nach sich 
zieht. Die Reduzierung der Gerechtigkeitsfragen auf formale prozedurale Fragen ist 
nämlich dem anthropologischen, dem Subjektkonzept zugrunde liegenden Modell 
innewohnend. 
 
Das Subjekt kann sich nur darin als freies Subjekt wiedererkennen, wenn es seine 
Strategien der Aneignung der Welt, des Selbst und des anderen im Kontext einer 
gemeinschaftlichen, im Verhältnis der Zustimmung von Rechten und Pflichten 
gegebenen Befriedigung der Billigung von politischen Dritten unterwirft. 
 
Dieser Versuch der Regulierung der von Individuen und Gruppen angeeigneten 
Taten und Güter erscheint im Ergebnis ebenso willkürlich wie der individuelle 
Wille, den er zu regulieren beabsichtigt. Die Beschwörung des Konsensus als eine 
für die Individuen transzendentale Instanz, wie sie die Gerechtigkeitstheorien von 
Rawls und Habermas anpriesen, bildet hier keine Ausnahme. Anstatt darin eine 
Lösung zu sehen, sollte angenommen werden, dass die kontraktualistischen und 
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konsensualistischen Theorien in Sackgassen geführt haben, denen entkommen zu 
helfen sie behaupten. 
 
Was im Kern dieser kulturellen Katastrophe zu Tage tritt und auf dem Spiel steht, 
ist, für das Denken eines dritten Weges Raum zu schaffen und die Falschheit der 
Menschenbilder offenzulegen, die eben dieser Gerechtigkeit den Anschein gegeben 
hatten, der einzige glaubwürdige säkulare Heilsersatz zu sein. Es ist notwendig, 
hinter dem Scheitern der modernen Gerechtigkeitsidee die Ursache dieser 
Autonomie zu erkennen: die Urteilsfähigkeit von jedem und allen, um der 
Autonomie die ganze Motivationskraft zurückzugeben, deren Abstumpfen durch 
die Heuchelei von Staaten, Nationen, Religionen und Völkern geglückt war. Hat 
nicht die allgegenwärtige Fähigkeit, über Lebensbedingungen zu urteilen, den 
öffentlichen Raum der Existenz aller bereits erschaffen? Ist sie es nicht, die sich 
wieder einmal selbst in die Lage versetzt, hinter dieser fundamentalen, dem 
Gerechtigkeitskonzept selbst innewohnenden Ungerechtigkeit, die im Lichte der 
ökonomischen Globalisierung offen ausbricht, die reellen Bedingungen von 
Gerechtigkeit zu erkennen, die es immer ermöglicht haben, die Bedingungen von 
sozialer und historischer Ungerechtigkeit zu überwinden? Hat sich nicht bereits 
diese politische Verteilung der Urteilsfähigkeit als fähig erwiesen, die Mängel 
dieses Gerechtigkeitsideals auszugleichen? 
 
Die Unfähigkeit, das Rechtsmodell der universellen Pragmatik auf den Kontext der 
neuen deutschen Länder zu übertragen, wurde durch die Ignoranz offengelegt, die 
in dem vorausgesetzten dualistischen Wissen liegt, das aus dem Menschen ‘ein 
Mischwesen aus Geist und Leib’ machte und als Basis der moralischen und 
politischen Rechtssysteme der Modernität fungierte. Dort fand die Verteilung der 
Rechte, Pflichten und Güter in der Respektierung der spirituellen Essenz des 
Menschen und vor dem Horizont der jedem Einzelnen gewährten Vollmacht statt, 
sich eigenmächtig über das angenommene ihm frei verfügbare Wissen zu 
verwandeln, das er von den zwischen freien Menschen notwendigen Verhältnissen 
besaß. Als ob er in der Lage wäre, sich diese Freiheit zuzugestehen, ohne über die 
Objektivität der Lebensbedingungen urteilen zu müssen, die diesen Verhältnissen 
innewohnen, als ob diese Geistesfreiheit, in diesem Fall das Bewusstsein dieser 
Verhältnisse, nur die eine Funktion hätte: die Verpflichtung aller, die 
bedingungslose Beachtung jener Imperative und Verbote, welche die soziale Ethik 
der Solidarität mit diesen Rechten, Pflichten und Gütern verbinden, ein für alle Mal 
zu rechtfertigen. 
 
Das Zugeständnis dieser Geistesfreiheit gewährleistete folglich die Möglichkeit, 
die körperliche, dem Geist feindliche Natur von vornherein zu bezwingen, indem 
ihr vorab die Fähigkeit verliehen wurde, die Feindschaft zwischen den sozialen 
Partnern aufzuheben und die agonistische Natur der ‘ungeselligen Geselligkeit’ 
(Kant) des Menschen zu neutralisieren, die in seinen Verteidigungs- und 
Aggressionstrieben verwurzelt ist. Dieses von Hobbes wie auch von Kant und 
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Hegel übernommene anthropologische Modell preist die vermeintliche 
Überlegenheit des Geistes gegenüber dem Leib und übersieht zugleich großzügig, 
wie dieser Geist in diesem Leib entstehen können hat. So widerlegt sich das Modell 
selbst, denn dass es in beiden Fällen die Widerlegung seines Gerechtigkeitsideals 
hervorruft, ist heute unübersehbar. 
 
Tatsächlich bezwecken diese Modelle die bloße Verwandlung des Menschen in ein 
gerechtes Tier, das so gründlich abgerichtet ist, dass es ausreichen würde, die 
juristische Wahrnehmung der ihm eigenen sozialen Welt mit dem unfehlbaren 
moralischen Bewusstsein seines Geistes in Beziehung zu bringen, um ihm dazu zu 
verhelfen, aus sich selbst die vollkommenste Gerechtigkeitsmaschine zu machen, 
die er zwanghaft zu sein träumt. Dieser Dualismus kann allerdings das moralische 
Bewusstsein des Einzelnen als unfehlbarer Richter nur auf das Leugnen der 
Möglichkeit des anderen und der Wahrhaftigkeit seiner Urteile stützen, wie wenn 
beide die einzigen Hindernisse wären, die den perfekten individuellen und 
kollektiven Zusammenschluss von Trieben und Gerechtigkeitssinn gefährdeten. 
 
Das Habermas’sche Modell der universellen Pragmatik hat dem liberalen Modell 
nur eine geringfügige Modifikation hinzugefügt. Sie besteht darin, den Dritten als 
das die quasi-göttliche öffentliche Meinung bewegende argumentative 
Bewusstsein/Gewissen vom Konsensus auszuschließen, um die Vorahnung, die 
man vom glücklichen Ausgang der sozialen Erprobung des Menschen durch den 
Konsensus haben muss, im theoretischen Diskurs wieder einzusetzen. Zwar greift 
diese Modifikation der Verwirklichung eines Gerechtigkeitsideals in der 
Kommunikationsontologie und in der entworfenen Rechtsausübung der 
öffentlichen Meinung vor, indem sie eine allgemeine Achtung der Bedingungen 
ihrer Autarkie aufzwingt. Aber sie ist nicht nur unfähig, die wechselseitige 
Heterogenisierung der Individuen umzukehren und ihre gegenseitige Ablehnung 
von Existenzbedingungen zu hemmen, sondern sie ist ebenso unfähig, aus dem 
Wechsel zwischen Sender- und Empfängerrolle, die sie eingehalten sehen möchte, 
ein beliebiges Kriterium abzuleiten, das ein Unterscheiden zwischen reellem 
Einklang der Verständigung und Pseudo-Konsensus ermöglicht. 
 
Bei der Bewährungsprobe scheinen beide Modelle zwangsläufig dazu zu führen, 
die Kraft des kritischen Urteils, das beide voranbringen wollen, zu neutralisieren. 
 
So scheinen sie dazu bestimmt, die von ihnen heftig bekämpfte soziale 
Ungerechtigkeit gegen ihren Willen zu verstärken. Sie verwandeln sie faktisch in 
eine Ungerechtigkeit im Denken, das die Individuen und Gruppen nur dort 
heimsucht, wo sie glaubten, der Entfremdung ihrer materiellen Bedingungen noch 
entkommen zu können: in ihrem Urteilsvermögen. 
 
Der Ausschluss der Benachteiligten und die Ausblendung der konsensuellen 
Denkfähigkeit entstehen tatsächlich beide aus dem doppelten Leugnen, das es dem 
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Bewusstseins des Gerechtigkeitsideals ermöglichte, an diesem Ideal Gefallen zu 
finden und sich mit diesem Bild des sozialen gerechten Glücks, dem eine Kraft der 
Selbstbeglaubigung und Selbstgratifikation innewohnt, zufrieden zu geben. Man 
versuchte, das psychische Leben nach dem Modell des griechischen Polytheismus 
zu erfassen – als einen inneren Konflikt jedes Einzelnen mit seinen Begierden – 
und das soziale Leben als einen durch den Gesellschaftsvertrag und die juristischen 
und politischen Konventionen meta-stabilisierten Konflikt zwischen Individuen 
und Gruppen zu verstehen. Man nahm ein allgemein vorhandenes Wissen an, das 
jeden Einzelnen in die Lage brächte, aus der Summe seiner Begierden die 
allgemein geteilten Begierden und aus der Summe der Normen diejenigen 
herauszufiltrieren, die ihn dazu zwangen, alles zu tun, was getan werden müsste, 
um alle in den Genuss einer fairen Verteilung der Güter kommen zu lassen, die auf 
Kompetenzen und Verdiensten beruhte. Diese Verteilung und die Betrachtung 
eines solchen gerechten Ausgleiches waren dank der Offenbarung der 
Gerechtigkeit, die sie errichteten und sicherten, als Geburtshelfer eines sozialen 
wie privaten Glücks gedacht. So war diese Gerechtigkeit das Α und Ω des 
psychischen wie des sozialen Lebens, in dem diese Gerechtigkeit das Maß dessen, 
was es zu wissen und zu tun galt, sowie des erreichbaren ethischen Glücks 
darstellte. Sie war Ursprung, Mittel und Zweck des menschlichen Lebens selbst. 
 
Das Recht erschien nur als sozialer Inkarnationsort der Gerechtigkeit, indem es 
jenen notwendigen Beziehungen zwischen freien Menschen Gesetzeskraft verlieh, 
die als frei in den äußeren und wahrnehmbaren Beziehungen zu den Dingen galten, 
welche die geistige Prägung des Leibes dieser freien Menschen zu pflegen 
bestimmte. Auf diese Weise determinierte das moralische Vorwissen die 
menschlichen Lebensbedingungen, und es wurde deshalb angenommen, dass dieses 
Vorwissen den Menschen als Wesen bestimmte, dem es gebühre, seine 
instinkthaften Begierden zu beherrschen und dem Geist unterzuordnen. 
 
Der Ausschluss der Benachteiligten und die Beraubung der Macht, über eine dritte 
politische Instanz zu richten, würde nur jene Leugnung des Selbst als Begierde-
Wesen auf den sozialen Plan übertragen, die dieses moralische Konzept des 
Menschen und eine Leugnung des Urteils des anderen beinhalten, von dem 
ebenfalls angenommen wurde, unser Feind zu sein, der im voraus und gemäß dem 
sozialen Neodarwinismus des Kapitalismus mit seiner instinkthaften Begierde 
gleichgesetzt wird. Das eigentliche politische Organ galt nur, solange es das 
Gewaltmonopol besaß und als einzige legitimierte Gewalt dazu ermächtigt war, die 
‘naturgegebene’ zwischenmenschliche Gewalt zu bezwingen. Nur das politische 
Organ galt folglich als fähig, das Irrationale dem Geist zu unterwerfen. 
 
Eine philosophische Distanzierung gegenüber der Anziehungskraft, die ein sich 
selbst genügendes, unabhängig von seiner Umsetzung gebilligtes Rechtsideal 
ausübt, ist nur über die Unterscheidung der Idee der Gerechtigkeit von derjenigen 
des Rechts zu erreichen: man muss aus ihm alles das tilgen, was es ermöglicht 
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hatte, aus dem Recht diesen deus ex machina zu machen, der fähig war, die 
natürlichen Kräfteverhältnisse wie durch Zauber in Vernunftkräfte umzuwandeln, 
der die Gerechtigkeit ins ethisch-politische Leben hineinzwang und es damit 
unweigerlich zum Verderb brachte. 
 
Die demokratische Grundlage des Rechtsstaates reicht tatsächlich nicht aus, zu 
garantieren, dass sich das Gerechtigkeitsideal und das öffentliche Wohl für jeden 
erfüllen. Weil die demokratische Grundlage ihnen aber ein vermeintlicher Garant 
ist, gewährleistet der juristische Bürgerstatus einerseits allen sozialen Partnern von 
vornherein den gleichen Zugang zu einer autarken Freiheit und zur Achtung ihrer 
Gleichstellung und regt andererseits zur Beschwörung einer brüderlichen 
Solidarität an, um die faktischen Ungerechtigkeiten zu mindern. Der prinzipielle 
Zugang zu einer autarken Freiheit muss auch hier wieder mit dem Opfer des 
individuellen Urteils bezahlt werden, das auf einen Begierden- und Rechtsträger, 
sowie auf den Vollstrecker der zu ihrer Erfüllung notwendigen Handlungen 
reduziert wird. Diese selbstverständliche Geltung wurde der politischen Gewalt 
zugeschrieben, ohne dass die eigentliche Verteilung der Rechte, Pflichten und 
Güter anders als allgemein und prinzipiell beurteilt werden konnte, da die 
Individuen und das soziale Leben nur Orte der Umsetzung dieser sozialen und 
juristischen Verträge sein konnten, von denen angenommen wurde, dass sie bereits 
das Wissen der notwendigen Beziehungen zwischen freien Menschen beinhalteten. 
 
Das Rechtssystem ist nur mittels der Fragestellung, ob es dem Gerechtigkeitsideal 
entspricht, das dieses System zu erfüllen behauptete, zum Eigentum des modernen, 
zum Rechtstaat verwandelten Staates geworden. Die Gerechtigkeitsfrage geistert 
durch das moderne Recht und verlangt für diese Änderungen eine ständige 
Legitimation, die den Durchbruch des juristischen Positivismus Benthams und 
Kelsens verhindert, und somit die Durchsetzung der reinen formalen Macht einer 
performativen Selbstlegitimation, die den juristischen Erklärungen eigen ist. Wenn 
dies so ist, gehört die Gerechtigkeit nur unter der Bedingung zum Recht, dass die 
Gesetze der Gerechtigkeitsidee entsprechen. Diese zweckmäßige Bedingung ist 
wiederum alles andere als formal, denn sie beruht, wie R. Dworkin betont hat, auf 
jener ethischen Forderung, die den Glauben an eine Rationalität des Rechts nährt. In 
schwierigen Fällen (hard cases) impliziert die Annahme, dass es trotz allem sehr 
wohl eine juristische Lösung für unlösbare Fälle gibt, einen ethischen Glauben an die 
Existenz einer gerechten Lösung. Die Rechtsprechung beruht demnach auf einer 
seltsamen juristischen Ethik : sie zwingt den Richter dazu, von der Existenz dieser 
im Rechtssystem gegebenen Lösung zu wissen und sie gleichzeitig identifizieren zu 
müssen. Diese ethische Vernunft erweist sich aus diesem Grund als handelnde 
Rechtsvernunft. 
 
Die verfahrensrechtliche Institutionalisierung des zwangslosen Dialogs, die J. 
Habermas befürwortet, kann nur die Legalisierung der Moral erreichen, sowie die 
Umwandlung der Forderung nach einem ethischen Wissen um die faire Natur des 
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Rechts in apriorisches kognitives Eigentum der rechtsetzenden und 
rechtsprechenden Argumentationsgemeinschaft. Und sie kann diese 
Argumentationsgemeinschaft in einen heiligen Kommunikationsraum verwandeln, 
ja sogar in eine Vernunftinstanz, die sich in ihrer rechtsgebenden und 
rechtsprechenden Fähigkeit verkörpert, die juristischen Formen zuverlässig zu 
erkennen, welche die Gerechtigkeit anzunehmen hat. 
 
All diese aus der ethischen Dogmatik des Rechts entstammenden rechtlichen, 
ethischen und politischen Schlussforderungen vermehren nur von vornherein die 
bereits über die Praktiken transportierte Rechtfertigung des Ausschlusses der 
wegen sozialer, technischer und wissenschaftlicher Inkompetenz in Sachen 
Lebensbedingungen Ausgeschlossenen auf der Ebene der Selbstbegründung der 
juristischen Praktiken und ihrer theoretischen Meta-Beschreibungen. 
 
So lassen sie nicht diese ‘Anderen’ der liberalen Gesellschaft sprechen und 
berauben sie – mit dem Segen der juristischen Ethik – aller Rechte zum 
Ungehorsam, nämlich des Rechts, die Ungerechtigkeitsdiagnose gegenüber jedem 
Recht zu vertreten. Denn jedes Rechtssystem schafft es, die Beziehungen, die das 
Wissen des anderen berücksichtigen, von vornherein der Forderung nach 
juristischen Vertragsverhältnissen zu unterstellen. Es zwingt damit diese 
‘Anderen’, ihre Urteilskraft gegen ihre Produktionsfähigkeit einzutauschen. Es 
fragt sich, ob sie nicht konform werden müssen mit dem, was von ihnen als 
Produktionskraft erwartet wird, um das Recht zu erlangen, sich selber und den 
anderen als konform, bzw. nicht-konform mit dem Entwurf zu beurteilen, den die 
demokratische Programmierung des Rechts von ihm entworfen hat. 
 
Genau dieses Opfer ihrer bürgerlichen Urteilsfähigkeit wird ihnen abverlangt,damit 
sie dazu berechtigt werden, an der demokratischen Gerechtigkeit teilzuhaben. So 
erlaubt wiederum dieses Opfer, dass man all diejenigen, die in dieser Gerechtigkeit 
keine gerechten Bedingungen für ihr Leben finden, einer Gerechtigkeit opfert, von 
der angenommen wird, dass sie für die Funktionalität der Verfassung, der 
gesetzgebenden Macht und des Rechtssystems notwendig ist. Gesichert ist hier nur 
die Ungerechtigkeit, die darin besteht, das Ungerechte als dem Recht inhärent 
anzuerkennen. So erlaubt diese Gewissheit die Aufopferung aller derjenigen, die 
vom Gegenteil überzeugt sind, nämlich von den Opfern des pragmatischen 
Liberalismus. 
 
Dennoch sind sie es, die die Wahrheit über das abwendbare Schicksal einer 
vermeintlichen Gerechtigkeit der Rechtssysteme aussprechen. Denn diese 
Gerechtigkeit ist nur ethisch, solange sie nicht diejenigen hervorbringt, die ihre 
Taten, Wünsche und Wissen dem gebeugt haben, was die Legitimität von 
Arbeitsverträgen jedem zu sein erlaubt, und weil diese Rechtssysteme selber von 
vornherein diejenigen mit Ausschluss bestrafen, die es wagen, sie zu kritisieren.  
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In letzter Analyse erzwingt also dieses Opfern der Urteilskraft nur das Opfern der 
Gerechtigkeit an den politischen Rechtsbetrieb, der uns das Urteil aufnötigt, dass 
es, um an der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit teilzuhaben, nur gerecht und ehrbar sei, 
seine Produktions- und Urteilskraft zu verkaufen. 
 
Nur dann kann man von der politischen Verkrampfung geheilt werden, die 
angesichts einer gerechten Verteilung der Rechte, Pflichten und Güter nach einer 
Lösung der Probleme strebt, wenn man sich dessen bewusst wird, dass es ja gar 
nicht um eine Heilung im eigentlichen Sinne geht. Vielmehr geht es darum zu 
erkennen, dass das politische Leben nur deshalb eine Krankheit, ein Unglück oder 
eine Wahnvorstellung entwickelt, weil es als Krankheit oder als notwendige 
Wahnvorstellung, in jedem Falle aber als Entfremdung diagnostiziert wird, die a 
priori oder von vornherein schon als Selbstverneinung der Vernunft bestanden hat. 
 
Die antagonistischen Beziehungen zwischen den gesellschaftlich wahrnehmbaren 
Begierden, die eine Reproduktion der ewigen Antagonismen zwischen den 
griechischen Göttern darstellen, sind seit Platon auf großzügige Weise als das an 
die Menschen verteilt worden, was ihre ‘Natur’ bestimme. Diese Ansicht aber ist 
nichts als eine Unwahrheit und als eine philosophische Ungerechtigkeit dem 
Menschen gegenüber. Sie beruht sowohl in der Antike, als auch in der Moderne auf 
der Unwissenheit dessen, wie im Menschen selbst die Beziehung zu seinen 
Begierden erzeugt wird, nämlich als eine a priori kommunikative vernünftige, 
nicht aber unvernünftige Beziehung. Angesichts dieser ursprünglichen Beziehung 
wäre es durchaus unangebracht, als Schutz ein philosophisches, bzw. politisches 
Verteidigungssystem zu erfinden, gegen das man sich nicht wehren könnte. 
 
Vielmehr heißt es, diese kommunikative und vernünftige Beziehung unserem 
Wahrheitsurteil zu unterstellen. 
 
Erkennt man diese Notwendigkeit an, dann ist man auch gezwungen, an die Stelle 
des Primats der praktischen Vernunft, das seit Kant betont wird, dasjenige der 
theoretischen Vernunft zu setzen, und dies sogar im Bereich der ethisch-politischen 
Beziehungen. Nur eines befreit tatsächlich von den ethisch-politischen 
Beziehungen, die man zu sein anerkennt und die man im Leben und in der 
Erfahrung so zu sein beurteilt, wie man sich auch in der Kommunikation zu sein 
anerkennt: man muss das, von dem im Leben, in der Erfahrung und in der 
Kommunikation gesagt wird, dass man es sei, auch als die einzig existierende 
Wirklichkeit in den ethisch-politischen Beziehungen anerkennen können. 
 
Die Ausübung des politischen Wahrheitsurteils besteht in der Tat ausschließlich 
darin, nur das zu verwirklichen, bzw. verwirklichen zu lassen, von dem man 
gedacht hat, dass man es sei oder dass der andere es sei; denn man hat es ja nur 
deshalb so denken können, weil man es bereits als wahr gedacht hat, und zwar als 
sein eigenes Wesen und als das Wesen des anderen. Nur so lässt sich der 
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philosophische Empirismus der neuen Moderne in der Wirklichkeit unseres Selbst 
und unserer Welt anwenden. 
 
Die transkulturelle Philosophie der neuen Moderne 
 
Die sich als fortgeschritten verstehenden Industriegesellschaften rühmen sich 
bekanntlich, unter ihrem Dach die unterschiedlichsten Völkerschaften zu 
vereinigen. Sie sichern ihnen ihre Existenz, ihr Überleben zu, indem sie ihnen unter 
dem Banner von Liberalismus, Toleranz und demokratischem Pluralismus Schutz 
und reibungslose Koexistenz versprechen. 
 
Dieser Multikulturalismus ist jedoch nicht mit den Kulturen selbst verbunden. Er 
ist ja als solcher global und kann daher nicht die spezifische Substanz, die 
Einmaligkeit, die unverwechselbaren Physiognomien der Kulturen einbeziehen. 
 
Als global auslegen und verstehen aber kann er sich allein aufgrund eines 
Paradoxes. Seine weltweite Verbreitung stützt sich auf ein Denken, das zwar alle 
Mauern mühelos durchdringt, in die sich die Kulturen eingeschlossen haben 
mögen, aber nur, weil er ihnen genau das nimmt, was sie zu Kulturen macht: die 
Eigenart, die Einzigartigkeit des Urteilsvermögens, das sich in der Kultur 
ausdrückt. 
 
Das liberale Denken zwingt allen Partikularitäten, allen kulturellen Besonderheiten 
die eigenen Gesetze auf, und diese sind die Gesetze des Marktes, die sie 
systematisch den Regulativen von Angebot und Nachfrage unterwerfen. Gleichsam 
treten die Menschen in den Rahmen einer Versuchsanordnung ein, innerhalb derer 
die einzelne Kultur aufs ‘kulturelle Erbe’ reduziert wird, in dem sie zum 
austauschbaren Markenartikel verdinglicht worden ist.  
 
Der Multikulturalismus gleicht einem kulturellen Niemandsland; er verurteilt die 
einzelne Kultur zu derselben Art von Autismus wie der, der den Spätkapitalismus 
auszeichnet, der das ‘interkulturelle Gespräch’ nur unter der Bedingung zulässt, 
dass das neutralisierende und relativierende Denkmodell des Liberalismus 
übernommen worden ist. 
 
Die eigentümliche Kraft seiner Verbreitung und Durchsetzung verdankt der 
Liberalismus dem Umstand, dass er auf gewisse Weise seinerseits 
‘kulturalisierend’ tätig ist. Er stellte ein logisches und dynamisches Denkmodell 
bereit, bevor er sich noch zur politischen Ökonomie entwickelt hat. 
 
Insofern sich der liberale Kapitalismus unserer Tage auf ein soziales Kalkül stützt, 
das die wechselseitige Befriedigung der Wünsche und Bedürfnisse der Menschen 
propagiert, versucht er, die Menschen dazu zu bewegen, ein Maximum an 
Befriedigung ihrer Wünsche und Bedürfnisse einzufordern – darunter viele, die er 
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überhaupt erst produziert – und ihnen zugleich zu suggerieren, dass sie Herr und 
Meister ihrer Wünsche und Begierden sind und mithin autonom. 
 
Deshalb hört man die ständige Predigt einer Moral, die den Verbrauchern 
Autonomie, Selbstständigkeit und Selbstmächtigkeit verheißt, bzw. unterstellt. Die 
politisch-ökonomischen Strategien zielen darauf ab, die mögliche oder wirkliche 
‘Triebbefriedigung’ der Menschen einerseits unausgesetzt zu bestätigen und ihnen 
andererseits in allen ihren Handlungen und zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen 
uneingeschränkte Autonomie zu bescheinigen. Das politische Leben muss den 
Menschen transformieren, um diese pleonaxische Befriedigung aller seiner 
Wünsche und diese Autarkie sichtbar zu machen, ganz wie der 
Experimentalwissenschaftler sich die gegenständliche Welt so zuzurichten sucht, 
dass sie die Wahrheit seiner Hypothesen bestätigen kann und diese Wahrheit 
sichtbar macht. 
 
Der experimentierende Pragmatismus sozialer Gerechtigkeit, den der 
fortgeschrittene Kapitalismus praktiziert, hat die Logik der 
Experimentalwissenschaften auf die Ebene der Sozialbeziehungen übertragen, und 
so sucht er wie diese eine Übereinstimmung der realen Welt mit der 
vorausgesetzten Hypothese zu erzielen – und damit notwendig auch die 
Übereinstimmung der einzelnen menschlichen Monaden untereinander. Der auf 
diese Weise hergestellte scheinbare Konsensus der Menschen kann sich dann so 
unauffällig wie allmählich zu einer Instanz verfestigen, die die Menschen 
unauffällig ‘transzendiert’, die sich ihren trivialen Wünschen und Begierden 
vorgeschaltet hat und sie entsprechend reguliert. 
 
Es scheint, als habe sich die ‘provisionelle Moral’, die dem cartesianischen System 
zugrunde liegt – ihrer eigenen Tendenz nach müsste sie ja alles einschließen, was 
sich etwa künftig noch erwarten lassen könnte –, auch auf sozialer Ebene 
durchgesetzt und zu jener ‘totalen Experimentierung’ geführt, die der Mensch 
nunmehr mit sich selbst anstellt. 
 
Die Suche nach einer die soziale Gerechtigkeit betreffenden Gewissheit ist 
offensichtlich der Gewissheit analog, nach der auch die 
Experimentalwissenschaften streben. Sie hat die ‘totale Experimentierung’, die der 
liberale Kapitalismus durchführt, ohne sich Rechenschaft darüber abzulegen, in ein 
Forschungsunternehmen transformiert, dessen Ziel so etwas wie die permanente 
Selbstvergewisserung kapitalistischer Sozialität zu sein scheint. Im Kontext dieser 
Serie von Experimenten experimentiert die einzelne Monade sowohl beständig mit 
sich selbst als auch mit dem jeweils anderen. 
 
Deshalb intendiert der beabsichtigte Konsensus mit dem jeweiligen 
Ansprechpartner, diesen davon zu überzeugen, dass die ihm in jeder Äußerung 
vorgeschlagene Hypothese über das Leben richtig ist (bzw. zu sein scheint), so dass 
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er sie mittels der abstrakten Handlung der Kommunikation teilen kann. Das 
Sprachspiel der Wissenschaften konnte sich auf diese Weise verallgemeinern und 
die Menschen ihrerseits zum experimentellen Umgang mit Menschen und zum 
Selbstexperiment antreiben. 
 
Diese Universalisierung scheint sowohl für das soziale als auch für das individuelle 
Leben der Menschen zu gelten. Sie hat uns zu der Entdeckung verholfen, dass die 
Hirnprozesse selbst nichts anderes sind als Versuche, die Kommunikation bzw. 
Selbstkommunikation aufrecht zu erhalten. Das monadologische Ich führt dadurch 
eine Art von permanentem Dialog mit sich selbst. Es kann die erforderliche 
Selbstregulierung nur über die sensorischen, affektiven, kognitiven und 
kommunikativen Zeichen und Impulse erreichen, indem es diese Regulierung 
zugleich in Harmonie mit den Dialogen zu setzen trachtet, die es mit seinen realen 
Ansprechpartnern führt. 
 
Seit dem Untergang der totalitären Regime des Ostblocks sind dem Liberalismus 
und dem freien Unternehmertum – und mithin demselben kapitalistisch-liberalen 
Denkmodell, das von den Vereinigten Staaten als Vorbild repräsentiert wird – 
offensichtlich keine Grenzen mehr gesetzt. Es hat sich auf den ganzen Planeten 
ausgedehnt und scheint mehr denn je dazu legitimiert, die einzige universale Form 
des Lebens anzubieten. 
 
Dass sich diesem historischen Triumph niemand mehr entziehen kann, hat offenbar 
einen einzigen plausiblen Grund: die liberale Demokratie kann sich auf die 
Errungenschaften der europäischen Aufklärung berufen, auf die Freiheit und 
Gleichheit der Sozialpartner. Sie konnte im 20. Jahrhundert endlich von den 
Vorzügen profitieren, die ihr einst A. de Tocqueville – und in jüngerer Zeit L. 
Hartz – attestiert haben. 
 
So schrieb etwa der letztere, die Amerikaner hätten den Europäern voraus, unter 
demokratischen Verhältnissen zu leben, ohne dass sie sie durch eine Revolution 
hätten erkämpfen müssen. Sie seien schon als Gleiche zur Welt gekommen; sie 
hätten es nicht erst werden müssen. Die Überquerung des Atlantiks hätte es ihnen 
gestattet, auf neuem Boden die Ideale der gerechten Verteilung – und damit der 
christlichen Heilsbotschaft – zu etablieren, ohne den ererbten Feudalismus 
umwälzen zu müssen. 
 
Die gemeinsame Erfahrung der Krisen, wie sie das ökonomische und kulturelle 
Wachstum mit sich brachte, hätte einen Konsensus herbeigeführt, der es erlaubte, 
die durch das ungebremste Selbst- und Privatinteresse entstandenen Antagonismen 
auch auf alle übrigen Bereiche des sozialen Lebens auszudehnen und dabei die 
Anwendung von Gewaltmaßnahmen auf ein Minimum zu beschränken. 
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Die Unterwerfung unter den Konsensus sei nicht allein die Folge, die aus dem 
Gesetz des ökonomischen und sozialen Fortschritts abgeleitet werden müsse ; 
vielmehr sei der Fortschritt zugleich als Motor für den wissenschaftlichen und 
technischen Fortschritt angesehen worden, der auch jedem Einzelnen zugute 
komme und dazu beitrage, den dem Liberalismus eigentümlichen Prozess der 
Rationalisierung von Mensch und Universum zu vollenden. Mit ihm gelange die 
Menschheit zu ihrer philosophischen Bestimmung. 
 
Aber diese uns von der jüngeren Geschichte Nordamerikas nahegelegte 
Hyperlegitimierung der amerikanischen Demokratie bleibt fragwürdig, selbst wenn 
wir berücksichtigen, dass es ihr gelang, die überdimensionalen Engpässe und 
Krisen, die die Universalisierung des ‘blinden’ Konsensus begleiteten, zu 
verdrängen, bzw. zu vergessen. Sie entlastete in der Tat den Einzelnen von der 
Pflicht, sich über die wahren Resultate der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung 
Rechenschaft abzulegen. 
 
Wie die Analysen S. Wolins in seiner Zeitschrift Democracy gezeigt haben, war 
der amerikanische Expansionswille in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren von der 
Intention bestimmt, vom allgemeinen Versagen des Staates nach Kräften 
abzulenken. 
 
Dieser Staat war ja ursprünglich entstanden, um im Interesse der Minoritäten und 
der Individuen die Macht der Korporationen und später der multinationalen 
Unternehmen einzudämmen. Aber das Anwachsen der sozialen Ungleichheiten und 
ihr Export in die Beziehungen der USA zu den Ländern der Dritten Welt, die 
Ausbrüche von Rassenhass, Integrismus und Nationalismus, der rasante Anstieg 
der Gewaltbereitschaft und die mit ihm entstehende zivile Unsicherheit – all das 
trat nur um so greller an den Tag in den zynischen Äußerungen der Politiker, in 
ihrer schamlosen, parasitären Berufung auf die internationale Legitimation 
Amerikas und im Neoliberalismus, sowie in der Resignation all derer, die vom 
Zugang zu den gesellschaftlichen Gütern ausgeschlossen worden waren. 
 
Der kapitalistische Geist erweist sich damit als eine kulturelle globale Katastrophe, 
die imstande ist, auch noch die bestehenden Kulturen vollends zu erschüttern. 
 
Die ökonomische Mondialisierung schwingt sich heute, so scheint es, nicht nur zur 
‘Globalisierung’ auf, wobei sie allen Ländern das kulturelle Gesetz des freien 
Marktes und die Deregulierung des sozialen Lebens aufzwängt, sondern sie zielt 
zunehmend auch darauf ab, sich zum Prinzip anderer Mondialisierungen, d.h. zu 
‘kulturellen Mondialisierungen’ zu machen, die unabhängig von ihr bestehen, bzw. 
die ihr vorausgingen und sie als ökonomische Mondialisierung erst hervorgebracht 
haben: dies gilt etwa für die kulturelle Mondialisierung des politischen 
Liberalismus, der okzidentalen und orientalen Kulturen, der Religionen oder 
Säkularismen, für die kulturelle Mondialisierung der NGOs, die kulturelle 
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Mondialisierung der Kunst, der Wissenschaft und der Technik und ganz allgemein 
für alle kulturellen Mondialisierungen. 
 
Aber auch wenn diese ökonomische Mondialisierung als Globalisierung das 
denkbar effizienteste System von Verarmung und Ausschluss hervorgebracht hat, 
ist mit ihr und durch sie eine dazu im Gegensatz stehende kulturelle Welt 
entstanden: obwohl sie die Entwicklungsdynamik dieser kulturellen Welt auch 
diktiert, sieht es so aus, als ob sie imstande wäre, eine nicht dagewesene 
internationale Öffentlichkeit entstehen zu lassen, die einen Prozess des 
weltumspannenden Austauschs antreibt und eine Delokalisierung des Kulturellen 
mit dem Effekt, Kreativität und Kritik jenseits staatlicher Regulation zu einer 
emanzipativen Kraft werden zu lassen. Die auf diese Weise gewonnene 
Unabhängigkeit kultureller Mondialisierungen von nationalstaatlichen Strukturen 
scheint das Gegengift gegen ‘die Globalisierung’ im Sinne einer 
vereinheitlichenden Etablierung des Marktprinzips zu sein. 
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François de Bernard 
 
Le paradoxe de «la globalisation», des mondialisations et des droits de l’Homme 
 
Je partirai d’un double constat paradoxal. Le premier volet de ce constat, que l’on 
peut faire sur un plan aussi bien métaphysique qu’anthropologique et pratique, est 
que « la globalisation » (technologique, informationnelle, économique, 
financière…) s’est progressivement dévoilée dans les faits comme une négation des 
droits de l’Homme. Le second aspect, à la fois « éloigné » et cependant lié, est que 
les mondialisations (de l’éducation, de la recherche, des informations, des luttes…) 
se sont au contraire et déjà révélées être des leviers majeurs pour défendre, 
promouvoir et développer dans toutes leurs conséquences les mêmes droits de 
l’Homme. 
 
Comment entendre véritablement ce paradoxe et le résoudre de manière rationnelle 
fait l’objet de la présente analyse. 
 
*** 
 
La globalisation ne s’intéresse pas aux droits de l’Homme, et ce en divers sens. Par 
« globalisation », j’entends ici la vague de globalisation contemporaine à l’œuvre 
dans les domaines technologique, informationnel, économique et financier (liste 
non limitative). Une vague de globalisation qu’il s’agit aussi d’entendre, non pas 
comme un « phénomène naturel » (comme la marée) sur lequel le politique n’aurait 
pas de pouvoir, mais bien comme un projet, qui a été préfiguré, conçu et débattu 
comme tel par exemple à l’hôtel Fairmont de San Francisco en 199514, puis mis en 
œuvre progressivement depuis la fin des Années 1980 avec le concours de tous 
ceux — leaders politiques et économiques, en particulier — qui ont saisi les 
avantages qu’ils pourraient en tirer pour eux-mêmes et pour leurs affidés, ou qui y 
ont même parfois souscrit « malgré eux ». 
 
En premier lieu, la globalisation ne s’intéresse ni à l’Homme ni au citoyen, ni au 
« sujet de droit ». Son intérêt est strictement focalisé sur le consommateur: ainsi 
« l’homme » ne peut-il l’intéresser, à titre accessoire, que comme consommateur de 
biens, de services, d’images, de recettes, de potions et aussi de couleuvres! Le 
« globe » de la « globalisation » se distingue d’un « monde » authentique en ceci 
qu’il ne doit être peuplé que de consommateurs, dont la vocation principale est de 
                                                 
 
14
 À l’occasion du premier State of the World Forum, censé préfigurer et analyser le monde à venir, 
et où étaient réunis Margaret Thatcher, George Bush n°1, Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, Vaclav Havel, 
George Schulz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Bill Gates, Ted Turner, etc.  
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consommer (avoir, posséder, acquérir, louer, vendre, gérer…), et non pas d’être (un 
homme, un humain, une personne, un citoyen, un électeur, un sujet de droit…).  
 
En deuxième lieu, la globalisation ne s’intéresse que très peu au droit en général, 
ou alors seulement à ce que l’on pourrait nommer le droit de globaliser sans 
souci… avec le moins de « droit normatif » possible, le moins d’« instruments 
juridiques », de conventions, de traités, sans parler de ces « déclarations 
universelles » et autres bizarreries superfétatoires marquées du sceau de 
l’inutilité… À l’inverse, c’est plutôt le « non-droit » qui apparaît comme le 
royaume d’élection de la globalisation car, moins il y en va, du droit, et de son 
respect, de son application, plus il est aisé et loisible de globaliser en ayant les 
coudées franches. 
 
En troisième lieu, et pour entendre un aspect distinct de leurs relations, on 
soulignera que la globalisation a « d’autres priorités que les droits de l’Homme », 
et que, même si ses zélotes laissent parfois croire qu’elle ne leur est pas indifférente 
(ce qui a des avantages « en termes marketing »), le projet qui la porte estime que 
les droits de l’Homme ne doivent pas être posés au commencement, c’est-à-dire 
comme des « principes fondateurs », mais plutôt à la fin, c’est-à-dire envisagés 
comme conséquence éventuelle (ou « cerise sur le gâteau ») de la réussite 
escomptée d’un processus de globalisation dont on rêve « l’achèvement »… En 
bref, si vous voulez avoir les droits de l’Homme, leur reconnaissance, leur 
avènement, leur triomphe, il vous est suggéré d’en passer par la globalisation, de 
vous en remettre à elle comme moyen ou moteur desdits droits, plutôt que d’en 
réclamer la réalisation préalable, ce qui ne saurait être possible… 
 
Toute la démarche du projet de globalisation (puisqu’il faut bien l’appeler ainsi) va 
même à l’encontre de la reconnaissance, de la défense et de la promotion des droits 
de l’Homme. Les droits de l’Homme, leur revendication sont en effet autant 
d’obstacles sur le chemin radieux d’une globalisation dont tout le mouvement 
s’efforce précisément et de manière obstinée… d’abolir les obstacles politiques, 
juridiques, fiscaux, réglementaires, supposés entraver sa course à l’uniformisation 
des fabrications, des consommations, des échanges, des discours et, finalement, des 
pensées et des œuvres! 
 
S’il fallait résumer d’un trait le jugement que les concepteurs, animateurs et 
promoteurs (à divers titres) du projet de globalisation peuvent se faire des droits de 
l’Homme dans le globe globalisé et globalisant actuel, ce serait que ces droits sont 
des « empêcheurs de globaliser en rond » et, selon la vulgate gestionnaire, que 
leurs « avantages compétitifs » éventuels (« restant à prouver ») sont sans 
commune mesure avec leurs inconvénients effectifs.  
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Si l’on poursuit même un degré au-delà de l’idée que projet de globalisation et 
projet des droits de l’Homme15 sont contraires, opposés, voire, et de manière plus 
spéculative, intrinsèquement contradictoires, on est fondé à se demander si l’un des 
ressorts essentiels du projet contemporain de globalisation (ce jeune homme d’un 
quart de siècle) n’est pas, d’une certaine façon (et cela réclame d’être évalué sous 
ses différents aspects), une authentique négation du projet des droits de l’Homme, 
déjà « vieux » de deux siècles et demi.  
 
Par « négation », je ne suggère pas d’entendre forcément ici une démarche 
volontaire d’annihilation16, mais plutôt cette dérive insidieuse qui est celle des 
prétendus « changements d’agenda » d’une époque prenant pour parangon (encore 
une fois, hélas !) une fausse « nouveauté » qui est, par essence, anhistorique et 
aphilosophique. La « négation des droits de l’Homme » ne se limite pas, en effet 
(ce serait trop simple) aux figures multipliées et répétées de la tyrannie, de la 
barbarie, du génocide, que le XXème siècle et le début du XXIème ont fait défiler 
sans relâche et selon un rythme accéléré…  
 
De fait, la négation, cela peut être aussi (sur un mode presque indolore) cette 
procession de discours (avec tous les actes possibles pouvant en résulter) selon 
lesquels « les droits de l’Homme ne sont plus la priorité », ou bien « la priorité, 
c’est la croissance, c’est le chômage!» (comprendre au détriment d’autres choses, 
telles que les droits de l’Homme, précisément), ou bien « il ne faut pas se tromper 
sur les priorités » (discours encore plus pervers qui fait du « défenseur des droits 
de l’Homme » un coupable d’irresponsabilité), et une foule d’autres discours aussi 
retors et profondément destructeurs de la valeur et du sens mêmes du concept de 
« droits de l’Homme ». 
 
Cependant, malgré ce constat inquiétant, le paysage concerné offre des nuances de 
taille, qu’il serait regrettable d’ignorer, d’autant qu’elles permettent d’espérer un 
sort plus enviable à la problématique des droits de l’Homme, aux combats soutenus 
en leur faveur de longue date sur les fronts les plus divers, enfin à leur « actualité » 
et à leur « priorité ».  
 
La première « nuance » contraint à rappeler la distinction (aussi peu médiatique 
qu’elle est essentielle) entre « la globalisation » et « les mondialisations », et à 
mesurer la différence décisive (et même ontologique) que l’une et les autres 
                                                 
 
15
 Un projet des droits de l’Homme, que l’on peut aussi nommer « projet des Lumières », dans la 
mesure où il n’est pas séparable de l’idéal cosmopolitique plus généralement théorisé et discuté par 
les intellectuels et les artistes de la seconde moitié du XVIIIème siècle. 
16
 Cf. à cet égard, le slogan « en finir avec le droitdelhommisme », qui s’entend de manière 
croissante chez des intellectuels organiques haineux, chantres du néolibéralisme, du racisme et de 
l’ethnocentrisme... 
114 
 
 
entretiennent avec « les droits de l’Homme ». La difficulté vient du fait que « la 
globalisation » (technologique, économique, monétaire, informationnelle) a été 
présentée dès son avènement médiatique et politique (vers la fin des Années 1980) 
sous la forme d’un paradigme unique, sans équivalent historique et, par voie de 
conséquence, excluant. La globalisation fut ainsi désirée par ses promoteurs 
comme auto-suffisante, auto-explicative
17
, incommensurable. Dans ces conditions, 
il n’était bien sûr alors pas question de laisser place à des mondialisations 
plurielles
18, comme nous l’avons requis dès 1999, des mondialisations permettant 
le dévoilement d’analyses (du monde contemporain et de ses figures 
conflictuelles), d’interprétations et de projets tout à fait différents (quand ils ne 
s’opposent pas frontalement) de ceux de la globalisation capitalistique, gestionnaire 
et impériale. 
 
Or, que cela soit reconnu ou non par les chantres de la globalisation exclusive, les 
mondialisations ont désormais (depuis une dizaine d’années) gagné droit de cité et 
dignité non seulement dans les milieux académiques, les acteurs sociaux et la 
société civile internationale, mais aussi, bien que plus timidement, dans les milieux 
politiques, économiques et médiatiques. Car ces mondialisations que l’on ne peut 
réduire à « la globalisation », ce sont aussi, par exemple et avec une importance 
croissante, la mondialisation des luttes pour l’abolition de la peine de mort et de 
meilleures conditions de vie pour tous les prisonniers; la mondialisation des 
politiques multilatérales visant à permettre à chacun de « vivre dans une égale 
dignité », avec une nourriture, des conditions sanitaires et environnementales 
convenables ; la mondialisation des campagnes de lutte pour le développement ou 
le rétablissement de la liberté d’expression ; la mondialisation des échanges 
d’opinions et de pratiques sur les questions environnementales et énergétiques, etc.  
 
                                                 
 
17
 Une « self-fulfilling prophecy » de plus… 
18
 Que le collectif transdisciplinaire et transnational du GERM s’efforce avec constance d’étudier et 
d’analyser depuis le lancement de ses travaux lors de l’année 2000. Cf. l’explicitation formulée sur 
son site Internet à l’adresse http://www.mondialisations.org/php/public/art.php?id=14433&lan=FR : 
« "La mondialisation" et "la globalisation" sont des expressions désignant un processus qui étend les 
principes de l'économie de marché à l'ensemble de la planète. Mais elles ne prennent en compte que 
la figure économique d'un mouvement plus complexe. Le concept de "mondialisations" (au pluriel) 
s’efforce, au contraire, de rendre compte de la diversité et de la singularité des différents processus 
de mondialisation à l’œuvre dans tous les champs d’activité. (…) "Les mondialisations" sont 
l’ensemble des processus culturels, informationnels, sociaux, économiques et politiques 
"mondialisés", c’est-à-dire : 1) diffusés à l’échelle du monde humain, en dépit des barrières 
d’origine nationale, géographique, technologique, linguistique, etc. ; 2) mettant à la disposition des 
hommes, de toute origine, culture et pays, des idées, des contenus, des services et des produits 
semblables ; enfin, 3) susceptibles d’avoir un impact "mondial" sur les activités humaines, quelle 
que soit leur nature. » Cf. également l’article « Le GERM : un laboratoire de la diversité culturelle 
pour comprendre «la globalisation» et les mondialisations » et « les mondialisations » » 
(http://www.mondialisations.org/php/public/art.php?id=2218&lan=FR, novembre 2001). 
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Plus généralement encore, on ne peut éviter de constater le paradoxe d’une 
mondialisation croissante des efforts, des luttes, des mobilisations en faveur d’une 
prise en compte toujours plus importante des droits de l’Homme dans les systèmes 
de gouvernement et de « gouvernance » : une mondialisation qui entre en conflit 
avec le slogan de la globalisation économique, lequel s’efforce, de son côté, de 
faire valoir le caractère prétendument secondaire ou accessoire de ses droits par 
rapport aux « véritables enjeux économiques » et à la prétendue « Realpolitik »… 
 
La situation actuelle sur le front des droits de l’Homme, de « la globalisation »19 et 
des autres formes de mondialisation se caractérise donc par une contradiction 
interne aussi intéressante que problématique. En effet, ce qui se présente sous 
l’espèce monolithique de « la globalisation » inévitable et indispensable manifeste 
à tous égards (par ses actes, par les théories et les pratiques qui accompagnent son 
projet chrématistique) que les droits de l’Homme sont devenus contingents par 
rapport aux impératifs propres d’une extension sans limites de son phénomène (au 
sens précisément phénoménologique). Simultanément, en ayant recours à et en 
prenant appui sur des moyens de facilitation et de diffusion semblables
20, ’autres 
mondialisations que l’on repère à l’œuvre dans tous les champs d’activité de la 
société civile, académique, sociale, culturelle, médicale, environnementale, mais 
aussi économique et politique, mettent au contraire en évidence que le projet des 
droits de l’Homme peut être relancé, poursuivi et accompli de manière plus rapide 
et « performante » (sinon « efficiente », en langue gestionnaire) par le déploiement 
même dans toutes les sphères d’activité humaine de ces mondialisations plurielles 
qui ne prétendent, à l’inverse, à aucune exclusivité ou inévitabilité. 
 
La différence essentielle entre ces deux projets et phénomènes21 ne tient peut-être, 
à la vérité, qu’à une question de volonté, de détermination et de choix, et le 
paradoxe soulevé n’est peut-être, au fond, qu’une affaire d’idéologies22 et de 
priorités. 
 
De fait, les uns (qui sont bien des hommes, et non pas des processus, même s’ils se 
dissimulent derrière leur simulacre) considèrent que les droits de l’Homme, leur 
sens et leur réalisation peuvent se révéler au mieux comme sous-produits et 
conséquences ultimes d’une « globalisation achevée » sur les plans économique, 
                                                 
 
19
 Autocentrée, exclusive, prétendument nécessaire et suffisante. 
20
 Les fameuses « TIC », soit les technologies contemporaines de l’information et de la 
communication, qui étaient dites « nouvelles » il y a encore peu (« NTIC ») et ont perdu cet adjectif 
de par leur massification. 
21
 Car il faut effectivement les nommer « projets » et « phénomènes », ce qui s’oppose à la vulgate 
dominante, qui ne discerne pour sa part que des « faits », des « processus », des dynamiques sans 
sujet ni désir humains aux manettes des faits et des processus concernés… 
22
 On prétend souvent « les idéologies mortes » avec la chute du Mur de Berlin, mais cette « thèse » 
est plus que fragile, elle est primesautière. 
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financier, informationnel, de même que l’éventuelle généralisation du paradigme 
démocratique à l’ensemble de la planète. Mais, à leurs yeux, droits de l’Homme et 
démocratie ne sauraient être posés au principe et comme priorités susceptibles de 
perturber le bon déroulement du cycle et l’accomplissement du phénomène de 
globalisation. Car, pour eux, c’est la globalisation même qui est seule prioritaire, et 
pour des motifs nullement « originaux » ou « nouveaux », puisqu’ils restent ceux 
explicités par Aristote lorsqu’il souligne23, dans ses Politiques en particulier, la 
distinction à opérer entre l’économie (l’Oikonomia juste, normale, « soutenable », 
comme on aime à le dire aujourd’hui) et l’économie chrématistique, dont la 
dernière incarnation est celle observée aujourd’hui sous la forme de la globalisation 
financière, monétaire et boursière en cours. Une « économie » qui n’est en fait plus 
du tout une Oikonomia
24
, mais qui a basculé du côté pathologique de l’économie 
pour l’économie, l’économie qui se prend pour fin d’elle-même, et, surtout, une 
fausse « économie » qui ne vise qu’à un enrichissement sans fin, illimité, toujours 
plus dénué de cause ou de motif justes… L’économie spéculative dépouillée de la 
prudence, de l’équité et de la raison inhérentes à ce que doit être une économie 
authentique, et inséparables d’elle. 
 
Pour les autres (qui sont aussi des hommes et des femmes, et non de purs 
mécanismes économiques et technologiques), le choix est clairement différent, 
affiché comme tel et présent dans toutes les dimensions des mondialisations 
concernées25. Pour eux, les droits de l’Homme, conçus et approchés tant au niveau 
de leurs principes philosophiques et de leurs énoncés déclaratifs que de leur mise 
en œuvre pratique, apparaissent au contraire et de fait comme inséparables du 
projet même de mondialisation. Ces droits ne sauraient en être un résultat éventuel 
et différé dans le temps. Ils en sont la condition et le sens principaux. De ce point 
de vue, il apparaît même souhaitable de soutenir, que toute mondialisation n’a de 
sens que de promouvoir et de réaliser une partie du projet des droits de l’Homme, 
que, sans cet alpha et oméga, elle serait vide de sens et de contenu.  
 
Ce qui advient ici est la question sous-jacente, et largement ignorée, de l’utilité des 
phénomènes de mondialisation. En effet, si l’on aborde notre problématique sous 
cet angle, force est de reconnaître, dans un premier temps, que la seule utilité 
véritable du projet de globalisation serait de nature chrématistique. Elle se 
résumerait à l’enrichissement sans fin et sans cause au sein d’un « globe », où il 
                                                 
 
23
 Politiques, Livre I, 8-10, en particulier 1256 sqq.. Cf. aussi le Livre V de l’Ethique à Nicomaque. 
24
 Une administration prudente et intelligente des ressources du « foyer », que celui-ci soit une 
famille, une maisonnée, un village, une cité, un état ou une cosmopolis… 
25
 Des mondialisations, que l’on perçoit trop souvent encore comme « alternatives » (cf. « Un autre 
monde est possible ») sinon « marginales », alors que l’on devrait plutôt estimer qu’elles constituent 
le cœur et l’essence du projet de mondialisation en général et entendu comme lien vivant entre le 
projet des Lumières et les conditions objectives de sa possible réalisation présente dans le contexte 
des Années 2000.  
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n’y aurait plus comme sujets que des « consommateurs ». De manière non pas 
seulement opposée, mais absolument éloignée, les mondialisations différentes de la 
globalisation exclusive et chrématistique ne dévoilent pas d’autre justification ou 
objectif que l’Homme lui-même, la reconnaissance et la mise en œuvre de ses 
droits dans des conditions historiques et en fonction d’un certain état de la 
technique qui permettent (ou facilitent) cette reconnaissance et cette mise en œuvre 
précisément mondialisées. 
 
Le paradoxe dévoilé se résout ainsi dans la mise en tension entre des projets (celui 
de « la globalisation » et celui des mondialisations) dont le rapport aux droits de 
l’Homme constitue comme la ligne de démarcation.  
 
Pour la globalisation et ses promoteurs, les droits de l’Homme constituent bien 
moins qu’une variable d’ajustement ou un hypothétique « effet dérivé » (qu’il soit 
désiré ou non). Ils sont en réalité perçus comme un obstacle majeur sur son chemin 
et dans sa course triomphale.  
 
Pour les mondialisations positives tissées au jour le jour, en particulier par la 
société civile, la communauté académique, les acteurs sociaux et culturels dans le 
monde entier, les mêmes droits de l’Homme sont à l’inverse placés au centre et 
cœur de leur projet. Cela signifie qu’il ne saurait y avoir de « mondialisation 
soutenable »26, qui omettrait de réserver la place la plus éminente au respect et à la 
réalisation effective des droits de l’Homme. Et cela désigne aussi, que les droits de 
l’Homme apparaissent, d’une certaine façon, comme la vérité authentique et 
intrinsèque de tout projet de mondialisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
26
 En un temps, où le marketing politique réclame en un leitmotiv aussi obstiné qu’il est impensé, et 
comme s’il s’agissait d’une martingale absolue, que tout doit être ou devenir « durable » et 
« soutenable » (sustainable, sostenible, sustentable)… 
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Leonid E. Grinin and Andrey V. Korotayev 
 
Revolution and Democracy in the Context of the Globalization  
 
The article studies the issue of the democratization of countries within the 
globalization context, it points to the unreasonably high economic and social costs 
of a rapid transition to the democracy as a result of revolutions or of similar large-
scale events for those countries, that are unprepared for this. The authors believe, 
that in a number of cases the authoritarian regimes turn out to be more effective in 
economic and social terms in comparison with emerging democracies especially of 
the revolutionary type, which are often incapable to insure a social order and may 
have a swing to authoritarianism. Effective authoritarian regimes can also be a 
suitable form of a transition to an efficient and stable democracy. 
 
The article investigates various correlations between revolutionary events and 
possibilities of establishing the democracy in a society using historical and 
contemporary examples and, especially, analyzing the recent events in Egypt. The 
authors demonstrate, that one should take into account a country’s degree of 
sociopolitical and cultural preparedness for democratic institutions. In case of a 
favorable background, the revolutions can proceed smoothly (“velvet revolutions”) 
with efficient outcomes. On the contrary, the democracy is established with a lot of 
difficulties, throwbacks, return to totalitarianism, and with outbreaks of violence 
and military takeovers in the countries with high illiteracy rate and large rural 
population share, with low female status, with widespread religious fundamentalist 
ideology, where they hardly ever hear of democracy while the liberal intellectuals 
idealize this form, where the opposing parties are not willing to respect the rules of 
the democratic game when defeated at elections.  
 
Keywords : globalization, Near East, Egypt, democracy, revolution, reaction, 
extremists, counterrevolution, Islamists, totalitarianism, excessive expectations, 
military takeover, economic efficiency. 
 
 
There is a widespread opinion, that the globalization contributes to the spread of 
the democracy. Besides, there is a conviction, which is more widespread among the 
politicians and ideologists than among the scholars, that democracy contributes to a 
faster and/or more adequate economic growth. The following quotation 
passionately expresses this conviction: ‘For the past three decades, globalization, 
human rights, and democracy have been marching forward together, haltingly, not 
always and everywhere in step, but in a way that unmistakably shows they are 
interconnected. By encouraging the globalization in less developped countries, we 
120 
 
 
not only help to raise growth rates and incomes, promote higher standards, and 
feed, clothe, and house the poor; we also spread political and civil freedoms’ 
(Griswold 2006). 
 
In this context, many supporters of the democracy consider as extremely 
disappointing, that sometimes the democracy does not work properly and the 
waves of the democratization get weaker. Samuel Huntington (1993) called the 
period of a fast spread of the democracy in the 1970s – early 1990s ‘the third wave 
of the democratization’. On the threshold of the twenty-first century, many 
researchers note that the number of democratic regimes ceases to grow and that it 
would be a dangerous intellectual temptation for the democrats to consider that the 
world is inevitably moving towards some final natural democratic state (see 
Diamond 1999, 2004; 2008). In this situation, the trend has strengthened, which 
promotes the democracy in all countries with non-democratic or partially 
democratic regimes. This trend, on the one hand, is based on the global geopolitical 
goals of the USA and the West (see Brzezinski 1998; Baranov 2006), and on the 
other hand, it relies upon an active support of a broad ideological and informal 
movement. And this justifies the efforts to support the democracy and to encourage 
a democratic opposition for the purpose of increasing chances of victory of the 
democracy in case of the crisis of authoritarian regimes (Diamond 2000). Intensive 
efforts led to a number of interventions and color revolutions. 
 
Undoubtedly, the globalization trend is anyway connected with the growth of the 
number of democratic regimes. One can hardly object that, in the recent decades, 
the general vector was moving towards the expansion of the democracy. However, 
the connection between democratization and economic success is not that evident 
as many new democratic regimes failed to advance either in an economic or social 
sphere. That is why the intervention and propagation of the democracy arouses 
much criticism. Besides, an increasing number of people support the idea that 
people should create their own democratic models, which can significantly differ 
from the Western model (Weinstein 2001: 414). 
 
Thus, we suppose that some delay in the spread of the democracy in the 2000s was 
due to the formation of rather successful economic models of development, which 
do not require any democracy and even contradict it. 
 
Thus, in practice, it is not all that simple as the political philosophers, political 
scientists and politicians used to think. First of all, an explicit connection between a 
democratic regime and an economic success is not always present; one would even 
say, that it is present in the minority of the cases. There are scarce studies, which 
clearly demonstrate such a connection especially with respect to emerging 
democracies but at the same time there are abundant works, that prove the opposite 
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(see Polterovich, Popov 2007). 27 On the contrary, in most cases, it is precisely the 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes that achieve much economic success 
as they can better concentrate resources and invest (Ibid). Of course, the most 
telling example here is China, where the authoritarian rule is the basis for the 
economic progress. Such countries as Vietnam, Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, and 
Kazakhstan are rather illustrative examples, as well as Egypt and Tunisia before the 
recent events. There is a peculiar enclave of monarchy regimes of the Gulf region, 
that also achieved a great economic success. 28 
 
“In the past two decades, a number of economies have followed the path of 
economic and trade reform leading to political reform. South Korea and Taiwan as 
recently as the 1980s were governed by authoritarian regimes that did not permit 
much open dissent. Today, after years of expanding trade and rising incomes, both 
are multiparty democracies with full political and civil liberties. Other countries, 
that have most aggressively followed those twin tracks of reform, include Chile, 
Ghana, Hungary, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, and Tanzania”, claims 
Daniel Griswold (2006). 
 
In fact, such transitions from the authoritarianism to the democracy did occur. But 
one can hardly define their way to the democracy as a quick and easy one. Besides, 
it is important to keep in mind that such countries as Taiwan, South Korea and 
Chile achieved the main economic success right under authoritarian regimes. And 
it is far from certain, that if a political democracy had been immediately established 
there (or preserved as in case with Chile) these countries would have shown the 
outstanding results at the onset of their rise (we can even suppose that this would 
not have come true). Finally, there are many examples when a rapid transition to 
the democracy leads to an economic and often social decline, to hard times in 
countries' history. Rather tragic events occurred in the development of the former 
USSR and a number of socialist countries, among which Rumania and Bulgaria, 
still remain in a difficult situation. The revolutions in Ukraine under the banner of a 
great enhancement of the democracy also have exacerbated economic difficulties. 
Here, we can conclude that the ideology aimed at introducing the democracy in 
countries with a non-democratic or partly democratic regime can bring drastic 
consequences for the populations of those countries; it does not bring prosperity 
but on the contrary, can cost the country great and useless sacrifices. “Democracy 
                                                 
 
27
 Even the UN Report stated that there is no direct relationship between democracy and economic 
growth (UNDP 2002). It is also noted that the total effect of democracy on the economic growth can 
be characterized as weakly negative (see Barro 1996).  
28
 On the other hand, the weakening of the economic engine in traditional democratic countries of 
Europe also leads to a certain distrust to democratic institutions (see Lowi 1999). And what can be 
the result of the process, which has already been considered, in particular by Robert Dahl, who 
argues that extending the sphere of a supranational activity reduces the citizens' opportunities to 
control their vital problems through the national means of rule (Dahl 1989). 
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above all” is a dangerous slogan, and the politics supporting the radicals and 
revolutionaries does not hold true from the point of welfare for those countries to 
which the revolution is exported or where it is introduced. 
 
Thus, one may conclude that quite a long transitional period to the democracy is 
needed there; and moreover, it may often turn that an authoritarian or semi 
authoritarian regime is capable of such a transitional function. So, to evaluate a 
regime positively, one should estimate it not in terms of its concordance with 
democratic values, but in terms of its economic success and social orientation, as 
well as the efficiency of its state institutions contributing to the order, stability, 
secure and consistent politics implementation (on the particular importance of a 
strong order, state institutions efficiency see among others Liew 2001; Barro 2000; 
Polterovich, Popov 2007). With a country's advancement toward larger opportunities 
for people, such regimes will inevitably move toward a larger liberalization. Here, it 
is sufficient to encourage the regime's actions contributing to the liberalization but 
not to rely on the radical forces, that can overthrow the regime, and, under the banner 
of the “democracy”, hurl a country into the chaos. 
 
One should note that the globalization context with a general recognition of the 
people's rights and condemnation of the violation of justice and law, with a demand 
for legitimacy (that is electivity) of government can by itself build a positive trend 
and, in certain respects, restrain authoritarian rulers. With a decreasing illiteracy 
and with the growing population’s self-consciousness necessarily accompanied 
with an enlarging personal political experience, a transition to the democracy may 
proceed much easier, smoother and more effectively than the attempts to establish 
the democracy through revolutionary ways.  
 
The present article makes an attempt to show different versions of the transition to 
the democracy (from time to time using the example of the recent events in Egypt), 
to show the costs and political, economic and social perils of the striving to 
establish the democracy quickly and by radical means. 
 
The general mood in Egypt in July 2013 was exultant, the revolutionaries were 
exultant either demanding a true democracy. They were exultant because the 
Egyptian military had ousted the legitimately, publicly and democratically elected 
President.  
 
Why were the revolutionaries excited with the overthrow of the legitimately elected 
President? What was this? An absurd, a paradox, a peculiarity of Egypt? No, it is just 
a common and quite expected outcome of revolutionary events. So, the major issue 
to be discussed in the present article is whether the revolution and the democracy are 
always closely related.  
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“Every revolution ends in reaction. It is inevitable, it is a law”, wrote the famous 
Russian thinker Nikolay Berdyaev (1990 : 29), who elaborated this profound idea 
through hard intellectual efforts and a personal political experience. Of course, 
Berdyaev was limited by the historical background of the early 20th century. The 
past and the present century have shown, that the stability of the democratic 
accomplishments of a revolution depends, to a huge degree, on the phase of a 
society’s modernization transition, on its cultural traditions, environment and a 
number of other factors. So, revolutions (or the reforms of a revolutionary kind) 
quite regularly happen in countries with a high level of socio-cultural and 
economic development, and where a long period of fascination and disappointment 
in the democracy as well as the cycles of democracy and authoritarianism are 
already over; after such revolutions, a rather stable democratic regime is often 
established. One can set here the examples of “the Carnation Revolution” in 
Portugal in 1974 or “the Velvet Revolution” in what was then Czechoslovakia in 
1989. Besides, such successful revolutions – ‘glorious’, ‘velvet’ and usually non-
violent – would proceed quite quickly. 29  
 
The history of such political overthrows starts from the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 in England, but the recent decades of the human history have witnessed a 
large number of them. If a society is not properly modernized (also in terms of 
demography 30), there are many illiterate people, non-urban population constitute a 
large share, a strong influence of the traditionalists is present and so on, then 
“Berdayev`s law” of a revolution transforming into reaction has large chances to 
come true. After some time, the idea of the democracy can again start generating a 
new revolutionary explosion. There are still historical precedents, when the 
democracy and the authoritarianism alternated many times. Besides, one should 
point that, in such societies, a revolution faces really large-scale challenges, and 
respectively its intensity can provoke a strong resistance. Extending his idea, 
Berdyaev wrote: “The more violent and rigorous is a revolution, the stronger is the 
reaction. The alternation of revolutions and reactions makes a mysterious circle” 
(Berdyaev 1990: 29). Rather a typical example here is China that, after its first 
democratic Xinhai Revolution of 1911, yielded to Yuan Shikai`s dictatorship. 
                                                 
 
29
 In a certain sense, even the French Revolution of 1870–1871 fits this model if we exclude the 
episode with the Paris Commune. At the same time, the experience of a number of successful 
countries, in particular of South Korea and Indonesia (to the degree it can be considered successful 
at present) show that, at a certain stage of modernization, the authoritarianism may contribute to its 
expansion. However, just in this case, it objectively paves the way for its own limitation and 
consequent political democratization (for detail, see Prosorovsky 2009). One should still note, that 
the authoritarian stage often becomes an extremely important and necessary one. 
30
 Structural-demographic factors regularly generating social explosions in the modernization 
process have been already analyzed in sufficient detail in our previous publications (see, e.g., 
Korotayev, Zinkina 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Korotayev, Grinin et al. 2011; Korotayev et al. 2011, 
Korotayev et al. 2012; Grinin 2011, Grinin 2012a, Grinin 2012b; Grinin, Korotayev 2012a) and will 
not be described here.  
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Many times they tried to restore democratic institutions, but China eventually 
plunged into a long-lasting anarchy and civil war. 
 
The path to a stable and sustainable democracy is rather long and complicated. 31 
In any case, it requires a certain level of society’s economic, social and cultural 
development. Let us emphasize again that the liberal democracy, as a rule (which 
still has some known exceptions), will no longer endure in the countries with large 
illiterate cohorts, considerable share of rural population, and with low living 
standards. The modernization in (more or less large) countries always proceeds 
unevenly. As a result in modernizing countries, a rather modernized “core” is 
formed while the periphery remains rather weakly modernized and prones to 
conservatism with the majority of the population (“the people”) living there. In this 
context, it turns out that the revolutionaries (who claim to “care for the people”) 
regularly get disappointed in “the people” and the people’s conservatism, and in 
that, at some point, the people start voting in a way different from the liberals and 
radicals` expectations and would prefer an order and stability, and also familiar and 
clear forms to some unfamiliar political and ideological appeals; moreover, the 
people would prefer something material to superficially ethereal freedoms. One 
should go a long way, to gain own political experience of several generations, to 
gradually emancipate the consciousness, to support the cultural-humanitarian 
development, so that freedoms and the democracy would get the status of the 
values that are precious to the majority.32 One should also realize that the stability 
of the democracy does not depend on to what extent a constitution is democratic 
but on how political institutions and actors fit each other and are ready to play the 
game. An outstanding French sociologist Raymond Aron fairly notes in his 
profound study Democracy and Totalitarianism, that “the stability and efficiency 
are not supported by the constitutional rules as such, but by their harmony with the 
party system, with the nature of parties, their programs, and political conceptions” 
(Aron 1993 : 125). This naturally takes much time to achieve. The similar ideas on 
high requirements to the society, its leaders and bureaucracy, were also pronounced 
by Joseph Schumpeter (1995 : 378–385). In particular, he argues that, for a 
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 Both in a particular country and in the world in general. It may seem paradoxical but in 1990, 
democratic regimes were established in approximately 45.4 per cent of independent countries in the 
world, that is almost the same rate as it was seventy years earlier in 1922 (Huntington 1993). 
32
 This means that one should first achieve the cultural-humanitarian level allowing a true 
democratic transformation, namely, an intellectual stratum should be present there, a certain level of 
borrowings from the world culture, and certain political forms. But to establish the democracy, an 
even higher cultural-humanitarian level is needed as well as a dramatic change in the social 
situation. Besides, the democracy is not just an idea, but a mode of life; and to take the root it should 
become a really important part of the everyday life. But since in newly democratic states, the idea of 
the democracy is quickly discredited, thus it fails to become a really important constituent of the 
everyday life. Here, we observe a vicious circle, which can be broken only after several attempts 
and under certain social-economic conditions. 
125 
 
 
successful functioning of the democratic system, “the human material of politics” 
(that is people who operate the party machines, work in the executive branch, and 
take part in broader political life) “should be of sufficiently high quality”; it is 
necessary that the bureaucracy should be of high quality either and have a 
developped sense of duty and esprit (this notion will naturally exclude corruption 
and nepotism). In addition a certain degree of “democratic self-control” is also very 
essential (Ibid.). 
 
Thus, the people (or their majority) can eventually and unconsciously betray the 
ideas of the revolution and the very notion of democracy. On the other hand, the 
population’s sensible pragmatism can prove to be wiser than the educated radical 
and revolutionary minority’s lofty ideals and aspirations. Then people, by intuition, 
choose a leader who (with all his drawbacks, vices and egoism) will generally 
choose for the country a moderate and more appropriate course (diverging in the 
most important aspects from the previous pre-revolutionary politics but, at the 
same time, not longing to implement at all accounts the revolutionary slogans). 
Napoleon III`s activity serves a quite typical example here.  
 
But at the same time (as we witness it today in some Near Eastern countries), it can 
happen that even the revolutionary minority itself, that has previously strived for 
power under the banner of establishing the democracy, can give up the democratic 
principles. Thus, the conservative majority can turn out to be more democratically-
oriented. And this is not surprising. As already stated, in the process of 
modernization, the core is modernized quicker and thus, the “liberal-revolutionary” 
minority in “capitals” turns out to be surrounded by the conservative, not to say 
“counterrevolutionary”, majority of provinces. Against this background, the 
increasing adherence to the democracy on the side of the conservative 
(“reactionary”) majority is quite natural and with fair election, they have good 
chances to come to power through an absolutely democratic procedure. Meanwhile, 
among the revolutionary (“progressive”) minority, the adherence to democratic 
ideals can be undermined as, for them, the fair elections are likely to end with 
defeat. 
 
Even with an election falsification in the societies where the democracy appears 
restricted through the manipulation of the “party in power”, quite a large share of 
the society or even its majority may be loyal to power (even if they are 
discontented with something) and, consequently, be conservative. The rulers can 
win even fair elections but certainly with less advantage than with the faked vote 
(with 80–90 per cent of votes). Put another way, in theory they could do without 
falsification but here the system of “controlled democracy” starts operating in its 
own way and forces the local authorities to demonstrate their loyalty because an 
unconvincing majority at the elections is considered as a motion of no confidence 
to the dictator. 
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Returning to the issue of a correlation between revolution and democracy, one can 
remember that the brilliant politician Vladimir Lenin emphasized that “the key 
question of every revolution is undoubtedly the question of state power” (Lenin 
1958: 145). At the early stages of the modernization, the revolutionaries who are 
too devoted to their initial slogans inevitably fail because their appeals, although 
being attractive and inspiring for the masses, are still unrealizable under the 
existing conditions. That is why the logics of the revolution either makes the 
revolutionaries in power ignore the democracy and even suppress it (as it happened 
when the Bolsheviks dismissed the Russian Constituent Assembly), thus 
continuing the escalation of violence; or those who are too devoted to democratic 
revolutionary ideals are substituted (in a non-democratic and less frequently, in a 
democratic way) by those who are less democracy-driven but are more prone to the 
radicalism, to the deepening of forced changes and to reinforcing the power and 
themselves in power. The history of the Great French Revolution of 1789–1794 
and Napoleon serves here as a classical example. 
 
Pitirim Sorokin, who studied the history and the typology of multiple revolutions in 
the ancient world (note that in Greek polis and Roman Republic, an intense socio-
political struggle between citizens for power and rights was much more frequent 
than peaceful periods), pointed that the famine and/or a war often trigger a 
revolution (Sorokin 1992a, 1992b, 1994). Lenin also considered the deterioration 
of the masses` distress beyond usual level as one of the main attributes of a 
revolutionary situation. However, the current studies demonstrate something 
different: revolutions are often preceded by a rather long period of growth of living 
standards (see, e.g., Davies 1969 ; on the Egyptian revolution, see Korotayev, 
Zinkina 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). But such a growth often combines with exactly the 
same and sometimes with an even larger increase of social inequality and 
stratification. This increases social tensions in the society and brings to life the idea 
that the living standard achieved by a part of the population should become the 
majority's property. At the same time, the modernization of the society brings the 
formation of a more or less large stratum of intellectuals (and students as its 
vanguard), who strive for higher (adequate to their education level) living standards 
but, naturally, the number of profitable positions is always limited.  
 
It is of utmost importance that excessive expectations emerge there, when the 
growth of living standards fails to meet the expectations of the majority of the 
population; besides, the increasing inequality and violent breach of common justice 
on the part of the men in power “fuel” the discontent. Here the most volatile 
situation occurs when, after a period of sustainable growth, an interruption happens 
there (which is often not the country authorities` real fault; after all, who can 
smoothly pass the modernization transition? Nobody can). In this case, the people’s 
expectations (as well as those of the elite) continue to grow by inertia, while the 
real satisfaction level decreases (the so-called Davies' J-Curve [Davies 1969; see 
also: Grinin and Korotayev 2012b]. As a result, the gap between expectations and 
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their satisfaction reaches a critical level and triggers a social explosion. With 
respect to Egypt, this refers both to Mubarak and to Morsi – it is just after the 
January 25 Revolution, that the metropolitan citizens' expectations radically grew, 
while their satisfaction drastically declined, that brought the “difference of 
potentials”, which in many ways defined the dismissal of the first democratically 
elected President of Egypt. But the same “difference of potentials” may also turn 
fatal for new Egyptian regimes.  
 
In what way is the above-discussed related to democracy? First of all, the 
democracy can become the opposition’s key idea, a magic wand, that is thought to 
help solving the social problems (naturally implying that democracy is a system, 
which will inevitably bring the right leaders, that is to say the oppositionists, to 
power). And since a rigid regime is in power (principally non-democratic or 
usurping the power) and naturally resists a quick establishment of the democracy, 
then overthrowing this regime becomes a goal in and of itself. This regime 
embodies society’s every evil (which is expected to disappear with the collapse of 
the regime). The regime is claimed to have no positive, valuable, and advanced 
characteristics (everything made by the regime is supposed to happen all by itself 
or it is even spoiled by the regime without which this good would have been even 
better). 
 
However, in spite of the frustration widespread in the society, the ideas of the 
democracy actually only penetrate the minds of some, that often represent neither 
the society’s majority nor even its significant minority. For most people, who have 
a limited cultural intelligence and relatively narrow vital problems, the democracy 
is a mere word (or something established by someone, but not necessary for the 
population to take part in).33 Under certain circumstances, the ideology-driven 
minority attracts the majority, which is indifferent to the democracy (to the 
democracy but not to personal problems) and in this case, a revolutionary situation 
can arise there. But from here, it is a long way to a strong democracy.  
 
                                                 
 
33
 The voting abstention in Russia even when the mass voter turnout could be decisive is quite a 
typical example. Moreover, a large number of voters (especially among the young) almost 
simultaneously with the right of voting get a steady ideological skepticism. Why voting? What is its 
use? Nothing will ever change. My vote means nothing. However, it seems easy to go and vote. But 
probably it is difficult as one should make a choice. On the other hand, there is some truth in this 
scepticism. The other part of the Russian population is accustomed to vote “they say we should, 
then we will vote” but also not for the sake of a reasonable voting. In any case, it is out of question 
that the skepticism of one part of the population and the promptness of the other part have been to 
the advantage of the party in power and of different kind of political chancers. This example 
explains how a political apathy may in a democratic way support certain forces in power. Karl 
Kautsky called such masses involved in voting ‘the political flock of sheep’. 
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It appears appropriate at this point to reflect on the correlation between the 
revolutionary minority and the majority within different contexts. The 
revolutionary minority is strong in its activity, persistence, ability to self-organize 
for joint actions, etc. That is what brings it to the front of the political stage of the 
revolution; it is ahead and at first seems to represent the whole society. Besides, the 
radicals/liberals genuinely believe that they are the society, their aspirations are 
necessary for the society.34 If the revolutions are “superficial” and do not establish 
the universal democracy (as it used to be in Latin America or Spain), then the 
majority of the population stays out of the politics. The revolutions are made by 
rather many but still a minority. Here, by the way, one of the most important causes 
of instability of the revolutionary governments originates, since the masses would 
quite indifferently witness their overthrow. But if a fair (without falsifications) 
suffrage is immediately introduced, then the correlation between the revolutionary 
minority and the majority of the population can significantly change. In such a new 
situation, the latter may become democratically minded. The example of Egypt 
proved this rather well. Against the background of meetings and exultation, one 
can really think that all people are expecting radical changes in the spirit of the 
Western democratic and liberal ideology, but it turns out that the major or a great 
part of the population has rather different values. But in a certain situation the 
democratic system can actually turn profitable to the conservative (“reactionary”) 
majority and thus it becomes more popular amidst them; meanwhile it loses 
supporters among the revolutionary (“progressive”) minority, which strived for 
power under democratic slogans. 
 
There can be no doubt that the revolutionaries` activity, their good organization, 
propaganda and persistence also play a great part in the elections, but still it is less 
than it used to be when organizing meetings and actions. Outcries will not lead to 
an easy victory. The defeat of revolutionaries is caused, to a great extent, by their 
internal disagreements (seeming quite unimportant for an external observer but 
crucial for the parties themselves). 
 
As a result of such a turn, the democratic elections, for which sake revolutions are 
actually undertaken, seem to bring the victory to the conservative forces and here 
the moment of truth is coming. What is more important for revolutionaries: the 
democratic ideals (which make join the opposition and work hard for many years 
before coming to power at the next elections) or a revolution proper, that is a 
constant overthrow and escalation of changes in society? The challenge is solved in 
different ways by different parties in different countries and situations. Some 
political forces are unable to reconsider the situation and diverge from their 
absolutes. Thus, the Mensheviks during the Civil War in Russia hesitated to join 
                                                 
 
34
 Here works the logics that the one against is the enemy of revolution, who is not with us is against 
us.  
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either the Whites or the Bolsheviks, and disappeared as a political force by 1922. 
But quite frequently, it is just the revolutionism (for the sake of rather vague 
revolutionary principles but with an ultimate urge for power) which becomes of 
utmost importance. In recent decades, one considers as faked votes any defeat at 
elections of the radicals who previously overthrew the government (or forced it to 
conduct free elections) but failed to win the elections (when the hated government 
actually gives them such an opportunity). The examples of the color revolutions at 
post-Soviet territory, in Serbia and other countries prove this rather well. 
Thereafter, the revolutionaries insist on the solution by force. The logic is that it is 
not democracy proper that is of utmost importance but the opponent defeated at any 
cost.35 This logic is quite clear and explicable. But this is the point where 
revolution and democracy are diverging. 
 
In short, in a society with uncertain democratic values, the following principle 
works: ”We will support the democracy if our candidate wins elections. If he does 
not, we do not need such a democracy”36. The ability to lose elections, to 
acknowledge the value of rules of the democratic game irrespective of who comes 
to power, to wait for consequent elections and work hard to win – these are actually 
the essential signs of social readiness for democracy.  
 
Since the revolutions often occur in societies unprepared for democracy, it often 
happens that at early and intermediate stages of the modernization the pathways of 
democracy and revolution eventually diverge. Their conjunction at relatively early 
stages is an exception rather than a rule. Of course, as we said above, we remember 
the Velvet Revolutions in Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries, 
the Glorious Revolution in England, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, etc. Of 
course, it is highly desirable that all revolutions follow the same scenario. 
However, at initial stages of the modernization, it can be hardly realized, as 
“velvet” revolutions are already the end of a long-lasting social and political 
development. 
 
Political opponents can make more or less active attempts to turn the revolution to 
their advantage through reduction, renunciation or abolition of democratic 
                                                 
 
35
 The revolution as any politics is hardly a fair contest, in this or that way one uses provocations, 
disinformation, deceit, and backstage dealings. The provocations often imply stirring up enmity 
towards government and opponents through direct or indirect murders (shooting from within crowd 
or something of this kind; with respect to the Revolutions of 1848 and other see Nefedov [2008]; the 
recent examples are in Brazil) which evoke the escalation of violence, formation of military guards 
etc. Thus, the violence and other rather precarious means become normal. Consequently, the 
violation of the democracy is not considered as something terrible.  
36
 The elections in such Caucasian territories as Karachay-Cherkessia and South Ossetia, when the 
opponents renounce the win of the other party and thus trigger the political crisis, is a very 
illustrative example. 
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procedures and institutions established during the revolution. Sometimes they 
succeed; in any case the attempts produce a certain effect. It often provokes a 
dramatic aggravation of the conflict especially within a considerable social rift. 
This seems to be the case in Egypt. In this respect, it appears that the new Egyptian 
authorities chose a rather risky tactic when, in early August, they delivered a firm 
ultimatum to the Society of the Muslim Brothers to stop sit-ins. Did they really 
hope that the Muslim Brotherhood would just go and break up ? Did they not 
realize that the solution by force would cause hundreds of victims (and all foreign 
observers warned against that)? Do they really hope that the repressive politics 
against Muslim Brothers will work without putting in a great danger the fate of the 
whole great country? Even after Nasser and Mubarak have failed with this? Before 
August 14, 2013, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Gehad El-Haddad said 
about his organization: “This organization has been built for 83 years under 
oppressive regimes. That is the nature of the organization and our comfort zone. 
They just pushed us back into it…” (Fick 2013).  
 
Let us dwell on the question why the pathways of revolution and democracy in 
countries with unstable democracy should inevitably diverge? In addition to the 
above mentioned reasons (the unpreparedness of society, idealization of democracy 
etc.) there is a variety of causes. 
 
Firstly, it appears that democracy by itself is insufficient to accomplish the 
purposes of revolution; you cannot do with democracy alone. Theoretically, 
democracy is a mean to replace a bad government by a good one which is supposed 
to automatically assure the county’s prosperity. In reality it is certainly impossible. 
The arrangement of particular matters requires a specific and effective 
management. But revolutionaries as a rule do not possess such skills. They should 
either retain old functionaries and managers (who are anyway professional), but 
then the situation to a large extent remains the same with same abuses; or substitute 
them, and thus worsen the situation as revolutionary reforms usually aggravate 
economic situation.  
 
Secondly, since a rapid miracle and general improvement do not happen, and 
revolutionary actions and ample promises aggravate the situation, it is absolutely 
essential to find someone to blame and thus, to draw attention away. But then does 
the respect for democracy really count for? Will the revolutionaries (or radicals, if 
the moderate revolutionaries come to power) wait for several years to win the next 
election? Certainly, they will not. The revolutionary epoch is not the time for a 
quiet life. Everyone wants to obtain the targeted results immediately and without 
any compromises. If the radicals wait they will lose their influence, their common 
followers will start asking hard questions and so on. In this case the democratically 
elected or a transitional (provisional) government finds itself between the hammer 
and the anvil (i.e. between the radicals, discontent with the worsening situation, 
and the conservatives displeased with changes and disorders). 
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Thirdly, the masses, whose main concerns are their concrete and immediate 
problems (e.g., food for children, etc.) become disenchanted with democracy. In 
general, people gradually cease to connect the solution of acute social problems 
with an abstract idea of democracy, and instead they associate it with the struggle 
against enemies of the revolution, the Nation, the President, the Party, Islam, 
Socialism or something else, as well as against wealthy former functionaries, etc. It 
is clearer and more concrete. As a result, conditions for radicalization and 
broadening of revolution emerge. However, as we remember, the more radical is a 
revolution, the more probably it will transform into reaction.37 Among other 
important terms of stability of liberal regime, Raymond Aron points out the 
necessity to limit people’s demands in the initial period of development of a 
constitutional regime (Aron 1993: 141). He writes: “Let us study the situation in 
France in 1848. The substitution of monarchy by a republic did not increase the 
society’s resources and economic production. For the masses` income to grow it is 
insufficient to call the regime republican or democratic. The revolutionary changes 
naturally evoke hopes and demands. And the regime falls victim to discontent”. 
However, it is obvious that the revolutionary masses support revolution not to level 
down their demands and to wait for something. They think that they have already 
been waiting for too long. But since the rapid and excessive demands are difficult 
to satisfy, the country can slide into economic disaster while the democratic regime 
risks of being overthrown.  
 
Fourthly, in this context it turns out that the number of the genuinely democracy-
oriented people is very small in comparison with those who strive for power or 
welfare. In a modernizing, rather poor, narrow-minded and suffering from 
drawbacks society it cannot be otherwise. In an illegitimate and undemocratic 
society everybody abuses the law (although, perhaps, a bad law that often 
complicates life) and accuses of this everyone except for oneself. Everyone thinks 
in an undemocratic way, even those who struggle for democracy. Only a few 
people can stick to their principles, but they have little influence. However, one 
should realize that globalization can really strengthen the people’s strive to change 
the political regime, but nothing can make up for the people’s peculiar political 
                                                 
 
37
 The ‘reaction’ is usually considered to be a definitely negative phenomenon (while revolution 
is associated, though not so unambiguously, with something positive, among other things because it 
is supposed to lead to democracy). But such an interpretation is not always reasonable. The reaction 
often plays a rather positive role preventing the aggravation of revolutionary upheavals and thus 
establishing more balanced and viable political institutions. Sometimes positive aspects of political 
reaction’s processes are more pronounced, than the negative ones. For example, the Thermidorian 
reaction of 1794 can be considered just as an attempt of the French political leaders to mitigate 
rampage of the Jacobin Terror, which caused the fierce civil war in many provinces and to form a 
new more viable social and political system. One can also point a positive component in the 
Bonapartist reaction to the French revolution in 1848. History gives numerous examples.  
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experience which helps to transform political mistakes into political wisdom. This 
refers not only to insufficiently politically aware masses but also to the intellectuals 
who need much time to strip away their illusions. Thus, globalization increases the 
gap between the rate of getting information and ideological attitudes from outside, 
on the one hand, and the accumulation of experience and creation of a necessary 
economic basis for a transition to stable democracy. 
 
Fifthly, democracy as a political system, when people accept their defeat and work 
peacefully in opposition, has a generally limited social base. It can persist in one 
form or another, but reduced and misrepresented, though for a society such a 
substitution proceeds unnoticeable for some time.    
 
Sixthly, genuine democratic institutions do not meet the purposes of revolution. 
Quite frequently the radical revolutionary changes are realized through constituent 
assemblies, parliament, etc. It works well in the beginning and with respect to the 
most urgent or consensual changes. But revolution is often a radical, drastic, grave 
and always impetuous destruction. Common parliamentary procedures with their 
long discussions, procrastination and respect for minorities do not satisfy the 
society. That is why assemblies, parliaments, councils, majālis can issue laws and 
decrees to launch radical changes, but it is the dictatorial authority (a party, central 
committee, executive committee, leader, etc.), relying on revolutionary source of 
power and, therefore, independent from the parliament, that should run the state. It 
is those authorities that solve the major problems and then submit the decision for 
approval. The democratic and pseudo-democratic decision-making process is quite 
often used to approve determining and fundamental documents and to consolidate 
the winning party’s power. That is what Morsi did with the Constitution. The new 
authorities have done the same to adopt their own Constitution.  
 
It is not surprising that dictators so like referenda, which consolidate their power. 
In fact, the democratic institutions turn out to be subsidiary.  
 
Thus, a genuine and full-scale democracy, that revolution strives to formalize, soon 
enough starts to contradict both the real purposes of revolution and other political 
(party, group and private) goals and conditions.  
 
Democratically elected authorities (or even a transitional pro-democratic 
government) is either overthrown or separated in full or in part from democracy 
(i.e. transforms into a pseudo-democratic organization like the Long Parliament of 
England). As said above, we speak about societies that have not completed 
modernization; meanwhile, the more culturally developed and advanced societies 
can frequently transform a post-revolutionary regime in a firmly liberal one.      
 
133 
 
 
Keep in mind that the key issue of revolution is always the one of power, so 
democracy is acceptable as long as it supports the domination of the most powerful 
group, party, social stratum, etc.   
 
Since large-scale and omnipotent democracy does not fit the revolutionary 
transformations, and due to the lack of necessary institutions and ability to live 
according to democratic laws as well as the fact that revolution is always a struggle 
(sometimes illegal) between opposing forces, involving huge masses of people, in 
the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period a pure democracy is reduced and 
transformed to a degree and in different ways depending on society’s peculiarities, 
results of political struggle and other factors. In societies, which are ready for 
democracy and where modernization has been completed, this can be an 
insignificant reduction (similar to the prohibition to propose a candidate from 
among the former members of communist parties, etc.). It is worth noting that 
universal suffrage, taken as a model today, was not legalized in a day, there often 
were applied voting qualifications. Even in the USA, whose comprehensive 
democracy fascinated Alexis de Tocqueville (1830), democracy was not perfect. 
The Indians, Afro-Americans, women and a considerable part of men (who 
acquired the right during Jackson’s presidency) were deprived of electoral right. 
Moreover, the presidential elections were a staged procedure (quite real at that 
time). In the cradle of democracy, Great Britain, in 1830 only a small percentage of 
population had the voting right. In 1789, in France the part of the Estates-General, 
which at first declared themselves the National Assembly and then the National 
Constituent Assembly, passed many well-known laws. But one should remember 
that the election rules there had little, if anything, to do with the current notion of 
democracy. It is noteworthy that women participation in elections in such countries 
as Egypt (with rather low literacy rate, especially among women) strengthens 
conservative political forces and sometimes this can produce a stabilizing effect.   
Just as embryo passes certain development stages, the non-democratic societies, 
striving for democracy, go through stages of evolution of democracy associated 
with its limitation. But in many cases democracy is limited because it fails to 
function to the full just due to the above-mentioned reasons.  
 
In the course of revolution, the restrictions can be associated with attempts to 
secure political advantages, and also with revolutionary and counterrevolutionary 
violence (we can observe both in Egypt), with activity of a powerful ideological or 
any other center (as for example, in Iran), with a dictatorial body, with an 
introduction of property or political qualifications, with assassination or arrests of 
the opposition’s leaders (what has happened in Egypt recently), with curtailment of 
free speech and associations, formation of unconstitutional repressive bodies, etc.  
 
The post-revolutionary regime also restricts democracy or just imitates it. In 
contemporary world the most widespread forms of limitation of universal 
democracy (without which only a few governments perceive themselves legitimate) 
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are different kinds of falsification of election results, which often combine with 
repressions of political opponents (the recent example is Ukraine, where one of the 
opposition political leader was imprisoned), and constitutional and legal tricks 
(Russia shows remarkable examples). There are some peculiar cases when there is 
an unconstitutional or constitutional, but non-democratic, force, which enjoys 
authority (Iran). Other forms are possible as well. The most widespread one is still 
the military coup or attempts to conduct a revolutionary overthrow (Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan provide numerous examples). The military forces step in, when a 
democratic government decays or degrades or when a state reaches an impasse. 
Anyway, the course of democracy development is corrected. On the other hand, the 
military also cannot remain in power endlessly or even for too long without 
legalizing the regime, so they have to hand over authority to the civilian 
community and hold elections.  
 
Thus, the general political course of modernizing societies follows the democratic 
trend (increasingly approaching the ideal), but the fluctuation along this trend can 
be severe and painful. The development can remain incomplete, oscillating within 
the controlled democratic system.  
 
In Egypt, the new presidential elections are likely to be held rather soon (if the 
situation does not get worse). However, this election seems to be less democratic 
(even in comparison with the previous events) because the Muslim Brotherhood 
was proclaimed “a terrorist organization”. The path to genuine democracy is very 
long (it is necessary to eliminate illiteracy along with solving other problems), but 
the chance is rather good that there will be established a new dictatorship in the 
form of controlled democracy and military power, supporting the authorities.  
 
Another important point explains why democracy cannot be established in a post-
revolutionary society or quickly degrades there. “Democracy is the worst form of 
government, except for all the others”, said Winston Churchill. For the societies 
that just enter this path, the first part of the phrase is of utmost importance. 
Democracy (just as free market and private property) has numerous drawbacks. 
Mature democratic societies, among other things, have found some means to 
mitigate them. But in young democracies these drawbacks get excessive forms. 
And acquiring immunity against such “infantile diseases” of democracy is a long 
and painful process. As a result, a society can turn out to be abnormal (as in the 
case with lack of immunity against private property and free market – actually, 
rather egoistic institutes if not restricted). It is clear that an introduction of formally 
democratic institutions is absolutely insufficient, since although including multi-
party elections, they often conceal and even legitimate an actual dominance of 
authoritarian rule (Diamond, Linz, Lipset 1995: 8; see also Diamond 1999).  
 
In conclusion, we should note that the transition from an authoritarian regime to 
democracy can occur in three main ways: through a revolution (quickly from 
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below), a military takeover or coup d’etat and a reformation (gradually from 
above). In previous epochs the reformative way was almost impossible, so the path 
to democracy was paved by revolutions and counterrevolutions. Still some rather 
successful examples of reformative transition to democracy (or just a step in this 
direction) can be observed as early as in the 19th century. For example, the 
Japanese authorities started the “democratization from above” by the establishment 
of the parliament in 1889. In Germany Otto Bismarck introduced from above the 
full male suffrage in 1867, while in Prussia the election system proper was 
established “from below” by the Revolution of 1848. Some Latin American states 
experienced transitions from military dictatorship to democracy, but the latter could 
not be firmly established in this region, with a few exceptions. However, in the 
20th century, especially its last decades, due largely to globalization, we can find 
numerous examples of voluntary dismantling of authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes by the very military or other dictatorship (in Spain, Chile and other Latin 
American countries, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, lastly the USSR). Some 
significant steps towards democratization were also made by the Arab monarchic 
states. Paradoxical at first sight, but on the eve of the Arab Spring most Arab 
monarchies appeared much more democratic, than the majority of the Arab 
republics (see, e.g., Truevtsev 2011).   
 
Such a non-revolutionary transition to democracy, ceteris paribus, can turn out to 
be more direct and secure.  
 
*   *   * 
 
Thus, the revolutionary events often assume a paradoxical character. For example, 
we sometimes get across such revolutions that the revolutionaries did not expect. 
The revolutionary repressions may often turn against those who were actually 
meant to benefit revolution. And those whose names were on the banners when 
overthrowing the old power join on a mass-scale the counter-revolutionary camp. 
The zealous monarchists or the henchmen of authoritarianism suddenly turn into 
democrats, while those who considered democracy as the highest value get ready to 
establish a dictatorship. The Egyptian revolution has revealed its own additional 
paradoxes. Thus, gaining a victory unexpectedly becomes disadvantageous in 
political terms, while “losing the battle” turns beneficial. For example, just the 
victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in November and December of 2012 (when 
they succeeded to rush quite an unconstitutional “Constitutional declaration”, as 
well as the Constitution they worked out and, thus, to obtain the full power in the 
country) caused a consolidation of the “liberal” camp, a rapid growth of its 
popularity and the Muslim Brotherhood’s drastic falling into disfavor. Up to the 
late June – early July, the Muslim Brothers rapidly lost their popularity (see, e.g., 
Zogby et al. 2013), until the seculiarists and the military “came to their rescue”. 
After the July 3 military coup, the Muslim Brotherhood and their opponents 
reversed the roles. Now the Ikhwan started to “score points”.  
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Paradoxical, but the Muslim Brotherhood`s post-revolutionary political rhetoric 
sounded incomparably more advanced, than their opponents` archaic political 
rhetoric. The secularists (as well as the military, supporting them) in an absolutely 
archaic manner identified the people with the crowd in Tahrir Square, the 
Brotherhood, in turn, appealed to the formal legitimate democratic procedures. 
We would not exclude entirely such a scenario of Egypt events, within which the 
Muslim Brotherhood would come to power again. But the sooner they will get it, 
the sooner they lose it. In sum, the paradoxes of revolution will not long in coming.  
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Alexander N. Chumakov 
 
Social Aspects of the Globalization 
 
The contemporary process of globalization is not only a concern to the lives and 
interests of the humankind in general but also of the individuals, independently of 
their social or racial status. That is why there is now a reason to add one more 
concept to the multitude of philosophies and scientific theories, where man and his 
problems occupy priority positions connected with the philosophical understanding 
of the nature and the trends of the globalization. We already have a corresponding 
sphere of interdisciplinary fields of knowledge that emerged in the last quarter of 
the last century, collectively termed global studies. As a result, the contemporary 
world is seen as a complex dynamic system, where human economic activities 
based on achievements of the science and the technology (but not the nature and 
the development laws of the biosphere) became the main acting force. 
 
Besides the growing understanding of how the scientific and technological progress 
is changing our living conditions, we are also becoming aware of the many dangers 
it poses, not only for the human health but for the existence of the life in general. 
The times have passed when science could be regarded as value-neutral and an 
indisputable human good, beyond good and evil. Of course, the science is giving 
people the fruits of its revolutionary discoveries and attracts them by the new 
perspectives, but it also causes a deep trouble for their future, demanding timely 
and adequate actions of scholars, philosophers and politicians. Having the ability to 
complexly study the world, the society and the human beings, the contemporary 
science orientates politicians and scholars towards a “dialogue”, the co-evolution of 
the society and the nature. This is the science way, where it acquires a new –human 
– dimension, when the interests of the people are directly connected with the 
sustainable development of the biosphere and an analysis of the human activity 
begins to occupy a priority position in the understanding of the contemporary 
world and its most important characteristic – globalization. 
 
It is important to note that the globalization is a result of centuries-old quantitative 
and qualitative transformations, both in the social development and in the system 
“society-nature”. That is why, trying to understand the essence of the contemporary 
globalization, many scholars connect it with cultural and civilizational changes; 
through this, the terms “culture” and “civilization” find themselves in line with the 
term “globalization”. Being the most important categories of the social philosophy, 
these terms are links of one chain, trends of the developping living language, when 
it tries to reflect the human mental and material world, an endless diversity and 
essence of social relations as well as relations of the society with the nature. 
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Supplementing one another from various sides, they describe social organisms and 
reveal the most important stages of their historical development. 
 
The concept of “culture” occupies a special position in this line, since it first 
emerged back in the Ancient Rome, to distinguish the artificial and the natural; the 
term “civilization” is of later origin, dating back to early Modern Times, when 
more complex social practices developped and internal and external links of the 
emergent nation-states demanded a more correct language and, respectively, a new 
notion for their description. The deep understanding of the phenomenon of 
civilization started later, at the end of the nineteenth century, when the processes of 
the globalization started to become more and more defined. They were not realized 
directly but guessed at in the theoretical works of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, 
Vladimir Soloviev, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Vladimir Vernadsky, Karl Jaspers, 
etc. 
 
The globalization fully revealed itself only in the mid-1990s, having generated an 
additional interest in the phenomenon of culture and civilization. It is important to 
emphasize, that the globalization leads to the formation of one culture and one 
civilization which, however, does not cancel either the cultural diversity or the 
peculiarities of the civilizatorian development of this or that region. The notion of 
“culture” expresses the internal, essential characteristics of a society ; in its turn, 
the civilization is a form, an external framework of culture, representing a society 
from the viewpoint of the mechanism of its management, its functional links and 
relations. Since the civilizatorian unity and cultural diversity are immanent for the 
humankind, we could propose a new synthetic category called “cultural-
civilizatorian systems” to designate the contemporary realities: this would provide 
an integral vision of the different social systems (national, local, regional) as well 
as the world community as a whole and give understanding of the dynamics of 
their development as a necessary process.
38
 Then, considering the globalization and 
the global problems as an objective historical process, into which all the really 
existing cultural-civilizatorian systems are included (objectively involved), one 
may say about the formation, that from the middle of the twentieth century both the 
all-human culture and the united world civilization revealed themselves only on 
local and regional levels.  
 
The culture embraces – more precisely, penetrates – all the spheres of the mental 
and material life of a society and so it finds itself this or that way to be involved 
into the process of the globalization. In this connection, a lot of the cultural 
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problems are arising there, which adopt more and more an international and even 
global character. As examples of that, the difficulties and contradictions are 
generated by the increase of the influence and the broad expansion of  the “mass 
culture”, periodically emerging crises of morality, the growth of the apathy, the 
sense of abandonment or defenselessness, etc. 
 
The influence of the globalization on the culture begins in the epoch of the great 
geographic discoveries when, for the first time in the human history, cultural 
communications reached a planetary level, although they were in the beginning 
fragmentary, limited to contacts with sailors, traders, and conquerors. From that 
time, we see the first signs, if not of unification then of borrowing and global 
spreading of material and spiritual values, as well as cultural achievements, which, 
as a result of expansionist aspirations of the Europeans and through the increasing 
world trade throughout the world. Together with the items of the material culture, 
the broad opportunities for spreading throughout the world were given to various 
elements of spiritual, mostly European culture, such as, for example, the language: 
first of all Spanish, Portuguese, English, French, and religions – Christianity, Islam, 
and Buddhism, the missionaries of which came to previously unknown regions and 
corners of the world.  
 
Even greater opportunities for the wide spread of material and spiritual values 
emerged at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, 
when new means of transportation were actively developped: railway, automobiles, 
and aviation. The contemporary means of the mass communication were also 
invented during this period: telephone, radio, cinema, television. As a result, the 
mutual penetration and assimilation of various cultures, being an objective and a 
necessary sequence of the globalization, have in the twentieth century led to the 
formation of the all-human, planetary culture, the outlines of which are rather 
clearly seen today in all countries and continents. 
 
The globalization of the culture is not revealing itself through this only in the fact 
that, while keeping their original traditions, living standards and peculiarities of 
their everyday life, different populations, at the same time, use the same cell-
phones, radio, television, transportation means, etc. It reveals itself also in the fact 
that, for instance, the design of this or that car, item of clothing or home appliance, 
as far as external qualities and composition are concerned, as a rule do not bear the 
seal of the national culture of those who made the products – they differ from the 
design of other examples only by the label indicating the manufacturing country. 
 
In the conditions of globalization of the culture, there are practically no borders for 
spreading the mutual influence of the various ideas, doctrines, beliefs, etc. In fact, 
all the most significant scientific discoveries and outstanding literary works are 
immediately translated into many languages of the world, popular songs and 
melodies; the best examples of fashion and dramatic art expand with an amazing 
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speed across the planet. Most are easily subsumed into the context of traditional 
cultures, which accept and assimilate such elements of the world culture and at the 
same time give it new impulses: for instance, it was officially reflected in the 1990s 
slogan “China for the world and the world for China”. 
 
In the context of globalization of the culture, one can point to the increasing spread 
in the world community of the unified norms of behavior, which are free of 
religious and other ideological foundations. Such conduct may be found in airports, 
railway stations, supermarkets and other public places, where individuals behave 
“like everyone else”, independently of their beliefs, ethnic and cultural origins, etc. 
In this sense, the youth is the best environment for the spread of the global culture, 
because the youth is less grounded than the elder generations in the influence of 
traditional cultures and stereotypes of thinking and behavior formed in a 
community. 
 
Due to this, the youth also becomes a main object of manipulation by mass media, 
political, religious, criminal and other groups, which, under the conditions of the 
globalization, acquire additional opportunities for influencing both separate groups 
and the mass consciousness as a whole. Pointing out this fact, one of the leaders of 
“the new left” – the mass social movement of the end of the 1960 - Theodore 
Roszak wrote that politics, education, leisure, entertainment, culture as a whole, 
subconscious symbols and even the protest against the very technocracy become an 
object of a purely technical control and purely technical manipulation.
39 
 
 
Now, in the conditions of the total globalization, the problem of the ability to 
manage the world processes, including the world culture and the world public 
opinion, becomes one of the central objectives of the humankind. The examples of 
the Turkish immigrants in Germany or the Africans and Muslims, who became a 
part of the French society, show very well how the actual task of finding generality 
in separate national cultures, as well as defining the points of their interaction, 
where they mutually assimilate, becomes impossible. In this connection, the 
question arises: to which culture should one relate the assimilated emigrants and 
their children, whose biographies do not take place in the accepted categories? The 
problem is that the new waves of immigrants, although they try to stick to the 
norms and principles of behavior established for the society they are entering, 
nevertheless, in the everyday life and in their customs they reveal and reproduce as 
a rule the traditions and stereotypes of the way of life adopted from their 
childhoods in previous cultures. And although at the meeting point of these 
different cultures some opportunities emerge for mutual understanding and mutual 
action, first of all, due to the globalization and unification of the culture, 
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nevertheless, a state of conflict and contradiction increases – which specialists pay 
particular attention to, both in the West and in the developping countries. 
 
Here it should be mentioned that, although the globalization has at first sight 
economic forms and political consequences, it is in fact increasingly revealing the 
primary place of the culture at the global level. Due to this fact, the influence of the 
culture on the globalization and of the globalization on the culture, as well as a 
combination of the global and the local, become the subject of special attention for 
many scholars. Previously, this led to the coining of a new term – glocalization, 
which was created by means of superposing the words “globalization” and 
“localization” and became widespread as a word reflecting a complex process of 
binding the local peculiarities of the separate nation cultural development and the 
global trends in the world community development. 
 
Thus, the cultural globalization exerts an increasing influence on the human world 
outlook, thereby provoking serious trouble, first of all for the representatives of 
underdevelopped and developping countries. Understanding the globalization more 
as the “Americanization of the culture,” as the imposition of Western standards and 
customs, and, finally, as a modern form of cultural colonialism, they see it as a 
means of transformation and destruction of the traditional values, of changes of the 
traditional way of life and, hence, as a threat to the national identity and cultural 
diversity. In other words, since the globalization is uneven, the majority of the 
traditional societies react defensively against it in the form of counteracting the 
process of integration as well as conducting the politics of localization and support 
to local cultures in every possible way. 
 
Some scholars, especially from Islamic, Arab and other countries of the Third 
World, consider the globalization as a specially designed plan or a strategy aimed 
at invading other parts of the world threatening local cultures through their 
unification. By this, the main threat to the cultural identity is, as a rule, seen in the 
expansion of the influence sphere of mass media, the activity of international 
foundations, transnational corporations, etc. Such concerns are not entirely 
groundless since the globalization is indeed not only the flows of goods or 
shortening of distances, deletion of the borders or unification of the production 
processes. This also tends to the formation of a single system of values, to the 
creation of a universal culture, which are called to provide effectiveness in world 
economics, openness and objectivity of information and, at last, tolerance in the 
world politics and the intercultural communications. Thus, the changes and 
transformations in the sphere of the culture, adequate to the globalization, acquire 
priority, while the economic factors turn out to be less meaningful. 
 
Here arises the question of the trends of the global processes and of the human 
future. We already have the term post-globalization, which is used with regard to 
the future condition of the global world. Also, a fully new term may possibly 
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emerge to provide a name for the future world, when the theme of globalization 
will be replaced by another, more actual topic. Now, we can make the following 
suppositions. In about 10 to 15 years “a stratum of scientific researches” under the 
title “globalization” will be entirely “worked out” and an intellectual and emotional 
discussion of the topic will become fatigued. As a result, the creative interests of 
the scholars in global studies will be transmitted to the sphere of the world 
constitution and search of practical steps of building the really new world order. 
This follows directly from the fact, that global studies objectively play an 
integrative role, making many scholars, politicians, public figures and the broader 
population take a new look at the contemporary world, stimulating them to 
understand themselves as a part of the integral world. That is why the transition 
from understanding global problems to the real processes of globalization, which 
we now observe, must, it seems to me, sooner or later be replaced by the primary 
interest in the question of how to form a new international order in the integral 
interdependent world in order to make it at last safe and stable. However, the 
solution or even right setting of this task is ahead, since it is interlinked with 
another much more difficult task – the problem of the human being and the “new 
humanism”.  
 
Thus, the further development of global studies will have to end sooner or later in 
understanding the nature and essence of man himself as the main cause of all his 
problems and difficulties, what in the history of the philosophy has not been 
mentioned once, in the works of all the great humanists from Antiquity to 
modernity. As Nikolai Berdyayev remarked, “Philosophers constantly returned to 
the understanding that to unriddle a mystery of man means to unriddle a mystery of 
being. Know thyself, and through this you will know the world. All attempts of 
external understanding of the world, without dipping into the depth of man, gave 
just knowledge of the surface of things. If we come from man to the outside, we 
will never reach the meaning of things, for the understanding of the meaning is 
concealed in the very man.”40  
 
Recalling in this connection Protagoras’ words “homo mensura est”, one should 
note that man is also the main cause of increase and escalation of the global 
problems of modernity. 
  
From here it follows that the human reason alone is the single hope to overcome 
the mentioned contradiction, for the human thinking and creativity are not genetic 
but cultural properties. People have no other way but to carefully build and 
insistently form a new thinking, a way of life and an appropriate strategy and 
tactics of action, for, as some scholars believe it, the future evolution will not be 
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 Nikolai Berdyayev, “Smysl tvorchestva” [“The Meaning of Creation”], in The Philosophy of 
Freedom. The Meaning of Creation (Moscow : The Pravda Press, 1989), 293. 
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determined by the survival of the strongest but by the wisest. This fact provides a 
reason to consider the human nature and essence as a main theme, which with time 
should take the first place in the global studies. 
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András Kelen 
 
The Distinctive Role of Collaborative Networks in the Social Economy - Towards 
a More Operational Definition of the Social Entrepreneurship 
 
When outlining the difference in the approach between the "Third Sector Research" 
and the "Social Economy", we see in the US both scientific approaches prevailing 
simultaneously. In Europe however, the paradigm of the social economy is 
emerging and seems to engulf the conventional notion of civil society and 
nonprofit sector. This study delineates concepts trying to contribute to a clearer-cut 
definition. The social economy’s concise definition is predicated on a sustainable 
business model paired with a social aim. This somewhat reductionist approach 
conveys, that the nonprofit constraint does not apply here. By social aim, it is the 
employment incubating function that is most frequently understood but green, 
welfarist, integrative and other societal purposes are also often meant. Bowing to 
expectations to show due citizenship, every corporation boasts of pursuing social 
aims, of revealing a degree of social responsibility. Unfortunately, when it comes 
then to count the social economy, degrees are not really measurable : our existing 
theory – based on the concise “social aim” criterion – starts stuttering. In order to 
help to overcome this difficulty in the empirical research, this study recommends 
applying a proxy variable as a substitute for the problematic “social aim” quality. A 
substitute, which can well discriminate the collaborative social economy from (1) 
business, from (2) state-owned companies and (3) nonprofits alike. To lay 
foundations for constructing a proper proxy, this study puts the emphasis on the 
self-governing nature of social enterprises. The study also provides background and 
definition of the notion of bottom-up networks and describes where and how they 
fit into the social enterprise. The existing literature on the social economy has 
amply treated networks as supporting structures. I recommend taking them rather 
as constitutive factors that give rise to this distinctive sort of entrepreneurship 
instead of merely supporting it. This functional change – amounting to a paradigm 
shift – modifies the concise definition to claiming a sustainable business model 
paired with anything but a business-like structure of collaborative network in 
management. Although there is a thirst for information on how social enterprises 
might be better managed, there has been little written to enable empirical research 
to do their work in measuring the social economy as distinguished from the civil 
society and the nonprofit sector. 
 
Keywords : civil society, the nonprofit sector, solidaristic and social economy, 
bottom-up networks, co-operatives, ceded income, entrepreneurship. 
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In the beginnings, when looking at the edge between the market and the state, the 
economic sociology delineated the independent voluntary sector including 
associations, foundations, civic groups and a few other forms of organizations. 
Later, in the nineties, the concepts of the social economy and social enterprises 
evolved, depicting the value-driven entrepreneurial activity. This term comprises 
all the economic organizations irrespective of their ownership where the structure 
is self-governing and the profit maximalization yields other functions such as the 
case with co-operatives
41
 and mutuals.
42
 Although heuristic, this subsequent set of 
private organisations is clear-cut, their discerning concept – the teleological factor 
inherent in the “social aim” - is not operationalisable.  
 
Most succinctly, social entrepreneurships are defined as a working business model 
coupled with a social mission. This latter criterion of finality – vague, as authors 
themselves always admit it – is always included in one form or another whatever 
the definition approach we take from the existing literature on the social 
economy.
43
  
 
Let us take the pioneering five economic and social characteristics of the duly 
recognized EMES-definition: “An explicit objective of benefits to the community: 
one of the main objectives of the social enterprises is to serve the community or a 
specific group of people. In this sense, one of the characteristics of the social 
enterprises is the desire to promote a sense of social responsibility at the local 
level.” 
 
Or, there is what I am inclined to dub the Spreckley-Southcombe definition
44
 
putting the social mission into the very centre as a distinctive feature of social 
enterprises in the social economy. Jacques Defourny then, in his significant 
dictionary entry defines as a combination of a special mode of production (private 
or collective) with the lack of an eminent profit motivation.
45
 There is then the 
                                                 
 
41
 A co-operative is a company where owners’ rights are distributed equally, independent of equity 
stake. In addition to this fundamental criterion, coops usually also provide something for members’ 
welfare.  
42
 A mutual is a non-profit organization without a public service function. Instead of serving the 
public benefit they build a civil society by providing something for their members’ welfare.  
43
 Under the venerable category of the informal economy there have always been scattered examples 
of social enterprise. The same applies to online businesses which often match all criteria of the 
social economy. The first accounts of businesses with an explicit community interest date back to 
research in CIRIEC and the writings of the UK Small Business Service. Until nowadays, an inbred 
social economy has emerged spontaneously and has developped into a sui generis sphere of the 
economy. 
44
 This is the Wikipedia article on social enterprises.  
45
 J. Defourny, Économie sociale, in J-L Laville, A.D. Cattani (2005), Dictionnaire de l’autre 
économie, Brouwer, p.233 
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minimalistic definition also frequently seen in texts all over the higher education 
and research: “the main aim of a social entrepreneurship as well as social 
enterprises is to further social and environmental goals…Social enterprises are for 
more-than-profit”. 
 
These approaches – although not capable to resist scrutiny in all aspect - are 
appropriate in focussing many more trading bodies beyond the conventional 
voluntary sector criteria (a third sector between business and state with the non-
distribution constraint based on ceded income as the principal source of operation). 
These approaches all have an underlying dichotomy as a constitutive element 
predicating that there were financial returns on investment (ROI – an index of 
financial profitability that measures the net result of operations as a percentage of 
funds invested; an indicator of business success) and social returns on investment 
(SROI – the non-financial outcomes created by a social enterprise, measured in 
terms of mission and impact, e.g. people served or jobs created, average salaries 
paid, foregone dole, amount of local authority transfer payments eliminated, etc ).  
 
We all know that when it comes to entrepreneurs, then competition, efficiency and 
the so-called Schumpeterian “creative destruction” come necessarily to mind. But 
what is then the core meaning of being “social”? In my interpretation, a social 
enterprise will not be social because (1) this issue was social politics-related. Not 
(2) that these entrepreneurs or project managers are all aiming at recipients of some 
social politics scheme. Not even that (3) the project belongs to a social 
responsibility framework of a company whereby business leaders exert their 
corporate citizenship. Nor (4) that they embody features like transparent reporting, 
environmental awareness, community service, contribution of profits to the 
common good. Having excluded all these factors, let us see what remains sticking 
under the adjective “social”. 
 
Social aims are all too often but captured public interest. Because of this and also 
because finality is always difficult to operationalize, I am looking for a 
methodological bypass: a bypass that omits all teleological setting as a criterion. 
While I have no basic problem (only contributing notes) with the vertical axis
46
, I 
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 For Boulding (1973), the grants economy (the welfarist ecosystem of one-way money transfers) 
as a whole belongs to the ceded part of income: contributed and not earned. But grants can partly 
also be interpreted as earned income! This is the case with grants when exchanged against some 
pre-determined performance such as the outcomes of a project. This type of grant making – by far 
not one-way anymore - is the modern tool of planning where articulated social aims precede 
economics. Otherwise a bank credit would have it made. The many grant makers in modern market 
economies exercise the same function what the Central Planning Bureau tried to do alone in the 
command economies (relegated to economic history): to channel resources along values. If such 
grants are then appropriated in a competitive tender, this source is then a full-fledged earned income 
(quid pro quo) for the winner. 
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am convinced that while this approach may be conducive at a state servant or 
journalistic level, it is certainly not yet applicable for empirical research, let alone 
comparative studies. So my critic aims at the deployment of the finality scale at 
levels deeper than information dissemination. I recommend substituting it with a 
mode of operation dimension. 
 
There is a way to operationalize the „social aim” criterion: in some European 
countries, public servants apply a community interest test or public service test 
before registering applicants as social enterprises or granting nonprofits a tax 
sheltered status. These tests are usually rudimentary and substantive at the same 
time – as opposed to being universally formal and restricting themselves to 
examining the incidence of community roots. The measure of the public service is 
also all too often a laxative list instead of a minimalistic formal criterion gauging 
the public support.
47
  Last but not least, a test like these is necessarily country-
specific without a feasible option to harmonize them at an all-European level.  
 
I recommend retaining the „trading for a social purpose” approach but espousing 
another (related but underlying) concept. This complementing concept is expected 
to go beyond the mentioned pre-existing dichotomy of public service. This notion 
of ours is intended to enable students of the social economy to arrive at a 
measurable proxy variable other than the primacy of mission, responsibility or 
finality whatsoever.  
 
I set out to interpret self-helping networks – instead of a social aim – as sine qua 
non of the social economy, as their second constitutive factor. As an outcome, the 
underlying definition – omitting the rather nebulous criterion of social 
responsibility, social mission – ought to convey that social enterprises, in addition 
to producing or servicing, necessarily also contribute to a community’s welfare 
production in a self-reliance manner. If not more, they at least offer useful activity 
and part of a livelihood for their members to the tune of their being a collectivity. 
Thus, there is little sense in prescribing them to be value-driven or to carry 
additional communitarian objective, let alone bearing some explicit philanthropic 
purpose. 
 
The role of reconnecting networks in the social economy 
 
Due to their more vulnerable character, all social enterprises are predicated on the 
existence of a sustaining collective. If the entrepreneurs here could carve out a 
                                                 
 
47
 When ascertaining the strength of the public support, a project with one single big donor ought to 
be attributed a lower status in the public service whereas as another project boasting of several 
although smaller donors should be deemed more as public service. Still, these criteria are nowhere 
applied. 
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living from anonymous market transactions alone, if they could do without the 
enabling hand of others, without being embedded in a closely knit helping set of 
connections, then they would not go for being linked in a social enterprise, they 
would definitely opt for an unplugged sole tradership (who can contribute by sweat 
equity alone) or a limited company.
48
 This inexorably connected status has 
consequences on at least two counts.  
 
Initially, the market value of a social enterprise is difficult to gauge, because the 
network behind it cannot be operated by anybody else other than the entrepreneur. 
Initiatives and maintenance all require their leadership. It cannot be outsourced, 
delegated or sold. Networks do not have an exchange value as they are linked to 
the person around whom they develop. Nobody else could operate another person’s 
network if it is not standardized (and called human resources) as in business. It is 
not only the exchange value that does not apply in social enterprises, maximization 
of profits and labour law are not applicable either – twenty years ago something 
like this was called a counter-culture. Thus there is no exchange value of the 
enterprise either!
49
 A social enterprise is a business that can hardly be sold later as 
a business. At this early stage, there is no calculable market value of it, only its 
goodwill and other intangibles, at least – quite beyond of accounting, as yet. Its 
value-added is hidden in its network it helps animating. The links are founded on 
direct and indirect reciprocity, informal liabilities and a delicate balance of requited 
favours nobody else. No purchaser can animate that – say proprietary – network. 
Social capital is not transferable.  
 
Ironically enough, the proven availability of a usable personal network usually 
qualifies one for a bank credit to the tune of micro financing. Because social 
entrepreneurs operate within a social context rather than the weak-bonds 
interwoven business world, they have limited access to other means of raising 
capital. Social capital is therefore – to this limited extent - convertible to capital 
without strings. 
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 As an antipode for a community-curated social enterprise with an enabling network behind, I 
could evoke the example of a rural hamlet as a family-run farm with its nearly accomplished self-
reliance - salt and petroleum as only imports are usually swapped against home-brewed spirit.  
49
 An asset lock as a public guarantee against the improper use of taxpayers’ money or against the 
expropriation of resources by some self-appointed owner is therefore not unconditionally necessary 
here. One man’s social capital is valueless for another man : social capital has no exchange value. 
My network and your social capital are not interoperable with someone else’s. On a different 
platform (say in another city) my old network is quite useless. Therefore, there is no exchange value 
of a liaison network. Databases (that is the description of a network) and especially personal data 
might have their exchange value on the market – but not the live network itself.  For instance, the 
Association of Mouth and Foot Painting Artists, a global association functioning like a social 
cooperative keeps on paying out its income to members without endangering their common-pool 
property. 
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The collateral outcome of the social entrepreneurship is as a community building 
and a social capital accumulation, the more diversity the social enterprises can have 
the more cohesive a neighbourhood’s civil society will be. While being 
businesspeople, social entrepreneurs at the same time carry many traits of a 
community organizer. They foster community bonds and without any 
embeddedness no community endeavour can survive.
50
 Their social capital is thus 
indispensable for them. Some of the entrepreneurs may take off and leave behind 
their network for the ever-changing clientele of the open market. Others will 
remain rooted in their network for life. 
 
Social enterprises are mostly collectively owned and – entrepreneurial as they 
might occasionally be – are characterized by an inclusive management and a 
participative governance. It is based on their acquaintance or membership network 
alone that they can muster human resources. As a rule, social economy 
organisations follow the one-member one-vote pattern of governance. Nonprofits at 
the same time usually apply curatorial governance or sheer businesslike patterns. 
Thus, the self-governing feature of network-animated business transactions 
satisfactorily distinguishes the collective ownership from individual companies or 
business clusters of privately owned companies.
51
 This dimension of inclusive 
governance based on the absence or prevalence of an own social capital is an easily 
operational feature that can be recommended to be applied instead of the vague 
„social aim” criterion.52 
 
Two mini case studies underscoring the role of networks 
 
In the social economy, when exploring the role of being linked-in, I would like to 
point out, as it is well-known, how much connecting were a suitable tool for 
revitalizing the inactive, the long-term unemployed and the underemployed. This is 
an active tool in the implementation of the employment politics. This means the 
tapping of the unemployed’ reservoir potential (as opposed to conventional welfare 
                                                 
 
50
 Recommendations, adoptions, endorsements and references are the usual measures of being 
embedded. In the emerging mathematical science of scale-free networks, equivalents are the density 
of links and consequent page ranking in search algorithms. As a spillover the so-called links 
economy has also emerged. Further consequences of being linked-in are popularity and reputation – 
giving rise to what is called the “attention economy”. 
51
 As a further example, I refer to the historical pattern of self-governing companies in the former 
Titoist Yugoslavia. As to their assets, they were neither state-run nor privately owned. Nevertheless, 
there is no way of interpreting them as part of the historical social economy, as their workforce and 
leadership alike were recruited on the open labour market and their governance was in fact anything 
but inclusive.  
52
 When it comes to a questionnaire of a survey, I could imagine asking respondents for either the 
pattern of governance or the ownership proportions. 
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structures such as social assistance or the dole). Networking alone is not yet a 
social enterprise but the lobby of it. I understand a time bank, for instance, as an 
unexploited, minimal level network, that can be operated without a pre-existing set 
of competences as an entrance hall for an entrepreneurship, where the core 
competences are revealed to the extent of forging an appropriate business model 
for sustainable operation. In order to substantiate this claim, I come up with two 
mini case studies. 
 
There are renewing initiatives by established banking institutions (not only non-
profit ethical ones but commercial banks, too) to start lending for the poor. Having 
perhaps learnt and drawn the consequences from the current crisis of decades of 
lenient lending to “unemployed alcoholics” (the current equivalent of the “Polish 
plumber” – they still consider offering credit for the poor, provided they form a co-
operative. A mutual organization, that is a network of long-term unemployed 
people with impaired works ethics could in fact elevate them to a level (of 
robustness), where a stable performance can realistically be expected from them 
(and defaults due to one member’s laziness or tardiness becomes less likely). In a 
co-op for cleaning founded by the long-term unemployed, it is a serious add-on for 
these people with their usually impaired work ethics that in case of tardiness and 
delays they have to reckon with each other instead of a boss. This is what I regard 
an enabling network.
53
 The mounting of an incubating time bank in form of a social 
cooperative or community interest company seems especially appropriate to foster 
skills in a live network for people who might find their marketable competences in 
this organization only later on.  
 
As to the incubating role, social entrepreneurs are especially capable to deal with 
the long-term unemployed, those with vulnerable work ethics. The organisations of 
the social economy are mostly considered as a bunch of people moving to and from 
between creating or having a temporary and precarious employment or being for a 
short time self-employed on the one hand and remissions of being a vulnerable 
subject of social politics on the other hand. This approach of social mission 
business ventures goes back as early as 1975 when Gappert and Rose first 
published their volume on the social economy in America. In case of such transit 
organizations never leaving behind project phases, the entrepreneurial task is that 
of a catalyst, who lets those vulnerable employees get together (build community in 
order to find their core competences) and then work together as a collective. This 
helping network is needed because individually and alone they are hardly capable 
of fulfilling what a working environment requires from workers.  
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 This does not mean that these ties were necessarily all too strong or were clustering high in these 
peer-to-peer networks.  In Marc Granovetter’s (Granovetter 1973) meaning they belong to the weak 
ties of social bonds. 
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The family-managed tourism is an important pattern in the social entrepreneurship. 
The tourism is always highlighted for being a sector with a potential of expansion 
on a global scale. For, its growth potential and being a product that can only be 
consumed in loco, the tourism has the prominence role of being a strategy for a 
local development. In this context, the search for competitiveness is one of the key 
concerns of companies around the world. Recently it was discovered that an 
associative cooperation is a competent tool in enhancing local hosts’ performance 
in the regional development. In the Tourism Destination Management (TDM), the 
best practice nowadays is to let hosts form a mutual organization, mostly an 
association or co-operative. Their bottom-up networks have a decentralized and 
less-businesslike governance; the network coordinator is mostly selected by a 
member of the cluster acting as a kind of service provider such as exerting quality 
control and development tasks in order to achieve a sort of brand-status for all the 
touristic products of their destination (a village or touristic region).
54
 Situated 
mostly in the arch-conservative social environment, such as Bavaria, Tirol or West-
Hungary, village tourism houses – as elementary cells of a cluster doing many 
management functions collectively – foster a few important “alternative” values. 
The labour law, for instance, yields to paternalism. Otherwise expressed, the 
employee satisfaction is said to be prevailing motivation in labour relations reduced 
to the realm of an extended family. In a typical family firm, where values of self-
employment prevail, the norm of maximizing profits does not apply, either. Last 
but not least, the technological development mostly aims at job-creation alone as 
the sole virtue of the entrepreneurship. This formation can certainly be called a 
value-driven organization, if not a grassroots organization bypassing all 
bureaucratic encroachment or state supporting schemes.  
 
The participative social economy  
 
Let me come up first with a mini case study on home restaurants. 
 
They usually begin as a pirate restaurant or unlicensed private supper club in a 
basement apartment, then start going public and losing cachet; they grow as a 
dinner party network for lovers of fine cooking, cool art and new friends. In a 
mature form, they can take shape as a "wandering supper club" producing 
community dining events. Having found their core competence and market niche, 
such a "dinner party network" is for hospitable and adventurous gourmets to 
connect, gather and share. At their best, they can attract diners looking to sample 
high-concept cuisine with an exclusive group of insiders without the usual 
overhead costs of a fancy restaurant as a reaction against the commercialism of 
celebrity chefs. 
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 As to clusters enhancing the competitiveness of a regional industry c.f. : Porter 2000; Rocha 
2004. 
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Having found their new competences as a cult site, alternative restaurants have the 
option to start a new commercialization (giving up their „password-enabled” entry) 
or remain within the voluntary constraints as they have evolved. Let me call the 
attention to the rich opportunities the prevalence or absence of a password offers in 
sociologically determining the „social” character of an endeavour. 
 
In one sense, the social economy is also a third sector just like the voluntary 
organizations – but relevant is then a Private/Public divide instead of the 
Business/State dichotomy which latter usually delineates the independent voluntary 
sector. Casting a glance on a Private/Public continuum, we discern for-profit and 
voluntary organizations alike as all constituted under private law, then statutory 
organizations enacted by some state decree belonging to public law. The third 
option in this ownership scale of the Private/Public continuum is placed in the 
intersection space occupied by the Commons.  
 
Following the original idea of Van Til (2000), who argues that the voluntary 
sector’s assets should be interpreted as belonging to the Commons, because these 
organizations serve the public good, I argue that the asset-locked organizations of 
the social economy do in fact constitute and enrich the scanty examples of non-
traditional, non-environmental, but newly emerging Commons.
55
 Instead of 
predicating a social aim to organizations here, I imply that the rich historical notion 
of the Commons should be regarded as the all-encompassing space for the social 
economy. That is why I speak of participative social economy where 
entrepreneurship means community development, where capital and labour as 
traditional factors of production are complemented by knitting an enabling 
network.  
 
The Commons, as we know it, embrace : 
 
Self-governance (referring to collectively owned companies) and inclusive 
management (referring to the manner in which peer production projects are 
managed) ; Common property (referring to natural monopolies and common-pool 
resources) and collective property (referring to the new type of licenses, which 
recognize individual authorship, but not exclusive property rights; historical and 
revived forms of land tenure, etc). 
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 The newly emerging Commons such as radiofrequencies or patents is a very special under-set. It 
should suffice here stating that common-pool resources – other than natural monopolies - are a 
social construction. One has to sensitize people otherwise they will not attribute them value. They 
only emerge, as they turn important,  just as distinctive items of a bequest may seem for the preying 
eye worth of handling like a heritage. 
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Patterns of spontaneously grown common utilization patterns (referring to 
collective land and forest exploitations) and peer distribution (referring to the 
manner in which products, particularly peer-produced products, are distributed).
56
 
 
The so-called sharing economy recognizing that, in addition to authors and artists 
who want to sell their work, there is an amazing creativity by scientists, teachers, 
authors, artists and the rest who simply wants to share our creativity. Community 
sites and social media provide this economy of giving an infrastructure to operate. 
On these enabling platforms millions of creative works have been offered to share 
and, occasionally, also to profit from the creativity that they share. An artist, for 
example, can release his work or enable those who want commercial rights to link 
to a site that can provide those other rights. This is an evolving hybrid economy of 
creativity. 
 
As a transition between the legacy notion of the Commons and its upcoming rich 
new applications, and also to denote collaborative projects in general, let us 
consider the term of commons-based peer production (Benkler 2006). Commons-
based peer production is to describe a new model of economic production in which 
the creative energy of large numbers of people is coordinated into large, 
meaningful projects mostly without traditional hierarchical management (and often, 
but not always, without or with decentralized financial compensation). Often used 
interchangeably with the term social production, commons-based peer production 
is to be contrasted to firm production (where a centralized decision process decides 
what has to be done and by whom) and market-based production. The notion of 
commons-based peer production is recently also being applied on tracing patterns 
of news consumption on social media (Benkler 2009) with a result that prepares a 
cautious thesis that many facets of social media activity - news distribution and arts 
production in the digital variations of the mainstream media - might also belong to 
the social economy. 
 
For a socially inclusive economy, one of the principal patterns is the poverty 
reduction and the employment generation. In Central-Eastern Europe this is the 
salient function for the social entrepreneurship. Its prevalent form is the social co-
operative
57
 with an aim to train into employment persons crippled by total absence 
of private sector jobs and exclusion from the labour market.
58
 These work 
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 Civilian journalism and the evolving ecosystem of shared news also belong here. These new 
phenomena are enabled by the changing consumption patterns of news. 
57
 Social co-operatives have an indivisible mutual fund that represents and symbolizes the joint 
network.  
58
 In Central-Eastern Europe, the inactive strata are so numerous that they really constitute a sort of 
counter-sphere. For the sake of a parallel, let me cite the example of the American Indians in their 
reserves where off-shore rules frequently apply to gambling and the proceeds are distributed among 
members as in a co-operative. In order to usher the Hungarian long-term unemployed from their 
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integrating social enterprises have as major objective to form and develop a 
collective that can absorb into work and reconnect into society by some productive 
activity. As stated before, the collectivity alone can reconnnect the non-qualified, 
long-term unemployed people with their vulnerable work ethics, who run the risk 
of permanent exclusion from the labour market. This helping network is 
needed because individually and left alone the long-term unemployed are usually 
not capable any more of fulfilling what a working environment requires from them. 
Without being embedded, they would keep on moving to and from between being 
self-employed and being systemically superfluous as a subject of social politics. 
 
The principal cleavage in traditional societies is that between being socially up or 
down. In modern societies, the main cleavage is set rather between being in or out, 
between being drawn in and having some social capital or being socially excluded. 
When gauging the pivotal role of networking in launching and operating a social 
enterprise, I point out that collectivities are accruing social capital to members. 
This is because of their transient, ephemeral character
59
 that brings them 
occasionally close to a sort of niche in the mainstream business. Last but not least, 
before anybody would think that networking builds only sympathetic 
organizations, let me state in unequivocal terms that local networks in the society 
and parochialism in general are often associated with narrow access, uneven or 
inequitable services, cultural homogeneity, gender inequality and exclusions. Well, 
the very essence of networking is that other people do not belong here... 
 
Social economy enterprises are said to encourage the participation of stakeholders 
in the management and delivery of production or services. In fact, private for-profit 
companies might at the best manage collaboration between multiple stakeholders 
but they are never open for sharing in strategy formation or operations. 
Contrastively, in the social economy, the non-profit sector notwithstanding, we 
witness the occurrence of some sort of a network that empowers the fringes and 
facilitates participation. This presupposes a network or rather the creation of a 
larger organization, that is not of a hierarchical, chain of command type but rather 
of a peer-to-peer type without a centre. Authority and prestige originate here from 
the collaborative work (including often the so-called sweat equity that is: toil) and 
from the collective utilization of their asset-locked common-pool resources. 
                                                                                                                                       
 
vestiges of informal work to formal employment, many schemes have been experimented with from 
part-ownership through shares up to social land programs. Social co-operatives are the last form in 
this long row. Still, among those between 50-64, some 10 percent less are employed than in the EU-
average. The same ratio for the Roma population is only around 20 percent, although in the time of 
state-socialism employment had reached 70%.  
59
 Family-run boarding houses offering day-care for children are often entitled to receive a statutory 
and normative allowance in countries with a low fertility rate. Still, their life span is short. Short-
lived as they might be, while in business they provide a considerable help to working parents to find 
a viable balance between raising children and going to work.  
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Typical qualifying networks are those of membership organizations and mutuals, 
self-governed organizations, collectively owned organizations, community interest 
organizations. Also, as to target groups, to work “for them” is not sufficient, to 
work “with them” is a necessary condition. 
 
Entrepreneurship online 
 
The online entrepreneurship with its user-generated content can be sensibly 
compared with the social entrepreneurship. User uploaded content – civilian 
journalism - adds to value in comparison to conventional news or some homepage 
content. Also, the way value is being added to this online content in a community-
curated manner, resembles to self-governing or autonomous social enterprises. The 
social web often acts as an incubator for young talent dabbling in one genre or 
another of art or literature. A friendly audience that gives feed-back – this is the 
essence of community portals - is invaluable in the unfolding of their creative 
potential. In order to prevail in the fields of creative human endeavour, it is 
traditionally the coincidence of gift and good fortune that can help talents unfold.  
This latter component of luck is leveraged in the non-scholarized domains of social 
media since attention alone is what counts. Ivan Illich, the intellectual foe of formal 
schooling would just rejoice seeing this practice. One can draw eyeballs without 
any effort as to material resources. Creative content will be noticed due to search, 
indexing, tagging, etc. Capital is only needed to leave incubating behind and take 
off.  
 
Social enterprises are typically an entrepreneurship with an idea or a business 
model. They can be disruptive ones that have the potential to extend in an 
explosive manner. Their extension starts when a reflecting network arises around 
them – the sprouts of a fledgling clientele. This feedback can help them survive and 
get confirmed as to the feasibility of their endeavour. Being embedded in a network 
has therefore the same incubating function as subsidies in case of SMEs. As the 
community roots always serve as a precondition for grants, online groups can 
easily substantiate their claims to respond to a larger audience. This feature points 
out to the fact that a network-rooted organization can operate without a feasible, let 
alone sustainable business model. This is often the case with online communities, 
where the size of committed followers alone is sufficient to draw the attention and 
keep the step going. I could cite innumerable cases
60
, where a young talent finds an 
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 „My problem is not piracy, it is obscurity, and having put the electronic free version of my novel 
on a community space, has turned my books into dandelion seeds, able to blow in the wind and find 
every crack in every sidewalk, sprouting up in unexpected places. Each seed is a possibility, an 
opportunity for someone out there to buy a physical copy of the book, to commission work from 
me, to bring me in for a speech. I once sold a reprint of an article of mine to an editor who saw it in 
a spam message -- the spammer had pasted it into the ‘word salad’ at the bottom of his boner-pill 
pitch to get past the filters. The editor read the piece, liked it, googled me, and sent me a check. This 
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audience or constituency with the help of the social media alone. The mode 
monetization – if any - is usually still to be invented later and can come afterward 
without compromising the existence and functioning of a co-operative work-
together. The community sites and popular applications can operate month after 
month without the direct prospect of commodification. I argue that the sustainable 
maintenance of a collectivity or a traffic-attracting network amounts to and 
compensates for a working business model – as long as they develop their core 
competence. This online state of affairs is relevant for social entrepreneurs, because 
it is often advisable to develop a co-operative with means of community work 
without a direct prospect of market opportunity. They will come later in quite 
unexpected forms.
61
 
 
Incubation for an entrepreneurship means simulating how amateurs do sport, how 
connoisseurs deal in paintings, the way laics dabble in their hobbies and volunteers 
act in their civic engagement.  
 
The reflection and feed-back alone can help a young creator to explore ways of 
collaborating with readers, bloggers, and other generators of ideas, words, news, 
analysis, pictures, and data - slowly developping towards professionalism. I 
equalize this network of interested or engaged people around a creative mind with 
the mentioned enabling network that is the differentia specifica of social 
entrepreneurship. What is feed-back by an audience in the online entrepreneurship, 
it is reciprocity and trust being incubated, developped and practicized in the social 
economy – reciprocal relations and an ever higher level of mutual trust are the 
salient factors of competitive advantage in this very special business segment. The 
experience of online communities casts doubt on the merits of demanding a full-
fledged business model from social enterprises instead of satisfying us with mere 
operability and financial viability.
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
dissemination allowed my work to spread far and wide, into corners of the world I never could have 
reached. I hear from sailors on battleships, volunteers working in the developping world, kids in 
underfunded school-districts, and people who ‘do not usually read this sort of thing’ but found my 
work because a friend was able to introduce them to it. My readers have made innumerable 
technical remixes, fan-fic installments, fan-art drawings, songs, translations and other fun and 
inspiring creative works from mine, each time humbling and inspiring me (and enriching me!).” 
61
 As to unexpected forms of market opportunity, let me refer to what happened to the homeless 
people in Budapest: a creative talent of the advertising industry, an artist in his leisure time, has 
come to the idea that the homeless might perhaps start distributing the copies of his artistic work to 
cars stopped by traffic lights. This turned out to be a genuine success; the artist achieved attention 
and accumulated considerable fame comparable to a vernissage of an exposition, the amateur 
salesmen received their alms or tips as usual. This case substantiates that (1) a live community is a 
value in itself that can be converted in work opportunities and (2) the availability of a sustainable 
business model need not be taken as a constitutive criterion for an organization to belong to the 
social economy. 
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There is then the well-known lesson of open-source software: When a company 
churns out an online product, they most likely will give away the source code in 
order to solicit the collaborative effort of independent software developpers to add 
applications and add value thereby. In a similar vein, I regard co-operatives as 
platforms of internalized voluntary discipline adherence, mutual knowledge sharing 
and burgeoning competences where others can join with their skills or labour. The 
cohesion alone within an unfolding network has an inherent value. Networks are 
thus an, as yet unrecognized, factor of production such as land, labour or capital.  
 
In order to accentuate my claim that collaborative networks constitute a factor of 
production in the social economy, I risk a lengthy citation from a recent research: 
„Young people who are not working or in school, generally characterized as 
disconnected, these youth may also lack strong social networks that provide 
assistance in the form of employment connections and other supports such as 
housing and financial assistance. Without attachment to work or school, the 
disconnected youth may be vulnerable to experiencing negative outcomes as the 
transition to adulthood. Since the late 1990s, social science research has introduced 
different definitions of the term disconnected. Across multiple studies of 
disconnected youth, the ages of the youth and the length of time they are out of 
school or work for purposes of being considered disconnected differ. In addition, a 
smaller number of studies has also incorporated incarcerated youth into estimates 
of the population. Due to these methodological differences, the number of youth 
who are considered disconnected varies… The factors that are associated with 
disconnection are not entirely clear, though some studies have shown that parental 
education and receipt of public assistance are influential. Compared to their peers 
in the general population, disconnected youth tend to have fewer years of 
education, and are more likely to live apart from their parents and to have children. 
Disconnected youth are also twice as likely to be poor than their connected 
peers…The parents of disconnected youth are more likely than their counterparts to 
be unemployed and to have lower educational attainment.”62 
 
In the network economy it is the sheer number of interconnections and links that 
yield added value. The availability of members keeps the network alive. This rule 
applies more and more as the bigger the network grows.
63
 The networks are usually 
organic grown, such as an ethnic purveyor hinterland for a, let us say, Chinese 
restaurateur.  
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 A. L. Fernandez and Th. Gabe, Disconnected Youth : A Look at 16- to 24-Year Olds Who Are Not 
Working or In School, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., 2008 
63
 The development of a network is described – among others - by the Metcalfe-law: the utility of a 
(telecommunications) network is proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the 
system. 
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Further on, the community is traditionally created by linking to each other under 
some cause (families alone are no communities under this qualifying constraint). 
Weak bonds or stronger bonds, but by bonds that have to be cared for and used in 
order to keep them alive. The density of that sort of network leads to popularity 
(e.g.: accumulated social capital). Sacrificing the integrity of our privacy, 
publicness alone also brings us comparable collective benefits and helps create a 
community, too. The community is therefore also being woven by other civic 
duties such as when members in a social space share their personal information, 
when they share their offering of skills, when (1) they tag themselves in a 
qualifying manner as this or that, when (2) they are rating and reviewing something 
online or when (3) they contribute or share a story or picture under an existing 
metatag. (What personal information people nowadays proffer on social spaces 
amounts to an environmental study hitherto executed by police alone on suspects). 
This tagging - the online equivalent of coming together and building community - 
renders them searchable, visible and retrievable under that description. This 
voluntarily revealed publicness of their traits renders people to become user-
curated objects in a wider dimension – sort of an emerging new Commons - called 
social intelligence. It is important to point out that social intelligence is yet 
unregulated by state authorities. Being not regulated does not mean that there is no 
management of these sometimes private, sometimes common-pool resources.  
 
Sharing of personal information that merges into a wider set of such a collective 
wisdom (the latest equivalent of a data base) is in itself a generative social act 
because it forms the basis of ensuing personal connections, let alone business 
transactions. The density of this sort of virtually knitted network leads to enhanced 
opportunities for members. (Enhanced opportunity is the latest recurrence of value 
added in economics). In the beginning there is some sort of content alone. That is 
enough for generating an attentive audience. That is also enough for this no-cost 
little online endeavour to operate. For creating an attention-maintained community 
(virtual at the onset, with the potential of turning into real business) the digital age 
requires some sort of hands-on reporting or vivid discussing that embrace virtual 
collaboration, viral dissemination, and feedback loops that inform and deepen 
original content. Once the community is at hand, an appropriate business model 
will sooner or later emerge for them.  
 
That is why I speak of networks – online networks and social capital generating 
collectivities alike - as factor of production. A live network is in itself a value 
driver: an intangible non-physical claim to future benefits for members. As an 
antipode, I have evoked the historical case of insulated hermits as people lacking a 
helping network whatsoever. Most businesses are situated in a continuum between 
these two antipodes: social enterprises are businesses that cannot manage without a 
network. For, the profit businesses, at the same time, may have a network of their 
own or not but their network does not belong to the core of their business. (In the 
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language of management science: not belonging to the technostructure but merely 
to the supporting staff). 
 
The difference between clusters, public utilities’ grid and personal networks is that 
business relationships rarely add on to a personal network. Personal links 
accumulate into intangible assets, intellectual or social capital whereas business 
relationships accrue to capital without strings.  
 
By the term collectivities, I do not understand only a working environment. 
Although by no means, part of the social economy, men’s magazines, business and 
trade magazines, and entertainment magazines - they also have the unique value of 
focus that their publishers can sell to advertisers. What is more, magazines as 
communities are perfectly positioned for the community-based internet, too. To the 
extent of a parallel, I can state that these periodicals are also collections of people 
who are interested in the same well circumscribed stuff. Complementing their 
paper edition, editors can figure out ways to enable their readers to utilize this plus: 
to share with each other, to become a platform for that community. Becoming a 
community platform, to turn into a place of exchange (say of criticism about all 
forms and tastes in entertainment), can still sustain quite a few high-value titles 
worldwide – even well after the looming demise of offline journalism64.  
 
There is an emerging principle for these organizations reflecting new architecture 
of (small) business models in our post-industrial age: do what you do best (your 
core competences) and – as leverage - link outward to the rest.65 Linking-in with 
partners presupposes expertise otherwise your partner would reject you! Your 
clients might appreciate and use these secondary competences of yours – that is 
why embedding is definitely leveraging social economy organizations. Links are 
value. The online content without links is valueless because it is unseen and cannot 
be monetized. The content with links gains value both because it has an audience 
that can be monetized and because it gains credence in the page ranking 
algorithms, which equates links with value. That is the basic precept of the link 
economy, which also applies offline to small companies and burgeoning 
collectivities that try to identify their core competences.  
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 In the minute, their paper edition goes out of business, what remains to be left of these magazines 
– the online community - will quite necessarily merge into the contemporary social economy. 
65
 As the rule of preferential attachment teaches, nodes (member workers) will wish to link 
themselves to hubs with the most connections (workers with informal prestige, say foremen). As 
nodes arrive and demand on the system increases, the total capacity of the system also increases, 
whereas in a chain command structure forfeit of flatness contributes to the bureaucracy. At the same 
time, an unemployed Roma bricklayer will perhaps not join a social co-operative according to the 
logic of a citation network, his choice still follows the very rule of „following” a person (in esteem). 
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Groups of village hosts or other self-employed, members of cooperatives – perhaps 
on their online site at that – might try to use the power of the link to build their 
reputation by putting together a sharing network of their consumers, benefactors 
and stakeholders cutting across departmental and institutional and economic 
boundaries. What is the social economy equivalent of an outward link (as reflecting 
non-core competences)? It connects their thrust in building partnerships to local 
authorities and other more established companies.  
 
Final remarks 
 
The social economy is made up of enterprises, the primary objective of which is to 
provide their members or a wider community with services. This leads to a so-
called hybrid organization, imbued with conflicts in the system of values and 
business goals. Social economy enterprises, accounting for nearly 8% of the private 
sector jobs in Europe, are often able to survive and provide quality services in 
circumstances that ‘investor-driven’ firms would find less lucrative. However, their 
specific management structures, stakeholder groups and capital structures 
necessitate adapted skills amongst managers and board officials.
66
 Multiplying 
effects can be taken for granted here. At the same time, there are no trickling-down 
effects at all, because growth in the social economy is by definition tantamount to 
the parallel and proportional income growth of their actors and participants. Social 
economy organizations are also tantamount to setting up a GATT-conform trade 
barrier in order to localize and to tap underutilized local skills. This is the “social 
democracy” of the anticapitalism, opposed to the militancy of hard-core 
antiglobalists, anarchists and environmentalists. 
 
According to my hypothesis, networks are a good proxy for finality. Looking for 
signs of networking is operational and statistically also discriminating enough. 
What is more, instead of presumed altruism (maximizing social aims) it sets upon 
gratification (that is a constant positive feedback) within a self-governing peer 
network. That is a network with a topology excluding any centre or chain of 
command. In sum, it is less the social aim but rather their social fabric that 
distinguishes best and yields the differentia specifica of the social economy as 
contrasted to other subsets of the non-state and non-business third sector. These 
features delineate a clear focus at the lowest level of rank-ordered organisations-
well below the SME sector with an emphasis on one special subset of the transit 
organizations, with their incubating function. 
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 Green Paper on Entrepreneurship in Europe, EU Commission, 2003. 
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Social economy organizations can all be understood as motivated by collective 
self-employment.
67
 The all-encompassing definition, without taking recourse to 
finality and without presuming a sustainable business model, could sound 
something like this: the social economy is made up of project-level, transitional or 
already institutionalized initiatives, where either their means of production are 
collective or their management is founded on values of self-governance. This latter 
results in an autonomous management, where the hierarchy builds on an informal 
prestige alone and a decision making is based on principles of participation and 
empowerment. Such a state of affairs is necessarily conducive to the primacy of 
personal engagement over capital. 
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„Es ist allgemein angenommen, dass das Selbstbild der verschiedenen  Völker 
Europas eindeutig Elemente westlichen Charakters hervorhebt – die Topoi 
’christlich-abendländische Zivilisation’, ergänzt mit den der ’jüdisch-christlichen 
Überlieferung’ und ’Erbschaft  der griechisch-römischen Antiquität’ sind ständige 
Elemente bei der Registration der Grundelemente europäischer Kulturerbe.“ 
Vilmos Heiszler 
Zwischen Ost und West: Elemente des Selbstbildnisses europäischer Nationen 
Kurzfassung 
 
„Mit dem Verschwinden des Feindbildes ‚Kommunismus’, so scheint es, treten die 
Schwächen des Verfassungstyps ‚westliche Demokratie’ um so schärfer hervor.“ 
Richard Saage 
Die Demokratie und die Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts
 
 
“Thus, the very globalization (that was actively imposed by the USA; that is 
stigmatized by the antiglobalists of all the countries; that is often regarded as the 
main source of problems for the developing countries) made the trend toward the 
relative weakening of the rich countries and the relative strengthening of the poor 
countries inevitable. Consider this point in more detail.” 
Leonid Grinin, Andrey Korotayev 
Globalization and the Sifting of Global Economic-Political Balance 
 
“The results showed that, among the participants of the study, the globalization is 
not seen as a major threat, but there is no enthusiasm about it either.” 
Márta Fülöp 
The Enthusiasm and/or the Fear Concerning the Globalization among the Post-
socialist Youth : The Case of the Hungarian University Students
 
 
“The imperial conflicts of second line (behind the global cooperation, that 
constitutes the first line) adopt in any of their constitutions always clear 
ideological-philosophical forms. This event reminds very clearly (as it has been 
declared so reluctantly in this attempt) of a state, that Huntington described in 1992 
and 1993. These ideologies-philosophies of life are adopting very generally (as it 
has been once pointed out) a „fundamentalist” character, what has also to be 
explained from this competition. It is almost alarming, that this process represents 
the counter-movement toward the development after 1945, while formerly the 
individual ideologies/philosophies of life became always more differentiated and 
demanding.“ 
Endre Kiss 
Constructivity and Destructivity in the Globalization.  A Background of the 
Problematic of Peace 
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Vilmos Heiszler 
 
Zwischen Ost und West: Elemente des Selbstbildnisses europäischer Nationen 
(Kurzfassung) 
 
Es ist allgemein angenommen, dass das Selbstbild der verschiedenen  Völker 
Europas eindeutig Elemente westlichen Charakters hervorhebt – die Topoi 
„christlich-abendländische Zivilisation”, ergänzt mit den der „jüdisch-christlichen 
Überlieferung” und „Erbschaft  der griechisch-römischen Antiquität” sind ständige 
Elemente bei der Registration der Grundelemente europäischer Kulturerbe. 
 
Schon beim ersten Blick wird es klar, dass diese Grundelemente problematische 
Züge aufweisen: sowohl jüdische, als auch christliche Elemente europäischer 
Kulturerbe stammen ursprünglich aus dem Gebiet des Nahen Ostens. Die grossen 
monotheistischen Religionen waren im Schosse semitischer Völker Südwestasiens 
entstanden („Kinder Abrahams”: Israeliten, Christen, Muslimen), also 
entscheidende Faktoren europäischer kultureller Identität sind vom 
aussereuropäischen Ursprung. 
 
Die Zusammensetzung der identitätsbildenden Image einzelner Völker Europas ist 
auch kompliziert. Einzelne Beispiele: 
 
Russen: auch selbst gefragt, ob sie zu Europa gehören: Kontroverse zwischen 
Zapadniki (Westler) und Slawophilen; Skythism, eurasische Schule; asiatische 
Tradition (mongolische Erbe in der russischen politischen Kultur); Bolschewismus 
zwischen Weltrevolution und „Sozialismus in einem Land” (Trotzkismus v. 
Stalinismus). 
 
Polen: überwiegend eindeutige prowestliche Orientation (Katholizismus, 
ständische und nationale Freiheitsauffassung), mit Betonung nationaler Eigenarten 
(Sarmatismus). 
 
Ungarn: Fähren-Metapher (Pendeln zwischen Ost und West). Kontroverse über die 
Rolle asiatischer (steppisch-nomadischer) Kulturerbe und Anpassung zur 
europäischen (christlichen) Kultur; Diskussionen über Herkunft der Magyaren 
(türkisch oder finno-ugrisch); orientalisierende künstlerische Richtungen um die 
Jahrhundertenwende; Turanismus; dabei auch Tradition „Schutzschild Europas” 
gegenüber dem Osten. 
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Finnen: trotz finno-ugrischer Abstammung Hervorhebung westlicher Züge 
finnischer Kultur, Meidung asiatischer Komponente (Erinnerung an die russische 
Oberhoheit). 
 
Rumänen: starke Betonung römischer (lateinischer) Abstammung und kultureller 
Erbe, geschickt harmonisiert mit byzantinisch-orthodoxer (und bis zur Neuzeit 
slawischsprachiger und griechischer) kirchlichen Tradition. Deshalb keine 
Kontroverse über Abstammung und kulturelle Zugehörigkeit. 
 
Bulgaren: sehr ausgeglichen, jedes Element harmonisch zusammengebaut: 
thrakisches Substrat, slawische und steppisch-turkische Volkselemente 
verschmolzen im Zeichen byzantinisch-christlicher Kultur. Kein Respekt für 
griechische und türkische kulturelle Einwirkungen, Bekenntnis zum Slawentum. 
 
Griechen: starkes Bewusstsein kultureller und politischer Nachlass der Antike 
(„Begründer der europäischen Kultur”), kombiniert mit Vorbehalten der 
byzantinischen Tradition gegenüber westlichen Einwirkungen. Dabei starke 
Zurückweisung asiatischer Kultureinflüsse auf die griechische Entwicklung. 
 
Türken: neben steppisch-nomadischen und islamistischen Traditionen immer 
stärkere Hervorhebung europäischer Elemente türkischer Entwicklung 
(Modernisationsbestrebungen der Osmanen und des Kemalismus). 
 
Deutsche: Spezialfall. Keine aussereuropäische Kulturerbe, aber oft starke 
Abgrenzung, besonders von der römischen Tradition (Germanenkult, Hermann-
Heroisierung), später Theorie über den „deutschen Sonderweg”. 
 
Aussereuropäische kulturelle Wirkungen von längerer Zeitdauer : 
 
Islamisch: Iberische Halbinsel, Sizilien, Balkan, Russland: lange nur als fremde 
Eroberung und Unterdrückung bewertet, in letzter Zeit objektiver beurteilt, als 
Vemittler anderer Kulturwerte (besonders am Gebiet der Musik, Tanz, Tracht, 
Gastronomie), in Russland auch als Ursprung grober politischer Handelns- und 
Umgangsformen betrachtet (wobei die Tataren nur teilweise als Träger islamischer 
Kultur zu bezeichnen sind). 
 
Zigeunerisch: Südost- und Mitteleuropa, Spanien, Frankreich: an der Peripherie der 
Gesellschaft, besonders Unterhaltung (Musik, Tanz, Gauklerkunst). 
 
Jüdisch: wegen dem langen Zusammenleben (2000 Jahre) bestritten, ob als 
„aussereuropäisch” zu bezeichnen. In den Anfängen wichtige Rolle in der 
Verbreitung des Christentums, später Hebräisch als wichtiges komponent 
theologischer Studien. In der europäischen Kultur gänzlich integriert, die 
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Wirkungen wechselseitig und nur mit Vorbehalt als „aussereuropäisch” zu 
bezeichnen. 
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Richard Saage 
 
Die Demokratie und die Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts
68
 
  
I. 
 
Nach dem Zusammenbruch der Gesellschaftsordnungen des sowjetischen Typs in 
den Jahren 1989 und 1991 hat der amerikanische Politologe Francis Fukuyama 
angesichts des Versagens der kommunistischen Legitimationsmuster in seinem 
Buch "Das Ende der Geschichte"
69
 die These vertreten, daß die liberale 
Demokratie, die seit den bürgerlichen Revolutionen des 17., 18. und 19. 
Jahrhunderts zahlreiche Metamorphosen durchlief, nun endlich zu der politischen 
Form der Integration der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse in kapitalistischen Staaten 
gefunden habe, zu der es keine historischen Alternativen mehr gebe. Der dieser 
Feststellung zugrundeliegende Triumphalismus schlug sich in den bekannten 
Formeln vom "Ende der Geschichte" oder vom "Ende der Utopie"
70
 nieder. 
Tatsächlich scheint es so zu sein, daß die liberale Demokratie (parlamentarische 
und präsidentielle Demokratie) auf der weltpolitischen Agenda keine andere 
Demokratievariante als Konkurrenz zu fürchten hat, ganz zu schweigen von 
möglichen diktatorischen Alternativen, seien sie nun kommissarischer, autoritärer 
oder totalitärer Provenienz. Doch demgegenüber bleibt zu fragen, ob tatsächlich 
der Niedergang des Realsozialismus in Europa automatisch zu einem 
Legitimationsgewinn des westlichen Verfassungstyps führte, der ihn gleichsam 
gegenüber allen Gefährdungen immunisiert. 
 
Wer sich einen Überblick über die Zeitdiagnosen der westlichen Demokratie nach 
der großen Zäsur von 1989 und 1991 verschafft, könnte zu dem Schluß kommen, 
das Gegenteil sei der Fall. Mit dem Verschwinden des Feindbildes 
"Kommunismus", so scheint es, treten die Schwächen des Verfassungstyps 
"westliche Demokratie" um so schärfer hervor. Gewiß ist die Rede von der Krise 
der Demokratie so alt wie diese selbst, weil die Ausweitung politischer Teilhabe 
das Resultat erbitterter politischer Kämpfe schon lange vor der Französischen 
Revolution war. Auch sind die Gefahren, die der Demokratie von den 
Bürokratisierungstendenzen etatistischer Verwaltungen und den 
Oligarchisierungstrends in den großen massendemokratischen Organisationen der 
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modernen Industriestaaten drohen, seit dem 19. und verstärkt im 20. Jahrhundert 
immer wieder analysiert worden.
71
 Aber die Herausforderungen der liberalen 
Demokratie seit dem Zusammenbruch der Herrschaftsordnungen sowjetischen 
Typs' sind offensichtlich neuartig. Genannt werden vor allem die folgenden 
Problemlagen, mit denen der westliche Verfassungstyp konfrontiert ist, ohne bisher 
überzeugende Lösungen anbieten zu können : 
 
1. Seit der frühen Neuzeit hätten sich in den westlichen Ländern 
Marktgesellschaften in einem langwierigen und komplexen Prozess durchgesetzt. 
Aber der individualistische Nutzenkalkül und das egoistische Konkurrenzverhalten 
als notwendige Voraussetzung und Folge der Marktökonomie seien, wie 
Tocqueville in seiner Analyse der amerikanischen Demokratie in der Mitte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts bemerkte, durch "Gewohnheiten des Herzens" korrigiert worden. Er 
habe damit einen Tatbestand gemeint, der eigentlich bis zur Mitte des 20. 
Jahrhunderts in den westlichen Demokratien außer Frage stand: daß nämlich das 
Prinzip egoistischen Utilitätsdenkens auf die Sphäre der Ökonomie im engeren 
Sinne weitgehend beschränkt blieb und die anderen Lebensbereiche der ständisch-
handwerklichen, sowie bäuerlichen Traditionen, des Familienlebens und der 
generellen sozialen Orientierung der einzelnen unberührt ließ. Der Triumph der 
Marktwirtschaft im weltweiten Kontext nach dem Zusammenbruch der 
Planwirtschaften des Ostens könnte nach dieser Diagnose für die innere Verfassung 
der westlichen Staaten einen hohen Preis haben
72
: Marktkonformes Verhalten, 
durch solidarische Werte nicht mehr korrigiert, treibe eine gesellschaftliche Praxis 
aus sich hervor, die der ehemalige Bundesverfassungsrichter Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde auf die Formel brachte: Es komme darauf an, "möglichst viel (für 
sich) herauszuholen, sich teuer zu verkaufen".
73
 Doch setze sich diese Maxime 
durch, so sei der liberalen Demokratie ihre wichtigste normative Ressource 
entzogen: die Bereitschaft der Bürger, sich für sie zu engagieren. 
 
2. Mit dem drohenden Zerfall der normativen Ressourcen des Bürgersinns gehe in 
den westlichen Staaten ein Modernisierungsschub einher, der aussschließlich seiner 
eigenen Logik folge, ohne auf die Logiken der anderen Teilbereiche der 
Gesellschaft Rücksicht zu nehmen. Eine konjunkturunabhänge, auf Dauer gestellte 
Massenarbeitslosigkeit, aber auch der Verlust humaner sinnstiftender Leitbilder sei 
die notwendige Folge: sie produziere dadurch massenhaft anomische 
Bewußtseinslagen, die sich in Gewalt- und Ideologiebereitschaft sowie in der 
Sehnsucht nach einfachen Lösungen und "starken" Männern äußere.74 Die immer 
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wiederkehrenden Wellen des Fremdenhasses und rechtsextremistischer 
Gewalttaten seien zwar nicht mit den Entstehungsbedingungen des Faschismus in 
der Weimarer Republik zu vergleichen. Doch stellten sie dann eine ernsthafte 
Herausforderung für die liberale Demokratie dar75, wenn sie begleitet würden von 
massiven sozio-kulturellen Fragmentierungen, in deren Gefolge sich innerhalb 
fundamentalistischer Gruppierungen totalitäre Ideologien durchsetzen können. Der 
ehemalige Ost-West-Gegensatz sei längst durch einen "Zusammenprall der 
Zivilisationen" (Huntington) ersetzt worden, der nicht nur an den Grenzen des 
Geltungsbereichs der westlichen Demokratien, sondern in ihren Metropolen selbst 
stattfinde.
76
 
 
3. Technologische Entscheidungen mit irreversiblen Konsequenzen drohten das 
Mehrheitsprinzip außer Kraft zu setzen. Die westliche Demokratie sei aber nur 
dann wirklich funktionsfähig, wenn die Minderheit zur Mehrheit werden kann und 
einmal getroffene Entscheidungen wieder zu revidieren sind.
77
 Noch schwerer aber 
wiege, daß die liberale Demokratie in ihrer jetzigen Form mit dem Nachweis 
schuldig bleibe, daß sie die Lebensbedingungen der Menschheit im 21. Jahrhundert 
zu sichern vermag. Dem Druck der nächsten Wahlen ausgesetzt, konzentrierten 
sich jedoch die Politiker auf unmittelbar anstehende Problemlagen; die längst 
fälligen ökologischen Strukturentscheidungen blieben aus, weil sie langfristigen 
Menschheitsinteressen dienten, die im System der Konkurrenzdemokratie nicht 
mehrheitsfähig und damit auch nicht durchsetzbar seien. Nicht im Parlament, 
sondern im Radio und im Fernsehen fänden im allgemeinen die sachkundigen 
Diskussionen über die wichtigsten ökologischen, sozialen, politischen und 
wirtschaftlichen Probleme statt. Das Interesse der Parteien an ihrem Machterhalt 
entwickle zudem eine solche Eigendynamik, daß der Abstand zwischen der 
öffentlichen Meinung und den gewählten Volksvertretern ständig wachse. Wir 
müßten uns bewußt sein, so die Diagnose des Berichts an den Club of Rome von 
1992, "Die globale Revolution", "daß die Demokratie heute ausgehöhlt und 
gefährdet ist und daß sie Grenzen" habe. Die Antwort auf die Frage, ob die Welt, in 
der wir uns vorfinden, überhaupt regierbar sei, laute: "Wahrscheinlich nicht mit den 
derzeitig vorhandenen Strukturen und Einstellungen."
78
 
 
4. In dem Maße, wie sich die Individualisierungstendenzen in den westlichen 
Ländern verstärkten, werde immer unklarer, worin der unverzichtbare 
gesellschaftliche Basiskonsens als Voraussetzung eines pluralistisch verfaßten 
Regierungssystems zu sehen sei: alle normativen Ressourcen traditionaler Art, aus 
denen sich jenseits marktkonformen Verhaltens so etwas wie eine kollektive 
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Identität ergeben könnte, scheinen erschöpft zu sein.79 Aus dieser Entwicklung 
resultierten zwei Konsequenzen, die sich für die liberale Demokratie 
gleichermaßen fatal auswirkten. Einerseits, komme es bei vielen Bürgern zur 
Herausbildung einer Doppelmoral: im Namen individueller Grundrechte würden 
staatliche Maßnahmen zur Schaffung von Infrastrukturen, die solidarischen 
Zwecken dienten, blockiert, um den politischen Akteuren gleichzeitig Versagen 
angesichts dringend zu lösender Strukturprobleme vorzuwerfen.80 Andererseits, 
habe die zunehmende Individualisierung des Lebens schon längst die Frage nach 
der Integrationsfähigkeit der westlichen Demokratien aufgrund des Wegfalls des 
kommunistischen Feindbildes auf die politische Tagesordnung gesetzt: es sei 
keineswegs ausgemacht, so lauten düstere Prognosen, ob nicht die 
Bürgerkriegsszenarien im ehemaligen Herrschaftsbereich des Realsozialismus die 
Zukunft der westlichen Demokratie vorwegnehmen.
81
 
 
5. Als zwischen 1989 und 1991 die realsozialistischen Staaten in Europa 
zusammenbrachen, beherrschte eine optimistische, wenn nicht sogar euphorische 
Europa-Vision die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung. Man sprach vom "Modell 
Europa", in dem es vielfältige und richtungsweisende Sozialexperimente geben 
werde, denen nicht länger mehr dogmatisierte Utopien und Ideologien, sondern 
empiriegesättigte und erprobungsfähige Handlungsentwürfe zugrunde liegen. 
Europa, so schien es, avancierte zum Hoffnungsträger überhaupt, der auf der Basis 
einer florierenden Marktwirtschaft wachsenden Wohlstand mit Demokratie, 
Rechtsstaat, sozialer Sicherheit, sowie einer zivilen politischen Kultur verbinde und 
so zu einer Erneuerung, bzw. Revitalisierung des westlichen Verfassungstyps 
führe.82 Heute, so scheint es, ist nicht mehr viel von dieser Aufbruchstimmung 
übrig geblieben. Vor allem werden Zweifel an der ökonomischen 
Leistungsfähigkeit Europas laut. Diese Prognose geht von der Annahme aus, daß 
die Wachstumsraten der vergangenen Jahre nicht mehr erreichbar sind, die die 
Voraussetzung für das Funktionieren unserer Sozialsysteme waren und die zugleich 
die Löhne in Europa unbezahlbar gemacht hätten. Einerseits, seien die Löhne 
brutto zu hoch; sie raubten den Produzenten die internationale 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Andererseits, seien sie jedoch netto zu niedrig, weil sich ein 
allein verdienender Angestellter mit zwei Kindern zunehmend der Armutsgrenze 
nähere.83 Aus diesem Szenario, werden einige beunruhigende Fragen abgeleitet: 
stehen wir vor dem Ende unserer bisherigen Lebensweise? Wenn Europa 
tatsächlich verarmt, verliert dann der Verfassungstyp "westliche Demokratie" nicht 
eine entscheidende Sinnquelle? Kann es sein, daß der Zusammenbruch des Ostens 
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nicht den Sieg des Westens bedeutet, sondern umgekehrt: das Vorbeben zu einem 
noch viel größeren Zusammenbruch? Befinden wir uns heute in Europa in einer 
Situation wie die DDR des Jahres 1985, ohne zu ahnen, wie wenig Zeit uns noch 
bleibt? 
 
6. Zwar bietet der Trend der Globalisierung der Märkte84, der sich mit dem 
Zusammenbruch der realsozialistischen Diktaturen in Europa und dem Siegeszug 
der neuen Informationstechnologien ungehemmt durchgesetzt hat, die Perspektive 
einer "Übereinstimmung des Rechts mit einer Gemeinschaft des Nutzens im 
globalen Maßstab".85 Doch dieser Chance stehen auch Gefahren für die liberale 
Demokratie gegenüber. Indem sich das Kapital internationalisiert und mittels der 
Neuen Medien weltweit vernetzt, könnte es sich zunehmend seiner 
sozialstaatlichen Korrektive entziehen, die durch die allgemeine Kapitalflucht und 
die Verlagerung ganzer Industrien in sogenannte Billiglohnländer noch weiter 
geschwächt werden. Da die Globalisierung die Gegenmacht der Gewerkschaften 
aushebelt und die Verringerung der Arbeitskosten einer der wichtigsten Aspekte 
der Konkurrenzfähigkeit innerhalb der globalisierten Weltwirtschaft ist, wäre nicht 
auszuschließen, daß dem wachsenden Heer der Arbeitslosen eine kleine Schicht 
von Superreichen gegenübersteht. Auf diese Weise könnte die Globalisierung jenes 
Mindestmaß an sozialer Gerechtigkeit zerstören, ohne das die liberale Demokratie 
ihre Integrationsfähigkeit verlöre. Der Rest-Staat müßte zunehmend zu autoritären, 
d.h. antidemokratischen Mitteln greifen, um die Stabilität der Gesellschaft zu 
sichern. Andererseits, könnten sich die wirklich relevanten 
gesamtgesellschaftlichen Entscheidungen in den Chefetagen der weltweit 
agierenden "global players" abspielen, die der demokratischen Kontrolle der 
Bürger  weitgehend entzogen sind. 
 
7. Spätestens seit dem 11. September 2001, ist die liberale Demokratie des Westens 
mit der Gefahr des weltweiten, gegen sie gerichteten Terrors konfrontiert, der bis 
dahin unterschätzt worden ist. Ausgehend vom islamischen Fundamentalismus, 
sind die bisherigen Reaktionsmuster wenig erfolgversprechend. Das 
kulturalistische Paradigma
86
 sieht das Problem nicht im islamischen 
Fundamentalismus, sondern im Islam insgesamt. Der westlichen Demokratie wird 
empfohlen, ihre Reihen zu schließen und sich auf ihre eigenen Werte zu besinnen. 
Unter dieser Voraussetzung, könnten dann in der Außenpolitik realistische 
Bündnisse mit anderen Kulturen geschlossen werden, die auf gegenseitigem 
Nutzen beruhen. Was aber geschieht mit den kulturellen Minoritäten in den 
westlichen Metropolen? Und wie soll dieser Ansatz funktionieren, wenn der 
fundamentalistische Islam in seinen eigenen Ursprungsländern mehrheitsfähig 
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wird? Das modernisierungstheoretische Muster
87
 geht davon aus, daß der 
islamische Fundamentalismus eine Ideologie darstellt, die streng vom Islam als 
Religion zu trennen ist. Die  westliche Demokratie habe den islamischen 
Fundamentalismus zu bekämpfen, aber den Dialog mit dem Islam zu suchen. Als 
Fernziel gilt die Entstehung einer Weltzivilisation, in der unter dem Zeichen der 
Demokratie die aufklärerischen Potentiale der islamischen und der westlichen 
Kultur verschmelzen. Auch diese Konzeption erscheint in einem problematischen 
Licht, wenn sich - gerade unter dem Eindruck westlicher Militärinterventionen - 
die Kooperationsbereitschaft der islamischen Staaten auf die ihrer korrumpierten 
Eliten beschränken sollte. 
 
II. 
 
Hat die liberale Demokratie angesichts dieser Herausforderungen eine Zukunft? 
Wir sollten nicht vergessen, daß in der bisherigen Geschichte alle diktatorischen 
und technokratischen Versuche, gegen das anthropologische Veto der 
Selbstbestimmung stabile Herrschaftsordnungen zu formieren, wenig erfolgreich 
waren. Der neueste Beleg sind die Ereignisse von 1989 und ihre Folgen: wie schon 
vor ihnen die faschistischen Diktaturen, so scheiterten auch die politischen Systeme 
des sowjetischen Typs in letzter Instanz an dem "Protest gegen den fremden 
Willen, dem sich der eigene beugen muß, gegen die Qual der Heteronomie".88 
Diese Aussage Hans Kelsens ist im der deutschen Verinigung der Jahre 1989/90 
eindrucksvoll bestätigt worden. So heißt es in der gemeinsamen Erklärung der 
Bürgerbewegungen der DDR vom 4. Oktober 1989: "Uns verbindet der Wille, 
Staat und Gesellschaft demokratisch umzugestalten. Es kommt darauf an, einen 
Zustand zu beenden, in dem Bürgerinnen und Bürger dieser Gesellschaft nicht die 
Möglichkeit haben, ihre politischen Rechte so auszuüben, wie es die 
Menschenrechtskonventionen der Vereinten Nationen und die KSZE-Dokumente 
verlangen. Wir erklären uns solidarisch mit allen, die wegen ihres Einsatzes für 
diese Ziele verfolgt werden. Wir setzen uns ein für die Freilassung der Inhaftierten, 
die Aufhebung ergangener Urteile und die Einstellung laufender 
Ermittlungsverfahren. Wir halten es für vorrangig, in unserem Lande eine 
Diskussion darüber zu eröffnen, welche Mindestbedingungen für eine 
demokratische Wahl eingehalten werden müssen".89  Aber sicher ist auch, daß die 
Demokratie in ihrer heutigen Form nicht in traditionalistischer Statik verharren 
darf. Sie muß sich den Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts stellen. Doch die 
                                                 
 
87
Vgl. Tibi 1995. 
88
Kelsen 1981, S. 3. 
89Gemeinsame Erklärung der Bürgerbewegung vom 4. Oktober 1989, in: Volker Gransow/Konrad 
H. Jarausch (Hrsg.): Die deutsche Vereinigung. Dokumente zu Bürgerbewegung, Annäherung und 
Beitritt, Köln 1991, S. 69. Zu den aus den Bürgerbewegungen der DDR in der Umbruchphase 
entstandenen "Runden Tische" vgl. auch Berg 2000 sowie Thaysen 2000.   
179 
 
 
Frage ist, wie das geschehen soll. Niemand kann an dieser Stelle detaillierte 
Reformvorschläge der Institutionen unseres politischen Systems erwarten; dazu 
mögen sich Experten äußern, die auf diesem Gebiet kompetenter sind als der 
Verfasser. Doch möchte er wenigstens zwei Bedingungen nennen, die für die 
Zukunft der westlichen Demokratie entscheidend sein können.  
 
Zunächst wird ihre zukünftige Entwicklung davon abhängen, ob es gelingt, dem 
Denken in Kategorien der individuellen Nutzenmaximierung neue Formen der 
Bürgersolidarität gegenüberzustellen. Offen kontraproduktiv wäre der Versuch, sie 
im Zeichen eines "Krieges gegen den weltweiten Terrorismus" durch innen - und 
außenpolitische Feindbestimmungen zu erzwingen: eine solche ausgrenzende 
Homogenisierung würde die Demokratie unter sich begraben. Bedenkliche 
Erosionserscheinungen des normativen Fundaments der liberalen Demokratien sind 
bereits heute allenthalben sichtbar, wenn in der Öffentlichkeit Versuche 
unternommen werden, die Folter als legitimes Mittel der Verbrechens- und 
Terrorismusbekämpfung zu akzeptieren und sich die einzige Supermacht der Welt 
mit dem Problem auseinanderzusetzen hat, für systematische Mißhandlungen von 
Kriegsgefangenen unterhalb des Niveaus der Genfer Konvention verantwortlich zu 
sein. Aber auch der neokonservative Ansatz, Solidarität durch den Rekurs auf 
traditionale Werte im Bereich der Familien-, Sozial- und Kulturpolitik notfalls 
administrativ zu verordnen, ist ein Irrweg. Längst sind "die traditionalen Polster, 
auf die sich - bis vor wenigen Jahrzehnten - der Respekt vor der Autorität des 
Staates, der Gehorsam gegenüber den Gesetzen und eine Ethik der Arbeit stützen 
konnten"
90, in dem Maße verschlissen, wie in den westlichen Ländern die 
zweckrationale, am Markt orientierte Nutzenmaximierung nicht mehr an einer 
bestimmten Schicht festmachbar, sondern tendenziell zur Handlungsmaxime aller 
Individuen geworden ist. Die von der Moderne ausgelösten 
Individualisierungstendenzen sind nur von ihr selbst durch neue Formen der 
Solidarität in ihrer Dynamik zu bremsen und auf ihr humanes Maß zurückzuführen. 
Sie kann dabei auf keine andere Quelle zurückgreifen als auf die aufgeklärten 
Eigeninteressen der Bürger selbst : erst in der zivilgesellschaftlichen Assoziation 
können die einzelnen wieder lernen, freiwillig solidarische Bindungen einzugehen. 
 
Sodann scheint mir klar zu sein, daß die aufgezeigten Strukturprobleme nur zu 
bewältigen sind, wenn der westliche Verfassungstyp entschlossen an den - freilich 
zu reformierenden - Strukturen des Parteiensystems festhält: sie sind keine 
Fremdkörper, sondern müssen zu einem Zentrum der anzustrebenden 
Zivilgesellschaft erhoben werden. Für alle Versuche, das tatsächliche oder 
vermeintliche Versagen der politischen Parteien dadurch zu kompensieren, daß 
man die Richtlinienkompetenz bei der Antwort auf die Herausforderungen des 21. 
Jahrhunderts neu zu schaffenden Institutionen zuordnet, die in einem, angeblich 
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vom pluralistischen Interessenkampf entlasteten Raum agieren, trifft noch immer 
zu, was Hans Kelsen über die Parteienfeindschaft in den konstitutionellen 
Monarchien in Deutschland und Österreich sagte : sie sei - bewußt oder unbewußt - 
"ein ideologisch maskierter Stoß gegen die Realisierung der Demokratie".91 
Tatsächlich benötigen wir nicht weniger, sondern mehr Pluralismus. "In der 
gegenwärtig entstehenden Welt", so heißt es im Bericht des Club of Rome von 
1992, "kann die Entscheidungsgewalt nicht länger das Monopol von Regierungen 
und ihren Ministerien sein, die obendrein in einem Vakuum arbeiten". Viele 
Partner müßten in diesen Prozeß einbezogen werden: "Handel und Industrie, 
Forschungsinstitute, Wissenschaftler, nichtstaatliche Einrichtungen und private 
Organisationen".
92
 
 
Allerdings wird der pluralistische Parteienstaat der Problemlage des 21. 
Jahrhunderts nur unter der Voraussetzung gewachsen sein, daß er sich in zweierlei 
Hinsicht reformiert. Auf der einen Seite muß er durch ein 
fundamentaldemokratisches Korrektiv wirkungsvoll ergänzt werden. Von einer 
solchen  Konstellation könnten das Parlament, die Parteien und die Abgeordneten 
nur gewinnen, weil sie in einer im Umbruch begriffenen Welt auf einen sensiblen 
Seismographen an der Basis angewiesen sind: nicht nur um eine Politik zu 
vermeiden, die sich von den Interessen, Hoffnungen und Ängsten der Bürger löst. 
Ebenso wichtig ist, daß nur so deren Identifikation mit dem politischen System der 
parlamentarischen Demokratie möglich erscheint. Auf der anderen Seite wird der 
pluralistische Parteienstaat des 21. Jahrhunderts um die Erarbeitung der Vision 
einer zukünftigen Welt, die wir für anstrebenswert halten, nicht herumkommen. 
Wer ein solches sinnlich konkretes fiktives Szenario, das über den bestehenden 
Status quo hinausweist, von vornherein als Totalitarismus abtut, hat nicht begriffen, 
daß die Institutionen des westlichen Verfassungstyps zu leeren Hülsen werden, 
wenn sie sich auf ihre Funktion der Elitenrekrutierung und der Erzeugung der 
staatlichen Ordnung beschränken. Das Politische verschwindet dann aus der 
Politik: sie droht zu einer öffentlichkeitswirksamen Inszenierung von 
Scheinlösungen zu verkommen, ohne auf die Strukturprobleme des 21. 
Jahrhunderts wirkliche Antworten zu finden.  
 
III. 
 
Die westliche Demokratie, so kann abschließend festgestellt werden, hat den 
Herausforderungen linker und rechter Diktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert standgehalten. 
Ob sie die Probleme des 21. Jahrhunderts lösen wird, für die sie selbst 
mitverantwortlich ist, muss die Zukunft zeigen.   
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Leonid Grinin, Andrey Korotayev 
 
Globalization and the Sifting of Gobal Economic-Political Balance 
 
 
The article offers forecasts of the geopolitical and geo-economic development of 
the world in the forthcoming decades. One of the main accusations directed toward 
globalization is that it deepens the gap between the developed and developing 
countries dooming them to eternal backwardness. The article demonstrates that the 
actual situation is very different. It is shown that this is due to the globalization 
that the developing countries are generally growing much faster than the 
developed states, the World System core starts weakening and its periphery begins 
to strengthen. At the same time there is a continuing divergence between the main 
bulk of developing countries and the group of the poorest developing states. The 
article also explains, why the globalization was bound to lead to the explosive rise 
of many developing countries and the relative weakening of the developed 
economies. In the forthcoming decades this trend is likely to continue (though, of 
course, not without certain interruptions). It is also demonstrated that this 
convergence constitutes a necessary condition for the next technological 
breakthrough. 
 
Keywords: developed countries, developing countries, the World System, core, 
periphery, balance of power, convergence, divergence, world order, global 
technological breakthrough, weakening of the USA, change of the world leader, 
global middle class. 
 
Since the end of the 2
nd
 World War one could see in the world a rather unique 
situation when one country – the USA – became the world hegemon in so many 
respects: political, military, monetary, economic, technological, cultural, 
educational, artistic, innovations, and so on. For a rather long period of time this 
leadership was strengthened by the competition with the world Communism, which 
unified the West and stimulated a vigorous energy in the United States. After the 
collapse of the USSR the USA became the absolute hegemon of the world. And 
this may appear paradoxical, but it was the obtaining of the status of the absolute 
hegemon, that contributed to the start of the eclipse of the US might. On the one 
hand, this weakened the country’s readiness to sacrifice anything (as was done in 
the framework of the Cold War); on the other hand, against the background of the 
apparent omnipotence, the American leaders chose a generally wrong strategy 
trying to transform internal American tasks into goals of the US foreign policy 
(Kissinger 2001). As a result, within two decades the US administrations made 
many mistakes. Through their various actions they dissipated a certain safety factor 
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that the US had, shook their own might, accumulated exorbitant debts, and created 
a detonator for the global crisis whose consequences are not clear yet. In the 
meantime, within less than two decades, between 1991 and 2008, against the 
background of the weakening of Europe and continuing stagnation of Japan one 
could see the explosive growth of the Asian giants (China and India) as well as the 
formation of large group of fast developing countries (from Mexico to Malaysia) 
that will take leading positions in the world in foreseeable future. 
 
How have the Globalization Weakened the Core and Strengthened the Periphery?  
 
Is the globalization the main cause?  
 
If we consider the situation in retrospective, the decline of the might of the USA 
and the West was inevitable. The crisis of 2008–2013 just revealed in a rather 
distinct way the trend that had become rather pronounced well before the crisis, the 
trend toward the weakening of the main Western economic centers and the 
inevitability of the loss of the absolute hegemony by the West. We are dealing here 
with a certain historical logic that, however, has not been completely 
comprehended yet: the development of globalization after it had reached its certain 
phase became incompatible with the well-established model of the American and 
Western hegemony. Thus, the very globalization (that was actively imposed by the 
USA; that is stigmatized by the antiglobalists of all the countries; that is often 
regarded as the main source of problems for the developing countries) made the 
trend toward the relative weakening of the rich countries and the relative 
strengthening of the poor countries inevitable. Consider this point in more detail. 
 
Law of communicating vessels of the world economy  
 
Up to the early 1970s the development of globalization was accompanied by the 
growth of the gap between the rich and poor countries (especially, if we compare 
their GDP per capita levels). However, in the recent decades the globalization 
began to contribute more and more to the closing of this gap. Thus, it appears 
possible to speak about the “divergent globalization” (approximately up to the 
1970s) and the “convergent globalization” (since the 1980s). It appears important 
to note at this point that a rather pronounced convergence between the First and the 
Third world was already observed in the 1990s; however, this convergence can be 
hardly seen when “the West” is compared with “the Rest”, as in this case the 
convergence between the First and the Third World was obscured by a catastrophic 
economic decline observed in the early 1990s in the Second World.  
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Hence, the very essence of the last globalization wave implies that the developing 
countries must grow faster than the developed.
93
 This is because the globalization 
increases the transparency of economic borders and this brings into action what 
may be called the “law of communicating vessels.” As a result the development of 
periphery (and, especially, semi-periphery) accelerated, whereas the growth of the 
countries of the World System core slowed down. There is no doubt that this is one 
of the main results of the global development in the last two decades.  
 
According to the World Bank, just 20 years ago the share of the most developed 
countries (= the 1
st
 World = “the West”94) in the world GDP (calculated in the 
constant 2005 international purchasing power parity) was almost twice as high as 
the one of the rest of the world. It started declining in the 1990s, but these were the 
2000s when this decline became precipitous, and by now the share of the Rest 
already exceeds the one of the West (see Fig. 1):  
For the recent years the analysis of the dynamics of the gap between the First and 
Third World (as regards per capita GDP) on the basis of Maddison’s database 
(2010) yield results that are very similar to the ones that one obtains on the basis of 
the World Bank (2014) data. However, this is only Maddison’s database that 
allows to consider this dynamics in a really deep historical perspective. 
 
In the age of modernization the fastest economic and technological breakthrough 
was achieved by those countries that had already attained sufficiently high levels of 
literacy by the beginning of that age. We believe that this point is not coincidental, 
as it reflects the fact that the development of namely human capital became a 
crucial factor of economic development in modernization age (see, e.g., 
Denison 1962; Schultz 1963; Scholing, Timmermann 1988; Lucas 1988, etc.). Our 
earlier research (Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006: 87–91) has indicated the 
presence of a rather strong (R
2
 = 0,86) and significant correlation between the level 
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 This especially relevant for those developing countries that passed a certain threshold level of per 
capita GDP, which has been identified by Ho Tsung Wu (2006) to be around $1150 (note that this 
is rather congruent with the “take-off” theory of W. W. Rostow [1960]). The growth of the 
convergence rate in the recent decades is directly connected with the fact that during those decades 
one could observe a very significant growth of the number of those developing countries that 
passed this threshold level. Indeed, as we have argued on a number of occasions these are medium 
developed countries that tend to grow faster than either the least developed countries or the most 
developed ones (see, e.g., Коротаев, Халтурина 2009; Korotayev, Zinkina 2014). It is also very 
important to stress that at present the majority of the developing countries (with a total population 
of about 5 billion) belong to the category of the medium developed (“middle income”) countries 
(World Bank 2014), whereas only the minority of the Third World population (the so-called 
“bottom billion” [2007]) live now in the least developed countries. Note also that in the recent 
years the least developed countries tend to grow faster than the most developed ones, but still 
slower than the medium developed states (Korotayev, Zinkina 2014).  
94
 In this study this notion is operationalized as “High Income OECD Countries” according to the 
World Bank classification.  
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of literacy in the early 19
th
 century and per capita GDP values in the late 20
th
 
century. This, of course, provides additional support for the point that the diffusion 
of literacy during the modernization era was one of the most important long-term 
factors of the acceleration of economic growth.
95
 On the one hand, literate 
populations have many more opportunities to obtain and utilize the achievements 
of modernization than illiterate ones. On the other hand, literate people could be 
characterized by a greater innovative-activity level, which provides opportunities 
for modernization, technological development, and economic growth. Literacy 
does not simply facilitate the process of innovation being perceived by an 
individual. It also changes her or his cognition to a certain extent. This problem 
was studied by Luria, Vygotsky, and Shemiakin, the famous Soviet psychologists, 
on the basis of the results of their fieldwork in Central Asia in the 1930s. Their 
study shows that education has a fundamental effect on the formation of cognitive 
processes (perception, memory, cognition). The researchers found out that illiterate 
respondents, unlike literate ones, preferred concrete names for colors to abstract 
ones, and situative groupings of items to categorical ones (note that abstract 
thinking is based on category cognition). Furthermore, illiterate respondents could 
not solve syllogistic problems like the following one – “Precious metals do not get 
rust. Gold is a precious metal. Can gold get rust or not?”. These syllogistic 
problems did not make any sense to illiterate respondents because they were out of 
the sphere of their practical experience. Literate respondents who had at least 
minimal formal education solved the suggested syllogistic problems easily (Luria 
1976; see also, e.g., Ember 1977; Rogof 1981). Therefore, literate workers, 
soldiers, inventors and so on turn out to be more effective than illiterate ones not 
only due to their ability to read instructions, manuals, and textbooks, but also 
because of the developed skills of abstract thinking. 
 
The gap between the developed and developing countries continued to grow up to 
the late 1960s, in the 1970s it decreased a bit, but it somehow grew again in the 
1980s. Paradoxically, these were just the 1990s when Western economists 
undertook a massive study of the convergence issue (see, e.g., Barro 1991; Bianchi 
1997; Canova, Marcet 1995; Desdoigts 1994; Durlauf, Johnson 1995; Lee, Pesaran, 
and Smith 1997; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Paap, van Dijk 1994; Quah 
1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997; Sachs et al. 1995; Sala-i-Martin 1996). The most 
widely used method applied in this series was the comparison of the gap in 1950 
(or 1960) and the most recent data point (which, naturally, tended to happen 
sometime around the late 1980s or the early 1990s)
96
. As is easy to understand 
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 See also, e.g., Barro 1991: 407–443; Coulombe, Tremblay, Marchand 2004; Naudé 2004; 
UNESCO 2005: 143.  
96
 Note that this comparison tends to be operationalized in the following way – what is the 
correlation between the per capita GDP in the countries of the world in 1950/1960 году and the 
GDP per capita growth rates in 1950/1960–1990? A significant negative correlation is quite 
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looking, such an analysis led consistently the Western economists to the conclusion 
that there is no convergence between the developed and developing countries; what 
is more, one should rather speak about the continuing (though not very strong) 
divergence. Note that by that time one could observe the emergence of what looked 
like a sound theoretical model for such a conclusion – in the form of Romer’s 
theory of “increasing returns”, which implied rather logically that the developed 
countries must tend to develop faster than the developing states, and, hence, that 
the gap between them must tend to increase rather than contract. Indeed, Romer 
himself maintains that the model of increasing returns “offers an alternative view 
of long-run prospects for growth” that entirely contradicts the basic assumptions of 
the convergence theory: “per capita output can grow without bound, possibly at a 
rate that is monotonically increasing over time. The rate of investment and the rate 
of return on capital may increase rather than decrease with increases in the capital 
stock. The level of per capita output in different countries need not converge; 
growth may be persistently slower in less developed countries and may even fail to 
take place at all” (Romer 1985: 1003).  
 
In the same time, in a paradoxical way in that very moment when the Western 
economists came to an almost unanimous conclusion that the Third World would 
never be able to catch up with the First World, that the developing countries were 
doomed for ever to lag far behind the developed states, that there is no convergence 
between them, the process of the Great Convergence was already in its way 
strengthening more and more every year!
97
  
 
Law of communicating vessels of the world economy and awakening of masses  
 
Many economists of the 1950s and the 1960s did not have much hope that in the 
forthcoming future there would be much chance to bring the countries of the global 
South from the obscurity of backwardness. They were right to consider as the main 
obstacle the absence of the aspirations to improve their lives among the population 
of those countries. Poverty did not bother people, they did not perceive it as an 
unbearable state that should be escaped as soon as possible (on this see, e.g., the 
book by Noble Prize Winner Myrdal [1968]; the same opinion may be also found 
in the famous book of Braudel [1973]). Such a psychology may still be found 
                                                                                                                                       
 
reasonably interpreted as an indicator of the presence of the global convergence; a significant 
positive correlation is interpreted in a similarly reasonable way as an indicator of the presence of 
the global divergence, whereas an insignificant correlation is regarded as evidence for the absence 
of either significant global convergence or significant global divergence.  
97
 We believe that this salient fiasco of the Western economic science was very closely connected 
with the fact that Western economists tried to apply lineal models to the analysis of highly non-
lineal processes.  
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among some inhabitants of the most underdeveloped areas (especially, in Tropical 
Africa).
98
   
 
However, in many developing (mostly middle-income) countries the situation has 
changed, that is why the Third World is transforming from sleeping and apathetic 
into rather dynamic indeed (see, e.g. Korotayev et al. 2011a, 2011b, 2012; 
Korotayev, Zinkina 2014; Grinin 2011, 2012, 2013). And one of the main changes 
may be seen just in the change of life priorities of hundreds million, who make 
more and more active attempts in order to escape from poverty and illiteracy into a 
new life. 
 
Thus, the most difficult precondition for the breakthrough turns out to awaken this 
activity in the population of the poor countries (this requires very considerable 
efforts aimed at the initial modernization of education and health care, that is the 
initial accumulation of the human capital). However, when the need to enhance the 
conditions of life emerges at the mass scale, this puts into work a powerful motor. 
This may produce a qualitative result (though such a “Brownian motion” is almost 
always connected with various sorts of lawlessness, injustice and so on). When it 
starts, the movement toward the change of people’s own life to the better tends to 
generate social energy for many decades. And when we observe a synergy of 
efforts produced by the population and by the state, the success may be 
overwhelming. This is what happened in China, India and many other developing 
countries.  
 
In reach countries (notwithstanding all their achievements in culture and education) 
this source of development has already dried up. Motivation toward hard work does 
not only decrease among some groups of immigrants struggling for their (and their 
children’s) economic status (and, by the way, in the USA this supports the 
economic dynamism up to a considerable extent).  
 
And taking into consideration the population aging, possibilities for fast 
development are further shrinking more and more. It appears important to 
emphasize that among the causes of the weakening of the relative might of the West 
an important place belongs to the dramatic slow-down of the population growth 
rates in the West (whereas in some developed countries those growth rates have 
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 It is surprising but even in the 1990s some very important economists (like Jacque Attali, who 
was the President of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development at that time) still 
believed that the overwhelming supremacy of the global North over the global South would only 
increase in the forthcoming decades and would continue in the foreseeable future. Attali, for 
example, was sure that in the forthcoming decades many markets of the North would become 
closed for imports from the impoverished South. He expected the desperate popular masses of the 
World System periphery to continue observing in painful despair the efflorescence and richness of 
the World System core (Attali 1991).  
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even become negative) which is accompanied by its very significant aging (see, 
e.g., Goldstone 2010; Powell, Khan 2013). This leads to the decline of the working 
age populations and explosive growth of the number of pensioners.
99
 In the 
meantime it was the globalization that increased dramatically the demand for the 
main resource of poor countries – their workforce. What is more, the value of this 
resource is likely to continue growing further in the forthcoming decades (though 
for many developing countries in South Asia and, especially, Sub-Saharan Africa 
this will still be an extremely difficult task to find a productive employment for 
hundreds million young working hands [see, e.g., Zinkina, Korotayev 2014]).  
 
The openness of economic borders creates a situation when a sort of law of 
communicating vessels of the world economy begins to act; whereas the above 
described arrangement of labor incentives and labor resources determine to a 
considerable extent the work of this system of communicating vessels. In order to 
make the production cheaper, capitals and production capacities of the developed 
countries are transferred to the developing countries where one can find hundreds 
million young women and men looking for a job. Together with this, the motor of 
the world economic growth is also transferred from the core to the periphery 
(which implies a significant reconfiguration of the World System). As a result, the 
role of the developing countries in the world economy (especially, as regards the 
generation of its growth) is increasing, whereas the gap between them and the 
developed countries is decreasing (though is still remains very significant). 
 
Thus, by now the globalization of recent decades has worked mostly in favor of 
developing countries notwithstanding claims that it only increases the gap between 
the developed and developing countries (see, e.g., Stiglitz 2002). Notwithstanding 
many just observations made by the critics of globalization, we should maintain 
that it is Jagdish Bhagwati (2007) who turned out to be right with his vigorous 
defense of globalization.
100
  
 
And could it be the other way? It is not rare when a logic of a certain process 
remains unclear and contradictory for a long period of time; the attention is 
attracted by those very features that disappear later, whereas the most important 
characteristics remain some time blurred. It becomes clear only later that the 
process was bound to acquire those characteristics. This was what happened with 
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 Note that the USA has certain advantages here as regards higher fertility and immigration rates, 
which are among the main factors making the US economy more dynamic than the European 
economies. 
100
 And we do not see sufficiently strong factors that can stop entirely the Great Convergence rather 
than just to slow it down (as has been mentioned above a certain slowdown is not entirely unlikely 
against the background of possible successes in the “reindustrialization of the West” and industrial 
application of robotics). 
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globalization. Let us consider if the development of globalization had substantial 
chances to bring significantly different results.  
 
For a rather long period of time (especially during the periods of colonialism and 
neocolonialism) the expansion and intensification of the economic links in the 
world proceeded (up to a considerable extent) through the transformation of 
peripheral economies into agrarian and raw material sources for the developed 
states.
101
 That is why many development students (e.g., Immanuel Wallerstein 
[1974, 1980, 1987, 1988, 2003]) believed that the world-system core (≈ the West) 
could only exist through the exploitation of the periphery, through its imposition on 
the developing countries such an economic specialization that would preserve the 
leadership of the developed countries. It was also rather comfortable ideologically 
to equate the new globalization wave with a sort of modernized neocolonialism, 
maintaining that it either conserves the global inequality, or will even increase the 
gap between the developed and developing countries. There seem to have been 
certain grounds for such believes. However, finally the logic of the globalization 
process has turned out to be rather different. Why? The point is that that the 
globalization does not only increase the number of economic ties, it also extends 
enormously the world economic space. And this means a constant transformation 
of the international division of labor. Actually this could have only happened in the 
following way – while advanced countries concentrated on the development of new 
sectors, the technologies of older generations must have been transferred to less 
developed countries. One should also take into account the exhaustion of labor 
resources in the developed countries, and the abundance of such resources in the 
Third World. Thus, globalization objectively forced those countries that developed 
postindustrial economy and that could hardly support all the economic sectors to 
move industrial production to weakly industrialized regions.
102
 As a result of such a 
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 However, even such a development was rather important for the modernization of the peripheral 
countries. Note also that in the 19
th
 century ones of the most salient examples of transformation of 
whole colonies into agrarian and raw material sources for the developed states were represented by 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. However, by 1913 the average level of life in Canada 
(estimated through the per capita GDP level, which, in 1913 in Canada, according to Maddison 
[2010], was equal to 4 447 international dollars [to be exact – 1990 Geary – Khamis international 
purchasing power parity {PPP} dollars]) was considerably higher than the Western European 
average ($3 687), whereas in Australia and New Zealand ($5 157 and $5 152 respectively) it was 
higher than in the most prosperous Western European countries of that time. Note that now 
Australia is still a major agrarian and raw material source, though in the present-day for China 
rather than Western Europe. In the meantime the average level of life/per capita GDP in Australia 
($34 396 [2005 PPP dollars]) is till now a few times higher than in the workshop of the present-
day world, China.  
102
 Such processes contributed to the economic development in the 19
th
 century too, though the 
transfer of industrial production was not so wide-spread. However, in the 19
th
 century one may 
note similar processes with respect to the agricultural production. In this century, as a result of 
explosive urbanization, the share of agriculture in the Western European GDP declined, whereas 
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diffusion (greatly facilitated by the opening of international borders for the 
movement of capitals) one can observe a transfer of a substantial part of the World 
System core industries to the World System periphery. On the other hand, many 
developing countries have applied a lot of efforts of their own to achieve their 
industrialization.  
 
Causes of the change of economic balance of forces in the world. Now summarize 
the points indicating that the convergence was a virtually inevitable result of the 
globalization process.  
 
1. Development of new technologies led to the situation when the technologies of 
older generations became cheaper and cheaper. The transition of the Western 
economies to new technologies connected with the production of highly skilled 
services (in conditions of scarcity and high costs of their labor [as well as high 
ecological standards]) demanded the transfer of the old industries to the periphery. 
The transfer of those industries led to the rise of the peripheral countries (see, e.g., 
Grinin 2013).  
 
2. For the functioning of the transferred industries it was necessary to raise the 
level of the recipient countries in many respects. Developing countries became 
production grounds (assemblage workshops, preliminary procession industries, 
etc.). However, such production grounds could only function in presence of a 
necessary minimum of infrastructure, financial sector, a certain qualification of 
workers (implying the elimination of illiteracy and some development of secondary 
and higher education) and so on. The West pressed that the developing countries 
should develop all these.  
 
3. The transfer of industries launched a vigorous source of growth. In a number of 
poor countries it set in motion two of their very important advantages: vast labor 
resources and their cheapness. As a result they did not only start producing cheap 
goods in great quantities – industrialization and modernization greatly accelerated 
in those countries. And those processes for decades (due to the rural-urban 
migrations) generate a rather fast economic growth.  
 
4. These were the unshakable globalization principles that led the West to its 
deindustrialization. The very globalization principles (free trade as well as free 
movement of capitals) have made the process of the production transfer to those 
regions inevitable (see, e.g., Korotayev 2010).  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
the demand for food increased dramatically. This led to the fast development of market-oriented 
agriculture (and economy in general) in many peripheral areas (Australia, Russia, parts of India, 
Argentine, the American West). 
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5. The West and Japan themselves gave modernization technologies to developing 
countries. In order to preserve their leading positions, the Western countries 
actively taught the developing countries what they should do, insisted on the 
acceleration of their modernization; what is more, they developed strategies of such 
a modernization; and, through the system of international development centers, 
they provided them with significant help in this regard. In many countries this 
coincided with desires and efforts of local elites; and in many cases this resulted in 
impressive successes of respective countries. Success of Japan (and later “Asian 
Tigers”) created an effective model of catch-up development based on the fast 
development of the exporting sectors, and this model started diffusing (see, e.g., 
Grinin 2011). 
 
6. Cheap industrial products defeated the industry of the West. The expansion of 
the importation of cheap manufactured products to the Western countries made the 
process of the transfer of industries to the poor countries irrepressible. Western 
producers failed to compete with low prices and were not ready to pay more to 
support their industry. 
 
Who have found themselves in the “globalization trap”?  
 
Let us summarize now. The transfer of industries to the developing countries has 
created such conditions when they started growing faster than developed states. 
This is hardly surprising taking into consideration the point that for a few decades 
industrial capacities and capitals were leaving developed countries while entering 
the developing ones. In addition, this was supported by active policies of the 
developing countries’ elites who tended to actively attract investments and 
technologies to their countries, to eliminate barriers in their ways.  
 
Compare, for example, economic growth of Mexico and the USA. The transfer of 
industries from the latter to the former (that especially accelerated after the 
establishment of the North American Free Trade Area [NAFTA] in 1994) has led 
to the following results: between 1986 and 2012 the Mexican GDP grew 9 times 
(from $129.4 billion to $1153.3 billion); the GDP of Brazil (that also actively 
imported capitals and technologies) grew comparably – eight times and a half, 
whereas the USA GDP only grew 3.5 times (respectively from $4 425 billion to 
14 991 billion).  
 
In the meantime the Mexican and Brazilian economies are far from being the 
fastest growing (and in the 1980s and the 1990s their economic and financial 
systems experienced serious turbulences). In the same years Malaysia and 
Indonesia increased their GDP about 11 times. Since 1991 (that is, since the 
country’s economy had become open to the importation of foreign capitals) India 
increased its GDP 7 times just within 20 years (whereas between 1980 and 2012 it 
grew about 10 times). And, finally, China between 1986 and 2012 increased its 
194 
 
 
GDP more than 27(!) times (from $298 billion to $8 227 billion)
103
. All those 
figures are very impressive indeed. For comparison, between 1986 and 2012 the 
GDP of the United Kingdom grew 4.3 times; whereas GDP of France and Germany 
only grew 3.4 times (calculated on the basis of data provided in World Bank 2014 
[NY.GDP.MKTP.CD]).  
 
The developed countries could only preserve the gap through the prohibiting of the 
transfer of capitals, technologies and industries, through policies of high tariff 
barriers, that is by closing their markets from foreign goods. However, after 
decades when they tried to convince the developing world that the free trade is 
sacred, after the establishment of the WTO, it appears impossible for the developed 
countries to protect their markets with custom tariffs. What is more – customers in 
the developed countries prefer to buy foreign but cheaper goods (first these were 
Japanese goods; then these were Taiwanese, Chinese and Mexican ones; now these 
are goods from Bangladesh, Vietnam etc.).  
 
Thus, we are dealing with a certain paradox of development. For a very long time 
the USA was a very active proponent of the ideology of the free trade and honest 
competition (for example, it constantly pressed upon such its partners as Japan that 
tried not to let to their markets certain goods); it initiated the creation of respective 
international organizations. That time it was beneficial for the USA. However, 
those firm rules prohibiting the creation of artificial barriers blocking cheap 
imports became the basis for the rationalization of technological process and the 
transfer of production from Europe and North America to Mexico, China and other 
countries. Note that the behavior of the respective Western corporations was rather 
rational and logical; yet, as a result the West transferred to the periphery together 
with the industries a substantial part of its might.  
 
As a result of the deindustrialization of the West, the developing countries have 
generally profited, whereas the developed countries found themselves in the trap of 
low growth rates. The process of deindustrialization (and its consequences) is 
described rather well by Martin and Schumann (1997) who see in it a global “trap” 
for Europe and the USA. However, those authors pay most attention to the issue of 
job cuts and wealth distribution, whereas they do not notice the global change of 
the balance of power, because they are sure that globalization brings negative 
results to all the countries of the world.  
 
These were just Western and Japanese corporations that “impregnated” Mexican, 
Chinese, Indian and other developing economies. Policies of the Western countries 
in combination with the global demographic changes (exhausting of the 
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 All the calculations have been performed on the basis of the World Development Indicators 
database (World Bank 2014).  
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demographic bonus combined with the population aging of the West and the 
demographic bonus of the East) amplified those processes. Of course, if the 
Western leaders of the late 1980s and 1990s could realize entirely all the 
consequences of the deindustrialization, they might have done something to slow 
down this process
104
, however, they could hardly prevent it entirely, taking into 
account the powerful influence of both consumers (≈ electorate) and the financial-
industrial elites. On the other hand, policies of a number of developing countries 
turned out to be rather successful as regards the support of industrialization and the 
accelerating development of those countries.
105
 Yet, without an adequate inflow of 
capitals and technologies from the developed economies their success would have 
been rather limited. Such reforms only turn out to be successful when favorable 
conditions are available.  
 
Hence, a decisive role in the weakening of the economic positions of the West in 
general, and the USA in particular (and, simultaneously, in the strengthening and 
rise of the countries of Asia and Latin America) was played precisely by the 
globalization. We would forecast that the process of convergence will go very 
unevenly, in a wavelike manner, sometimes slowing down (up to temporary 
reversals), sometimes accelerating. According to many forecasts, in the 
forthcoming decades one will observe a very significant reduction of poverty in the 
developing countries (according to some calculations it will decrease twice by 2030 
[NIC 2012: 8]), the most notorious forms of exploitation will be eliminated, the 
illiteracy will be reduced very substantially, there will be serious successes as 
regards gender equality, and so on.
106
 This will result in a substantial reduction of 
the gap between richer and poorer countries. We can also forecast in a rather 
confidential way the growth of the group of middle income countries (see, e.g., 
Korotayev et al. 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Korotayev, de Munck 2013; Grinin 2013; 
Grinin & Grinin 2013; Гринин 2013). In some respects such an equalization of 
incomes appears to be resembling the process of convergence as regards levels of 
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 Today the US administration tries to take certain steps in this direction, and Obama openly 
expresses his joy as regards the return of some industries to the USA. 
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 Note that a certain possible slowdown in the growth of developing countries turns out to be 
rather compatible with our idea that a new technological breakthrough within the World System 
(that we expect to take place in the 2030s and 2040s [see Grinin & Grinin 2013 for more detail]) 
will request not only a certain decrease in the gap between the developing and developed countries 
(the economic convergence), but also a certain decrease of this gap in the sociopolitical and 
administrative dimensions (sociopolitical convergence), which may hinder the economic growth of 
respective developing countries, especially against the background of the World System 
reconfiguration that is likely to be generated by those processes (see Grinin, Korotayev 2012 for 
more detail).  
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 However, in absolute figures the number of poor and illiterate people remains rather high. On the 
other hand, the fertility decline in the Third World is bound to contribute to the reduction of those 
figures. 
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life of different strata in various modern countries in the first two thirds of the 20
th
 
century (especially in conjunction with a rather active processes of the middle class 
formation).  
 
Decline of the Leadership of the USA and the West  
 
The discussions of an inevitable eclipse of the American might began already in the 
1970s when this country confronted simultaneously political, economic, and currency 
crises. In the 1970s and the 1980s a number of forecasts appeared that predicted that 
the USA would be replaced by Japan in the role of the world economic leader (see, 
e.g., Vogel 1979; Kennedy 1987; Attali 1991). However, a new vigorous technological 
wave in the USA (that took place against the background of the economic stagnation in 
Japan) demonstrated the fallacy of such views. The US hegemony did not only turn out 
to be rather solid; what is more, it rose to a new level as a result of disintegration of the 
Communist block and the USSR.  
 
However, these were just the 1990s when the number of forecasts predicting the 
inevitable decline of the American hegemony and the ascent of Asia to the leadership 
positions started growing rather rapidly (see, e.g., Thompson 1988; Attali 1991; 
Colson, Eckerd 1991; Frank 1998; Todd 2003; Wallerstein 1987, 2003; Kupchan 
2002). First such forecasts were taken rather skeptically, or were received as a sort of 
expression of leftist views and anti-American moods. However, with the growth of 
negative tendencies in the USA and successes of Asian countries the idea of the 
American decline started looking more and more grounded, which provoked 
(depending on one’s orientation) feelings of triumph or apprehension. Nowadays, 
taking into account the consequences of the global crises, the forecasts of the decline of 
the US role in the world appear to be shared by the overwhelming majority of analysts. 
The USA seems to have started putting up with the idea of the decline of the American 
hegemony – though many still seem to pin their hopes on some sort of technological or 
other miracle that will revive the American might (this is often expressed rather 
vividly in President Obama’s speeches).  
Thus, there is no much doubt that the USA hegemony (which has continued for 
more than 60 years) is coming to its end. Sooner or later the USA will not be able 
to remain the World System leader in the sense that has become usual for us, as a 
result of which the global geopolitical landscape will change rather seriously (see, 
e.g., Grinin, Korotayev 2010, 2011; Grinin 2011, 2012, 2013; Гринин 2012). On 
the other hand, hopes of some political scientists and economists that a sort of total 
collapse of the USA will take place very soon appear rather ungrounded; the 
relative decline of the USA will proceed gradually (and not without certain 
interruptions), while certain objective circumstances (including the rise of 
peripheral countries) will contribute to this. However, in the forthcoming two or 
three decades the USA will remain a sort of primus inter pares because of their 
superiority with respect to a few aspects of leadership and a certain “legality” of its 
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leadership role (NIC 2012: XI). In addition, one should take into account the point 
that the world as a whole is still interested in the continuation of the US leadership.  
 
Some causes of the weakening of the West. How did this take place? And (what is 
the most important) why? Quite a number of explanations have been suggested by 
now. For example, “Decline of the West” may be interpreted in spirit of Oswald 
Spengler (1918) or Pat Buchanan (2002), that is from the point of view of the 
theory of civilizations and the renunciation of moral imperatives.
107
 However, this, 
of course, fails to account scientifically for the actual causes of the “moral 
degradation”. The weakening of the USA may be also regarded as the confirmation 
of various theories of cycles of political hegemony (e.g., Modelski 1987; 
Thompson 1988; Modelski, Thompson 1996; Arrighi 1994), according to which 
the hegemony period lasts about 100–200 years, whereas afterwards an old 
hegemon tends to be replaced by a new one. Indeed, no country can remain a 
global hegemon infinitely. However, the point is that, as we will see below, the 
forthcoming change of the global hegemony pattern will not mean just a “usual” 
replacement of the USA by a similar absolute world leader. And if there is no 
single absolute leader, the world will be structured in a significantly different way 
(see, e.g., Grinin 2010; Grinin, Korotayev 2010, 2011). Thus, with the eclipse of 
the USA the cycles of political hegemony are likely to come to their end.  
 
It is rather natural to consider the change of geopolitical landscape as a result of 
mistakes and arrogance that become typical for great powers at a certain phase. 
Jawaharlal Nehru notes in this respect that history of nations goes through three 
stages: success, the consequence of success – arrogance and injustice, and as a 
result of this – fall (Nehru 2004 [1934]). Indeed, a very considerable number of 
mistakes (including rather evident ones) have been made. One may even have an 
impression that Western democracies tend to lose their very important quality – to 
make correct conclusions from their own mistakes. Some evidence in support of 
this statement appears to be suggested by a sort of maniac attempts to topple 
regimes in the Near East without a sufficient care for consequences, without taking 
into account experience of their involvement in Lebanon, Palestine, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq…  
 
However, those very mistakes (as well as changes in behavioral patterns of elites 
and commoners) may be regarded as results of deeper processes that change the 
world (often contrary to the will of those who seem to be in the center of the 
events). We discussed these processes above. 
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 “The de-Christinization of America is a great gamble, a roll of the dice, with our civilization as 
the stakes. America has thrown overboard the moral compass by which the republic steered for 
two hundred years, and now it sails by dead reckoning” (Buchanan 2002: 198).  
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The World Without an Absolute Leader  
 
Will any country be able to replace the USA? The development of the 
abovementioned trends connected with the weakening of the USA and the West, 
the growth of the significance of many developing countries and the gradual 
convergence of the World System core and periphery mean that at the planetary 
scale we are dealing not just with major changes, but rather with a radical 
transformation of all the structure of the global economic and political order, and 
an overall rather complicated reconfiguration of the world.  
 
Yet, how will this reconfiguration proceed? First of all note that though the USA 
positions will be weakening, no one in the new world will be able to become its 
absolute leader. The idea that the position of the USA will be occupied by someone 
else (the most frequently proposed candidate is, of course, China) is utterly wrong. 
Today the USA concentrates simultaneously almost all the aspects of leadership 
(political, military, financial, monetary, economic, technological, ideological, and 
cultural), whereas there is no country in the world (and there is no group of 
countries) that in foreseeable future will be able to monopolize so many aspects of 
the world leadership (this was suggested by William R. Thompson already in 
1988). In addition, neither China, nor India (or any other country) will be able to 
afford such a heavy burden due to the lack of appropriate economic possibilities as 
well as political risks (at least because of the problems with poverty of substantial 
parts of respective populations and discontent with social problems, but also due to 
the lack of experience and necessary alliances, as well as ideological weakness [see 
Grinin, Korotayev 2010, 2011; Grinin 2011, 2013 for more detail]).  
 
How could the future world look like? One may expect that the forthcoming global 
system will have the following three characteristics: (1) changing rules and 
flexibility of structures of the World System, (2) activization of the struggle for 
allies, (3) reduction of the countries’ sovereignty. The absence of the strong 
absolute leader will lead to the growth of the World System flexibility as regards 
the search for new political foundations. The following point of view was 
expressed by us earlier in this respect: “The struggle for an ‘honorary’ place within 
the globalization and coalitions, organization and functioning of the new world 
order will lead to the beginning of what we have called the epoch of пew 
coalitions…In the process of the search for the most stable, advantageous and 
adequate forms of supranational organization one may expect to observe the 
emergence of various and even fast changing intermediate forms when actors in global 
and regional political arenas will look for the most profitable and convenient blocks 
and agreements. However, finally some of those new alliances and coalitions may 
transform from temporal into permanent creating some fixed supranational forms” 
(Гринин 2013; Grinin 2010; Grinin, Korotayev 2010).  
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Thus, in the forthcoming decades one will see the emergence of a number of 
countries and alliances that will play leading roles in different respects; against 
such a background the winners might be those countries that will conduct the most 
active policy aimed at the formation of new blocks as well as the joining of new 
blocks, those countries that will be able to get the maximum number of partners in 
various spheres. It may be said that a country’s influence will grow through 
“getting points” by its participation in various alliances and blocks.108 For the 
largest actors one is likely to observe a high degree of competition as regards 
attempts to influence the restructuring of the international system.  
 
Consequently, we will leave in such a world, where one can observe a more and 
more active search for allies and alliances (though this might be accompanied by 
the growth of competition in many respects); this can result in the emergence of 
some institutional factors of the new world order that imply the need in a greater 
stability (Grinin 2009, 2012). Naturally, it appears impossible to predict concrete 
combinations of future alliances. However, it appears possible to offer a few ideas 
about this. For example, we believe that scenarios suggesting the global dominance 
of the alliance of India and China are not realistic. However, there are some more 
realistic scenarios – for example, the ones with the USA and the West maneuvering 
between the alliances with India, China, and other large developing countries and 
their blocks. As a matter of fact, in recent years we have been observing the 
growing activity of the US foreign policy aimed at the inhibition of the Chinese 
influence (through the attempts to strengthen contacts with India and other Asia-
Pacific actors).  
 
All the above described processes will also lead to a certain transformation of 
national sovereignty that will be generally weakened due to the explicit and 
implicit, forced and voluntary delegating of some parts of sovereign prerogatives to 
various international, supranational, and global entities and arrangements (see 
Grinin 2008, 2012 for more detail).  
 
The weakening of sovereignty may be accompanied by the growth of national self-
consciousness and nationalist moods in some developing countries with 
intensifying industrialization (see Grinin 2012 for more detail). In the forthcoming 
decades the depth of economic links will increase, which will make a powerful 
influence on those developing countries (especially in Tropical Africa) whose 
population mostly does not feel those links yet in a substantial way. As a result, the 
struggle between traditionalism and globalization may intensify. In some areas 
conflicts and instability may grow, and whole regions may experience powerful 
social destabilization waves. We can observe this in the case of the Arab Spring 
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 This may be also done through the formation of new alliances (the emergence of the BRICs, and 
then the BRICS is very symptomatic in this respect).  
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(see, e.g., Grinin, Korotayev 2012; Korotayev et al. 2011c), as well as in Ukraine 
now.  
 
New geopolitics and the end of the epoch of stable political blocks. For many 
decades one of the main factors of the emergence of political alliances was the 
threat of war, which dictated selection of certain allies. That is why political 
alliances were mostly military-political. In the contemporary world the risk of the 
large-scale war has diminished significantly, whereas the economic 
interdependence between countries has increased dramatically, and it will continue 
to grow in the forthcoming decades. This allows to maintain that the old style of 
geopolitics gradually (and often insensibly) gives way to a new style of geopolitics 
connected with the necessity to create optimum conditions for the economic 
development of a state or a group of states. Features of this new geopolitics look 
rather vague at present, but they should become much clearer in the forthcoming 
decades. Let us outline a few of them.  
 
The epoch of firm alliances and inter-allied loyalty appears to be coming to the end 
(a characteristic example is Washington’s refusal to support Pakistan and the USA 
alliance with India). The selection of allies, partners and blocks will be more and 
more determined by rapidly changing interests and conjunctures.  
 
States will not look for constant allies; they will rather be looking for temporary 
“fellow travelers” for particular occasions, trying to reach agreements 
simultaneously with many partners (this corresponds well to one of the principles 
of modern business – to have as many partners as possible). Even now many 
experts are concerned with the future of international system if it is only based on 
interests, not on certain rules (see NIC 2012).  
 
Economic interests will be clearer expressed in the foreign policy.
109
 Thus, 
economic interests of some countries may become constant, whereas political 
interests may be adjusted to them up to a considerable degree. Political and 
geopolitical principles and interests of some other states (especially larger ones) 
will never be dissolved in economic aspects. However, in this case different vectors 
of foreign policy may turn out to be pulled apart, that is, political and economic 
aspects of foreign policy will exist more detached from each other. And, 
consequently, policies will become more pragmatic than now.
110
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 We can see this phenomenon in the issue of sanctions in respect of Russia. On the one hand, 
Western countries are sure that such sanctions are necessary; on the other hand, it is very difficult 
for them to implement really serious sanctions.  
110
 As a result both enmity and friendship may be forgotten very soon (one of salient examples is 
provided by Vietnam and the USA; they have forgotten their antagonism and are developing 
bilateral relations in a rather active way).  
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The epoch when the creation of economic blocks was determined to a very 
considerable extent by some (civilization, ideological, military-political etc.) 
proximity evidently passes away. Today we see a growing tendency toward the 
situation when close economic links do not necessarily imply any political or 
ideological partnership, though they may impede outbreaks of open conflicts.  
 
Consider this using China as an example. Its political influence is growing. In 
which way is this taking place? China has to join various alliances or to establish 
with them (e.g., with the ASEAN) special relations, as it tries to play there an 
important role. It also tries to initiate and actively support various economic 
agreements (e.g. regarding free trade with Japan and Korea). China also tries to 
push the RNB as an international currency (note, e.g., recently signed agreements 
with Brazil and Australia), but to achieve this China must activize its agreements 
with numerous countries, simultaneously making concessions to them, and getting 
such concessions from them. However, notwithstanding all the active economic 
policy pursued by China, notwithstanding all the growth of trade with its 
neighbors, this did not eliminate the political (and territorial) contradictions with 
Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, India and so on. Let us mention another example. The US 
“flirtation” with India implying a virtual permission for India to possess nuclear 
weapons do not imply that a sort of firm allied relations have been established 
between the two states.  
 
Thus, the behavior in politics is becoming closer to business strategies where the 
principles are always rather fluid. However, new principles of the world order may 
start emerging just on this fluid soil. 
 
Conclusion  
 
World network community?  
 
In those historical periods when economic links between countries and regions 
were not as deep and indissoluble, the development of globalization needed a 
certain military and political hegemony that relied to a considerable extent on 
technological superiority of certain powers. At present the depth of economic 
relations has become unprecedented, which (as has already mentioned above) 
weakens the need in political and military hegemony in its present sense; this, of 
course, leads to more pragmatism in foreign policy.  
 
The same causes will influence the process of a certain shift toward the formation 
of the global network community (from the contemporary hierarchical structure), 
within which (in addition to states and their blocks) an active role will be played by 
NGOs and many other actors. This process may be also regarded as one of the 
aspects of the leveling of degrees of economic development (this is likely to 
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contribute to the establishment of a new basis of global relations whose formation 
could facilitate the creation of conditions for the emergence of some effective 
global coordination center).  
 
The movement toward the network society will contribute to the growth of the 
world middle class, a sort of world citizens (NIC 2012: 8–9), whose numbers, 
according to the Asian Development Bank, will grow with the rate of about 9% 
annually. And, generally, even according to conservative models, up to 2030 those 
numbers will grow twice – from 1 billion to two billions. We tend to agree that this 
is a very important megatrend (ibid.: 4). The idea that middle class of different 
countries will constitute potentially a sort of global citizenship (which gives some 
hope as regards the emergence of a certain solid basis of economic, cultural, and 
even political unity of the world) appears rather interesting and stimulating. In the 
19
th
 century intellectuals in different countries started constituting a certain unity 
first within Europe, and later all over the world, thus paving the way toward the 
development of panhuman ideas and values (which were finally proclaimed at the 
level of UN declarations). In a similar way the world middle class may create new 
possibilities for the globalization. It may be that due to this it will get new (more 
mature) features, moving toward political globalization of the world whose 
contours are not clear yet.  
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Márta Fülöp 
 
The Enthusiasm and/or the Fear Concerning the Globalization among the Post-
socialist Youth : The Case of the Hungarian University Students
 
 
The globalization is one of the most frequently discussed economic, political, social and cultural 
phenomenon of the twenty-first century, however there are very few studies that seek to uncover 
how young people, the future generation of the globalizing world, perceive these processes. Most of 
the existing studies’ target attitudes toward the economic changes and youth in Western European 
societies. There has been no study to investigate the perception and attitudes of young adults in the 
post-socialist countries; therefore the goal of the present research was to explore Hungarian 
university students’ views. Altogether 103 respondents of two different majors (humanities and 
social sciences/economics) participated in the research. A closed-ended questionnaire including a 
semantic differential scale and a 4-point Likert-type attitude scale consisting in 30 items regarding 
the most common mentioned economic, political, cultural and environmental benefits and dangers 
of the globalization was administered.  
 
The analysis of the data revealed that, while the participants consider the influence of the 
globalization on Hungary at large, they are neither fearful nor enthusiastic about its effects, however 
they considered there general impact slightly more negative than positive. Items expressing different 
aspects of the globalization resulted in five factors: decreasing differences, multiculturalism, 
globalization as a threat, benefits of the globalization and cultural and economic hegemony.  
 
The university major proved to be a better predictor of the attitude towards the globalization than 
the gender. Students in economics evaluated the globalization significantly as being better, more 
exciting and useful than students of humanities. They seemed to have a more definite and elaborated 
picture about what is needed for success in a globalized world in terms of skills. Economics students 
also had higher means in Factor 4 ‘benefits of the globalization’ and they evaluated the specific 
effects of the globalization more positively.   
 
 
Keywords 
 
- globalization, 
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- attitude, 
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Globalization, internationalization and cosmopolitanism have become key concepts 
of the social sciences at the turn of the twenty-first century (Davies, Evans and 
Reid 2005). Philosophers, economists, politicians, historians, sociologists and 
psychologists all have something to say about it (e.g. Fukuyama 1992 ; Huntington 
1996 ; Schmidt 1998 ; Bauman 1998 ; Giddens 2000 ; Arnett 2002 ; Bhagwati 
2004). While their views are diverse, none of them questions, that the globalization 
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is one of the dominant social forces in the twenty-first century, and is inevitable 
and unstoppable.  
 
According to Lieber and Weisberg (2002), the globalization is the increasing global 
integration of economies, information technology, the spread of a global popular 
culture, and other forms of human interaction. The globalization is a process by 
which cultures influence one another via trade, economic and financial 
interdependence worldwide, immigration and travel, telecommunication and 
information exchange. Young people in every part of the world are affected by the 
globalization; therefore many young people now grow up with a global 
consciousness (Arnett 2002). In the twenty-first century, the citizenship includes 
the global citizenship and the internalization of global values (Reimers 2006).  
 
There have been contrasting ideas and a polarized discussion about the 
globalization, on the one hand, enthusiasm and on the other hand, warnings about 
disruptions and dangers. Fukuyama (1992) had the pro-globalization stand that 
secularism, liberal democracy and free markets will reduce all tensions in the 
world. Giddens (1990) called the globalization the corollary of the modernity and 
praised the advent of a ‘global cosmopolitan society’ (Giddens 2000).  Bhagwati 
(2004) argues that the globalization, when properly governed, is in fact the most 
powerful force for the social good in the today’s world. Supporters of the 
globalization point out that, when promoted with circumspection, the globalization 
can lead to higher, efficient output, lower prices and increased employment and 
more opportunities for entrepreneurship in all the countries involved (Sampatkumar 
2007). Via the globalization, it is possible to build an integrated society, where 
differences in race, colour, gender, religion, culture or nationality will not deny 
anyone the opportunity to progress and succeed (Sampatkumar 2007). 
 
However, according to Bauman (1998), promoters of the political and economic 
globalization seem to ignore its negative and dehumanizing effect, progressive 
spatial segregation, separation and exclusion. Anti-globalization ideas manifest 
themselves in demonstrations and organized protests. Many activists perceive the 
economic globalization as an instrument in the hands of multinational corporations, 
the sole motive of which is to increase profits to the detriment of the freedom of the 
individual. Anti-globalization groups, mostly consisting in young people, claim 
that the globalization leads to the disenfranchisement, the political and economic 
instability, wide disparities between developed and developing countries, and 
uneven distribution of wealth (Sampatkumar 2007). Multinational corporations 
infiltrate the political life and exert an undue influence on policymakers of nation-
states, and national borders become insignificant due to transnational companies 
and economy (Sampatkumar 2007) and the state sovereignty becomes fragmented 
(Giddens 1991). 
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Another aspect of the globalization is related to cultural differences (Huntington 
1996). While there is a view that, in the ‘global village’, all social, ethnic and racial 
divisions may disappear, there is more fear that the globalization may lead to 
oppositions, clashes, prejudices and misunderstandings among different groups 
(Herman and Dimaggio 2007). The globalizing world interconnects people from 
different cultural backgrounds and intercultural relations increase (Pieterse 2009). 
There are those who claim, like Bird and Stevens (2003), that national cultures are 
moving towards a certain degree of obsolescence.  Due to the fact that production 
and consumption are operating at a global scale, and competition also functions at 
the worldwide level, the ‘comparative areas’ become reduced, dominated and 
dictated by the ‘winners’ of this process, and those who want to stay in competition 
are forced into this framework (Fülöp 2008). Values of the global culture are based 
on individualism, free market economics and democracy and include freedom of 
choice, individual rights, openness to change and tolerance of differences 
(Friedman 2000 ; Giddens 2000 ; Arnett 2002). All these are basic principles of the 
western democratic societies, therefore Pieterse (2009) claims that, according to the 
convergence principle, the globalization is a theory of Westernization or 
Americanization referred to as ‘McDonaldization’  (Ritzer 1993) or 
‘Disneyfication’ (Lieber and Weisberg 2002).  
 
As a counter-response to the homogenizing force of the globalization, many groups 
strengthen their ethnic, religious and national identities (Brown, Larson and 
Saraswathi 2002). Herman and Dimaggio (2007) question the notion of increasing 
the uniformity and the cultural imperialism as well. They argue that the 
globalization evokes the localization as its counterforce and in this counter 
reaction, the experience of uncertainty and instability of a globalizing world plays a 
crucial role and increases the desire for stability and safety in the form of finding 
local niches for the identity construction as globalization’s counterforce. In other 
words, when the ‘identity’ and the self-respect of a group is threatened by a strong 
imposing culture, the group will start to emphasize the difference within the 
imposed dimensions, not to be ‘channelled’ into an existing competitive 
framework, in which losing is inevitable (Fülöp 2008).  
 
The success of the globalization may in the future be judged by the ability to 
maintain cultural distinctions while creating a new understanding of the global 
community (Sampatkumar 2007). It also requires combining the local identity and 
the identity linked to the global culture, or producing a kind of integration of 
different sources of identity into a hybrid identity that is a combination of a variety 
of cultural influences (Arnett 2002). More integrative processes are needed, called 
‘glocalization’ (Robertson 1995) instead of mutually exclusive trends of 
homogenization or ethnic fragmentation. In the last decade, the hybridity became a 
regular discourse in the popular and mainstream culture and this is the leading 
paradigm in relation to identity issues connected to the process of globalization 
(Pieterse 2009). The global multicultural citizenship and a new class of persons, 
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who belong to an emergent global culture, the ‘global melange’ (Pieterse 2009), 
may be a constructive solution to this conflict (Bird and Stevens 2003).   
 
The globalization in the post-socialist countries: the case of the Hungarian youth 
 
In their large scale international research GLOBALIFE – Life courses in 
Globalization Process  (Blossfeld et al.’s 2005) basic assumption was that, in a 
globalizing world, structural conditions and social norms provide citizens less and 
less support in terms of choices and decisions and this results in an increasing 
uncertainty. In the case of young people, this uncertainty is coupled with 
uncertainties of the developmental process of the transition from youth to 
adulthood (Arnett 2002). For the post-socialist youth, this double uncertainty has 
been intensified in the last two decades by the ongoing transitions of its society 
(Róbert and Bukodi 2005).  
 
During the last two decades, since 1989, the post-socialist citizens have had to face 
the challenges of not only adapting to the dramatic internal societal changes, i.e. 
the introduction of free market ideologies, competition, deregulation, privatization 
and democratic institutions, but also to the global society (Fülöp 2005). The 
collapse of the communist block made it possible in these countries to open up 
towards the West and accelerated dramatically the financial and economic 
interdependence with the international world. For Hungary and some other post-
socialist countries, joining the European Union in 2004 was also a facet of the 
wider process of globalization. By the end of the twentieth century, the market 
economy stabilized in Hungary and as a result of this, the Hungarian young people 
nowadays grow up with an increasing global consciousness just like their Western 
European peers. English as the ‘lingua franca’ of the globalization process prevails 
as the most commonly spoken foreign language in the 15−25-years-old age group 
(almost 70 per cent) and is taught as a required subject from primary school 
(Szénay 2005). In terms of the Internet, 84 per cent of the Hungarian 15−29-years-
old had access to it in 2008, but among the university students, this was 100 per 
cent (Ságvári 2009). The globalization leads in all modern societies to a decline of 
the national character of the economy, but this process was especially dramatic in 
the post-socialist Hungary. From the international commerce restricted to the 
socialist block before 1990, by 1997 more than 65 per cent of the enterprises were 
partially or totally foreign owned (Róbert and Bukodi 2005).  
 
This means that a majority of those young people, who nowadays enter the 
business world in Hungary, will be employed by foreign/multinational employers 
and have to be able to meet the demands of this new type of global labour market.   
Studies on attitudes towards the globalization 
 
There are very few empirical studies on attitudes towards the globalization in 
general among young people internationally. The globalization is a 
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multidimensional process, in other words, it is a social process that unfolds in 
multiple realms of existence simultaneously (Pieterse 2009). In spite of this, most 
of the studies addressed these aspects separately and with mainly an economic 
aspect (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006 ; Bhagwati 2002). Coopers & Lybrand 
(1997) conducted an extensive research on values among more than 1,200 business 
students from 30 of the world's leading universities in ten countries on five 
continents in an attempt to capture the cultural aspects of the globalization. They 
found that there is a greater similarity in values and preferences among the students 
of such diverse parts of the world than differences. A great majority of the 
respondents (78 per cent) expressed an interest in working for a global company, 
were positive about working for a company in the international market (73 per 
cent) and wanted to work with clients from different countries. The survey 
provided evidence that a globalization of values is taking place today and within 
the business community an identifiable and homogenous group is emerging, that 
does not share common geographic location, religion, native language or national 
culture, yet they share a common set of values, attitudes and norms (Bird and 
Stevens 2003). They are members of the emerging global culture.  
 
Goal of the research 
 
Psychological studies have rarely addressed the globalization directly (Arnett 2002) 
and empirical studies among youth on the attitude towards the globalization as a 
complex phenomenon are basically non-existent. There is also a lack of such 
studies with young people living in post-socialist societies within the European 
Union. Arnett (2002) calls this age group the ‘emerging adults’, meaning that they 
are mature and autonomous enough but are not yet committed to a definite way of 
life and open to new influences and have a vivid interest in global media, the 
leading edge of the globalization. At the same time, this is the age group worldwide 
that has a crucial role in the future process of the globalization.  
 
Therefore the aim of the present study was to reveal the Hungarian university 
students’ perception, and attitudes towards the globalization: if the globalization is 
seen as a threat, or a source of opportunities, and to what degree young people in a 
post-socialist society agree with the different views on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the globalization process. 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were 103 university students. Based on studies indicating an attitude 
difference between students of economics/business and humanities/social sciences 
(Hainmüller and Hiscox 2006) students of these two different majors i.e. 
humanities/psychology and economics were included. 
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Methods 
 
An Osgood Semantic Differential task has been used to investigate the evaluative 
aspect of the attitude towards the globalization in general. It consisted of four 
different opposite terms and a 7-point scale in between them.  
 
A questionnaire consisting in different types of closed-ended questions, an attitude 
scale and an evaluation scale were administered after this task. The closed-ended 
questions were related to the identity, the influence of the globalization, the 
symbols of the globalization, and the perception of the necessary qualities to be 
able to be successful in a globalized world. A 4-point Likert-type attitude scale 
consisting in 30 items, in which participants indicated their extent of agreement on 
each item, was also administered. Items, regarding the most common mentioned 
economic, political, cultural and environmental benefits and dangers of the 
globalization appearing in the pro and anti-globalization literature, were included.  
Finally, in an evaluation scale, participants had to indicate in the case of each item, 
if they consider the particular effect positive or negative. 
 
Results 
 
The nature of the influence of the globalization in general. 
 
In the Osgood-type Semantic Differential task respondents had to judge the 
globalization along four adjective pairs using a 7-point scale.  
 
Means of two of the four dimensions (good-bad and useful-harmful) differed 
significantly from the neutral evaluation (mean : 3.5) in the one-sample t-test (t 
(105) = 2.690 ; p=0.008 and t (105) = 2.594 ; p = 0.011) respectively. Participants 
thought the globalization as a rather bad and a rather harmful process. These 
dimensions strongly correlated as well (r = 0.751 ; p = 0.000). 
 
There were no gender differences in these dimensions. However, significant 
differences could be observed according to the major of the participant. Economics 
students believed that the globalization is rather exciting (economics : M = 2.90 ; 
SD = 1.47 ; humanities : M = 4.02 ; SD = 1.59 ; F(1;103) = 13.853 ; p = 0.000) 
rather good (economics : M = 3.38 ; SD = 1.24 ; humanities : M = 4.35 ; SD = 1.39 
; F(1;103) = 13.952 ; p = 0.000) and rather useful (economics : M = 3.44 ; SD = 
1.09 ; humanities : M = 4.25 ; SD = 1.51 ; F(1;98.261) = 10.203 ; p = 0.002). In 
terms of importance, no significant difference has been found.  
 
Different levels of identity 
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Students had to put into rank order which identity (national, European, global) is 
the most and less important to them. The national identity was considered the most 
important (67 per cent of the respondents) followed by the European identity and 
the world citizen/global identity being the less important to an almost equal 
proportion of the respondents (19 per cent and 18 per cent respectively). There 
were no differences according to gender or study major of the participants.  
 
The influence of the globalization on Hungary 
 
Respondents had to indicate on a 5-point scale how much they think Hungary is 
affected by the globalization (1 : strongly affected to 5 : not at all affected). The 
mean of responses was 2.0 (SD = 0.66) indicating that the respondents believe that 
Hungary is largely affected by the globalization. There was no significant 
difference according to the gender or major of the participants. 
 
 
Symbols of the globalization 
 
Respondents had to indicate on a 4-point scale (1 : very much ; 4 : not at all) how 
much they consider a list of items to symbolize the globalization. Amongst all 
listed symbols of the globalization, the Internet was considered to be the most 
expressive (mean = 1.3; SD = 0.62), while Oscars/Academy Awards were judged 
to be less expressive (mean = 3.2 ; SD = 0.85). All symbols are listed in table 3 in 
descending order of expressiveness.   
 
A significant gender difference was present in only one item : according to males, 
Bill Gates symbolizes the globalization significantly more than according to 
females (p = 0.002). Students of economics regarded the Internet (p = 0.014), the 
Olympic Games (p = 0.039) and UNICEF (economics : p = 0.041) to be stronger 
symbols of globalization than humanities students reported. While supermarkets (p 
= 0.004) and Hollywood (p = 0.044) were considered to symbolize the 
globalization more among students of humanities. 
 
Qualities needed in a globalized world 
 
Among the eighteen listed qualities, that can be considered necessary to be 
successful in a globalized world, IT skills (mean = 1.66) ; Knowledge of languages 
(mean = 1.7) ; Education (mean = 1.75) and learning skills (1.77) proved to be the 
most important, while unscrupulousness (mean = 2.67), selfishness (mean = 2.64), 
money-hunger (mean = 2.62) and patriotism (mean = 2.60) as the less important. 
 
The gender difference was present in one item. Selfishness was regarded by 
females to be significantly more needed than by males (p = 0.031).  
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Students of economics, both males and females, considered some characteristics as 
highly important (mean < 1.5) in a globalized word, while students of humanities 
did not attribute any high significance to any characteristics (no mean under 1.5 
and only one characteristic in the case of each gender has the mean under 2.00 ; 
openness in the case of male humanities students (mean = 1.78) and IT skills in the 
case of female humanities students (mean = 1.95). Female students of economics 
considered the cooperativity as a highly important quality in a globalized world, 
while male students regarded the competitiveness,as well as the cooperativity, as a 
very important requirement. 
  
Effects of the globalization 
 
In the 30-item attitude scale, the participants had to consider the economic, 
political, informational, ecological and cultural effects of the globalization and 
indicate to what extent a statement is true or false on a 4-point Likert-scale (1: 
strongly disagree ; 4 : strongly agree).  
The statement that had the highest mean of agreement was: ‘Because of the 
globalization it is important to nourish national traditions and make people aware 
of national cultural values’ (mean : 3.73), indicating that the respondents consider 
it important to strengthen the national identity as a reaction to the globalization.  
 
There were two items in which gender differences could be found. Men agreed 
more with the statement: ‘As a result of the globalization, the significance of 
nation-states will cease and the national identity will diminish.’ (F(1;100) = 6.454 ; 
p = 0.013), as well as with : ‘The globalization blurs cultural differences and makes 
the world uniform.’ (F(1;100) = 8.282 ; p = 0.003). 
 
In 10 out of 30 statements, students of economics and humanities differed 
significantly. In eight statements, students of economics reached significantly 
higher means. These referred to the decreasing significance of national boundaries, 
increasing competition, scientific progress, knowledge of other cultures, 
broadening international opportunities and information flow, importance of 
national culture, and cooperation among nations. There were only two statements: 
‘Through the globalization, the capitalist view of life becomes general’ and  the 
‘environmental pollution is the result of the globalization’, with which humanities 
students agreed more. 
 
A maximum likelihood factor analysis was conducted with the 30 statements. After 
a direct Oblimin rotation, 5 factors were identified that explained 49 per cent of the 
total variance. The factors were named as follows:  Factor 1: decreasing differences 
; Factor 2: multiculturalism; Factor 3: globalization as a threat; Factor 4: benefits of 
the globalization; Factor 5: cultural and economic hegemony.  
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Gender difference was present in factor 2 ‘Multiculturalism’, males having higher 
means than females (males : M = 0.47 ; SD = 0.81 ; females : M = -0.13 ; SD = 
0.79 ; F(1;87) = 9.414 ; p = 0.003).  
 
In terms of major, students of economics produced significantly higher means in 
factor 4  ‘Benefits of the globalization’ than students of humanities (economics : M 
= 0.25 ; SD = 0.87 ; humanities : M = -0.25 ; SD = 0.87 ; F(1;88) = 7.537 ; p = 
0.007).   
 
Evaluation of the effects of the globalization 
 
In order not to measure only the structure of the attitudes, but also their evaluative 
nature in addition to indicating the agreement with each statement, respondents had 
to evaluate each item if they found the particular effect it describes good (1) or bad 
(2). The most positively perceived effect of the globalization (mean between 1.01 
and 1.10 [4 statements]) was its effect on the scientific progress, becoming aware 
of the national culture, getting to know other cultures, and broadening international 
opportunities. The effects, that were considered the most negative (mean between 
1.90 and 1.99 [11 statements]) were in connection with the homogenization 
(Americanization, minor and national cultures and cultural differences 
disappearing), with cultures becoming more distant and people becoming alienated, 
with terrorism, environmental pollution and the increasing gap between poor and 
rich and one part of the world being exploited by the other. 
 
In terms of gender differences females, regarded it significantly more negative: ‘As 
a result of the globalization, the same products will be sold everywhere’ (p = 0.19). 
Among students of humanities, this particular effect of the globalization was seen 
as significantly worse than among students of economics in the case of seven 
statements, while students of economics considered it significantly worse in only 
one. 
 
Significant differences in the evaluation of the effects of the globalization per 
major: In the evaluation of each item, whether it differs significantly from 
indifference (mean = 1.5) was also tested. Neutral items were excluded (4 items), 
and a scale for positive statements (Positive Statement Scale, 12 items, Cronbach 
alpha = 0.721) and a scale for negative statements (Negative Statement Scale, 14 
items, Cronbach alpha = 0.836) was created. There was no significant difference 
between the positive and negative statements in the whole sample according to the 
paired samples t-test. However, a gender difference was found in the Negative 
Statement Scale, males (M = 2.90 ; SD = 0.46) having larger mean than females (M 
= 2.64 ; SD = 0.51 ; F(1;91) = 4.371 ; p = 0.039). A difference was also found 
according to major. Economics students (M = 2.93 ; SD = 0.36) had higher means 
in the Positive Statement Scale than students of humanities (M = 2.69 ; SD=0.44 ; 
F(1;94) = 9.160 ; p 0.003). There was no gender and major interaction, male 
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students of economics as well as male students of humanities had significantly 
higher means in the Negative Statement Scale. 
 
Summary 
 
The Hungarian university students’ general evaluation of the globalization was 
more negative than positive. According to the Semantic Differential Scale, they 
considered the globalization rather bad and harmful and they were rather neutral in 
terms of its importance and its being exciting or boring. At the same time, they 
considered the effect of the globalization on Hungary as large. The Hungarian 
(national) identity was the primary identity they indicated, followed by the 
European and world/global identity. Symbols that were believed to symbolize the 
globalization the most were related to the technology (the Internet), economics 
(multinational corporations, Euro) and regions (United States, European Union), 
while the least significance was attributed to symbols representing the global media 
(CNN, HBO), culture (Hollywood, Oscar/Academy Award) and sports (Olympic 
Games). The most important qualities, that the Hungarian university students 
regarded to be necessary to be successful in a globalized world were cognitive in 
nature (IT skills, knowledge of languages and learning skills) and the least 
important were those emphasizing the national identity and the patriotism and 
negative characteristics like money-hunger, selfishness and unscrupulousness. 
Items expressing different aspects of the globalization resulted in five factors: 
decreasing differences (Factor 1), multiculturalism (Factor 2), globalization as a 
threat (Factor 3), benefits of the globalization (Factor 4), and cultural and economic 
hegemony (Factor 5).   
 
The evaluative aspect of the attitudinal structure reflected a balanced position. The 
participants’ evaluation of the different effects deviated from the neutral view 
neither toward the positive, nor toward the negative. The most positively perceived 
effect of the globalization was its impact on the scientific progress and the most 
negative, its potential contribution to social inequalities.  
 
On the one hand, respondents strongly agree that, due to the globalization, the 
national identity strengthens, i.e. the main effect is not the homogenization but the 
differentiation and they consider this process very positive. At the same time, the 
national identity and the patriotism are not seen as the pragmatically most useful 
qualities to be successful in a globalized world, cognitive and social skills are 
believed to lead more directly to a competitive advantage. 
 
There were no major gender differences in the evaluation of the globalization in 
general, in the estimated extent of its effects on Hungary and in the preferred 
identity (i.e. Hungarian/national). Male and female participants also estimated the 
significance of symbols the same way, except for Bill Gates, who was considered 
as a stronger symbol of globalization by males than by females. There was no 
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difference in estimating the necessity of different characteristics needed to succeed 
in a globalized world but in the case of selfishness, which was considered as a 
necessary quality to be successful significantly more by females. There were also 
just slight differences regarding the different effects of the globalization. Men 
believed more that, due to the globalization, nation states will cease and that the 
globalization contributes to the uniformization. However, females regarded more 
negatively that, as a result of the globalization, the same products will be sold 
everywhere. Men agreed more with statements on the multiculturalism (Factor 2) 
and had a higher mean in the Negative Statements Scale than females.  
 
While the data showed no major gender differences, the university major proved to 
be a better predictor of the attitude towards the globalization. Students of 
economics evaluated the globalization significantly better, more exciting and useful 
than students of humanities. While both groups considered the effect of the 
globalization to Hungary equally large, the globalization itself had a rather positive 
connotation among students of economics and a rather negative one among 
students of humanities. Students of economics considered the Internet, the Olympic 
Games and UNICEF stronger symbols of the globalization than students of 
humanities, while students of humanities did so in the case of Hollywood and 
supermarkets. Students of economics considered several qualities significantly 
more important to be successful in a globalized world than students of humanities. 
They seemed to have a more definite and elaborated picture about what is needed 
for success in a globalized world. Female and male economics students attributed a 
high necessity to IT skills, knowledge of languages, education, learning skills and 
cooperativity. In addition to this, male economics students, besides the 
cooperativity, considered the competitiveness as highly important as well. No 
quality was considered highly necessary by humanities students. Economics 
students also had higher means in Factor 4 ‘Benefits of the globalization’. This 
positive attitude was strengthened by their significantly higher means in the 
Positive Statement Scale.  
 
Discussion 
 
While the globalization is a major and probably most relevant driving force of the 
twenty-first century, there are basically no studies that aim to reveal how young 
people perceive and evaluate it as a process that happens at multiple levels i.e. in its 
complexity. There have been studies to reveal attitudes towards the economic 
effects of the globalization, also there are many studies about its cultural effects i.e. 
intercultural encounters, perception of migration, etc., or perception of the 
environmental effects of the globalization, but these levels have not been addressed 
simultaneously.   
 
The collapse of the socialist block at the end of the 1980s meant, among other 
things, that millions of young people were suddenly exposed to a free 
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communication with the rest of the world in terms of free information flow, travel, 
exchange of ideas, etc. The globalization did not come to them gradually, but in the 
form of a ‘cultural shock’.  There have been no studies in the post-socialist 
countries aiming to reveal how the present day ‘emerging adults’ view the 
globalization after more than two decades of the transition to market economy, 
democracy and freedom of information exchange.  
 
Therefore the goal of this study was to reveal the attitudes of university students of 
different majors toward different aspects of the globalization in a post-socialist 
country, Hungary. The results showed that, among the participants of the study, the 
globalization is not seen as a major threat, but there is no enthusiasm about it 
either. Hungarian university students tend to see both the positive and the negative 
consequences of the globalization; they have a slightly negative, but more or less 
realistic and balanced view. In a recent study on attitudes towards the economic 
globalization among adult Chinese, Lee et al. (2009) found that respondents 
considered the effect of the globalization on China more positive than negative and 
highly educated respondents had a more positive attitude. They explained this with 
the position of better educated people in the society as they have more 
opportunities to capture the benefits of the economic globalization.  
 
Some are arguing, that it is not the educational level that counts, but much more the 
level of economic knowledge. Walstad and Rebeck (2002) found that higher levels 
of economic knowledge, among surveyed individuals, have large positive effects 
on the support for free trade and trade openness, that is a key-factor in the 
economic globalization. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) also claim that the 
economic knowledge and exposure to economic ideas and information, which 
students of economics are gaining through their education, may play a key-role in 
shaping their attitudes toward a more positive view of the economic globalization. 
In this study, students of economics, with an expected higher position and higher 
income in the Hungarian society, had a more positive − however not enthusiastic − 
view on the globalization than the students of humanities. This is in line with 
previous studies with university students, in majors outside economics (i.e. 
English, comparative literature, sociology) that indicate more remorse toward free 
trade and a capitalist competitive market (Bhagwati 2002). Wolfe and Mendelsohn 
(2005) argue, that it is not the economic knowledge and interest, which are 
responsible for the difference in the attitudes toward the trade liberalization, but 
different values and ideology. In their Canadian study, they found that irrespective 
of educational level, those who trust multinational corporations and the market, 
who like the United States etc., are more likely to support the globalization. Ohmae 
(1996) asserts that in the twenty-first century people will salute the corporate flag, 
not the flag of the nation. The future work context in the case of the Hungarian 
economics students will be a global market-driven and with a high probability, that 
they are going to work for a joint venture or a foreign owned company, therefore 
their more positive attitude toward the globalization is an adaptive preparation for 
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their future life context. It seems that students of economics are more aware of the 
requirements of the globalized world in terms of qualities and are better equipped 
in terms of their attitudes and expectations to meet the challenges it creates.  
 
In the present study, the gender did not prove to be a major factor in the 
determining attitudes towards the globalization, however, men evaluated the 
different aspects of the globalization altogether more negatively than women. 
Although the attitudes toward the globalization, as a multilevel process, were not 
investigated, the attitudes toward the international trade, as an economic aspect of 
the globalization, have been researched extensively. These studies show just the 
opposite relationship. Burgoon and Hiscox (2008) found that women were 
significantly less likely than men to support an increasing trade with foreign 
nations. This gender gap existed only among college-educated respondents though. 
They suggested that the differences among men and women in exposure to the 
economic ideas and information, i.e. men being more exposed, may be the source 
of the gender gap in the attitudes toward the trade. Results of the present study do 
not confirm this, as male respondents with an economics major also had a more 
negative view on the globalization, however, not on its economic aspects. This can 
be explained by Gidingel’s (1995) argument, that the significant gender gap in 
relation to the free trade can be explained by different values, with men relying 
more heavily on economic considerations, such as their belief in the market, and 
women on social ones, such as their commitment to the welfare state.  Hungarian 
male economics students may have more social concern than their Western 
counterparts. 
 
The participants of this study were highly educated young adults of a post-socialist 
society. It would be very interesting to extend this investigation to professional 
groups of a different age and to other countries within Europe and outside Europe 
to gain a picture of the similarities and differences. Also political views can have a 
mediating effect on the attitudes towards the globalization, and this should be 
investigated in a forthcoming study. It should be also acknowledged, that the 
present study cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of the Hungarian young 
adults’ attitudes towards the globalization. A further examination is needed, as a 
large body of research shows that an increased education tends to lead to more 
tolerant, cosmopolitan views of the world (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006). These 
findings also raise issues with respect to the role and possible competitive 
disadvantage, which young people, who do not continue into higher education, will 
perhaps have in an increasingly globalized market.   
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Endre Kiss 
 
Constructivity and Destructivity in the Globalization.  
A Background of the Problematic of Peace. 
 
Among the international relationships, the specifically imperial relations can be 
distinguished through the principle of the each other guided competition or rivalry 
of the diverse actor-states in the framework of a paramount global cooperation. 
The attribute "imperial" is neither a random nor a traditional description, that 
connects with each other phenomena of similar character timeless, without any 
further qualification.  
 
„Imperial” means, in our context, a specifically new relation and condition, that are 
somewhat described in Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. It can also be 
understood, that the globalization can today be nearly characterized and addressed 
not only through this relation, although its increasing importance can no longer be 
put into question mainly somewhat after 2000. The visible validity, let alone 
supremacy of the imperial discourse is also therefore an excellent perspective on 
the globalization, because the basic sensibilities of the globalization do not define 
at all its significance from the beginning, on the contrary, the relevance of the order 
of magnitude of the imperial discourse is itself equivalent with an attribute of the 
respective state of the globalization. 
 
The imperial dimensions can of course also change through the rapid development, 
partly in their absolute conditions, partly in their relations to the other forms of the 
global discourse, i.e. to these perspectives, from which the globalization can be 
interpreted and understood also independently. Since the actorial dimensions, i.e. 
the action space of the diverse protagonists in the global processes are unchanged 
of high importance, this actorial freedom can also on its part increase, in a striking 
way, the order of magnitude of the imperial dimension amongst the other 
dimensions. In the context of the imperial dimension, a mixture of objective and 
subjective actions spaces is thus arising, which constant interweaving can be 
regarded as one of the leading conditions of the globalization. 
 
The rapid changements in the imperial dimensions of the process of globalization 
are very characteristic of this event from the beginning. It goes so far, that in the 
first years after 1989, the imperial dimension has not been at all thematized 
publicly, the euphoria of the „end of the history” promised a world, where the 
traditional imperial relations have become, as for ever, obsolete. The conscious 
profiling of the individual virtual or real global imperial actors is joining this 
225 
 
 
starting situation, for finally the potential imperial role does not only depend on the 
will of these actors. 
 
Sometimes the introspection of the great global actors also means a search for 
identity. So, China already belonged in the first decade of the new millennium 
certainly to the „empires”, this appartenance revealed however as „virtual”, while it 
so quickly changed in the second decade, that it costs China now much effort to 
avert that impression, according to which the country would already be now the 
leading state of the globalization (or one of the states willing to lead) or intend to 
become as such. Other categorizations can also remain unfixed: for, somewhat the 
imperial major actors are by no means identical to the members of the leading 
international organizations, even this affirmation can be true, according to which it 
should be possible to enter the first leading circle of the global states (in our 
consciously chosen formulation: „empires”) „through invitation”. 
 
Our thought process is concerned by this new phenomenon of the mutual 
competition of the global „empires”. On the one hand, it is about, we repeat it, a 
competition, that realizes as secondary phenomenon behind the phenomenon of a 
multi-strata global cooperation on the first line. But this phenomenon, also as a 
competition of all against all, is revealing quite complex and multiple. This rivalry, 
and we must again also emphasize this, does not call into question the validity of 
the reality and the relevance of the primary global cooperation. This competition of 
the second line adopts often the outline of asymmetrical forms. 
 
This competition of the second line is, in its true definitions, a quite new 
phenomenon. Conscious of this fact, our approach of research might be selective 
since, for a thorough research, neither a temporal distance nor a sufficiently 
specific methodology are now available. 
 
First, we concentrate on the question, to whose expense this struggle of the second 
line is led. Generally, we could already now take the thesis, transmitted to us by the 
historical tradition: the burdens and costs of wars and crises are transferred in the 
rule to the „society”, it is also not different with the „risks” of the modern industrial 
societies, what is finally a consequence of the state and of the great economical and 
financial actors. We cannot be satisfied with this general answer. 
 
This rivalry on the second line includes obviously the domain of the economy, 
however it belongs to the methodological hypotheses of our essay, that we include 
economical phenomena and facts, only in this case, in the rivalry, if it can be 
proved about such phenomenon or such fact, that it results from conscious 
strategical reflections, i.e. from a decision, which can be certainly associated with 
this rivalry. It goes without saying, that this decision is, for our thought process, of 
a crucial importance. We can only develop and interpret this rivalry through facts, 
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which origin is secured. It follows, that we will have to deal with a huge number of 
facts, which we cannot decide the course of. 
 
Do we take again the universal global cooperation as starting fact („first line”), it 
becomes then comprehensible, why this conflict can be conceived, on the „second 
line” also as a war of a new type. This rivalry is not characterized by combatting 
armed forces or frontal clashes. This rivalry is rather determined by the idea of 
weakening if possible the opponent (some opponents, all opponents), would it be 
about his concrete, but also symbolic or virtual weakening. If this expression has a 
current sense, in this new context and terrain having to be compared with no former 
context, we should then say, that these conflicts are oriented, in the second line, 
against the hinterland of the competitors. This means however, that the individual 
actors in competition do not attack the elites or the ruling class of the other actors, 
rather their „hinterland”, or the everyday life and the conditions of reproduction of 
those involved, also global „imperial” participants. 
 
Would it be effectively the case (while we do not consider the designation 
„hinterland” as the optimal designation), then the purely theoretical question is first 
put, whether this phenomenon is distinguishing from the many similar phenomena 
of the world history, whether this phenomenon, that we have described as rivalry, 
concurrence in the second line, is mainly a new phenomenon. 
 
Our answer is, that this phenomenon must be precisely also then considered, 
through the fact of the globalization and the also relevant fact of the universal 
cooperation (the „first” line), necessarily as a new phenomenon, if many of its 
forms remind effectively very strongly of similar phenomena from the former 
world history. 
 
It is quite difficult to discuss of the facticity of these conflicts. An economical 
success, the changements in the prices of raw materials, the movements of the 
stock exchange and of the markets can improve the positions of one actor at the 
expense of the other(s). These conflicts, we accept it now, do not disturb the global 
communication and the global cooperation (the „first line”), they are often not lived 
as conflicts, while they can cause concrete and violent damages. This asymmetrical 
war is thus also simultaneously a silent war, which victims or those damaged often 
do not know themselves, whom they fell victim to.
111
 
 
                                                 
 
111
 An interesting confirmation of this assumption of the mutual rivalry in the second line can be so, 
if inside the cooperating global structure of these imperial actors other coalitions are emerging, 
which feel themselves closer to each other than versus the others, for this consideration seems to 
have already taken into account the fact, that this rivalry causes damages to the others (with the 
closer approach, these can certainly be moderated).   
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Would this assomption be right, the Wiki-Leaks opportunities and finally the 
Snowden’s case would be considered as anything but exceptional phenomena or 
even astonishments. In reverse order, it would be precisely a surprise, if the 
individual involved actors would not listen to each other in this context. What is so 
disappointing in the public opinions following these scandals, is not necessarily the 
visible information on the state of the business as usual, but the indescribable lack 
of claim of the arguments accompanying the declarations, that undertake no 
attempt to associate this conflict in the second line with that of the first member of 
the cooperation. In these opinions, we find nothing, where the contours of the new 
global world order would have become visible, what we see is only the attitudes of 
the potential war of all against all, which were characteristic of the pre-global 
world. The case Snowden underlines our hypothesis, but not only in the assumption 
of the „normality” of mutual listening. Also the „silent” war appears here, for it 
was also a fact, that we assumed, maybe Snowden would be even also kidnapped 
under the peaceful circumstances of the global international life. 
 
The assumption of this mutual rivalry of the „imperial” actors can extend also to a 
somewhat modified vision on arms production and commerce. This leads however 
also further into the experience, that the global circumstances and relationships are 
changing between the politics and the economics again in a new context. For, 
precisely the arms commerce (through its double rooting in the political and the 
economical) must not be differently interpreted than a moment of this competition 
in the second line, even if it is carried out from „purely economical” moments. The 
supposed and hypothetical role of victim of the hinterland is realizing in this 
context again very sharply: if these guns are needed, then this role is clear (for, no 
population can be today kept away from these conflicts), if not, then (and we 
remain now only with this single consequence), the costs of the arms are taken 
from other sections of the budget. 
 
It is also similar with the concurrence of the representations! Events, such as the 
Olympics in China, winter Olympics in Russia or a football World Cup in Brazil, 
are certainly considered as rational steps (amongst others also) in the rivalry of 
global actors in the so-called second line of the international reality of the age of 
the globalization. It is however just as clear, that the costs of these mega-events of 
the global representations are ascribed to the account of the populations. These 
examples show also, that this competition of the second line is also revealing as a 
medium, which can appropriate to itself and instrumentalize also events, emerging 
totally independant on it. With a quiet conscience, we can namely assume, that if in 
Kuwait the discontent of the civil population is growing and is also manifesting in 
the public declarations, this event can be admitted as a moment in the mutual 
struggle of the global actors of imperial rank or is also just admitted. 
 
The problem of the energy and energy supply shows however also a type of events, 
in which the decisive (intentionally guided) or random (spontaneous) actions could 
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hardly more distinguish from each other. In these domains, we can literally make 
no step, without having also any influence on other actors, what already alone, like 
autopoietically brings the state of the competition of the second member on the 
scene. This type is also that, which shows always publicly the everyday reality of 
this rivalry, which then – enhanced through the force of the digitalization and the 
approaches of a society of information – strengthens the impression of the mutual 
global rivalry at the expense of the global cooperation existing already in itself. 
 
Peculiar sides of this mutual struggle are, if individual actors set for themselves 
certain coordinates, orders of magnitude and norms, that they consider them as 
pain threshold of the others in this universal and permanent conflict. So, we can for 
example read in the dron attacks, that we want to avoid to enlist in the Chinese 
airspace, because we assume, that China would not tolerate it. Another side of the 
same dimension consists in the support to the civil-, women’s and other social 
movements on the sovereign territory of other imperial actors, in which also 
blurred borders of influences are established. For us, this phenomenon has the 
above-average importance, that such steps and opinions can apply as indirect 
confirmation of our thesis. 
 
A very particular place is coming in this very concretely conceived conflict of the 
global empires of the mass communication and of the mass culture. That these be 
since ever already international, and can be prevented in their nature only through 
the force, is a fundamental fact. That this rivalry of individual global protagonists 
be happening in them thousands of times, is another important fundamental fact. 
The difficulty and simultaneously the theoretical interest of this domain consist in 
the quantitative infinity of this domain, in its confusion, but also not less in the 
considerable asymmetry, that exists under this aspect among the individual global 
players, while the American mass culture influences much more clearly the other 
great empires as it is the case in reverse order, even if this effect can also not be 
considered as unlimited or unilateral. An independent complex in this context is, 
that a mass culture does not only mediates the own and the other „world”, but in 
several genres also „works up” and thematizes another world. On working up the 
essential problems of the other empire, several variations of interpretation can 
appear, every civilization is working on the fundamental problems of the other, like 
it was formerly the case in Charlie Chaplin’s and Leslie Howard’s films on the 
Third Reich or Andrzei Wajda’s films on the Stalinism. 
 
In sign of the universal rivalry of the individual civilizations, multiple and very 
strange phenomena can also outgrow from this problematic. This signals, in an 
interesting way, (as one of many phenomena) a reaction on an American film 
presently shot about Che Guevara, in which it was affirmed, „the others relate our 
histories”. There are however examples for that, which one global „empire” calls 
into question the right to exist of the other, like it happens often, in an astonishing 
way, between the USA and America (for instance : America = Mars, Europe = 
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Venus). In this communication, some individual real dimensions of this mutual 
conflict of individual empires are however also thematical, like for example in the 
matter of relationship between Europe and North-Africa, or in the discussion about 
to what extent the EU interventions should support the individual member-states in 
other places of the world. 
 
In this analysis, a point is also visible, that would be even not noticed from another 
starting point. If it is really about the responsibilities of the „hinterland” (we still 
keep so problematically this description), it becomes then soon visible, that this 
concept means something quite different in Europe than in all other great global 
units. Europe’s „base” consists of individual nation-states, that partly protect their 
sovereignty, partly have abandonned it. This known fact can become relevant in the 
new context of the competition of the global empires in the second line. If we 
already stay at the level of the damages, it is then already quite fundamental to 
expect, that they can be unevenly distributed only because of this fact. Here, we 
want to mention briefly the European politics of education and school, where the 
university shows surely itself (and even totally understandable) as a terrain, on 
which the rivalry of the individual great player (behind the comprehensive global 
cooperation) is running intensely. At this point, let us leave aside, whether the 
European politics of higher education is meaningful or not (for us: not). The chosen 
strategy in the conflict revealed however undoubtedly as a strategy, which 
disadvantages and losses are not distributed evenly among the individual states. 
 
Up to now, we dealt with a new phenomenon of globalization, that reminds, indeed 
in many trains, of the traditional competition of the great powers, that must be 
however regarded as new phenomenon, because of the new basic qualities of the 
globalization. Now, we put the suggested question, whether this rivalry can also not 
be associated with that phenomenon, that we usually name as the conflict, or as the 
rivalry of the great philosophies of life, religions or ideologies or that has been 
called, just after the advent of the globalization, by Samuel S. Huntington, „clash of 
the civilizations”. It is obviously an attempt, and we start from the fact, that the 
rivalry of the global empires in the second line, as well as the clash of civilizations 
were originally returning to different motives and origins. 
 
Huntington’s concept, also as self-fulfilling prophecy, plays a very great role in the 
fact, that we must put today this very concrete question of the relation of the rivalry 
of the global powers to the great ideological or civilizational struggles. At the 
beginning of the nineties, even other ways opened namely before the further 
development of the globalization! Huntington’s concept played also a well-
identifiable role, while he reduced the new and very complex dimensions, the 
victory, even the dialectics of the Modern Age in a reactionary basic situation 
seeming fundamentalist. 
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If we think of the rivalry of the philosophies of life, religions and ideologies 
(practically of all that Huntington described as clash of civilizations), we would so 
spontaneously think, that only quite few ideologies take part in this great 
competition. It is however not the case. In truth, there are many more ideologies in 
the global world, which are fighting each other and each of these ideologies has 
also inwards a rich differentiation, that fights also now inside the same major 
ideology or religion. 
 
The convincing impression, that Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations was a self-
realizing prophecy, that influenced in its way the events, came mostly from the 
strange and somewhat instilling fear experience, that this „struggle” (according to 
Huntington or also without him) came together with that result, that every ideology 
or philosophy of life „fundamentalized” with consequences, i.e. in case of every 
individual ideology gave rise to the more fundamentalist or the most fundamentalist 
variation. 
 
Thus, the fundamentalism entered a new phase of its history, with which also a new 
history, a new sociology and also a new sociology of the knowledge of the 
fundamentalism became necessary. A development occured, which in a pecular 
way had also moved closer to each other the individual philosophies of life or 
ideologies. Simultaneously, some fundamentalist thought structures became so 
general, that larger groups and masses, in many countries and in many sociological 
circles, do no longer recognize exactly the fundamentalist color of their mode of 
thinking and just use the fundamentalism, like they applied formerly the 
constructive thought structures, they use even now the fundamentalist structures to 
solve factual problems. 
 
With the necessary care, we can recognize, that both universal struggles (empires + 
civilizations) of the great global actors are today on the way to grow together. In 
the duality of such two empires, the ideological and civilizational clash can show 
through with great ease, the difference between communism and post-communism 
is, for such reasons, also not made with sufficient care, while China is still 
classified, sometimes communist, sometimes neo-liberal in these double-level 
becoming confrontations (empires + ideologies). Also the eventual differences 
between America and Europe are looking already for „ideological” marks, where 
one part must always ideologically (i.e. democracy-theoretically) stand above the 
other, even if the criteria of this civilizational superiority are absolutely very 
relative and no longer show the unambiguity of the year 1989. 
 
The imperial conflicts of second line (behind the global cooperation, that 
constitutes the first line) adopt in any of their constitutions always clear 
ideological-philosophical forms. This event reminds very clearly (as it has been 
declared so reluctantly in this attempt) of a state, that Huntington described in 1992 
and 1993. These ideologies-philosophies of life are adopting very generally (as it 
231 
 
 
has been once pointed out) a „fundamentalist” character, what has also to be 
explained from this competition. It is almost alarming, that this process represents 
the counter-movement toward the development after 1945, while formerly the 
individual ideologies/philosophies of life became always more differentiated and 
demanding. No doubt, this movement is also to explain with the rivalry of the 
individual global empires, in which leading ideologies are often really very close to 
the fundamentalism, it is however to explain also with the ever decreasing role, that 
the intellectuals play in the process of formation of these ideological concepts. 
 
Of course, it is not to establish exactly, at which stage this process of common 
growth of the imperial and ideological-philosophical competition stands, this 
tendency is however today already clearly visible. 
 
This common growth carries in itself two dangers to consider seriously. The first 
danger is apparently „only” of intellectual nature. The correspondence-relation of 
an „empire” with a „civilization/philosophy of life/religion” represents such an 
amazing simplification of our modern and post-modern world, which must be alone 
identified, through the scale of this simplification, directly as the highest danger. 
This simplification is somewhat as we would really think, that the Roman Empire 
consisted of Romans, who represented the civilization/philosophy of life/religion of 
the Roman Empire. 
 
This extreme simplification operated up to now and will, most probably in the 
future, also work as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The concrete orientation of this 
prophecy is already alone a negative and self-destructive one. If one „empire” 
interprets the plural, multi-strata, modern reality of the other as fundamentalism, it 
follows then necessarily, that the own society considers itself as fundamentalism, 
possibly emphasizes and supports in itself the own, fundamentalist trains.
112
 From 
these virtual processes, a concept of the enemy occurs already each time. Two 
fundamentalistically colored empires can experiment the others as „enemies”, 
depending on the intensity of formation of the concept of the enemy of the own 
philosophy of life. No today politician is to blame for the fact that, in his 
fundamentalist basic ideology, every other philosophy of life is an enemy, he is, so 
to speak, constrained to experiment, at a certain stage of the self-fulfilling 
prophecy, the other as an enemy. 
 
Another consequence of this danger of the link of the rivalry of the empires with 
the rivalry of the ideologies consists in the easily understandable fact, that on this 
basis the mechanisms of the positive feedback must work. The perception of this 
now doubled rivalry leads necessarily to the acceleration and intensification of 
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 That by the way such inner trains seeming fundamentalist at the age of the crisis and of the self-
destructive society of indebted states occur as alone, goes even without saying. 
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conflicts among the individual great actors. This rapidity can, under some 
circumstances, be a rapidity, to which we are not prepared and that possibly can 
also not be perceived in the normal everyday world. This doubling (if not 
potentialization) of the global rivalry is obviously also motivated by many real 
processes.
113
 This unquestionable proportion of the real processes cannot mislead 
us about the fact, that at the stage, when this doubling (if not potentialization) of 
the rivalry is installing, the importance of the real moments to interpret rationally 
decisively regresses, the own dynamics of the already fundamentistically colored 
doubled rivalry takes excessive proportions and can highly diminish the control on 
this development in certain circumstances. In other words, it looks like so, that in a 
positive feedback of the redoubled competition (empires + „civilizations”), the 
chances of the universal fundamentalists are getting always bigger, for the 
solidarity, the emancipation, the individualization, the information or the human 
rights are hardly more able to compete with a fundamentalist competition of the 
„civilizations”, that could win for themselves at each concrete location already the 
majority of the own masses. 
 
The doubled competition in the second line (always under the universal 
cooperation in the globalization of the first line) can go over the ideological war. 
The question remains put, whether this war runs today or not yet. It is however 
certain, that the doubling of the rivalry contains now already in itself the danger of 
the ideological war of a new type. 
 
This danger exists quite concretely in the fact, that the launch of the civilizational 
struggle in the imperial rivalry represents a critical, if not just an irreversible 
changement. 
 
The universal rivalry of the global „empires” (at a time, when the imperial 
dimension arrived already historically in the history of the globalization) is after all 
part of the real politology, is rational to interpret and might be even also addressed 
as trivial event. It is therefore of socio-ontological nature, even if it does not maybe 
please us. The truly tragic consequences of the penetration of the civilizational 
struggles consists in the fact, that the ideologies grant the struggle of the great 
empires new qualities, they make of this struggle a new reality, a no longer 
controllable irrational world situation can arise from a politically and socio-
ontologically „normal” situation. 
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 It is unsuccessful individuation processes, break of traditions, economic crisis, unemployment, 
disappointment because of political systems, that are only exacerbated by the modern social and 
non-social communication, so that in this acceleration they can even have archaic, modern and 
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The mutual rivalry in the second line of the globalization can engage new „double 
antagonisms” through this link with the struggle of the civilizations. Since the 
„fundamentalization” mutatis mutandis is going forward in the inner life of every 
great empire, a confrontation between „fundamentalism” and „correct democracy” 
arises from these double positions, and sometimes also democratic elements are to 
be found in the „fundamentalism” and fundamentalist trains in the „correct 
democracy”.  
 
Apart from these new simplifications, we must here point out the again very 
problematic side, in the fact that, while in the „West” the anti-communism is the 
opposing fundamentalism N°1, in the fundamentalist „East” (i.e. in the concrete 
empires, we count there), the „anti-liberalism” is the concept of enemy N°1. The 
juxtaposition of both these „fundamental” facts prepares considerable dangers for 
the further development. For, the role distribution has the common train, that 
neither in the „West” (in the here concerned great actors), nor in the „East” (in the 
here concerned great actors), the fundamentalism is the concept of enemy N°1, this 
contributes to another acceleration of the dynamics, if not of the dialectic of the 
fundamentalism. 
 
In this relation of the „West” to the „East”, the West wanted mainly act, with the 
attraction force of the occidental values, on the population of the East, and also 
export the democratic institution. We cannot say, that the endeavours remained 
unsuccessful, even these efforts were however highly hindered by the arising of the 
clash of civilizations, because they have been just fully politicized and even the 
clearest values of the democracy and of the emancipation could appear as imperial 
interests. This concrete confrontation shows again asymmetrical trains. Thus, a 
double threat arises from the mutual influences (as rivalry of the second line even 
from a „normal” fact). The first is directed against the other „civilization”, without 
forgetting however also the other one, in which the other threat concerns the own 
population, if it does not understand how to take over, at its level, also the logic of 
the civilization struggle. In a „fundamentalist” empire, we may not behave 
„democratically” and in a „democratic” empire, we may not behave 
„fundamentalistically”, understanding these attitudes, as we just understand them 
concretely. 
 
We came to the conclusion (temporary and in many ways quite hypothetical), that 
any fundamentalism is an organic component of the doubled global rivalry of the 
„empires”, that must act in a globalization (if not exclusively of „imperial” color). 
While we have described, at a place, the globalization as dialectic of the modernity, 
we must categorize the advance of the fundamentalism (as well vertically as also 
horizontally) in this doubled rivalry as dialectics of the fundamentalism. Like as if 
precisely this dialectic of the fundamentalism would appear on the scene also in the 
present events in Syria, if we read in a strongly worded article (Spiegel, 2013/22), 
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like „iron particles on the magnetic field, how the fighting groups are organizing on 
the confessional line”. It seems to us, that this observation could characterize also 
many other situations in the processes of the today globalization. An open 
confessional conflict or even a war would also come together with that incalculable 
damage, that we may think, that the world history would not exist and this (global) 
confessional war (which is ultimately anything but confessional or civilizational) 
differs in nothing from the war of the crusaders. 
 
That we previously focused on the confrontation of the „West” and of the „East”, 
does not at all mean, that we had forgotten, that there are quite a lot of „imperial” 
and „civilizational” conflicts. The effective reality is precisely constituted of a 
multiplicity of these conflicts. 
 
In this „dialectic of the fundamentalism” (which extent is, as said, temporary and 
hypothetical), we must sensitize, in this domain, in the direction of the „elective 
affinities”. In the wake of these processes, the individual empires try to find their 
own (old or new) civilizational ideologies, while the same movement can also start 
from the other end: the organizing civilizational ideologies (that can already occur 
at this stage also as independent institutions) also try to find their „own” empire, 
from which they expect, that they will play, in this concrete field, an „exclusive” 
role. 
 
Has the „dialectics of the fundamentalism” effectively somewhat advanced, it is 
then inevitable, that the democracies be disadvantaged in this competition. In the 
short term, it is namely questionable, that the attraction force of the democracies, in 
a non-democratic society, or in a state of crisis, could resist with the demagogy or 
the aggressiveness of the well-organized fundamentalist pressure. 
 
It seems to us, that the assumption of Huntington’s option of a Clash of 
Civilizations was an historical error of the „West”, mainly of the USA, for the rapid 
identification with this (also intellectually very weak) conception has prevented a 
more constructive, more communicative and, finally, more human development in 
the „global” space of the globalization, already the absence of another way must be 
considered today as a serious mistake. 
 
The interpretation of the terrorism is without any doubt a consequence of this 
politics. This vision hides, on the one hand, the reality, at least in the sense, that 
this phenomenon is not justified by the doubling of the imperial rivalries in the 
second line. Drawn from this context, the terrorism can already be multiply 
interpreted, even if also numerous right moments can also be easily contained in 
these interpretations. 
 
So, the terrorism is on the one hand immeasurably increased. On the other hand, 
the transformation of the such understood terrorism reveals also in a self-fulfilling 
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prophecy, so that at the end we can just as difficultly make the distinction between 
the ideological phantom and the reality, such as it has been formerly the case with 
the Clash of Civilizations. The integration of the struggle of the civilizations in the 
(almost obvious) rivalry of the empires of the globalization can accelerate the 
conflicts in the globalization also thus unexpectedly and critically. 
 
Thus, a dialectics of the fundamentalism realized. It is apparently the consequence, 
but in the reality a not necessary consequence, if not just the contrary of the 
globalization itself. It may no longer be called into question, that thus a true danger 
appeared. 
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"Die Aufgabe einer Weltkultur des Ausgleichs, getragen von einer Technik, die 
möglichst allen Menschen ein menschenwürdiges Leben erlauben und doch die 
Tragfähigkeit der irdischen Biosphäre nicht überlasten soll - diese gegenwärtig 
drängend aktuelle Doppelzielsetzung haben die Lebensphilosophen in 
unterschiedlicher Deutlichkeit gesehen. So sehr diese Aufgabenstellung fast eine 
Quadratur des Zirkels bedeutet, sie ist doch ein Zukunftsentwurf, zu dessen 
Verwirklichung es sich lohnt, alle Kräfte einzusetzen." 
Ernst Oldemeyer 
Ortsbestimmungen der Technik in der Lebensphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts
 
 
“The modern technology represents a particular logic and this logic necessarily 
becomes the dominant logic of the human life. One of the significant consequences 
of such a conception of technology is that the traditional ‘logic’ of the technology 
reverses itself. That is to say, the technology as a producer of mere means of 
human action becomes a producer of ends or meaning, or what is the same, 
‘means’ of action determine its ends and prefigure the direction of the social 
change.” 
Nico Stehr 
Theories of the Information Age 
 
“Whereas the knowledge of the 19th and 20th century modernity was a kind of 
learning acquired with a view towards a humanistic or theological end, the new 
post-industrial knowledge of the information age is an unrestricted, seemingly 
uncontrollable flood of pure data.” 
Hans-Peter Söder 
Caught in the Web? Liquid Modernity and the Fluidity of Synthetic Knowledge: 
Some Remarks on a Global Phenomenon 
 
“In every tribe you would need some people who would go out, look around and 
bring things and ideas back home.” 
Rob van Kranenburg 
Essay on Sharing Everything 
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Ernst Oldemeyer 
 
Ortsbestimmungen der Technik in der Lebensphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts
114
 
 
Technik ist ein Erzeugnis des Lebens - ein Lebens-Mittel. Wo kein Leben - in 
kosmischen Regionen ohne Biosphäre -, dort auch keine genuine Technik. Leben 
ist die notwendige, wenn auch nicht hinreichende Bedingung der Entstehung von 
Technik. Vor allem für die Erzeugung dessen, worauf gewöhnlich der Begriff 
„Technik“ beschränkt wird - das System menschlicher Artefakte und ihrer 
Herstellungs- und Verwendungsaktivitäten, müssen weitere, abkünftige 
Bedingungen erfüllt sein. 
 
Die meisten philosophischen Bemühungen seit Platon und Aristoteles, zu einer 
Bestimmung des Wesens der Technik und ihrer Funktionen in der menschlichen 
Lebenswelt zu gelangen, haben bei solchen abkünftigen Bedingungen angesetzt. Zu 
ihnen gehören, aufeinander aufbauend, vor allem : (a) ein nach Versuch und 
Irrtumskorrektur erfolgendes Zubereiten und Anwenden von materiellen Mitteln 
des Überlebens unter dem Druck widriger Naturumstände und drängender 
körperlicher Bedürfnisse, (b) die intuitive („geistige“) Erfindung von 
zweckmäßigen Werkzeugen durch Ausnutzung einer fortschreitenden 
Naturerkenntnis, (c) die zunehmend planmäßige Schaffung einer sich ausweitenden 
Kultursphäre menschlicher Kollektive im Zuge einer arbeitsteiligen Umgestaltung 
der je vorgefundenen Naturumwelt. 
 
Die bekanntesten philosophischen Technikdeutungen großer Reichweite legen - so 
ist meine These - diese Bestimmungsfaktoren menschlicher Technik im Lichte 
bestimmter metaphysisch-weltanschaulicher Grundpositionen aus - auch wenn sie 
dieselben nicht immer ausdrücklich formulieren. Solche Standpunkte prägen 
weitgehend die Perspektive, unter der ein Erfahrungsbereich - hier: die Technik - in 
seinen Strukturen und Funktionen aufgefaßt wird. In erster Linie sind es drei 
metaphysische Positionen, die die genannten Ausgangsphänomene je in ihrem 
Sinne interpretiert haben: ein auf den Atomismus Leukipps und Demokrits 
zurückgehender materialistischer Naturalismus (in der Neuzeit teils im  Anschluß 
an die vom Materie-Geist-Dualismus Descartes’ abgeleitete mechanistische 
Wissenschaft von der Materie [res extensa], teils an den Materialismus 
französischer Aufklärungsphilosophen wie Holbach, La Mettrie und Helvetius 
vertreten), verbunden mit einem technizistischen Utilitarismus, wie er von Francis 
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 In diesen Aufsatz sind in erweiterten und überarbeiteten Fassungen drei Einzelbeiträge über 
Henri Bergson, Nikolaj Berdjajew und Max Scheler eingegangen, die in C. Hubig/A. Huning/G. 
Ropohl (Hgg.) 2000, S. 76 ff., 81 ff., 325 ff., erstveröffentlicht sind. 
239 
 
 
Bacon vorgedacht wurde, ein an Platon orientierter objektiver Idealismus oder 
Ideen-Realismus (im 20. Jahrhundert z.B. vertreten von Friedrich Dessauer), ein 
(anthropozentrischer) humanistischer Naturalismus (eine Lehre vom Menschen als 
planmäßig handelndem Naturwesen, die, in der antiken Sophistik angelegt, vor 
allem im marxistischen Historischen Materialismus, im anglo-amerikanischen 
Pragmatismus und in der philosophischen Anthropologie des 20.Jahrhunderts, z.B. 
bei Arnold Gehlen, ausgebaut wurde). 
 
Die vorliegende Studie konzentriert sich auf eine vierte metaphysische Position, die 
bisher als Grundlage einer eigenständigen Sichtweise der Technik wenig zur 
Kenntnis genommen worden ist: die Position der Lebensphilosophie. Es ist 
gebräuchlich geworden, unter diesem Stichwort die Ansätze einer Reihe von 
gleichsinnig arbeitenden, aber keinen Schulzusammenhang bildenden Denkern der 
Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert zusammenzufassen.
115
 Zu ihnen gehören im 
engeren Sinne Wilhelm Dilthey, Henri Bergson, Georg Simmel, Ludwig Klages, 
Theodor Lessing, Oswald Spengler; in einem weiteren Sinne steht  darüber hinaus 
das Denken u.a. von Leopold Ziegler, Max Scheler, Nikolaj Berdjajew, Hans 
Driesch, Hermann Graf Keyserling in Grundlagen dem lebensphilosophischen 
Ansatz nahe. Dieses Denkkonzept kann auch als fortentwickelte Spätform eines 
viel älteren kosmologischen Organizismus (einer „organologischen“116 oder 
„biomorphen“117 Weltsicht) verstanden werden, dessen europäische Traditionslinie 
von Heraklit über die Stoa, Giordano Bruno, Jacob Böhme, Leibniz bis zu Herder, 
Goethe und Schellings Identitätsphilosophie reicht. Im späten 19. Jahrhundert 
stellte insbesondere Nietzsche im Anschluß an Schopenhauer den Begriff des 
„Lebens“ ins Zentrum seiner Konzeption einer Welt des unablässigen Werdens. Er 
schlug zugleich den emphatischen, diesseitsbejahenden Ton an, der die traditionelle 
Anziehungskraft der platonisch-christlichen „Hinterwelten“ (eines „ewigen“ Seins) 
vergessen machen sollte und viele Dichter und Musiker der Jahrhundertwende 
inspirierte - etwa wenn er seinem Zarathustra das ekstatische Tanzlied „In dein 
Auge schaute ich jüngst, o Leben“ in den Mund legte118. Einige Jahrzehnte später 
sah Georg Simmel „Leben“ als den Zentralbegriff seiner Kulturepoche an, der die 
früher vorherrschenden Leitbegriffe im Europa des 19. und 18. Jahrhunderts 
abgelöst habe - etwa, zeitlich rückwärts gereiht: „Gesellschaft“, „Ich“, „Vernunft“, 
„Natur“.119 
 
Der Begriff des Lebens erwies sich damals vor allem aus zwei Gründen als 
geeignet, zu einem philosophischen Grundwort zu werden. Einerseits war dem 
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 Vgl. dazu z.B. M. Scheler 1972, S. 311 ff.; O. F. Bollnow 1958; F. Fellmann 1993  
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 M. Scheler 1960, S. 28 ff. 
117
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 F. Nietzsche 1966, Bd. 2, S. 470 ff.  
119
 G. Simmel 1987, S. 152 f. 
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Phänomen des Lebens seit Darwin, Haeckel, Mendel, usw. intensive 
naturwissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit zuteil geworden. Mit der Entdeckung von 
Evolutions- und Vererbungsgesetzlichkeiten gab es Handhaben für eine sich als 
streng wissenschaftlich verstehende Biologie, das Leben als Systemeigenschaft 
selbstorganisierender Materie unter bestimmten Aspekten objektiv zu erfassen. - 
Andererseits war Leben aber auch eine Erscheinung, der die im 19. Jahrhundert 
sich konstituierenden Geisteswissenschaften und die weiterbestehenden Zweige der 
bewußtseinsidealistischen Philosophie großes Interesse abgewinnen konnten. Als 
Inbegriff des „Erlebens“ (Bewußtseins und Sich-Ausdrückens) ließ sich Leben als 
ein „von innen“, subjektiv zu verstehendes Geschehen thematisieren - ein Ansatz, 
der in der Tiefenpsychologie auf das Erschließen „unbewußter“ biopsychischer 
Regungen ausgedehnt wurde. - Schließlich konnte vom Leben und Erleben her ein 
Zugang zur Kommunikation zwischen Lebewesen gewonnen werden: ‘nur Leben 
versteht Leben’.120  
 
In der Einschätzung des Lebens als Zentralphänomen kündigte sich - bei einem 
Teil der lebensphilosophischen Autoren auch ausdrücklich - eine veränderte 
Einstellung zur Natur an, wie sie ein halbes Jahrhundert später mit den 
ökologischen Bestrebungen und in den „grünen“ politischen Bewegungen breitere 
Kreise erreichen sollte. War es im neuzeitlichen materialistischen Weltbild mit 
seinem technizistisch-utilitären Ethos zu einer scharfen Gegenüberstellung von 
Kultur und Natur gekommen, bei der die Natur vorwiegend als bloßer Gegenstand 
der Beobachtung und als Material der Bearbeitung und Ausbeutung angesehen 
wurde, so gehört der lebensphilosophische Impuls in eine Reihe von Bestrebungen, 
diesen Dualismus zu überwinden und zu einer ‘integrativen’ Sicht des 
Verhältnisses von Natur und Kultur zu gelangen.121  
 
In den im engeren Sinne philosophischen Richtungskämpfen der Epoche lassen 
sich bei den genannten Autoren des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts zwei grundsätzliche 
Frontstellungen ausmachen : einmal gegen die (sich meist auf Kant berufende) 
Tendenz in der akademischen Philosophie, sich auf Logik, Erkenntnis- und 
Wissenschaftstheorie, sowie eine rein rational begründete Ethik zu beschränken. 
Demgegenüber wollte die Lebensphilosophie Bewußtsein, Vernunft, Erkennen und 
Rationalität nicht als selbständige Prinzipien anerkennen, sondern sie als 
Teilfunktionen vom tieferen Grundgeschehen des Lebens her verstehen. Zum 
anderen setzte sich die Lebensphilosophie von einer Weltsicht ab, die sich am 
Vorbild der allein als exakt geltenden mathematischen Naturwissenschaften 
orientierte. Die auf diesen aufgebaute quantifizierende Weltbetrachtung wurde als 
unzureichend angesehen, Phänomene mit wesentlich qualitativen Seiten wie Leben 
und Bewußtsein, Personalität und Geist zu begreifen. 
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Mit solchen Orientierungen konnte die Lebensphilosophie zu einem geeigneten 
Rahmen werden, das Thema Technik nicht nur anthropozentrisch, sondern auch 
von seinen tieferliegenden Bedingungen im ‘Leben’ überhaupt anzugehen. 
Technik, so wurde nun mitunter gesehen, entwickelt sich aus Funktionen des 
Lebens schon auf vormenschlicher Stufe (zumindest im Tierreich). Die in der 
Antike angelegte Entgegensetzung von Natur (physis) und Kunst/Technik (téchne), 
des Von-selbst-Hervorwachsens und des Von-außen-Gestaltens (die allerdings bei 
Platon und Aristoteles noch keine strikte war, sondern ein komplexeres Verhältnis 
bildete)
122
, wurde von manchen Lebensphilosophen als nicht fruchtbar erkannt. 
Freilich nicht immer konsequent - und so finden sich im lebensphilosophischen 
Denkkontext durchaus verschiedenartige und, wie schon bei Nietzsche
123
, 
ambivalente Einschätzungen des Verhältnisses von Natur und Technik in seiner 
geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Doch da die Technik nicht nur ‘von innen her’, aus 
dem Blickwinkel von Ingenieuren und Technologen, zum Thema gemacht wurde, 
ergaben sich aus der größeren Distanz von Fachfremden überraschend vielfältige, 
auch hellsichtig-kritische Gesichtspunkte zur enormen Gewichtsverlagerung 
zwischen natürlicher und technischer Lebenswelt im Laufe der Geschichte 
menschlicher Technik.  
 
Die Lebensphilosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts haben keine systematischen 
Technikphilosophien hervorgebracht. Doch finden sich bei ihnen bemerkenswerte 
Versuche, den ‘Ort’ der Technik im Verhältnis zur Natur und innerhalb der 
menschlichen Kultur, unter Berücksichtigung seiner Wandlungen, zu bestimmen. 
Dementsprechend thematisieren die hier behandelten Texte die Technik nicht 
isoliert, sondern stellen diese jeweils in den Rahmen umfassenderer Lebensbezüge. 
Die ausgewählten Autoren haben hinsichtlich des Themas Technik kaum Bezug 
aufeinander genommen. Die innere Verwandtschaft ihrer Standpunkte ergibt sich 
aus den angedeuteten Voraussetzungen ihrer Weltsicht - bei freilich nicht 
unerheblichen Unterschieden im resultierenden Urteil über die Bedeutung der 
Technik. Daher reihe ich die folgenden sechs Skizzen nicht chronologisch 
aneinander - das würde in diesem Fall nicht zur Vertiefung der Einsicht beitragen. 
Ich ordne sie vielmehr - im Ausgang von einer ausführlicheren Darstellung der 
fundierenden Gedanken zu Leben und Kultur bei Georg Simmel - fortschreitend 
von geringerer zu größerer Vielfalt der Perspektiven an, die von den Autoren an 
der Technik wahrgenommen wurden, sowie nach dem Grad des Realitätssinns, den 
ihre Prognosen erkennen lassen. Im Anschluß an Simmel kommen dabei 
exemplarisch Gedanken zur Technik von Ludwig Klages, Leopold Ziegler, Henri 
Bergson, Nikolaj Berdjajew und Max Scheler zur Sprache. (Auf andere, etwa 
gleichzeitig publizierende Autoren lebensphilosophisch-anthropologischer 
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Orientierung, bei denen sich ebenfalls erwägenswerte Gesichtspunkte zur Technik 
finden - wie Theodor Lessing, Hans Driesch, Alfred Weber, Ernst und Friedrich 
Georg Jünger, sowie Wilhelm Schapp - sei hier nur hingewiesen.) 
 
Georg Simmel (1858-1918) hat erst in seinem letzten Lebensjahrzehnt zur 
lebensphilosophischen Grundlegung seines Denkens gefunden. Er war das gerade 
Gegenteil einer engen Spezialistennatur. Ohne ein Methodologe der 
Phänomenologie zu sein, öffnete er sich (im Einklang mit Husserls Maxime) von 
früh an weit den „Sachen selbst“, die sich zu seiner Zeit als aktuell aufdrängten. 
Mit seinem „empfindlichen Sensorium für zeittypische Reize, für ästhetische 
Neuerungen, für geistige Tendenzwenden und Orientierungsumschwünge im 
großstädtisch konzentrierten Lebensgefühl, für subpolitische 
Einstellungsänderungen und schwer greifbare, diffuse, aber verräterische 
Alltagsphänomene“124 fand er über seine Berliner Vorlesungen viel Anklang bei 
einem bildungsbürgerlichen Publikum und stand im Austausch mit bedeutenden 
Künstlern und Schriftstellern. Doch hatte er mit seinen unorthodoxen Themen, die 
in die Soziologie und die Kulturwissenschaften übergriffen und die er in seinen 
späteren Jahren vorwiegend in der Form des Essays behandelte, Schwierigkeiten, 
bei der akademischen Zunft Anerkennung zu finden. So erhielt er erst 1914 einen 
Lehrstuhl an der Universität Straßburg. Von den drei Phasen seines Schaffens, die 
meist unterschieden werden - einer biologistisch-pragmatistisch orientierten 
(Hauptwerk : „Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft“, 1892/93), einer soziologisch 
orientierten (Hauptwerke : „Philosophie des Geldes“, 1900; „Soziologie“, 1908) 
und einer lebensphilosophisch orientierten Phase (Hauptschriften : „Philosophische 
Kultur“, 1911; „Lebensanschauung“, 1918)125 -, sind für seine Gedanken zur 
Technik vor allem die zweite und die dritte wichtig. Der systematische 
Zusammenhang läßt sich am besten von seiner Lebensphilosophie her erkennen.  
 
Die Formel, mit der Simmel in seinem letzten Buch „Lebensanschauung“ seine 
Konzeption des Lebens zusammenfaßt, läuft darauf hinaus, daß Leben seinem 
Wesen nach nicht nur „Mehr-Leben“ bedeutet, sondern (auf menschlicher Stufe) 
auch „Mehr-als-Leben“.126 - Leben entfaltet sich, nach Simmel, auf drei Stufen127: 
Als erste Stufe faßt er das ganz in die Rhythmik der vormenschlichen  Natur 
eingebettete (pflanzliche und tierische) Leben zusammen: es produziert und 
reproduziert sich selbst und gelangt - im Tierreich - bereits zur Ausbildung einer 
„seelischen“ Innerlichkeit (Bewußtsein). - Im Menschen folgt zweitens ein Leben 
auf der Stufe des subjektiven „Geistes“. Es unterscheidet sich von der 
vorausgehenden durch die Ausbildung des reflexiven Selbstbewußtseins. Das 
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 So die treffende Charakterisierung von Simmels Geistesart durch J. Habermas 1986, S. 8 
125
 Vgl. M. Landmann 1987, S. 7 f. 
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 G. Simmel 1918, S. 20 ff. 
127
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243 
 
 
Lebendige wird damit fähig, eine Distanzhaltung zu sich selbst und zur 
umgebenden Natur (Subjekt-Objekt-Trennung) zu erreichen, Vorbedingung einer 
neuartigen Produktivität: des kulturellen Schöpfertums. - Durch dieses wird die 
dritte Stufe konstituiert : die Kultur. Hier stellt das „geistige“ Leben objektive 
Gebilde („objektiven Geist“ nach Hegel) aus sich heraus, die eine vom naturhaften 
und subjektiv-bewußten Leben unabhängige Existenz erlangen. Diese prägen dem 
„strömenden“, wandlungsreichen  Leben feste Formen auf, in die es sich einfügt, 
an denen es Gestalt gewinnt und sich selbst versteht: Sprache, soziale Institutionen 
und Organisationen, Wirtschaftsformen, Technik, staatliche Verfassungen und 
Einrichtungen, rechtliche Regelsysteme, Wissenschaften, Künste, Kanones von 
Werten und Moralnormen, Religionen, Weltanschauungen usw. Diese 
Kulturgebilde erlangen gegenüber der Lebensdynamik, aus der sie hervorgegangen 
sind, eine „transvitale Sonderexistenz“ mit Eigengesetzlichkeiten und einer 
widerständigen Beharrungskraft, die sich der weitergehenden Lebensbewegung 
entfremden kann. 
 
Die Wesensart des „Mehr-Lebens“ - des unablässigen Vergehens von erreichten 
Lebensformen zugunsten des Entstehens neuer - ist diesem bereits auf der 
naturhaften Stufe eigen. Im Wachstum, in Metamorphosen und in der Zeugung von 
Nachkommen geht Leben über seinen je erlangten Zustand hinaus. Selbst Altern 
und Sterben bedeuten Gestaltwandel und Formauflösung, durch die neue 
Organisationsformen vorbereitet werden. Daher faßt Simmel auch diese 
Erscheinungen unter den Begriff des „Mehr-Lebens“. Mit dem Hinweis auf diese 
dem Leben noch gewissermaßen immanente „Selbsttranszendenz“128 greift Simmel 
sowohl Schopenhauers Gedanken vom Streben nach Selbsterhaltung („Wille zum 
Leben“) als auch Nietzsches Gedanken vom „Willen zur Macht“ (zur Selbst- und 
Fremdüberwindung) als Grundmerkmale des Lebens in einer erweiterten Form auf. 
Für Simmel bekundet sich Mehr-Leben aber auch auf der Stufe des Bewußtseins 
und Selbstbewußtseins, indem das Leben hier stets über den jeweiligen Moment 
seiner Jetzt-Existenz ahnend, erwartend, planend in die Zukunft vorgreift und einen 
Vergangenheitshorizont erinnernd bewahrt.
129
 Damit bezieht Simmel die Ansicht 
Bergsons ein, daß dem Menschen - über die fest-stellenden Akte des Intellekts 
hinaus - ein intuitives Wissen vom Fließen der gelebten Zeit (durée), von 
Bewegung, Veränderung und Entwicklung zugänglich sei.  
 
Mit der Bestimmung, daß Leben sich auf der Stufe der Kultur zu „Mehr-als-
Leben“ entfalte, geht Simmel über Nietzsche wie über Bergson hinaus, ohne doch 
zur metaphysischen Absolutsetzung einer rein geistigen „Hinterwelt“ 
zurückzukehren. Die kulturellen Gebilde sind zwar ihrer Genese nach durchaus 
Produkte des schöpferischen Lebensprozesses. Sie erlangen aber als vollendete 
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Gestalten den Charakter eines vom Leben und Erleben abgelösten Bestandes mit 
einer gewissen „Autonomie“, mit eigenlogischen Sinnstrukturen, die mehr oder 
weniger auf „Dauer“ angelegt, ja mitunter (wie z.B. bei logischen und 
mathematischen Gesetzlichkeiten) als „zeitlos“ gültig ausgewiesen sind. Leben auf 
der Stufe der Kultur braucht solche objektiven Formen in zweierlei Hinsicht: 1. zur 
Kultivierung der jeweiligen natürlichen Lebensumwelt durch Hege, durch Einsatz 
von Werkzeugen, durch Werke und Einrichtungen, die menschliches Leben 
schützen und erleichtern; 2. zur Kultivierung der menschlichen Innerlichkeit, der 
„Seele“, durch (soziale, moralische, ästhetische, religiöse) Riten, Sitten, Normen 
und Institutionen. Für Simmel liegt der eigentliche Sinn der Kultur durchaus in der 
zweiten Leistung
130
 (womit er Ciceros Unterscheidung und Gewichtung von 
„cultura agri“ und „cultura animi“ aufgreift). Die Problematik in diesem 
Kultivierungsprozeß besteht nach Simmel darin, daß das menschliche Leben 
einerseits auf eine Ordnung durch stabilisierende „Formen“ angewiesen ist, 
andererseits sich jedoch in seinem rascheren „Weiterströmen“ von ihnen 
entfremdet und sich an ihnen wie an der unlebendigen Natur abarbeiten muß. 
Daraus ergeben sich unvermeidlich Kulturkonflikte; ja Simmel geht so weit, dem 
unablässig aufbrechenden Widerstreit zwischen dynamischem Leben und 
statischen Kulturformen - bei dem nicht nur Leben zugrunde geht, sondern auch je 
und je ehrwürdige Kulturgebilde zerbrochen werden, um neuen Platz zu machen - 
die Unausweichlichkeit einer „Tragödie“ beizumessen.131 
 
Für diesen von Simmel herausgearbeiteten Wesenszug des Lebens, auf „Mehr-als-
Leben“ angelegt, ja im Kulturzustand angewiesen zu sein, bildet die Technik nur 
einen, wenn auch gewichtigen Beispielbereich. Simmel hat seine Gedanken zu den 
Auswirkungen dieses Wesenszuges in der Kulturentwicklung  nicht systematisch 
anhand der Technik dargestellt. Dennoch lassen sich aus verschiedenen seiner 
Schriften bedeutsame Einsichten zur Struktur, zu den Funktionen und den Folgen 
der Technik herausheben. 
 
Der Grundansatz seiner Gedanken zur Technik ist aus der Analyse des Systems der 
„Werkzeuge“ und des Werkzeuggebrauchs in Simmels „Philosophie des Geldes“ 
(1900) ablesbar.
132
 Simmel geht von der Unterscheidung zwischen „Triebhandeln“ 
und „Zweckhandeln“ aus. Beide sind Lebensäußerungen, und beide kommen beim 
Menschen vor, aber sie haben verschiedene Strukturen und wirken sich verschieden 
aus. Das Triebhandeln ist ein „gradliniger“, „zwei-gliedriger“ Kausalvorgang: 
physiologisch bedingte Energiespannungen (als Ursache) drängen auf Lösung 
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 Die hier folgenden Zitate finden sich in der „Philosophie des Geldes“ (PhG), ˛1907, S. 197 ff. 
Simmels Ausführungen  knüpfen offensichtlich an die Dialektik von „Mittel“ (Werkzeug) und 
„Zweck“ in Hegels „Wissenschaft der Logik“ (1812-16) , 2. Teil, II, 3, an.  
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durch ein Tun (als Wirkung), mit dem der Trieb zeitweise endet. Das 
Zweckhandeln hingegen weist eine „dreigliedrige“ Kausalität auf. Zwischen die 
energetischen Spannungen und die lösende Aktion schiebt sich ein Drittes: die 
Antizipation eines erstrebten Erfolges, die dann gleichsam rückwirkend dessen 
kausale Realisierung steuert. Im ersten Fall fühlen wir uns „von hinten getrieben“, 
im zweiten „von vorn gezogen“. „Das Essen [...] aus Hunger gehört in die erste, 
das Essen [...] nur um des kulinarischen Genusses willen in die zweite Kategorie“ 
(S. 197). Diese Einschaltung eines Bildes vom „Zweck“ überlagert als eine 
„teleologische“ Komponente den Kausalprozeß und erlaubt das Festhalten eines 
Handlungszieles über viele Zwischenschritte, während deren die erstrebte 
Befriedigung hinausgeschoben werden muß. 
 
Der Übergang vom Triebhandeln zum Zweckhandeln ermöglicht den Übergang des 
Menschen vom Naturwesen zum Kulturwesen. Die Fähigkeit zum  Zweckhandeln 
ist die Voraussetzung auch für das Schaffen von Technik. Denn „der Zweck ist 
seinem Wesen nach an die Tatsache des Mittels gebunden“ (S. 200), und Technik 
ist für Simmel Inbegriff von Mitteln. Für ihre Ausbildung ist entscheidend, „daß 
wir mit vielgliedrigen Reihen von Mitteln mehr und wesentlichere Zwecke 
erreichen können als mit kurzen“ (S. 202). Die Technik entwickelt sich als 
Teilsystem der Kultur durch zunehmendes Einschalten von Mitteln in das 
menschliche Handeln. Dies bedeutet ein Durchlaufen immer differenzierterer 
„Umwege“, um projektierte Zwecke effektiver zu erreichen (S. 203). Neben 
direkten Umweghandlungen durch leibliche Organe fungieren eigens geschaffene 
Sachmittel, die „Werkzeuge“, als wichtigste vermittelnde Instanzen zwischen 
„Subjekten“ und ihren erstrebten „Objekten“. „Wer einen Samen in die Erde steckt, 
um später die Frucht des Gewächses zu genießen, statt sich mit der wild 
wachsenden zu begnügen, handelt teleologisch [...]; wenn aber bei dieser 
Gelegenheit Hacke und Spaten verwendet werden, so ist [...] das subjektiv 
bestimmte Moment [...] dem objektiven gegenüber verlängert“. „Das Werkzeug ist 
das potenzierte Mittel, denn seine Form und sein Dasein ist schon durch den Zweck 
bestimmt“ (S. 203): es wird entdeckt oder hergestellt, ‘um zu ...’. Das gilt für die 
einfachsten Geräte der Handverstärkung133 ebenso wie für großtechnische Systeme 
der Industriekultur. - Diesen Mittel- und Umwegcharakter des Werkzeugs haben 
nach Simmel nicht nur „Sachen“, die den Wirkungsgrad der „materiellen 
Produktion“ erhöhen, sondern auch soziale Institutionen, rechtlich-staatliche 
Einrichtungen, kirchliche Kulte und, nicht zuletzt, das Geld (S. 204).  
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 Gelegentlich, so im Essay „Der Henkel“ (1911), greift Simmel auch die Organprojektionsthese 
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Simmel sieht einesteils die enorme Leistungssteigerung des Zweckhandelns durch 
die Entwicklung der Werkzeugtechnik. Er sieht aber auch, als Kehrseite, wie sich 
in der Technik der von ihm angenommene „Konflikt“ zwischen Leben und 
kulturellen Formen auswirkt. Vor allem ein Wesenszug der Werkzeugwelt lasse 
diese mit dem „strömenden“ Leben in Widerstreit geraten: der Funktions-wechsel 
zwischen Mittel und Zweck. Das Mittel (Werkzeug), ursprünglich geschaffen, um 
einen projektierten Zweck zu realisieren, kann seinerseits zum Zweck werden oder 
eigene Zwecke generieren. - Dies liegt erstens an der Eigenschaft des Werkzeugs, 
„über seine einzelne Anwendung hinaus zu beharren“ (S. 207). Diese 
Dauerhaftigkeit, einerseits ein Vorteil, der Werkzeuge (insbesondere solche aus 
festem, anorganischem Material) langfristig ‘zuhanden’ sein läßt, kann andererseits 
zur „Fessel“ werden. In den heutigen Wohlstandsgesellschaften kennen bereits die 
meisten Privathaushalte das Problem, daß noch brauchbare, aber tatsächlich nie 
mehr verwendete „Sachen“ aller Art sich im Lauf der Zeit platzraubend anhäufen. 
Aus der Geschichte großer technisch-gesellschaftlicher Systeme verweist Simmel 
auf die Beharrungstendenz „militärischer Organisationen“: ursprünglich zur 
Kriegsführung geschaffen, werden sie als angebliche 
Kriegsverhinderungsinstrumente auf Dauer gestellt und zum Selbstzweck (S. 207, 
546 f.). Noch andere Ausmaße erreicht die Problematik, wenn riesige technische 
„Infrastrukturen“, wie diejenigen zur Elektrizitätserzeugung durch Atomenergie, 
wegen unbewältigter Nebenfolgen (Entsorgung, hohes Gefahrenpotential) ihre 
gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz verlieren und nur mit immensem Arbeits- und 
Kostenaufwand wieder beseitigt werden könnten beziehungsweise in „Endlagern“ 
über menschlich inkommensurable Zeiträume bewacht werden müßten.  
 
Eine zweite, nur scheinbar entgegengesetzte Eigenschaft, die das „dialektische“ 
Mittel-Zweck-Verhältnis verschärft, ist die „eigenlogische“ Entwicklung ganzer 
technischer Systeme. Auf diese hat Simmel besonders in seinen späten Schriften 
aufmerksam gemacht und damit ein Problem bezeichnet, das in der 
Technikphilosophie und -soziologie der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts unter 
den Stichworten „Sachzwang“, „Sachdominanz“ und „technologischer 
Determinismus“ zentral werden sollte.134 Schon in der „Philosophie des Geldes“ 
hatte Simmel sich von dem bekannten Satz Francis Bacons, daß wir die Natur 
beherrschen, indem wir ihr gehorchen,
135
 distanziert, weil er nur oberflächlich 
richtig sei. In der Meinung, daß von den Naturgesetzen ein „Zwang“ ausgehe, den 
wir „besiegen“ müßten, stecke noch eine „mythologische Denkweise“, während 
doch „das natürliche Geschehen [...] ganz jenseits der Alternative von Freiheit und 
Zwang“ stehe und die Naturgesetze (als bloße „Formeln für die allein möglichen 
Wirksamkeiten“ von Stoffen und Energien) ihrerseits überhaupt nicht „wirken“. 
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Demgegenüber sieht Simmel mit der Entwicklung der technischen „Sachen“ 
zunehmend Zwänge im kulturellen Leben Platz greifen; er spricht geradezu von 
einem „Aufstand der Sachen“ (statt von einem „Aufstand der Massen“ [des 
Proletariats])
136. „Die Maschine, die den Menschen [...] die Sklavenarbeit an der 
Natur abnehmen sollte, [hat] sie zu Sklaven [...] an der Maschine selbst 
herabgedrückt.“ Doch nicht nur „Sklaven des Produktionsprozesses“ seien wir 
geworden, sondern über „tausend Gewöhnungen“ und „Bedürfnisse äußerlicher 
Art“ auch „Sklaven der Produkte“, sagt er im Einklang mit Marx und Nietzsche. 
Das führe zu einem „Übergewicht der Mittel über die Zwecke“; „relative“ 
Errungenschaften des technischen Fortschritts würden mit „absoluter Bedeutung“ 
aufgeladen. Zum Beispiel ließen die „Triumphe von Telegraphie und Telephonie“ 
übersehen, „daß es doch wohl auf den Wert dessen ankommt, was man 
mitzuteilen“ habe, und weit weniger auf die Schnelligkeit der Übermittlung (PhG, 
S. 548 ff.) - eine Ansicht, die inzwischen nur noch wenig Zustimmung finden 
dürfte.  
 
Diesen Ansatz hat Simmel später nur noch ausgebaut,137 aber nicht mehr 
grundlegend verändert. Sein Interesse gilt nunmehr vor allem den psychosozialen 
Auswirkungen der eigengesetzlichen Entwicklungstendenzen in der Technik und 
den anderen sich ausdifferenzierenden Kulturgebieten (Wirtschaft, Recht, 
Wissenschaften, Künste, usw.): Die „immanente Logik“ der kulturellen 
Subsysteme zwinge den individuellen Subjekten der Kultur eine Anpassung auf, 
die sie ihren tieferen „seelischen“ Zielen entfremde. - Auf dem Feld der Technik 
besteht, nach Simmel, die Sachlogik des Fortschritts darin, daß „die Reihe der 
Mittel für unsere Endzwecke [...] unablässig verlängert und verdichtet wird.“ Das 
steigert die Effektivität technischer Systeme, führt aber zu einer ebensolchen 
Verlängerung der menschlichen Handlungsketten, die zu ihrer Organisation, 
Bedienung und Verwaltung nötig sind. Die schließliche „Unabsehbarkeit der 
Zweck- und Mittelreihen“ für die Individuen hat zur Folge, daß „Mittelglieder für 
unser Bewußtsein zu Endzwecken“ und die eigentlichen Endzwecke der 
„seelischen“ Kultivierung „verdrängt“ werden (IG, S. 232 ff.). 
 
Im Bereich der Produktion ist eine der sachlogischen Konsequenzen dieser 
Technikentwicklung ein Grad an Arbeitsteilung und eines entsprechenden, „vom 
Leben abgeschnürten Spezialistentums“, der dazu führt, daß in die Herstellung 
eines einzelnen Produkts die Leistungen von immer mehr arbeitenden Personen 
einfließen, die den Gesamtprozeß der Produktion, sowie die Teilarbeiten der 
anderen nicht überblicken. Der Produktionsprozeß läuft sachlogisch ab, 
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„unbekümmert darum, ob ein Subjekt das darin investierte Quantum von Geist oder 
Leben zu seiner eigenen Förderung wieder herausentwickeln kann“ (IG, S. 138, 
145). - Im Bereich des Konsums ruft der technische „Zwang“, geschaffene 
Einrichtungen voll zu nutzen und durch ergänzende Glieder zu komplettieren, 
Angebote zahlreicher Waren hervor, die „künstliche und, von der Kultur der 
Subjekte her gesehen, sinnlose Bedürfnisse“ wachrufen und das Leben „mit 
tausend Überflüssigkeiten“ überladen (IG, S. 141, 146; Hervorhebung von E.O.). 
 
Als weitergehende Auswirkungen dieser Technisierungsfolgen beobachtet Simmel 
bereits zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts typische Veränderungen menschlicher 
Wahrnehmungsweisen, Verhaltensmuster und Charakterzüge. In seinem Essay 
„Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben“ (1903)138 stellt er die „Steigerung des 
Nervenlebens“ der Individuen als die wichtigste psychovitale Wandlung heraus, 
die eine „großstädtische“ Existenz mit sich bringt. Die Ursache sieht er darin, daß 
die Individuen in den Metropolen sich unablässig gegen „Übermächte der 
Gesellschaft, des geschichtlich Ererbten, der äußerlichen Kultur und Technik“ zu 
behaupten haben - statt, wie in früheren Kulturzuständen, gegen die Übermacht der 
Natur (BuT, S. 227 f.). Während das kleinstädtische und das Landleben noch einem 
naturnäheren „langsameren, gewohnteren, gleichmäßiger fließenden Rhythmus“ 
folgen, fordert das Großstadtleben mit der technischen Durchorganisation seiner 
ungleich mannigfaltigeren gesellschaftlichen Einrichtungen die Anpassung an 
einen ununterbrochenen Wechsel von - häufig kontrastreichen, unerwarteten - 
Eindrücken.  
 
In dieser starken Beschleunigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Reaktionstempos, zu 
deren Bewältigung ein viel höherer Bewußtheitsgrad nötig ist als im Landleben, 
sieht Simmel den Hauptgrund für weitere psychosoziale Veränderungen im 
Großstadtleben. Während die ländlichen Verhaltensweisen sich mehr vom 
„Gefühl“ und vom „Gemüt“ lenken lassen, läuft die Verarbeitung der 
großstädtischen Impressionen vorwiegend über den „Verstand“ als das „am 
wenigsten empfindliche [...] psychische Organ“. Daher der „intellektualistische 
Charakter des großstädtischen Seelenlebens“, ein Überwiegen von „Sachlichkeit“ 
und „Berechnung“ in den menschlichen Beziehungen, sowie die Einordnung aller 
Tätigkeiten und Geschäfte „in ein festes, übersubjektives Zeitschema“ (BuT, S. 228 
ff.). - Eine Folge dieser großstädtischen Rastlosigkeit ist die Entstehung einer 
typischen seelischen Haltung: der „Blasiertheit“. Sie erwächst aus einer 
„Unfähigkeit, auf neue Reize mit der ihnen angemessenen Energie zu reagieren“ 
und besteht in einer „Abstumpfung gegen die Unterschiede der Dinge“ - einem 
                                                 
 
138
 Hier zitiert nach der Essaysammlung G. Simmel, Brücke und Tür (BuT), 1957, S. 227 ff. Mit den 
„Großstädten“ sind offenkundig nicht, wie in der später üblichen Definition, alle Städte mit mehr als 
100000 Einwohnern gemeint, sondern Metropolen. 
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„subjektiven Reflex“ zugleich der „Geldwirtschaft“, in der sich alle qualitativen 
Unterschiede zu quantitativen einebnen (BuT, S. 232 f.).  
 
Mit derartigen Beobachtungen erkennt Simmel bereits vor dem Siegeszug der 
Massenmedien Rundfunk und Fernsehen im modernen Lebensstil Symptome 
dessen, was in der späteren Technik- und Medienanthropologie „Reiz- und 
Informationsüberflutung“ genannt worden ist.139 Schon damals erscheint Simmel 
die Menge des durch technische Medien und Kommunikationsstätten (Zeitungen, 
Zeitschriften, Bücher, Kino, Reklame, Warenhäuser, Ausstellungen) an die 
Großstädter herangetragenen kulturellen Angebots quantitativ überwältigend. Eine 
„Unzahl von Kulturelementen“ erheischt Aufmerksamkeit; es reiht sich „Buch an 
Buch, Erfindung an Erfindung, Kunstwerk an Kunstwerk“. Der Einzelne kann 
diese „formlose Unendlichkeit“ weder „innerlich assimilieren“, noch „einfach 
ablehnen“, da sie „potentiell in die Sphäre seiner kulturellen Entwicklung“ gehört. 
Diese „Überladung“ mit Eindrücken führt zum „fortwährenden ‘Angeregtsein’ des 
Kulturmenschen“, zum flüchtigen „Kennen oder Genießen“ von Dingen, die wegen 
mangelnder Verarbeitung im seelischen Haushalt letztlich nur „Ballast“ sind (IG, 
S. 144 ff., 233). Das Ganze der Kultur, das unser individuelles Dasein bereichern 
und steigern sollte, bleibt so dem Rezipienten auch qualitativ weithin fremd. „Der 
Mangel an Definitivem [...] treibt dazu, in immer neuen Anregungen, Sensationen, 
äußeren Aktivitäten eine momentane Befiedigung zu suchen“. Folgen sind: 
„Reisemanie“, „wilde Jagd der Konkurrenz“, „Treulosigkeit auf den Gebieten des 
Geschmacks, der Stile, der Gesinnungen, der Beziehungen“ (PhG, S. 551). So zeigt 
sich das Individuum dem „Überwuchern der objektiven Kultur [...] weniger und 
weniger gewachsen“. Es entsteht eine „Wachstumsdifferenz“ (BuT, S. 240): die 
‘Kultur der Seele’ bleibt hinter der ‘Kultur der Sachen’ weit zurück (IG, S. 234). - 
Damit hat Simmel an einem zentralen Beispiel vorweg erkannt, was William F. 
Ogburn ab 1922 zur Theorie des „cultural lag“, des Zurückbleibens der 
Entwicklung bestimmter Kulturbereiche hinter anderen, ausgebaut hat.
140
 
 
Bemerkenswert ist schließlich ein ‘dialektischer’ Zug des metropolitanen Lebens, 
den Simmel gesehen hat: es fördere ebensosehr eine Spielart des 
„Individualismus“ wie eine Haltung des „Kosmopolitismus“. - Starke 
Arbeitsteilung und Spezialisierung der Leistungen auf dem Angebotsmarkt, die 
einerseits eine ganzheitliche Entfaltung der Persönlichkeitsanlagen behindern, 
lassen andererseits Freiraum für eine „Ausbildung persönlicher Sonderart“ bis hin 
zu „Extra-vaganzen des Apartseins“ als Formen des „Sich-Heraushebens“ aus der 
Menge der Anderen, wie sie im beengenden Sozialgefüge von Dorf und Kleinstadt 
nicht möglich wären (BuT, S. 235 ff.). Dazu trägt auch die - dort unbekannte - 
Einstellung der „Reserviertheit“ bei, die im Umgang der vielen, einander 
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 Z.B. bei A. Gehlen 1961, S. 50, 63, 71 
140
 W. F. Ogburn 1922  
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unbekannten „atomisierten“ Großstadtindividuen dominiert (BuT, S. 233 ff.). - 
Zugleich fördert die Erweiterung des Gesichtskreises durch dichte wirtschaftliche 
und kulturelle Beziehungen, die über regionale und nationale Grenzen ausgreifen, 
in den Metropolen eine „kosmopolitische“ Haltung, in der die vielen 
individualisierten Einzelnen zumindest partiell übereinstimmen (BuT, S. 237 f.). 
 
Am Beispiel der skizzierten Gedanken Simmels lassen sich Möglichkeiten und 
Grenzen seiner lebensphilosophischen Technikdeutung ablesen. Der Grundansatz 
eines „Konflikts“ zwischen „strömendem“ Leben und stabilen Kulturformen, 
näher: zwischen einer Anlage zur kontinuierlichen seelischen Entwicklung in den 
Individuen und einer Beharrlichkeit, bzw. „Eigenlogik“ der „Sachen“, führt 
zweifellos eine Strecke weit zu fruchtbaren Analysegesichtspunkten. Anhand 
dieses Leitfadens hat Simmel sowohl Strukturmerkmale als auch problematische 
Erscheinungen und Auswirkungen der modernen Technikentwicklung entdeckt, die 
im Banne des Glaubens an einen unaufhaltsamen Kulturfortschritt zuvor wenig 
beachtet, zumindest nicht so konkret beschrieben worden waren: - den „Umweg“-
Charakter technischer Verfahren und Instrumentarien als Grundlage ihrer 
Effizienz
141
 ; - den Funktionswechsel zwischen Mitteln und  Zwecken; - die 
Zunahme von ‘Sachzwängen’ mit der Vergrößerung und Vernetzung technischer 
Systeme; - die Vervielfachung differenzierter Techniken und eines entsprechenden 
Spezialistentums in den Metropolen ; - die (grundsätzlich schon von Hegel und 
Marx erkannte, von Simmel aber konkreter beschriebene) inflatorische Erzeugung 
neuer Bedürfnisse; - die Steigerung des Lebens- und Wahrnehmungstempos, die 
Reiz- und Informationsüberflutung, überhaupt das Zurückbleiben der Seelenkultur 
hinter der Sachkultur („cultural lag“), die gleichzeitige Stärkung von 
Individualismus und Kosmopolitismus im metropolitanen Lebensstil.  
 
Grenzen von Simmels Sicht werden erkennbar in seiner Verabsolutierung des 
Grundwiderstreits Leben - Form und der von ihm abgeleiteten Konflikte. Die 
Vorstellung, „das Leben“ sei gleichsam genuin formarm und erhalte seine 
Formungen vor allem durch ‘äußere’ Kräfte, ist so nicht haltbar. Daß Leben auf 
allen seinen Stufen aus sich selbst formenbildend und -auflösend ist, wurde von 
ihm unterschätzt, die Unausweichlichkeit („Tragödie“) und Determinationskraft 
der kulturellen „Sachlogiken“ („dämonische Vergewaltigung“ der Menschen)142 
überschätzt. Er sah nicht genügend, daß in all diese „Sachlogiken“ menschliche 
Bewertungen und Entscheidungen eingehen, die grundsätzlich geändert werden 
können.143 In der Analyse der Mittel-Zweck-Reihen konnte er sich nicht zu der 
(bereits von Hegel wahrgenommenen und später in der Systemtheorie 
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 Die „Umweg“-These wurde später von H. Sachsse 1978 aufgegriffen. 
142
 So die Formulierung in G. Simmel 1918, S. 94. Eine ähnliche Überschätzung noch bei H. 
Schelsky 1961 im Gedanken eines „technologischen Determinismus“. 
143
 Vgl. F. Rapp 1990, S. 179 ff. 
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aufgegriffenen)
144
 Einsicht durchringen, diese Unterscheidung sei überhaupt relativ 
und die Einstufung von etwas als „Mittel“ oder als „Zweck“ abhängig von der je 
eingenommenen Beurteilungsperspektive zu einer Hierarchie von Unter- und 
Oberzielen. Er hielt am Gedanken absoluter „Endzwecke“ und ‘wahrer’ 
Bedürfnisse der Menschen fest und berücksichtigte  zu wenig, daß unter 
generationenlang etablierten hochkulturellen Lebensumständen eine konkrete 
Unterscheidung, was sinnvolle und was „sinnlose“ Bedürfnisse sind, kaum noch 
möglich ist. Ein solcher Unterscheidungsversuch würde schon heute ganz anders 
ausfallen, als zu Simmels Lebzeiten. Trotz seiner treffenden Einsicht in die 
Förderung eines „Kosmopolitismus“ durch die Großstadtkultur hat Simmel noch 
nicht wahrgenommen, daß die moderne Technik selbst geeignet sei, zu einem 
bedeutenden Faktor kultureller Universalisierung zu werden. Und die ökologische 
Problematik, die sich als Folge der Hochtechnisierung mit Umweltbelastung und 
Ressourcenknappheit schon zu seiner Zeit abzeichnete (siehe Ludwig Klages), hat 
Simmel, obwohl er ein feines Sensorium für die geistige und künstlerische 
Erfassung von „Landschaften“ besaß,145 ebenfalls nicht in sein Denken zur Krisis 
der Kultur einbezogen. Doch hat er mit seinen auf Technik bezogenen Einsichten 
späteren technikphilosophischen und technikkritischen Ansätzen zentrale 
Gedanken geliefert. 
 
Max Scheler (1874-1928), ein Schüler des idealistischen Lebensphilosophen 
Rudolf Eucken, schloß sich nach der Jahrhundertwende dem frühen 
phänomenologischen Ansatz Edmund Husserls an, der die Philosophie aus 
erkenntnistheoretisch verengten Fragestellungen zu einer methodischen 
Wesenserfassung der „Sachen selbst“ öffnen wollte. Sein wandlungsreiches Werk, 
das bei seinen lebensphilosophischen Grundlagen nicht stehenblieb, machte 
Scheler als geistig beweglichsten und spekulativ ausgreifendsten Vertreter der 
phänomenologischen Schule auch einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit bekannt. Vor allem 
die anthropologischen und wissenssoziologischen Schriften seiner Spätphase 
enthalten Komponenten einer eigenständigen kulturellen Ortsbestimmung der 
Technik und der positiven Wissenschaften. Am vollständigsten finden sich diese 
Komponenten in der Abhandlung „Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens“ 
(1924)
146, die den grundlegenden Teil seines Buchs „Die Wissensformen und die 
Gesellschaft“ (1926) bildet. Schelers kompakte, materialreiche, aber wenig 
systematische Ausführungen speziell zur Technik werden im Folgenden in fünf 
thesenhaften Abschnitten zusammengefaßt. 
 
Scheler geht von dem - aus seiner Geist-Drang-Metaphysik hergeleiteten - 
„Grundgesetz“ aus, daß stets „geistig-ideenhafte und triebhaft-reale 
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 Z.B. bei G. Ropohl 1979, S. 115 ff. 
145
 Siehe z.B. seinen Essay „Philosophie der Landschaft“ (1913) in BuT, S. 141 ff. 
146
 Hier zitiert (als PSW) nach der Ausgabe in den Gesammelten Werken, Bd. 8: M. Scheler 1960 
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Determinationsfaktoren“, kurz „Idealfaktoren“ und „Realfaktoren“, in einem 
jeweils epochenspezifischen „Zusammenspiel“ das geschichtlich-gesellschaftliche 
Leben der Menschen bestimmen (PSW, S. 11). Damit setzt er sich vom 
marxistischen Historischen Materialismus (Dominanz der Realfaktoren) ebenso ab, 
wie vom Hegelschen historischen Idealismus (Dominanz der Idealfaktoren). 
Allerdings nimmt Scheler an, daß der „Geist“, Inbegriff der Idealfaktoren, keinerlei 
eigene Realisationskraft hat. Vom Geist her wird nur das mögliche Sosein von 
Kultur-Inhalten (Religion, Metaphysik, Wissenschaft, Kunst, Recht, Technik, usw.) 
entworfen, nicht aber deren wirkliches Dasein gesetzt. Erst „wo sich ‘Ideen’ [...] 
mit Interessen, Trieben [...] oder ‘Tendenzen’ vereinen, gewinnen sie indirekt 
Macht“. Sie werden durch vorbildhafte „freie Taten“ einer „kleinen Zahl“ von 
Pionieren verwirklicht und über die Nachahmung durch eine „große Zahl“ 
verbreitet (S. 21).  
 
Realfaktoren sind für Scheler Motivationskräfte, die ursprünglich aus drei 
menschlichen Haupttrieben (Nahrungs-, Geschlechts- und Machttrieb) gespeist 
werden. Die Befriedigung und Kanalisierung dieser Triebe wird kulturell 
ausgestaltet in den sich differenzierenden Systemen der Wirtschaft, der 
Fortpflanzungs-/Abstammungsinstitutionen und der Herrschaft. Ihnen sei eine 
letztlich „sinnblinde“ Entwicklungskausalität eigen, gegenüber der dem Geist nur 
eine „hemmende oder enthemmende“, „verzögernde“ oder „beschleunigende“ 
Funktion zukomme (S. 22 f.). Dabei gebe es in „relativ geschlossenen 
Kulturprozessen“ eine typische Folgeordnung in der Dominanz der Realfaktoren: 
Auf (a) eine Periode dominanter Abstammungsverhältnisse in archaischen 
Kulturen auf der Basis von Geschlechterverbänden folgt (b) eine Periode der 
Dominanz politischer Herrschaftsverhältnisse, vorwiegend in Hochkulturen mit 
Staatsinstitutionen, und (c) eine Periode dominanter Wirtschaftsverhältnisse, die im 
Abendland mit dem Beginn des Hochkapitalismus einsetze (eine Periode, die von 
Karl Marx „fälschlich auf die ganze Universalgeschichte verallgemeinert“ worden 
sei) (S. 44 ff.).  
 
Bezüglich der Idealfaktoren nimmt Scheler einen geschichtlichen Prozeß der 
Ausdifferenzierung relativ eigenständiger Sektoren an: Am Anfang stehen 
gruppenspezifische „relativ natürliche Weltanschauungen“, die auf „mythischem 
Denken und Schauen“ beruhen und mit einer „magischen Technik“ zur 
Beherrschung von Naturmächten verbunden sind (S. 60 ff., 133 ff.). - Aus ihnen 
bilden sich parallel drei Typen „relativ künstlicher“ Weltsichten heraus, denen drei 
Techniktypen entsprechen: (a) ein „Heils- oder Erlösungswissen“  (in Religionen 
und mystischen Strömungen), verbunden mit religiös-kultischen Ausdrucks-, 
Darstellungs- und Selbstbeherrschungstechniken, (b) ein „Bildungswissen“ (in 
Metaphysiken und Wesenslehren), verbunden mit verschiedenen künstlerischen 
Techniken, und (c) ein „Leistungs- oder Herrschaftswissen“ in den positiven 
Wissenschaften und der Mathematik, verbunden mit der 
Naturbeherrschungstechnik durch Werkzeuge, Maschinen usw., auf die der 
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Technikbegriff oft eingeschränkt wird (S. 29 f.). Zu jedem dieser Wissens- und 
Techniktypen gehören bestimmte soziale Kooperationsformen, Fachsprachen, 
Terminologien und Gruppenideologien (von Klassen, Berufen usw.). - Scheler 
sieht die Entwicklung der „relativ künstlichen“ Weltsichten als einen Prozeß 
paralleler Ausdifferenzierung von Wissens- und Technikformen an, nicht aber als 
einen linearen Fortschritt von einer Funktion zur anderen, etwa im Sinne des 
Dreistadiengesetzes von Auguste Comte, das eine Folgeordnung von theologischer, 
metaphysischer und positiv-wissenchaftlicher Weltsicht derart annahm, daß mit 
Erreichen des jeweils ‘höheren’ Stadiums die ‘niederen’ Stadien als abgetan galten 
(S. 10). 
 
Von diesem gedanklichen Rahmen aus, gelangt Scheler zu spezielleren 
technikphilosophischen Aussagen. 
 
1. Zur Trieb- und Motivationsbasis der Technik 
 
“Ursprünglich zweckfreie Konstruktions-, Spiel-, Bastel- und Experimentiertriebe“ 
sind die Wurzel ‘aller Arten von Technik’ wie auch „aller positiven 
Wissenschaften“ (S. 66). Diese Antriebe lassen sich zurückverfolgen bis auf das 
Lernverhalten gemäß Versuch und Irrtumskorrektur bei höheren Wirbeltieren, das 
instinktive Verhaltensregulierungen überformt und damit eine erste Form 
„praktisch-technischer Intelligenz“ bildet. Inhaltlich äußern sich diese Antriebe in 
einer erhöhten Aufmerksamkeit auf „Konstantes und Regelmäßiges“, auf 
„sinneinheitliche“, z.B. symmetrische, Gestalten in Raum und Zeit. Diese 
Selektionsform bewährt sich in der Fähigkeit, Ereignisse vorherzusehen und 
vorauszuberechnen. Indem sich das Berechenbare als das Kontrollier- und 
Beherrschbare erweist, verbindet sich mit jenen Antrieben schon früh ein Macht- 
und Beherrschungsmotiv im Verhalten zu den Umweltgegebenheiten (S. 67 f.): 
„Wissen ist Macht“ (Francis Bacon). 
 
2. Zur Beziehung von neuzeitlicher Technik und positiver Wissenschaft 
 
Die neuzeitliche Technik ist nicht „nachträgliche ‘Anwendung’ einer rein 
theoretisch-kontemplativen Wissenschaft“, sondern „Produktionstechnik“ und 
„positive Wissenschaft“, sie sind beide fundiert durch die gleiche Triebbasis sowie 
durch ein entsprechendes Wertethos, wie es in Europa mit dem „aufstrebenden 
Stadtbürgertum“ zur Ausprägung gelangte. Diese Einstellung ist teils direkt auf  
„systematische Naturbeherrschung“ gerichtet, teils auf Erwerb eines Wissens, 
mittels dessen naturhafte und seelische Prozesse prinzipiell als „beherrschbar und 
darum lenkbar gedacht werden können“ (S. 112). Sie ersetzt die „auf ein 
teleologisches Formenreich“ von Qualitäten zielende „Begriffspyramide“ der 
Scholastik durch ein „Suchen nach quantitativ bestimmten gesetzlichen Relationen 
der Erscheinungen“: Naturgesetzen (S. 130). - Scheler unterscheidet  ausdrücklich 
diese „hinter dem Rücken des Bewußtseins“ der Wissenschaftler sich auswirkende 
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Wertungs- und Denkstruktur des bürgerlichen Menschentyps von den vielfältig 
wechselnden „Motivationen und subjektiven Absichten“ der forschenden 
Individuen (S. 93, 113). 
 
3. Zum Verhältnis von moderner Technik und Wirtschaft 
 
Nicht die Bedürfnisse und Produktionsverhältnisse determinieren einseitig den 
Fortgang von Technik und positiver Wissenschaft (wie die ökonomische 
Geschichtsauffassung annahm), sondern die mit dem „Zeitalter der Erfindungen 
und Entdeckungen“ aufbrechende technologisch-wissenschaftliche Denkhaltung 
entdeckt zugleich mit Naturgesetzlichkeiten auch mögliche technische Aufgaben 
und Lösungen. Dadurch werden neue wirtschaftliche Bedürfnisse erst geweckt und 
industrielle Produktionsverfahren angeregt. Kapitalistische Wirtschaft und positive 
Wissenschaft/Technik weisen aber eine analoge Dynamik auf: dem „Willen zu 
grenzenlosem Erwerben“ in der Wirtschaft entspricht ein „Wille zu ‘Methoden’“, 
d.h. zum unbegrenzten methodischen Hervorbringen von Erkenntnissen, in den 
Wissenschaften. Beide produzieren ihre Waren, bzw. Wissensgüter grundsätzlich 
unbeschränkt „auf Vorrat“, und ein gleicher „Konkurrenzgeist“ wie zwischen 
Unternehmern herrscht auch zwischen Wissenschaftlern, bzw. zwischen 
Technikern, wofür z.B. ihr „Forschungsehrgeiz“ und   ihr Bestehen auf „geistigem 
Eigentum“ charakteristisch sind (S. 127 ff.). 
 
4. „Äußere“ und „innere“ Technik 
  
Die abendländische Kultur der Neuzeit hat eine vorwiegend auf Beherrschung der 
„äußeren“ Natur gerichtete positive Wissenschaft und Technik hochentwickelt, im 
Vergleich zu der die Ausbildung einer „Seelentechnik“ (trotz Ausnahmen wie bei 
Ignatius von Loyola) zurückblieb. - Die asiatischen Kulturen haben demgegenüber 
auf dem Boden einer vorwiegend das Heils- und Bildungswissen pflegenden 
Einstellung ein großes Spektrum von Seelen- und Vitaltechniken zur Beherrschung 
der „inneren“ Natur entwickelt, während die Entfaltung der „äußeren“ Techniken 
zurückblieb. Das hier zugrundeliegende Prinzip der Selbstbeherrschung dient teils 
der Ausschaltung des Realitätsmoments der Gegenstände mit dem Ziel, eine „reine 
Contemplatio“ zu erreichen, teils der Erlangung einer Haltung der 
Leidüberwindung durch „innere Unterbindung des ‘Leidens an’ den Übeln“ (wie 
im Buddhismus). - Beide Typen von Technik schließen sich nicht aus, sondern 
ergänzen einander (S. 95 ff., 135 ff.). 
 
 
 
5. Ausblick auf ein „Weltalter des Ausgleichs“ 
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In dem Aufsatz „Der Mensch im Weltalter des Ausgleichs“ (1927)147 hat Scheler 
eine mit diesem Stichwort benannte programmatische Zukunftsperspektive für 
wichtige Kulturbereiche skizziert. Scheler hält nach der Katastrophe des Ersten 
Weltkriegs die Förderung eines „Ausgleichs“ zwischen Antagonismen und 
Partikularismen, die die Menschheit in ihrer bisherigen Geschichte immer wieder 
entzweit haben, für eine drängende politische und kulturelle Aufgabe. Dieser 
Ausgleich, der keine Einebnung aller menschheitlichen Unterschiede bedeuten, 
sondern eine Steigerung der (individuellen und kollektiven) „geistigen“ 
Differenzen gestatten soll, ist einerseits ein „Ideal“, das sich nur durch „freie 
Selbstgestaltung“, aber nicht automatisch verwirklichen kann. Andererseits liest 
Scheler Indizien dafür, daß die Entwicklung zu einer solchen „universalisierenden 
Kräfteentspannung“ schon begonnen habe, an vielen Symptomen seiner Gegenwart 
ab. Sie bedürfe allerdings einer geistig-willentlichen Lenkung, damit die großen, 
mit ihr verbundenen Anforderungen sich zum „Heile der Menschheit“ und „mit 
einem Minimum von Zerstörung, Explosion, Blut und Tränen“ vollziehen (MWA, 
S. 150 ff.). - Im einzelnen behandelt Scheler als „langsam“ sich vollziehende 
Ausgleichsprozesse unter anderem: den Ausgleich der naturalen 
Rassenunterschiede durch Mischung in Richtung auf „eine Menschheit“, - der 
Mentalitätsunterschiede zwischen den großen Kulturenkreisen (bei Erhaltung ihrer 
geistigen „Sinn- und Wertgehalte“), - der Klassengegensätze zwischen „Ober- und 
Unterklassen“ in Bezug auf körperliche und geistige Arbeit, auf soziale Lage und 
‘typische’ Denkweisen (Ideologien), - der Wirtschaftsformen von Kapitalismus und 
Sozialismus, - der Beiträge der einzelnen Nationen zur menschlichen 
Gesamtkultur, - der nationalen Abgrenzungen im Wirtschaftsleben (bei einem 
„Rückzug“ des souveränen Nationalstaats überhaupt), - von einseitigen (z.B. 
intellektualistischen und vitalistischen) Menschenbildern, - von ‘typisch’ 
männlicher und weiblicher Seelenhaltung, - von ‘typischen’ Orientierungen der 
Jugend und des Alters. - Alle diese Bewegungen setzen als Grundlage den 
internationalen „zivilisatorisch-technischen“ Ausgleich“  (in „positiver 
Wissenschaft, Technik, Staats- und Verwaltungsformen, Rechtsregeln“ usw.) 
voraus, der dank des „Welthandels“ weit rascher vor sich geht und die langsameren 
Prozesse mit seinem kumulativen Fortschritt fördert (MWA, S. 152 ff.).   
 
Zu der anvisierten Synthese zwischen den Kulturen Europas und Asiens (Indien, 
China, Japan, mit dem Mittelglied der islamischen Welt) gehört für Scheler auch 
die gleichgewichtige Ausbildung von „äußerer“ und „innerer“ Technik und der 
mit ihnen verbundenen „Ideen vom Menschen“ in Ost und West (MWA, S. 159 
ff.).  Das bisherige Ungleichgewicht zwischen diesen Orientierungen in beiden 
Kulturkreisen stelle die Menschheit vor die Aufgabe einer „Neuverteilung der 
Wissenskultur und der technischen Kultur“. Denn „der abendländische, äußere 
Naturtechnizismus und sein Wissenskorrelat [...] drohen den Menschen in einem 
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256 
 
 
Maße in den Mechanismus eben der Sachen, die es zu beherrschen gilt, 
hineinzuverwickeln, daß dieser Prozeß ohne das Gegengewicht [...] 
entgegengesetzt gerichteter Wissens- und Machtprinzipien [...] nur im sicheren 
Untergang der abendländischen Welt enden kann. Wir müssen [...] die beiden 
großen Prinzipien aller ‘möglichen’ Technik überhaupt und der ihnen korrelaten 
Wissensformen gleichzeitig und je abwechselnd in systematische Tätigkeit setzen, 
um eine sinnvolle Balance des Menschentums wiederzuerreichen“  (PSW,  S. 140).  
 
Schelers kulturphilosophische Ortsbestimmung des Technik gehört zu den 
perspektivenreichsten seiner Zeit. Als einer der ersten hat er die ethnologisch 
erforschten magisch-rituellen Komponenten archaischer Technik in Beziehung zur 
Entwicklung der profanen Werkzeug- und Maschinentechnik gesetzt. Seine 
Zurückführung dieser profanen Technik auf einen ursprünglich zweckfreien, erst 
sekundär sich als zweckmäßig erweisenden Basteltrieb nimmt einleuchtende 
Hypothesen von Arnold Gehlen und Claude Lévi-Strauss vorweg. Sein Gedanke einer 
parallelen Ausdifferenzierung von Wissens- und Technikformen kommt dem 
tatsächlichen Kulturprozeß wohl näher als einsinnige Fortschrittsschemata. Nachhaltig 
gewirkt hat ferner seine These, daß der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft, unabhängig 
von der mit ihr sich verbindenden Technik, eine Denk- und Werthaltung 
zugrundeliege, die sie zum Beherrschungswissen prädestiniert (Varianten finden sich 
u.a. beim späten Husserl, bei Heidegger und bei Habermas). Auch die Annahme einer 
Parallelität von kapitalistischer Wirtschaftsdynamik und moderner 
Technikentwicklung scheint fruchtbarer als die Behauptung einer einseitigen 
Abhängigkeit der einen von der anderen. Und sein - angesichts der immer noch 
kriegerisch explodierenden Regionalegoismen - vernünftiges Zukunftsleitbild einer 
ausgleichenden Synthese von spaltenden soziokulturellen Tendenzen in der 
Menschheit bleibt auch heute eine zentrale, längst nicht bewältigte Aufgabe. 
 
Fragwürdig erscheint bei Scheler - neben voreilig unterstellten geschichtlichen 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten - die Art, wie er seinen Drang-Geist-Dualismus auf empirische 
Befunde anwendet. So lassen sich in Kulturprozessen „Realfaktoren“ und 
„Idealfaktoren“ kaum so scharf voneinander trennen, wie er es annimmt; und die 
naturalistische Entwicklungslogik der menschlichen Grundtriebe hat, als Motor der 
zunehmend komplexer werdenden zivilisatorischen Prozesse verstanden, wenig 
Erklärungskraft. Zudem mangelt es dem Anthropozentriker Scheler an Sinn für die 
ökologischen Auswirkungen der technischen Kultur. Doch hat er das Verdienst, 
relativ früh den Blick für weiträumige Verflechtungen der Technik mit anderen 
Dimensionen des Kulturprozesses geschärft und ihr eine wichtige Rolle in seiner 
realistischen Zukunftsvision zuerkannt zu haben. 
 
Die oben in einigen Beispielen vorgestellten lebensphilosophischen 
Ortsbestimmungen der Technik zeichnen sich durch eine erstaunliche Bandbreite 
der Gesichtspunkte aus. Der Blickwinkel, unter dem hier die Technik 
wahrgenommen wird, ist deutlich weiter als im Rahmen der (zu Beginn erwähnten) 
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anderen metaphysischen Orientierungen. Die „großen Erzählungen“, die unter 
deren Leitung entworfen wurden, sind durch ihre Einseitigkeit von beschränktem 
Aufschlußwert: so die Erzählung vom unbegrenzten und unaufhaltsamen 
Fortschritt der technischen Naturbeherrschung (im materialistisch-utilitaristischen 
Naturalismus), so die Erzählung von einer durch vorgegebene ewige Ideen im Maß 
gehaltenen technischen Erfindungskraft (im objektiven Idealismus), so die 
Erzählung von der Geschichte der Klassenkämpfe, die in eine auf Hoch-technik 
beruhende klassenlose Endgesellschaft einmünden soll, oder die Erzählung vom 
Naturwesen Mensch, das seine „Mängel“ durch technische Organergänzungen zur 
„Entlastung“ im Überlebenskampf kompensiert (im humanistischen Naturalismus). 
 
Demgegenüber gestattet es der biozentrische Blickwinkel, die Technik als  ein 
schon vormenschlich angelegtes und in der menschlichen Kultur sich allmählich 
verselbständigendes Instrumentarium des Lebens in ihrer Ambivalenz zu sehen: als 
ein Instrumentarium von Verfahren und Artefakten, das daran zu messen ist, 
inwieweit es nicht nur dem menschlichen, sondern dem Leben überhaupt förderlich 
ist. Im Blick auf den umfassenden Zusammenhang der Biosphäre konnten 
Lebensphilosophen erkennen, daß für den technisch-zivilisatorischen Fortschritt 
ein Preis im außertechnischen Leben zu zahlen ist. Daher ist bei den 
Lebensphilosophen kein planer Fortschrittsglaube zu finden, daher stehen sie dem 
technizistisch gedachten „Projekt der Moderne“ kritisch bis skeptisch gegenüber. 
Allerdings in abgestuftem Maße: von der strikt konservativen, technikfeindlichen 
Einstellung eines Ludwig Klages über die ambivalenten Positionen von Simmel 
und Ziegler, über das Postulat eines religiösen Einstellungswandels bei Bergson 
und Berdjajew bis zu Schelers politisch-kultureller Aufgabenstellung, ein Weltalter 
des Ausgleichs herbeizuführen, das auf eine hochentwickelte äußere und innere 
Technik gegründet sein soll. 
 
Unterschiede zeigen sich in der Einschätzung der Rolle des Christentums für die 
Lenkung der technischen Entwicklung und die Bewältigung ihrer Auswirkungen in 
Natur und Kultur. Das Spektrum reicht von der völligen Verurteilung der 
(angeblich) christlichen Haltung zur Natur bei Klages bis zu einer christlichen 
Mystik der Tat als Pendant zur notwendigen Hochtechnik bei Bergson, sowie zu 
einer innerweltlichen christlichen Eschatologie, die auf einer geistig-religiösen 
Beherrschung der Technik basiert, bei Berdjajew. Aus heutiger Sicht erscheint es 
zweifelhaft, ob das Christentum zum gemeinsamen Nenner einer 
menschheitsweiten, befriedeten und regional ausgewogenen Technokultur zu 
werden vermag. Die verschiedenen religiösen Weltsichten und kirchlichen 
Organisationen wirken in ihrer (bis auf kleine Subzirkel und Sekten) meist ganz 
unmystischen Gegenwartsverfassung eher polarisierend, ja, in Verbindung mit 
politischen Ideologien, mancherorts fördernd für einen kompromißunfähigen 
Fundamentalismus und Fanatismus (wie ihn Bergson und Berdjajew nicht entfernt 
im Sinne hatten).  
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Realistischer erscheint die von Scheler entworfene politisch-kulturelle 
Zukunftsaufgabe eines Ausgleichs von bestimmten entzweienden Haupttendenzen 
der bisherigen Menschheitsgeschichte. Sie bezieht zwar grundsätzlich auch die 
metaphysisch-religiösen Sinnorientierungen in den geforderten Prozeß ein, setzt 
aber nicht alles auf die Karte einer primären religiösen (christlichen) Umkehr. 
Ähnlich wie Simmel - mit seinem Ausblick auf einen von der metropolitanen 
Kultur geförderten „Kosmopolitismus“ -  und auch wie Bergson und Berdjajew mit 
ihren technikbejahenden Visionen hat Scheler geahnt, daß die moderne Technik 
und eine „westlich“ geprägte zivilisatorische Ausstattung kulturelle 
Universalisierungsinstrumente ersten Ranges werden würden. Angesichts dessen, 
daß sich heute die technischen Infrastrukturen der Metropolen aller Erdteile 
frappant angleichen und, bei allen sonstigen kulturellen Diskrepanzen, nur noch im 
Grad der Entwicklung unterscheiden, ist klar: die („westliche“) Hochtechnik ist - 
im Unterschied zur Religion - bereits weithin ein gemeinsamer Nenner für 
sämtliche Kulturen geworden, und die Akzeptanz der meisten ihrer Sektoren ist 
schon heute in aller Welt sehr hoch. Angesichts dieses Maßes an Akzeptanz (die 
absurderweise, zumindest in der männlichen Hälfte der Menschheit, auch einer 
hochgeputschten lebensfeindlichen Waffentechnik gilt) erscheinen alle generellen 
fundamentalistischen Ablehnungen „westlicher“ Kultur inkonsequent oder 
verlogen. Erst sekundär wird die Hochtechnik, wo sie weit ausgebaut ist und 
deutlicher erkennbar wird, daß sie nicht nur Probleme löst, sondern auch erhebliche 
Probleme schafft, durch „grüne“ Bewegungen in ihren natur- und (in der Folge) 
menschengefährdenden Auswirkungen in Frage gestellt.  
 
Die Aufgabe einer Weltkultur des Ausgleichs, getragen von einer Technik, die 
möglichst allen Menschen ein menschenwürdiges Leben erlauben und doch die 
Tragfähigkeit der irdischen Biosphäre nicht überlasten soll - diese gegenwärtig 
drängend aktuelle Doppelzielsetzung haben die Lebensphilosophen in 
unterschiedlicher Deutlichkeit gesehen. So sehr diese Aufgabenstellung fast eine 
Quadratur des Zirkels bedeutet, sie ist doch ein Zukunftsentwurf, zu dessen 
Verwirklichung es sich lohnt, alle Kräfte einzusetzen. In einer Welt des 
Ausgleichs, wie sie Scheler vorschwebte, muß die regionale Vielfalt kultureller 
Lebensstile, die die Erde als Wohnstätte von Menschen, Tieren und Pflanzen so 
abwechslungsreich und farbig macht, nicht verschwinden, sondern kann durchaus 
in vielen Bereichen (in Sitten und Gebräuchen, Ethosformen, Künsten, Architektur, 
Landschaftsgestaltung, religiösen und säkularen Sinnsystemen, usw.) 
weitergepflegt werden.  
 
Man möchte hoffen, daß eine Vision dieser Art die Motivation eines 
veränderungswilligen und zuversichtlichen Teils der Weltjugend anzuspornen 
vermag. Denn die Alternative: die pessimistische Kassandraprognose eines 
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unvermeidlichen „Zusammenpralls der Kulturen“148, die ganz von den 
(gegenwärtig noch starken) retardierenden, partikularistischen Kräften aller 
Kulturkreise ausgeht, kann den Willen, einen Beitrag zur globalen Umorientierung 
zu leisten, nur lähmen. 
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Nico Stehr 
 
Theories of the Information Age 
 
In some way or other, any knowledge, and especially all common knowledge of 
identical objects, determines in many ways the specification (Sosein) of society. 
But all knowledge is ultimately also conversely determined by the society and its 
structure. 
   Max Scheler, [1924] 1990:17 
 
It is virtually impossible to transcend the contest and the conflation of the terms 
information and knowledge in much of the discussion about the information age. 
However, in the context of an examination of some of the important theories of the 
information age, it is unavoidable to take up the contentious question of the 
meaning as well as the relation between knowledge and information. The main 
puzzle at this juncture of the theoretical discourse on the role of knowledge and 
information in social action is whether it is even possible and sensible to 
distinguish between them. The conceptual distinction between information and 
knowledge, is in any case at best relative, appears to be most difficult, if not 
impossible to sustain in the light of the fact that these notions are often employed 
as virtual equivalents.  
 
Many dictionaries simply define the information as a certain kind of knowledge. A 
similar symmetry between information and knowledge is evident if one defines the 
information as “knowledge reduced and converted into messages that can be easily 
communicated among decision agents” (Dasgupta and David, 1994: 493). In other 
definitions of the information and knowledge, the information is simply 
conceptualized as a subspecies, as an element or the raw material of a number of 
knowledge forms. For example, the information is a codified knowledge as well as 
an indirect knowledge (see Borgmann, 1999: 49), or the knowledge is defined as 
the cumulative stock of information (Burton-Jones, 1999: 5); similarly, the 
knowledge in general is seen to extend to “tacit knowledge” (cf. Polanyi, 1967: 
204-206) and other forms of knowledge (Dosi, 1996: 84). In short, the outcome of 
many efforts to define knowledge and information appears always to lead to the 
same result: knowledge and information become indistinguishable.   
 
I plan to present my argument covering theories of the information age in a number 
of steps. First, I will describe some of the intellectual precursors that give rise to 
the notion that we are living in an information or knowledge age. Second, I will 
enumerate some of the perspectives that lead to the idea of modern societies as 
knowledge or information societies. Third, the usage of thee term knowledge as a 
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capacity for action is explicated in greater detail. Forth, in the core sections of the 
chapter, I deal with the theory of the knowledge and the information society as well 
as some of its competitors such as the network society. I will present the argument 
that advanced societies are best conceptualized as knowledge societies, last but not 
least because economic growth, social change generally but also the nature of 
social conflicts are increasingly generated by the knowledge (Stehr, 2001; 2002). 
That is, knowledge does not merely open up the secrets of nature and society but is 
the becoming of a world.  
 
The origins of the information/knowledge age 
 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), in The Spirit of the Age, published in 1831 after his 
return to England from France, where he had encountered and taken in the 
philosophy of history in the political thinking of the St.-Simonians and of the early 
Comte, affirms his conviction that the progress is possible in the society as the 
result of the intellectual accomplishments of his own age. But the progress and the 
improvement of social conditions are not, Mill argues, the outcome of an “increase 
in wisdom” or of the collective accomplishments of the science. They are rather 
linked to the general diffusion of the knowledge throughout the society. 
 
Men may not reason, better, concerning the great questions in which the human 
nature is interested, but they reason more. Large subjects are discussed more, and 
longer, and by more minds. The discussion penetrated deeper into the society; and 
if greater numbers than before attained the higher degrees of intelligence, fewer 
grovel in that state of abject stupidity, which can only co-exist with utter apathy 
and sluggishness (Mill [1831] 1997 : 8). 
 
Mill’s observations in the mid-nineteenth century, a period he regarded as an age of 
profound moral and political transition, and in particular his expectation that such 
beneficial consequences for the society as the increased individual choice for a 
greater number of people (and hence emancipation from “custom“ ) will be the 
result of a broader diffusion of knowledge and education but the scientific 
knowledge, in the narrow sense of the term, does not necessarily resonate with the 
idea of the modern society as a knowledge society.  
 
By the same token, the notion that we have begun to live in an information age 
often refers to the same historical period, yet the notion of the information age 
emphasizes the growing presence of certain technical devices and tools in the 
society, which allow the much more rapid communication of the information and 
knowledge than it was the case in previous periods. Thus, in a recent exhibition 
devoted to the “Information Age” in the Smithsonian National Museum of 
American History, it is argued that the modern information age began with Samuel 
Morse's invention of the telegraph transmitter and receiver in 1837. It was the first 
265 
 
 
instrument to transform the information into an electrical form and to transmit it 
reliably over long distances (see also Darnton, 2000). 
 
The promise of more knowledge and information cannot really be separated either 
from its counter image, for example from the fears and the darkness associated 
with a lack of knowledge or, from the allegedly mistaken or false use of knowledge 
even when it is available in abundance. The general point here is that much is 
gained from an analytical point of view that confronts a particular perspective with 
its opposite, its negation or competitor. Such a conscious confrontation also serves 
as useful reminder, that the knowledge tends to be contestable and is developped in 
response to contenders, that after a time may only be implicitly accessible, 
especially as a certain form of knowledge acquires authority and power. The 
mixture of fears and warnings with blessings and compliments exhibits a trait of 
virtually all forms of knowledge, namely its controversial nature and the fact that it 
was, and is, developped in opposition to other forms of knowing. The exclusion of 
other means and purposes is inevitable. In the case of the knowledge, the 
contestable context is provided, on the one hand, by arguments that question or 
promote the knowledge per se and, on the other hand, by opinions that at times 
differ sharply on the uses to which the knowledge ought to be put. In the 
contemporary society, doubts about the social consequences of the knowledge that 
are bound to give rise to a new field of political activity, namely the knowledge 
politics concerning the regulation and control of the new knowledge and technical 
artifacts (Stehr, 2004).  
 
Knowledge society predecessors 
 
In retrospect, some ancient societies may be described as knowledge societies. 
Ancient Israel, for example, was founded upon its law-like Torah-knowledge. And 
in the ancient Egypt, religious, astronomical and agrarian knowledge served as the 
organizing principle and the basis of authority. More recently, Marxist theories of 
society have assigned decisive importance to the (cultural) forces or means of 
production for societal development since “man’s understanding of nature and his 
mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body ... appears as the great 
foundation-stone of production and wealth’, so that the general knowledge 
becomes a direct force of production” (Marx, [1939-1941] 1973 : 705). Max 
Weber’s seminal inquiry into the unique features of the Western civilization 
stresses the pervasive use of reason to secure the methodical efficiency of the social 
action. The source of the rational action and, therefore of the rationalization, is 
located in particular intellectual devices.  
 
The theory of the industrial society, as developped by Raymond Aron ([1962] 
1967), which encompasses both socialist and capitalist forms of economic 
organization as a single social reality of industrial civilization, accentuates first and 
foremost the extent to which the science and the technology shape the social 
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organization of productive activities. Even more recent theories of the post-
industrial society, in particular those of Daniel Bell, have elevated the theoretical 
knowledge to an axial principle of the society. That the “rational knowledge”, 
fabricated in one system, apparently travels with great ease and without loss across 
the boundaries of the social systems, for instance, from the science into the 
economy or the state institutions, is hardly ever questioned. 
 
The first to employ a related term, “knowledgeable society", appears to have been 
Robert E. Lane (1966:650). Lane's conception of a knowledgeable society, 
however, is closely tied to a particular theory of science and it reflects the 
excessive optimism of the 1950s and the early 1960's that the (social) science will 
help to bring about a society, in which the common sense has been replaced in 
major social institutions by the scientific reasoning. Lane argues that the members 
of such a knowledgeable society will be guided in their conduct, if not always 
consciously, by the standards of a "veridical truth".  
 
In the late 1960s, Peter Drucker, in The Age of Discontinuity (1969), refers to the 
“knowledge society”. Drucker regards the knowledge as central to the modern 
society and as the foundation of its economy and of the social action. Daniel Bell 
also uses this term in the context of his discussion of the emergence of the post-
industrial society, a designation he himself prefers. Bell at times uses the 
knowledge society interchangeably with the "post-industrial society", since he 
regards the knowledge as a “fundamental resource" of the post-industrial society. 
 
The theory of the post-industrial society recognizes a particular central principle, 
viewed as a kind of dominant logic, which allows the observer to impose a specific 
conceptual order on vast societal developments of the (Western) modern society. 
Bell describes his theory as concerned primarily with changes in the social 
framework of the "society", that is, its social structure that analytically along with 
the politics and the culture comprises the society. The social structure of a society 
refers, more specifically, to its "economy, technology and the occupational system" 
(Bell, 1973 : 12) and the structure of the social roles. The kind of changes in the 
social structure, which Bell attempts to chart primarily, are those induced by the 
"axial principle" of his theory of the society, namely "the centrality of the 
theoretical knowledge” (Bell, 1973 : 14). The theoretical knowledge has a dual 
function. It is both source of innovation and a foundation for the politics formation 
in the society. For Bell, the axial principle is likened to a "director of social 
change" in and for the post-industrial society. The post-industrial society is no 
longer organized around the co-ordination of individuals and machines for the 
production of commodities, but around the knowledge. It is a game between 
persons. The post-industrial society witnesses a shift from the production of 
commodities to the tertiary or service sector and a corresponding decline in the pre-
eminence of the occupations of the manufacturing sector of society. One important 
contrast, therefore, is that a desirable standard of life in the post-industrial society 
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is no longer defined by the quantity of goods but by the quality of life as reflected 
in the ready access to services and amenities such as health, education, leisure, and 
the arts (cf. Bell, 1973 : 166). The kind of work, that the  individuals increasingly 
perform, requires the theoretical knowledge. The chief  "resource of the post-
industrial society is its scientific personnel" (Bell, 1973:221). 
 
The knowledge referred virtually to all theories of the modern society, that elevate 
the knowledge to prominence, and the groups of individuals, that are seen as 
acquiring influence and control by means of this knowledge, tend to be 
conceptualized narrowly. This does not mean, however, that such a concept lacks 
cultural centrality and public or political influence. On the contrary, the narrower 
notion of knowledge and the often accompanying stress on the role of the technical 
innovation, that attributes enormous efficacy to the scientific and technical 
knowledge, resonates strongly with the dominant public as well as political 
conception of the knowledge, the information and its role in the society. The 
narrow definition of the knowledge is also testimonial to the success of the 
scientific community in installing a particular conception of the knowledge as the 
dominant public concept of knowledge. Whatever the limitations of this 
“scientistic” conception of the knowledge, its centrality clearly reflects the 
diminishing social role of non-scientific conceptions of knowing and forms of 
knowledge. 
 
A lot in the same way, a systematic sociological reflection about the nature of the 
"theoretical knowledge" (and its interrelation to the technology) is virtually absent 
from Bell's The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. The concept of knowledge 
found in Bell’s work is formulated in deference to a philosophy of the science 
dominant a few decades ago that describes the knowledge as objective, truthful and 
in conformity with the reality. The knowledge is treated as a black box. 
Paradoxically, there is the tendency to overestimate the efficacy of the "objective" 
technical-scientific or formal knowledge. We are not offered a sociological 
perspective of the knowledge process. The central question about the knowledge, 
posed by the theory of the post-industrial society is a functionalist one: what are the 
consequences of the objective knowledge for both the society and the individual, 
and how can these results of the knowledge be apprehended? The lack of sufficient 
detail and scope in explicating the social role of the knowledge results in a deficit 
of accounts for the reasons of the growing demand for more and more knowledge 
in modern societies, for the ways in which the knowledge travels, for the rapidly 
expanding groups of individuals in the society which, in some way or another, live 
off the knowledge, for the many forms of knowledge considered pragmatically 
useful and the various effects the knowledge may have on the social relations. 
Since the constitutive mechanism of the “knowledge” is defined in a restrictive 
objectivist manner, the social, political and economic consequences, to which these 
theories allude tend to be confined to rather straightforward effects that include the 
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hope for (or the fear of) highly rationalized forms of social action. A more adequate 
understanding of knowledge requires that one opens the black box.  
 
I therefore would like to introduce in greater detail a contrasting concept of 
knowledge that will be employed in explicating the idea of the modern society as a 
knowledge society. 
 
Knowledge about knowledge 
 
I would like to define the knowledge as a capacity for action. The term 
“knowledge” is derived from Francis Bacon’s (1581-1626) famous observation that 
knowledge is power (a somewhat misleading translation of Bacon’s Latin phrase : 
scientia est potentia). Bacon suggests that the knowledge derives its utility from its 
capacity to set something in motion. Knowledge as a symbolic “system” structures 
reality. Knowledge is a model for reality. Knowledge illuminates and is able to 
transform the reality. The term potentia, that is, capacity, is employed to describe 
the power of knowing. Knowledge is becoming. Knowledge acquires its social 
distinction last but not least because of its ability to transform the reality. 
 
The knowledge, as a generalized capacity for action, acquires an active role in the 
course of the social action only under circumstances, where such an action does not 
follow purely stereotypical patterns, or is strictly regulated in some other fashion. 
The knowledge assumes a practical significance under conditions, where the social 
action is, for whatever reasons, based on a certain degree of freedom in the courses 
of action that can be chosen. Karl Mannheim ([1929] 1936 :102) defines, much in 
the same sense, the range of the social conduct generally, and therefore contexts in 
which the knowledge plays a role, as restricted to spheres of the social life, that 
have not been routinized and regulated completely. For, as he observes, “conduct, 
in the sense in which I use it, does not begin until we reach the area where the 
rationalization has not yet penetrated, and where we are forced to make decisions 
in situations, which have as yet not been subjected to regulation.” The knowledge 
is no reliable “commodity.” It tends to be fragile and demanding, and has built-in 
insecurities and uncertainties. Despite its reputation, the knowledge is virtually 
never uncontested. The science is in many instances incapable of offering a 
cognitive certainty. This is to say that the scientific discourse has been 
depragmatized, that it cannot offer definitive, or even true, statements (in the sense 
of proven causal chains) for practical purposes, but only more or less plausible and 
often contested assumptions, scenarios, and probabilities. Instead of being the 
source of a reliable trustworthy knowledge, the science becomes a source of 
uncertainty (Grundmann and Stehr, 2000). The uncertainty linked to scientific 
findings is no expression of ignorance, or of a (temporary) deficit of knowledge. 
Uncertainty is a constitutive feature of the knowledge, as it is of the contexts, in 
which the knowledge must operate. 
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The knowledge has of course always had a function in the social life. That the 
human action is knowledge-based might be regarded as an anthropological 
constant. Social groups, social situations, social interaction and social roles all 
depend on, and are mediated by the knowledge. Relations among individuals are 
based on the knowledge of each other. Indeed, if, like the interactionist tradition in 
the sociology, we regard such a general notion of knowledge as the foundation 
stone of the social interaction and the social order, we will find that the possibility 
of a social interaction itself is based on the situation-transcendent knowledge 
shared among the individuals engaging in the social action. The power, too, has 
frequently been based on knowledge advantages, not merely on physical strength. 
The societal reproduction, furthermore, is not just a physical reproduction but, in 
the case of humans, always cultural, that is to say, the reproduction of the 
knowledge.  
 
It is precisely the enhanced social, political and economic significance of the 
scientific knowledge and technological artifacts in the modern society, that calls for 
an analysis of its essential features in terms of knowledge. More specifically, I will 
indicate how the economic capital – or, more precisely, the source of the economic 
growth and the value-adding activities – increasingly relies on the knowledge. The 
transformation of the structures of the modern economy on the basis of knowledge 
as a productive force constitutes the “material” basis and justification for 
designating the advanced modern society as a knowledge society. 
Knowledge Societies 
 
In this section I will explicate and explore the idea that the present-day society or, 
more precisely, the type of society that appears to be emerging as an industrial 
society gives way, is best conceptualized as a “knowledge society”. But why I 
regard this term as more fruitful than competing terms and approaches (such as 
information society or post-industrial society) requires some justification. The 
present-day society may be described as a knowledge society because of the 
penetration of all its spheres by the scientific and technical knowledge (Stehr, 
1994).  
 
Past theorists of the society provide designations for the assembly of those 
attributes of social relations they regarded as constitutive of the specific nature of 
their particular society. They therefore spoke of a capitalist, industrial or post-
industrial society. It is for quite similar reasons, that one is able to label the now 
emerging form of society as a knowledge society since it is increasingly clear that 
the knowledge is the constitutive identity-defining mechanism of the modern 
society.  
 
The historical emergence of knowledge societies does not occur suddenly; it does 
not represent a revolutionary development, but rather a gradual process, during 
which the defining characteristics of the society change and new traits emerge. 
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Even today, the demise of societies is typically as gradual as was their beginning, 
even if some social transformations do occur in spectacular leaps. But most major 
social changes continue to evolve gradually, at an uneven pace, and they become 
clearly visible only after the transition is already over. The proximity of our time to 
significant social, economic and cultural changes, however, makes it highly likely, 
that what is now beginning to come into view, is of extraordinary present and 
future significance. 
 
Moreover, the knowledge societies do not come about as the result of some 
straightforward uni-modal unfolding. They are not a one-dimensional social 
figuration. Knowledge societies become similar by remaining or even becoming 
dissimilar. New technological modes of communication break down the distance 
between groups and individuals, while the isolation of particular regions, cities and 
villages remains. The world opens up and creeds, styles and commodities mingle; 
yet the walls between incompatible convictions about what is sacred do not come 
tumbling down. The meaning of time and place erodes even while boundaries are 
celebrated.  
 
Until recently, the modern society was conceived primarily in terms of property 
and labor. Labor and property (capital) have had a long association in social, 
economic and political theory. The work is seen as a property and as a source of 
emerging property. In the Marxist tradition, the capital is objectified, encapsulated 
labor. On the basis of these attributes, individuals and groups were able or 
constrained to define their membership in the society. In the wake of their 
declining importance in the productive process, especially in the sense of their 
conventional economic attributes and manifestations, for example as "corporeal" 
property such as land and manual work, the social constructs of labor and property 
themselves are changing. While the traditional attributes of labor and property 
certainly have not disappeared entirely, a new principle, the "knowledge", has been 
added which, to an extent, challenges as well as transforms property and labor as 
the constitutive mechanisms of the society.  
 
Theories of societies, depending on their constitutive principles, mirror these 
quintessential social mechanisms in the chosen shorthand for the historical era they 
claim to describe and represent. Thus, the bourgeois or capitalist society was 
originally viewed as a society of owners. Later it became a "laboring society", and 
it is now evolving into a knowledge society.  
 
Daniel Bell (1973:346) argues, that the "symbolic" onset of the post-industrial 
society may be traced to the period since the end of World War II, although he 
admits that it would be foolish to give precise dates for the origins of these major 
social transformations. It was, according to Bell, in this era that a new 
consciousness about time and social change began to emerge. Block and 
Hirschhorn (1979:368), who also inquire into the knowledge, science and 
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technology as the new productive force of the pos-tindustrial society, argue that a 
qualitative shift, which even then began to affect the economic system, has its 
origins in the 1920s. At least in the United States, the input of labor, time and 
capital had already then begun to diminish while output had started to rise. In 
economic terms, the knowledge had become a crucial source of (added) value. 
Finally, Radovan Richta (1969:276) and his colleagues date the beginning of the 
profound transformation of the modern society (at least of its state-socialist variety) 
to the profound impact of the scientific and technological revolution in the 1950s.  
 
The society of societies 
 
The emergence of knowledge societies signals first and foremost a radical 
transformation in the structure of the economy. Productive processes in the 
industrial society are governed by a number of factors that appear to decline in 
significance as preconditions for a changing and especially a growing economy: the 
dynamics of the supply and demand for primary products or raw materials, the 
dependence of employment on production, the importance of the manufacturing 
sector that processes primary products, the role of the manual labor and the social 
organization of work, the role of international trade in commodities, the function of 
time and place in production and of the nature of the limits to economic growth. 
The most common denominator of the changing economic structure is a shift away 
from an economy largely driven and governed by "material" inputs into the 
productive process and its organization, toward an economy, in which the 
transformations of productive and distributive processes are increasingly 
determined by "symbolic" or knowledge-based inputs. The development and 
impact of the modern information technology exemplifies these transformations 
(and not only in the sphere of economic activities). They include the 
dematerialization of the production, that represents lessened constraints on supply, 
lower and declining cost and a redefinition of the social functions of velocity, time 
and place (cf. Perez, 1985 ; Miles, Rush, Turner and Bessant, 1988). 
 
The economy of the industrial society, in short, is primarily a material economy 
and that gradually changes into a monetary economy. Keynes' economic theory, 
particularly his General Theory (1936) reflects this transformation of the economy 
of the industrial society into an economy substantially affected by monetary 
matters. But, as a more recent evidence indicates it, the economy described by 
Keynes must now be understood as a symbolic economy. The structural changes of 
the economy and its dynamics increasingly reflect the fact that the knowledge is 
becoming the leading dimension in the productive process, the primary condition 
for its expansion and for a change in the limits to economic growth in the 
developped world. In the knowledge society, most of the wealth of a company is 
embodied in its creativity and information. In short, for the production of goods 
and services, with the exception of the most standardized commodities and 
services, factors other than "the amount of labor time or the amount of physical 
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capital become increasingly central" (Block, 1985:95) to the economy of advanced 
societies.  
 
The focus of any sociological analysis of the modern society must therefore be the 
peculiar nature and function of the knowledge in social relations as well as the 
carriers of such a knowledge together with the resulting changes in power relations 
and sources of social conflict. In the sociology, however, virtually all classical 
theorists are proponents and even architects of scientism. This even applies to the 
ways, in which the knowledge is conceptualized in theories of society designed to 
capture the unique features of the present-day society. For example, Daniel Bell 
(1968: 156-157) acknowledges, that "every modern society now lives by 
innovation and growth, and by seeking to anticipate the future and plan ahead". 
Innovations are driven by theoretical discoveries, while the commitment to growth 
is linked to the need for planning and forecasting.  
 
But why the knowledge or the information, despite these reflections, are supposed 
to play such an exposed role in the modern society, remains open or is not even 
raised as is the case in many contribution to the theory of the information society: 
“why should it be information, embracing both goods and services, that has come 
to dominate the world’s largest and most advanced economies?” (Beniger, 1986: 
v). Bell is optimistic that the science (including the social science) will affirm these 
expectations. "The rise of macroeconomics, and the new codifications of the 
economic theory, now allow governments to intervene in economic matters in 
order to shape economic growth, redirect the allocation of resources and ... 
engineer a controlled recession in order to redeploy resources". Indeed, toward the 
end of the 1960s, Keynesian economics and interventionist economic policies 
appeared to have solved for the foreseeable future the problem of planning and 
controlling national macroeconomic developments. Yet only a few years later, the 
economic and governments alike bemoaned the absence of any economic policy 
able to deal with the problem of simultaneous unemployment and inflation. The 
Keynesian consensus gave rise to what may be regarded as the persisting crisis in 
economics and economic politics. Daniel Bell’s claim that the social sciences will 
be able to deliver and implement (“codify”) a useful practical knowledge has 
proved to be much too optimistic. 
 
What justifications are there to designate the presently emerging society a 
knowledge society rather than a science society (Kreibich, 1986), an information 
society (e.g. Nora and Minc, [1978] 1980), a postmodernization (cf. Inglehart, 
1995), the network society (Castells, 1996) or as scientific-technological 
civilization (Schelsky, 1961)? There are several important reasons that argue for 
the “knowledge society” as the term of choice. I will begin with a brief discussion 
of the idea that we are living in an age of the technical state or in a technological 
civilization before I turn to the perspective that the modern society is an 
information society.  
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The technical state 
 
In the 1960s, both conservative and neo-Marxist thinkers conjured up the image of 
the impending spiritless technical state and that the society as technical rationality 
extends its relentless influence to all sectors of the modern life. The domination 
and closure achieved by the pervasive power and authority science and technology 
mark the beginning of a singular type of society and the end of the individual 
freedom and of the subjectivity. Individuals are in danger of being totally absorbed 
into a repressive set of productive relations and absolute domination exercized by 
the state with the help of new forms of control.  
 
Two prominent accounts are representative of this perspective of the possible rise, 
the internal make-up and the consequences of the technical state. Herbert Marcuse's 
influential statement of the theme found, most fully developped, in his One-
Dimensional Man (1964) and Helmut Schelsky's (1961) thesis that the advanced 
industrial society is a powerful instance of "scientific civilization" as first 
expounded by him in a lecture in 1961 entitled "Man in the scientific civilization". 
Though Marcuse and Schelsky stood for radically opposed political philosophies 
and goals, they arrived, in their description of the social consequences of the 
modern science and technology, at essentially the same position. Both descriptions 
are self-exemplifying in that they display some of the very intellectual practices, 
namely universality, control and prediction, the authors otherwise castigate as 
representative of a scientistic spirit out of control. Although Marcuse's and 
Schelsky's theories of the advanced society today are somewhat forgotten and 
rarely invoked when attention or critique turns to the key features of the modern 
society, especially its built-in flaws and risks, I will briefly consider their views and 
point to convergences with theories of the information and the network society. 
Among the most notable common denominators, their description of the nature of 
the modern technology is as an instrument of social and political action. 
 
The modern technology represents a particular logic and this logic necessarily 
becomes the dominant logic of the human life. One of the significant consequences 
of such a conception of technology is that the traditional "logic" of the technology 
reverses itself. That is to say, the technology as a producer of mere means of 
human action becomes a producer of ends or meaning, or what is the same, 
"means" of action determine its ends and prefigure the direction of the social 
change. Schelsky describes the technology as an intellectual process that dissects 
varied natural objects into their elementary parts in order to re-assemble them 
according to the principle of the least effort or maximum efficiency. The result of 
the modern technological construction, therefore, is a novel product or process with 
artificial features and, in analogy, an artificial human being.  
 
274 
 
 
The reversal of the means/ends relationship is particularly noticeable in the arena 
of the authority or power relations in the society. More specifically, Schelsky 
postulates, as a decisive feature of the scientific civilization, that power relations 
are depersonalized; traditional relations of power between individuals and groups, 
as well as the legitimating belief systems in the modern society, exercize the power 
based on political norms and laws, and are replaced by "iron necessities" of the 
scientific civilization and these, which is crucial, are "not arrived at as political 
decisions and are incomprehensible as based on normative or ethical 
considerations" (Schelsky, 1961: 22). These developments imply, of course, that 
the democratic decision-making becomes impossible because the place of the 
sovereign citizen is taken by technical necessities, that make political contest and 
discourse superfluous. Power relations take on qualities that make them appear 
unassailable. Schelsky predicts a concentration and consolidation of state power, 
that therefore evolves into a "technical state". The state increasingly monopolizes 
all means of power based on the technology, the necessary financial resources and 
the (technical) necessity for co-ordination within its control. It follows, that such a 
state no longer needs politics and politicians in the conventional sense of the term 
because decisions are taken, or occur, in an almost automatic and self-regulated 
process. Therefore, the notion of the technical state converges, in significant 
respects, although the convergence does not signal the identity, with the analysis 
and the thesis of the increasing societal dominance of the technical rationality in 
the advanced society by a number of authors, who belong to the group of the 
critical theorists. 
 
Herbert Marcuse for one observe that the scientific mind and the transformation of 
its knowledge into scientific-technical rationality in the advanced industrial society 
produce an ensemble of things and objectified social relations, which have turned 
the project of emancipation from the domination of nature and control into its 
opposite. Marcuse (1964: 146) argues, that these outcomes are inherent in pure 
science and that  the "scientific-technical rationality and manipulation are welded 
together into new forms of social control". Outside the world of objective things 
and social relations, one only encounters a world of values but since they or their 
metaphysical basis cannot be verified, the subjective domain is not real, but is 
objective and weak and ultimately counts little in the affairs of life.  
 
The power of knowledge and information 
 
The Achilles' heels of the theory of scientific-technical civilization and of 
instrumental rational control, in which the "technology becomes the subject of the 
history", to use a formulation by Günther Anders ([1956] 1980), is the rather 
conventional notion of the nature of the advanced technology and technological 
expertise, which animates all of its utopian promises and rationalistic designs. The 
domination by the technology and by the technical expertise requires a degree of 
cognitive coherence and commonality of interest, which in fact cannot be observed 
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among technical experts, or in the discourse that rests on the authority of the claims 
scientific knowledge. Experts neither act in a unified manner, nor expertize 
undivided, or for that matter, will it ever be if such consensus is to emerge on a 
voluntaristic basis. It is important to recognize that most "technical controversies 
have (taken) the form of a competition between two plausible interpretations of a 
situation...and the technical expert controversy has many of the features of the 
theoretical controversy in the science" (Barnes, 1985 : 106). Scientists, engineers, 
experts and counselors are far too fragmented intellectually and display allegiances 
to varied groups in the society to seriously represent a stratum on the verge of a 
collectively dominating society. Barnes (1985: 11) concludes, that the modern 
society, though dominated by the science, is not ruled by scientific experts: "the 
expert assertions today must be expressed in a scientific/technical idiom. This is 
essential, just as centuries ago a religious idiom was essential. But, it no more 
guarantees that a scientist will be believed today than it guaranteed that a priest 
would be believed long ago". 
 
A related and equally dubious assumption of the utopian designs of the impending 
technical state concerns the conviction, that the growth in knowledge and 
information occurs in patterns, which assure its orderliness and therefore prompts 
greater transparency and rationality of conduct in situations drenched in 
intelligence. However, the proliferation of the knowledge does not invariably mean 
the reduction of the ignorance and the increase in certainty. On the contrary, a gain 
in mere intelligence may well constitute an explosion in confusion, uncertainty and 
unpredictability. As a result, in the sphere of organizations, for example, an 
"increasing share of organizational resources goes to intelligence function; 
structural sources of intelligence failures become more prominent; doctrines of 
intelligence - ideas about how the knowledge should be tapped and staff services 
organized - become more fateful" (Wilensky, 1971:174). 
 
The Information Society 
 
Wiio (1985) indicates that the term “information society” was first used in a report 
to the Government of Japan in 1972. The suggestion, that the contemporary society 
is an information society frequently is an exemplar of a modern version of the 
technological determinism convinced that a society ought to be named after the 
technical device that allegedly closely controls its development. The devices are 
often seen as highly efficient, without flaws and as imposing their logic on the user. 
The discussion about the information society is typically animated by a related 
concern, namely that the "production, processing, and transmission of a very large 
amount of data about all sorts of matter – individual and national, social and 
commercial, economic and military" (Schiller, 1981 : 25) gives rise to fresh forms 
of domination and subordination. We are warned, that a new order “is being forced 
upon an unsuspecting world by advances in telecommunications” (Angell, 1996: 
81), that individuals are increasingly paralyzed by an overload of information in the 
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new media or that we are in the midst of a deepening social crisis that results from 
inequality of access to information and from the impoverished content of 
information itself. Yet, every society transmits the information and in every society 
such dissemination is stratified. Little is said by the information society theorists 
about the genesis of the substance of the information, the media of communication, 
the changes brought about by the actual content of the information that is 
communicated or, for that matter, about the extent to which the information 
technology devices are user-defined and user-led. Nor are discussions about the 
information society usually concerned with questions of solidarity and authority or 
whether any economic effects of the spread of the communication technologies and 
information especially when defined as a material commodity or simply as “thing-
like” (Schement and Curtis, 1995 : 2) cannot just as well be accommodated within 
a more conventional neo-classical economic discourse, namely as processes best 
understood in terms of long-established and familiar market and commerce-based 
criteria.  
 
The Network Society 
 
In a series of imaginative and empirically grounded studies, Manuel Castells 
(1966) suggested that the modern society constitutes a network society on the basis 
of the massive use of the information and communication technologies in all 
spheres of the social life. The innovations in the field of the communication and 
information technology represent, not unlike the 18
th
 century industrial revolution, 
a fundamental change in the material structure or the forces of production, the 
social structure and culture of the society. The information revolution of the 
present-age or the transformation of the “material culture” of the modern society 
since the decade of the 1980s amounts to a historically new formation of the 
capitalism. The new society or network society, in which the state continues to 
occupy a decisive function, originates as the result of a new technological paradigm 
and therefore a dynamic process, which is propelled by information processing or 
informationism. In short, “in the new, informational mode of development, the 
source of productivity lies in the technology of the knowledge generation, 
information processing, and symbol communication” (Castells, 1996 : 17). In 
contrast to the notion of mass society and the nature of social control and 
regulation usually seen to operate in such a society, for example the presence of 
essentially vertically functioning mass media, one should also be cognizant of the 
development and presence of horizontally operating media and that means of media 
controlled by the end user.  
 
Given Castells’ description of the network society with its essential dependence on 
the operation of communication technologies, the questions that arise is in what 
way if any does his term of “network society” differ from that of the more 
frequently used term of the information society? And, in what ways does Castells’ 
analysis differ from the straightforward assertion, that computers create a new 
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society (e.g. Dizard, 1997: 20)? The difference, which Castells points to and which 
in his own assessment constitutes a progressive conceptual step forward in our 
analytical understanding of the modern society and the notion of the information 
society in particular, operates in analogy to the distinction between “industry” and 
“industrial”. At first glance, such a differentiation would not appear to yield much 
in the way of differences. Information and informational results, Castells suggest, 
in distinct ways of viewing and knowing. The concept of information or, as he calls 
it, the “communication of knowledge” implies nothing more or less than the 
assertion that, information is of importance in all possible social formations or 
represents an anthropological attribute found in all societies. In contrast to the 
information, the term “informational“ indicates the attribute of a specific form of 
the social organization, in which the information generation, processing, and 
transmission become the fundamental sources of productivity and power, because 
(of the) new technological conditions emerging in this historical period (Castells, 
1996: 21). The term “information”, which Castells locates as indicated on the same 
conceptual plane as knowledge remains but skin deep or on the surface, while the 
concept informational refers to the probability, that the social action is somehow 
effected in its inner constitution by the information or that the social organization 
of social conduct is transformed, based on the utilization of the information. 
 
In what kind of Society do we live? 
 
The close alliance of Castells’ theory of the society to the development of 
information and communication technologies as well as his conscious conflation of 
knowledge and information, make it rather difficult to detect any firm and decisive 
differences between the notion of an information and a network society. After all, 
for most observers, especially in the media, the information revolution is 
understood as a technical one, in the first instance. The gadgets change but not the 
socio-cognitive frames, the ideologies, the language of entitlements and scientific 
regimes. Although Castells is not a strict proponent of technological determinism, 
it is almost unavoidable that one discovers a number of theses in his study, that 
tend to resonate with the paradigm of the technological determinism, which 
stresses the consequences of the technical product rather than the social processes 
of innovation. But on the whole, there are numerous thoughtful and imaginative 
observations to be found in his study, for example, Castell’s insistence, that the 
idea of information itself reconstitutes and refashions the human activity. 
Nonetheless, as Alain Touraine ([1984] 1988: 104) argued convincingly, the 
specificity of a particular society should not hinge on a given technology : “It is 
just as superficial to speak of a computer society or of a plutonium society as it is 
of steam-engine society or an electric motor society. Nothing justifies the granting 
of such a privilege to a particular technology, whatever its economic importance.” 
But Touraine’s alternative designation of the modern society as a “programmed 
society” resonates with Castells' notion of a network society in as much as that 
concept also stresses the symbolic transformation. Touraine ([1984] 1988: 104) 
278 
 
 
insists, that the idea of a programmed society aptly captures changes under way in 
the modern society, because his imagery highlights the capacity of the society to 
“create models of management, production, organization, distribution, and 
consumption, so that such a society appears, at all its functional levels, as the 
product of an action exercized by the society itself.”  
 
The notion of post-industrial society is perhaps equally ill suited to capture the 
realities of present-day social and economic transformations. To some extent, the 
term is even misleading because "industry" or manufacturing sector of the 
economic system of modern societies, though they are being transformed to be 
sure, are certainly not disappearing altogether. The decline of the industrial society 
is not identical with deindustrialization, as is occasionally claimed. If attention is 
exclusively paid to the diminishing employment in the industrial sector (Therborn, 
1995: 71-72) and/or the closure and shrinkage of entire branches of the 
manufacturing sector, such a claim may of course be made. However, employing 
the conventional differentiation among economic sectors, the contribution of the 
industrial or manufacturing sector to the total output, the value added, has remained 
remarkably constant in the economies of most industrial countries.  
 
As a result, interpretations of Bell’s theory of post-industrial society, that refer to 
the “economic predominance of the service sector in contrast to the industrial and 
agricultural sectors” (Huntington, 1973 : 163) as one of the central features 
distinguishing the post-industrial society from its predecessors, identify a 
characteristic of the modern economy, that is not really new or fail to recognize, 
that the changes in the employment among sectors does not necessarily signal a 
change in the economic importance of sectors in terms of their contribution to 
GNP. It is accurate that the production in industry has changed significantly but it 
is not the case, that this sector has almost disappeared and has been dramatically 
surpassed in its importance for the overall economy. Life without “industry” is as 
unimaginable as life devoted to leisure only is. As a result, Alain Touraine’s 
([1984] 1988 : 104) conception of the post-industrial society concentrates less on 
the demise of the industry but on the transformation of the products generated and 
the consequences they assume for the society: “The passage to the post-industrial 
society takes place, when investment results in the production of symbolic goods, 
that modify values, needs, representations, far more than in the production of 
material goods or even of ‘services’. The industrial society transformed the mean 
of production; the post-industrial society changes the ends of production, that is, 
culture.” 
 
In a recent analysis of cross-sectional data, which is part of a series of studies 
dating back to the early 1970s, on values and beliefs of the public in 43 societies 
representing 70 percent of the world’s’ population, Ronald Inglehart (1995) 
proposes, that the dramatic shift in the direction of the social change in the past 
quarter of the century is an impressive evidence that we have entered an era of 
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post-modernization. Its origins are to be found in the unprecedented achievement 
of the economic security coupled with the safety net of the welfare state, first in 
Western Europe and North America and then incipiently in Southeast Asia. The 
cultural and political feedback, that may be observed in these societies manifests 
itself in a decline of the authority of religion and the state, a persistence of 
individualism, an emphasis on non-economic values and as a shift from scarcity 
values to security values as well as a rejection of all forms of power.  
 
According to Inglehart, in the political realm, the post-modernization is linked to 
the democratization. Finally, a diminished confidence in the social role of science 
and technology is noted as a characteristic attribute of the emerging post-modern 
worldview. Inglehart’s argument about the dawn of the post-modernization gives 
primary weight to certain economic accomplishments, especially the achievement 
of the economic security for large segments of the public. The attained level of the 
economic security corresponds to equally unprecedented levels of subjective well-
being. Precisely because the public in the advanced societies take their material 
existence for granted,  “they are not aware of how profoundly this supposition 
shapes their worldview.” (Inglehart 1995:385) Although Inglehart refers to a wide 
spectrum of cultural changes as indicative for the post-modernization, he stresses, 
in contrast to most other post-modernity theorists, that the economic 
transformations make the post-modernization possible.  
 
Pierre Bourdieu ([1979] 1984: 55-56) offers similar observations about the cultural 
consequences of the growing economic well-being but refers more to shifts in life-
style: “As the objective distance from necessity grows, life-style increasingly 
becomes the product of what Weber calls the ‘stylization of life’, a systematic 
commitment, which orients and organizes the most diverse practices – the choice of 
a wine or a cheese or the decoration of a holiday home in the country.“  
 
But the changes, that are more significant for the modern society and that are 
captured in the knowledge society perspective are developments, that occur with 
respect to the forms and dominance of the knowledge itself. The focus is not 
merely on the science, but on the relationships between the scientific knowledge 
and the everyday knowledge, the declarative and procedural knowledge, the 
knowledge and non-knowledge, and on the knowledge as a capacity for the social 
action.  
 
In the context of influential recent discussions on the impact of the science on the 
society, for example as part of an attempt to devise an accounting scheme for its 
social impact (cf. Holzner, Dunn and Shahidullah, 1987), the nature of the impact 
of the science and technology on the social relations and the society tends to be 
conceptualized in a restrictive fashion as well. In most conventional accounts, 
science and technology are said to generate, first and foremost, if not exclusively, 
new but fixed types of possibilities, resources or constraints for the practical action. 
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There, it is believed to be an asymmetric relationship between the distinctive 
spheres of the social systems of science, technology and social institutions. The 
scientific reasoning and technology artifacts impose their logic on the social 
conduct and beliefs in more or less definitive ways. In some variants of the 
technological determinism, the general effects for the society are described as 
beneficial, perhaps enhancing the logic of human action, in other cases, the primary 
concern is much more with the destructive forces of technical and scientific 
rationality and therefore the extent to which the sphere of the human action – 
outside of science and technology – mimics its rationalized world (see Grint and 
Woolgar, 1997).  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The concept of knowledge employed to describe various theories of the 
information age is much broader than is the case in most theories of the 
contemporary age as either a post-industrial society, a technical state, a network or 
an information society; and to list only a few of the multiple outcomes of 
knowledge as a capacity for action, an additional knowledge mostly generated in 
modern societies by the science and technology permit new forms of social action, 
but also eliminates old forms of action; the science and technology affects the 
experience of action while also assuring the "survival" (in the sense of a continued 
relevance) of existing forms of action, it even generates occasions, that affirm the 
traditional action and diminishes or adds to control regimes. The concept of 
scientific knowledge advanced here and therefore the idea that our era is best 
described as a modern knowledge society is therefore quite distant from any notion 
of technological or scientific determinism. Technological determinism often is part 
and parcel of the theory of the information, post-industrial or network society. 
Nonetheless, the constraining features of science and technology are by no means 
underestimated or neglected in perspectives that they describe the advanced society 
as a knowledge society. But in contra-distinction to most arguments in favor of the 
technological and scientific determinism, and the theories of the society associated 
with such views, the crucial point about knowledge societies is that the science and 
technology possess strong attributes, which allow for effective resistance to one-
dimensional and homogeneous transformation and therefore efforts to concentrate 
or even monopolize the modern science and technology as a capacity for action. 
The science and technology have important enabling features, which can be 
harnessed not only by the already powerful : these increase the number of available 
strategies, heighten flexibility or limit the ability of the powerful to exercise 
control; by the same token, for others, such features constitute constraining forces 
that limit choices, reduce options, and impose penalties and risks. In short, the 
impact of the scientific knowledge and technical artifacts occurs within and hence 
is contingent upon situational constraints.  
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It is therefore by no means contradictory to maintain, that knowledge societies can 
simultaneously become more standardized and more fragile. Generally, it is 
important to avoid overstating the extent to which the modern science and 
technology are forces, which merely operate as means of control and regulation and 
therefore constrain the human agency and delimit the social action. They do all of 
these things, but there are other consequences as well. A perhaps even more 
significant outcome, as we will show, is exactly the "opposite", namely an increase 
in the essential fragility of the society. The science and technology not only enter 
relational fields of social action of groups, that display an interest in maintaining 
the status quo but they enter the domain of opposing social forces and are 
employed for entirely different purposes. The emergence of knowledge societies 
does not mean, that modern societies are becoming uniform social and intellectual 
entities. Knowledge as a capacity for action allows and encourages the co-existence 
and interdependence of historically distinct forms of social organization and 
thought. Knowledge societies do not spell the end of the ideology or of the 
irrationality. Nor is the scientific knowledge, as a cultural ensemble, merely a way 
of deciphering the world; it is also a model for the world.  
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Hans-Peter Söder 
 
Caught in the Web ? Liquid Modernity and the Fluidity of the Synthetic 
Knowledge: Some Remarks on a Global Phenomenon  
 
It is probably dangerous to use this theory of information in fields for which it was 
not designed, but I think the danger will not keep people from using it. 
 
   J. C. R. Licklider (1950) 
 
Where are we in the globalization process? Is the term globalization still applicable 
or useful as an explicatory description? Since the 2008 economic crisis, there are 
many who think of it merely as a label, a jingle that gave voice to the gold rush 
euphoria after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. For them, the globalization 
is an apt catchphrase describing the economic expansionism of the late 1990s. 
According to this interpretation, the globalization ought to be narrowly defined, it 
is a description of the helter-skelter between 1991 and 2008. This understanding of 
the globalization, as the motto for an economic free-for-all, with all of its negative 
implications, is widely held. However, as globalization also implies an in-built, 
long-term agenda, and as the neologism globalization is laden with timeworn 
cultural baggage, it is hasty and improvident to reduce the expression to two 
decades of post-wall jubilation. Only recently, in the 1990s, the globalization was 
perceived to be carrying similar cultural weight as civilization writ large. However, 
as it came to be regarded as a late hybrid of civilization, it was just a matter of time 
before the globalization would held responsible for everything that went wrong 
soon thereafter: the ensuing political mayhem and the subsequent Western 
economic crash. It was the economist Joseph E. Stiglitz, who made this connection 
explicit. By making reference to Civilization and its Discontents, Freud’s seminal 
book of 1930, he associated the globalization with the deleterious effect of 
civilization.
149
 As Freud had pointed out, the tension between individualism and the 
“oceanic feeling” of being part of the whole is a fundamental feature of social 
interaction. In his Globalization and its Discontents (2002), Stiglitz makes the 
point that the globalization carries within it the same paradox intrinsic to 
civilization itself: in its care-taking role, the globalization is a desired state of 
political and social organization. However, as it concurrently restricts and threatens 
individual and regional identity, it is also a primary source of civil discontent 
(Freud’s Unbehagen).  
 
                                                 
 
149
 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). 
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This is not the place to dwell further on the semantics of what we, today, are to 
understand by globalization.
150
 As I intend to report on the emergence of the 
synthetic knowledge as a global phenomenon, I cannot expand on the social 
configuration of the globalization, nor do I plan to further investigate whether 
globalization is indeed a global phenomenon.
151
 It is patently clear that much more 
needs to be said to argue convincingly that the globalization is more than a post-
modern slogan of the late 1990s. However, it is also clear that if we were to be 
done with the globalization, and consign it as another short-lived historical oddity 
to our historical curiosity chamber, we would be blind to its wider universal 
relevance. For instance, the progress made by the European Union in the last two 
decades gives evidence that the codified Western knowledge paradigms of the 
various nation-states have indeed been overtaken. They have been superseded by a 
novel trans-national logic and by new types of democratized knowledge. There is 
no mistaking that the nationalism of 19
th
 and 20
th
 century Europe has run its course. 
This development represents a definite historical caesura, marking off the 
culmination of a political development that began with the storming of the Bastille. 
Were we to use globalization merely to describe certain neo-liberal agendas, we 
would leave out of the account that there has been a definite paradigm shift in the 
post-industrial configuration of world, or at least within Western political and 
scientific culture. For my purposes here, it suffices to show that we have been in 
the midst of a double revolution, the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 was an 
irrefutable political change, while the concurrent founding of the World Wide Web 
at CERN was an accompanying scientific revolution of great consequence. 
 
It is no exaggeration to compare the current transformation in the sciences (from 
analog to digital thinking) to a Copernican Revolution. Seen from this perspective, 
the globalization describes not only an isolated political phenomenon in the late 
20
th
 century Europe, but also stands for a world-wide process, namely a 
fundamental political and scientific transformation of the contemporary society. 
What makes it so difficult to conceptualize the globalization is that one needs to 
carefully distinguish the process of globalization from its unique, isolated points of 
reference, or faults, at which social and scientific revolutions occur. Thus, one 
continually needs to employ a double, or binary focus: on the process, and on 
singular occurrences, such as the establishment of the Web in 1989, for example. 
This kind of conceptualization, where one makes use of a macro- and microscopic 
vision for understanding the cultural history, necessarily leads to historical 
blurring, or to what the philosopher Bernhard Stiegler calls “disorientation”. It is in 
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 For a well-rounded presentation of the various points of view see Frank J. Lechner and John 
Boli, eds., The Globalization Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 
151
 If I were compelled to elaborate further on this issue, I would argue, with Horkheimer and 
Adorno, that cultural industries have become all-pervasive global enterprises, and that the World 
Wide Web can only be comprehended in terms of its own global aspirations. 
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this momentary historical puzzlement, that Stiegler sees Kuhnian paradigm shifts 
not in terms of continuous historical developments, but as a series of disruptions. 
 
“The resulting disruption (from a Kuhnian paradigm shift), universally recognized 
as vital to industrial societies and as a decisive stage in the ‘globalization’ process, 
has been however a first step. The second step, which is taking place currently and 
which will only result in an increase in digital networking, will produce a new kind 
of temporal object: one that is delinearizable and inseparable, produced by 
hypervideo technologies.”152 
 
One of the most fascinating but also most puzzling characteristics of the 
globalization is its ambiguous relationship towards the knowledge. No matter how 
we define the knowledge, be it a static phenomenon such as “framed experience” or 
be it a dynamic concept such as the process where data or information is converted 
to wisdom, or a course of action, it seems that “the globality” of the globalization 
(that is its seemingly all-encompassing global ambition) is impacting the closely 
circumscribed, print-based world of the traditional knowledge. In the face of the 
unceasing exponential growth of the information technology, it is, of course, 
difficult to define what we mean exactly when we speak of the “traditional 
knowledge”. For Oswald Spengler, it is an attitude towards nature, a kind of piety 
(anbetende Frömmigkeit); however this piety has been evolving over the centuries: 
“the philosopher of antiquity ‘sees’ knowledge as did the illustrious Aristotle, the 
Arabian philosopher, as alchemist, is searching for the philosopher’s stone 
intending to possess nature’s treasures without effort, the scientist of Occident 
wants to subjugate the world so that it follows his beckoning.”153 
 
Not everyone will agree that the knowledge is a stance taken toward the nature. 
However, there are some, who are inclined to agree that the “knowledge”, as we 
used to understand it intuitively, is changing before our eyes. For one, the linear 
thinking of Greek logic is now being supplanted by the non-linearity of a new 
electric language: the language of hypertext. As it emanates from numerous points 
in the hyperspace, hypertext no longer follows a linear path. By virtue of its 
hyperlinks, it can be said to be direction-less as it allows multiple readings that 
could be illogical: either contradictory, or pitted against each other in other ways. 
On the surface, the fact that the knowledge is adaptive and that its status in the 
society is fluctuating and continually evolving, is no news. After all, knowledge by 
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 Bernhard Stiegler, trans. Stephen Barker, Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the 
Question of Malaise (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011) 3. 
153
 My translation of: „Der antike Grübler ‚schaut’ wie die Gottheit des Aristoteles, der arabische 
sucht als Alchymist nach dem Zaubermittel, dem Stein der Weisen, mit dem man die Schätze der 
Natur mühelos in seinen Besitz bringt, der abendländische will die Welt nach seinem Willen 
lenken“. Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes II (München : C.H. Beck, 1923) 622. 
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definition is a dynamic force. Furthermore, as Oswald Spengler argued in The 
Decline of the West (1918) and in his Man and Technics (1931), knowledge and 
technology, if they are not identical, have co-evolved.
154
 What is new, according to 
Spengler, is that the speed of the technological innovation is outstripping our 
cognitive capacities and that technology is thereby in the accelerating process of 
emancipating itself from the human knowledge and the human involvement: “and 
the configuration of these machines is becoming more and more dehumanized, 
more ascetic, mystical, esoteric. They weave the entire earth in an unending web of 
fine forces, electric flows and currents. Their bodies become ever more cerebral, 
ever more taciturn. These wheels, cogs and levers no longer talk to us. Everything 
that is of consequence withdraws in its innermost center.”155 In other words, it is 
the machine that is learning what its work is to be. And because it does its task 
independently, it forces us to comply wit its procedures.  
 
Oswald Spengler, one of the most astute historians of technology, predicted the 
advent of this pending development in 1918 when he characterized the modern 
technology as having a Faustian will to power. The goal of Faustian Physics, 
according to Spengler, is the utter mastery of nature (der Wille zur Macht über die 
Natur). For Spengler, the Western scientific tradition, the scientia experimentalis, 
is nothing other than a violent and hostile interrogation of the nature (die 
gewaltsame Befragung der Natur). The goal of the Faustian technology in 
Spengler’s eyes is the construction of another synthetic, man-made environment.  
This other world, writes Spengler, cannot itself arise solely from the spirit of 
technics (Geist der Technik), but can come about only through the fusion of 
technology and modern capitalism. This synthesis, according to Spengler, is an 
indication of a late stage of cultural decline.   
 
Strangely enough, it is here, in the application of a historical dialectics, where the 
father of the Communism, Karl Marx, and the right wing intellectual Oswald 
Spengler meet. Nonetheless, the conclusions drawn by the philosophical pessimist 
Spengler and the left-Hegelian prophet of world revolution could not be more 
distinct. In his essay Man and Technics (1931) Spengler predicts the doomsday 
scenario, where man´s obsession to master the nature leads to a global ecological 
disaster. Conversely, Karl Marx sees this development in a more positive light. In 
the Communist Manifesto (1848), he compares the interdependence of capital and 
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 My translation of : „Die Technik ist so alt wie das frei im Raum bewegliche Leben überhaupt.“ 
Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes II (München : C.H. Beck, 1923) 619. 
155
 My translation of: “Und diese Maschinen werden in ihrer Gestalt immer mehr entmenschlicht, 
immer asketischer, mystischer, esoterischer. Sie umspinnen die Erde mit einem unendlichen 
Gewebe feiner Kräfte, Ströme, Spannungen. Ihr Körper wird immer geistiger, immer 
verschwiegener. Diese Räder, Walzen und Hebel reden nicht mehr. Alles was entscheidend ist, zieht  
sich ins Innere zurück.“ Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes II (München: C.H. 
Beck, 1923) 625. 
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knowledge to Goethe’s idea about world literature. In Goethe’s view, the world 
literature was to be a future state, where the literature was globally accessible and 
judged on its own merits in comparison with one’s own local literature. In this 
respect, the literary or cultural globalization is to act as a supra-national force, 
where urbanity and humanity is no longer a national enterprise of certain privileged 
Kulturnationen. Marx argues similarly. As the home-grown thinking comes in 
contact with the global thinking, its universality, reasons Marx, becomes 
understandable. It then transcends its own provincialism as it necessarily becomes 
more intertwined and interdependent:  “In place of the old local and national 
seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal 
inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. 
The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National 
one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and 
from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.”156 
 
Neither Goethe’s vision of a future world united by the literature, nor Marx’s 
prediction of the end of the capitalism has yet come to pass. Of all things, it seems 
that it is the incongruous views of the iconoclast Spengler that seem to come 
closest to the truth. The union of capitalism and technology has created a 
behemoth: the information economy. Furthermore, technological enhanced 
learning, virtual environments for training, educational hypermedia and web-based 
learning are massively impacting the traditional knowledge. Whereas the 
knowledge of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century modernity was a kind of learning acquired 
with a view towards a humanistic or theological end, the new post-industrial 
knowledge of the information age is an unrestricted, seemingly uncontrollable 
flood of pure data. As it is open ended and unending, data (and metadata - the data 
about data) is invading and colonizing the circumscribed fields of traditional 
knowledge.  
 
The word knowledge itself is no longer the uniform Platonic abstraction of old. It is 
slated to become obsolete and it will soon have an archaic feel. Today 
“knowledge” is manifold. We now speak of knowledge engineering, and of 
representational and motivational knowledge.
157
 In terms of knowledge 
engineering, it is the cognitive neuroscience that has emerged as the integrative 
revolutionary science of our time. With the help of the computing technology it 
promises to unify various descriptive models of cognition. In the wake of what is 
sometimes called the Cognitive Revolution, numerous knowledge creation theories 
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 www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto, retrieved on 02.02.2014. 
157
 The partitioning of knowledge, in linguistic terms, begun at the conference of cognitivists at MIT 
in 1956; the dissection of the cognitive process itself can be said to have begun in earnest with the 
rise of cognitive behavioural and cognitive neuroscience in the 1980s.   
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are currently being put forward.
158
 Their aim is to enrich the knowledge 
development by facilitating the transformation of implicit into explicit 
knowledge.
159
 As knowledge is becoming user-defined, what is of foremost 
concern to the engineers and programmers in the learning resource labs is not only 
the question of how to optimize, but also how manage the ever-quickening output 
of the various web service technologies.  
 
Today we no longer speak of students, but of learners, where a learner is defined as 
any person in the world wanting access to the knowledge. As virtual learning 
societies move the responsibility of learning from the individual to the system, and 
as they dislocate the classical localized university, the primary objective of 
technology-enhanced learning is the knowledge capitalization. It is in this aim of 
exploitation and maximal extraction, that is, in the movement toward maximum 
technological efficiency, where there seems to be a divergence from the civilizing 
aspirations of the classical knowledge. The new knowledge, that is E-knowledge, is 
a comprehension (or at least an awareness) of the world in its global dimension 
(where global implies the validity of other knowledges, such as artificial or virtual 
knowledge). It is trans-national in its structure as it transcends geographic 
boundaries as interest-free, open-source information. A central concern of E-
knowledge is the knowledge management, that is to say, the organization and 
classification of the information. This organizing of the knowledge creates a cluster 
that is a new locus as it generates a novel type of public space (in terms of a 
Stiegler’s temporal object). Like the Platonic world of ideas, it is a timeless hyper-
space in the truest sense of the word, a computer-generated, simulated world over 
and beyond the actually-existing world at hand. This newly generated locality is 
not made by any governing body, but is engendered by the flow of electrons 
through the World Wide Web.  
 
What is truly remarkable about cyberspace is the fact that it is an entirely man-
made, artificial world. Faced with the loss of final frontiers, mankind has created 
its own space ex nihilo. It replicates not only a physical, but also a social and 
cultural space. It has the ability to mimic any kind of space, be it historical, literary 
or poetic. Because it is hyperreal, it is not under any one person, law or entity’s 
control. Cyberspace is an immersive, fictional universe with its own laws and 
particular rules. It is synthetic, but the electrons that animate it are real. Because it 
exists only by the flicking of a switch, it is a hybrid space that is and is not. The 
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 Michael S. Gazzaniga, ed., Conversations in Neuroscience (Boston, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999). 
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Collins, 2011). 
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 Marc Spaniol, Yiwei Cao and Ralf Klamma, „A Media Theoretical Approach to Technology 
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newly-won territory is a hyperreal domain that needs to be continually shored up. 
Like a natural space, it can be seized, governed, lost and colonized. A Shangri-La 
come true, the Web is indeed a new form of colonization. The sun never sets on 
this artificial empire, but there is no longer a king or queen. It cannot be bequeath 
to another generation.  Like the universe, it is an endless space. But because the 
hyperspace is both a classical medium and a self-generating system, it does not 
qualify only, but also alters the collective perception. As Friedrich Kittler put it so 
bluntly in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (1999), hyperspace shapes the very way 
we see and experience the world. In that new space, learning by doing means to 
move to a given virtual space (where the distinction between real and fictional 
experience is unclear). In computer games for example, little is left to the 
imagination as the boundary between fiction and reality disappears. Here the 
question arises how “real” an experience in a half-real world can be, if the 
experience does not entail suffering in real life? Training is not experience, and 
what happens for instance at a flight simulator, is a drill that needs to be 
differentiated from “real” learning.  As the game theorist Jesper Juul remarked, 
video games are always “half-real”. They are fictional worlds with “real” rules, 
otherwise gaming would not be possible.
160
 However, the meaning of “game over” 
has decidedly different consequences in real and virtual reality.  
 
Given these radical changes to the way we see and experience the world around us, 
it is astonishing how comparatively little energy has been devoted to assess the 
cultural and social impact of the knowledge gained in the cyberspace. Granted, it is 
generally recognized that digital, or E-knowledge is a radical departure from pre-
digital thinking, however, most web theorists are loath to think of the digital 
revolution as a radical historical advance. Jay David Bolter, for example, argues 
that new media, such as hypertext, is only the latest kind of writing in a different 
kind of space.161 Bolter’s argument merits careful attention as new technologies 
are often trumpeted to radically change the society. Shortly after Alexander 
Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1875, the Scientific American proclaimed 
the advent of a new world: “Soon it will be the rule and not the exception for 
business houses, indeed for the dwellings of well-to-do people as well, to be 
interlocked by means of telephone exchange, not merely in our cities, but in all 
outlying regions. The result can be nothing less than a new organization of the 
society...The time is close at hand when the scattered members of civilized 
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 Jesper Juul, half-real: Video Games between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). 
161
 “All forms of writing are spatial, for we can only see and understand written signs as extended 
in a space of at least two dimensions. Each technology gives us a different space. . . . How the 
reader and writer understand writing is conditioned by the physical and visual character of the books 
the use”. Jay David Bolter, Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing 
(Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991) 11. 
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communities will be as closely united, so far as the telephonic communication is 
concerned, as the various members of the body now are by the nervous system.”162 
 
The question if the Web is the logical continuation of the Gutenberg press, or if it is 
a revolutionary new type of technology that is globally impacting the world, is a 
major point of contention. Post-humanists such as Cary Wolfe, Joel Garreau, N. 
Katherine Hayles argue that we are indeed beyond the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century 
industrial modernity. Bolter’s “new writing space”, the computer (being a chiffre 
for digital technology), in the eyes of post- and trans-humanists, increasingly 
exhibits the characteristics of an augmented reality. Post- and trans-humanism is an 
emerging field with a wide spectrum of opinons. However, part and parcel of the 
post-humanism is the view that the body is a prosthesis that has fulfilled its 
usefulness. The body, writes the robotic researcher Hans Moravec, needs to be 
released from its “carnal corporation”. In this view, a post-human “is a human 
descendant who has been augmented to such a degree as to be no longer human.”163 
Although the post- and trans-humanism spread out over a wide spectrum in the 
post-modern theory, both agree at least on two points. First, there is a continuous 
and accelerating merging of man and machine to the point where technics and 
humanism are becoming indistinguishable. And second, the virtual reality created 
through digital simulations, machine algorithms and subversive computer games 
qualifies as a cybernetic system. That is to say, humans no longer control the 
machines that they have constructed to fit their purposes, but it is the machine, in a 
circular-causal relationship, that now holds sway over the human operator. In man-
machine systems there is always co-organization and a specific procedural 
relationship. Nietzsche had already remarked that his Nansen writing ball was 
forcing him to write in a certain way. Now however, posthumanists assert that the 
virtual reality goes beyond the surface as it reaches deep into the human psyche, 
affecting the neurological system. Hayles calls this feedback loop a technogenetic 
intervention leading to a new evolutionary phase: technogenesis.
164
 As Ihab Hassan 
put it most succinctly: “we need first to understand that the human form – 
including the human desire and all its external representation – may be changing 
radically, and thus must be re-visioned. We need to understand that five hundred 
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 Quoted by James Gleick, The Information: A History, A Theory, A Flood (London: 
Harper/Collins, 2012) 191. 
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 Quoted by Oliver Krueger, “Gnosis in Cyberspace? Body, Mind and Progress in Posthumanism”, 
Journal of Evolution & Technology 14(2) August 2005:79.  
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 In her view digital technology, as a form of technology that we have created, will impact the 
creator bringing about neurological, epigenetic changes in our brains. See N. Katherine Hayles, 
How we Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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years of humanism may be coming to an end as the humanism transforms itself into 
something that we must helplessly call post-humanism”.165 
 
Post- and trans-humanism may well be the flavor of the month in the post-
postmodern theory, nonetheless it shows that the question concerning the 
technology has finally arrived in the humanities. We return then to my question at 
the beginning: what role does the new technology play in the ideology of the 
globalization? If we were to interpret the globalization as the process towards a 
global or world society, as the evolution of a moral imperative to eradicate the 
world poverty and to eliminate the educational barriers to transcend the gender 
politics, then the globalization is indeed a natural successor age to the project of the 
Enlightenment. The Modernity, as a point on the way to the idealist vision of the 
world enlightenment could then be interpreted, as Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck 
and other sociologists have proposed, as high or late modernity. However, one 
could also argue, that this re-Enlightenment model of the world history is caught up 
in a Winckelmannian and Spenglerian view of periodicity that is no longer tenable 
in a world made up of alternative modernities and grassroots globalization. Here, 
we need to work with other historical models that shun Eurocentric patterns and 
paradigms such as the idea of progress.   
 
Zygmunt Bauman`s notion of a liquid modernity elegantly skirts the issue of 
continuity and discontinuity by setting up another dichotomy: liquids and solids. 
Here it is no longer a question of antiquity, the middle ages and modernity, but of 
liquid time and space. Put in another way, by dissolving Kant´s seemingly 
immutable categories of perception, by looking at the very constitution of basic 
matter differently, Bauman is able to view the modernity in utterly new terms. For 
example, lightness can now be introduced as a new category of perception: “Fluids 
travel easily. They 'flow', 'spill', 'run out', 'splash', 'pour over', 'leak', 'flood', 'spray', 
'drip', 'seep', 'ooze'; unlike solids, they are not easily stopped - they pass around 
some obstacles, dissolve some others and bore or soak their way through others 
still. From the meeting with solids they emerge unscathed, while the solids they 
met, if they stay solid, are changed - get moist or drenched. The extraordinary 
mobility of fluids is what associates them with the idea of 'lightness'. . .We 
associate 'lightness' or 'weightlessness' with mobility and inconstancy: we know 
from practice that the lighter we travel the easier and faster we move. These are 
reasons to consider 'fluidity' or 'liquidity' as fitting metaphors when we wish to 
grasp the nature of the present, in many ways novel, phase in the history of the 
modernity.”166  
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 Quoted by N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999) 1. See Ihab Hassan, “Prometheus as Performer: Towards a Posthumanist Culture?” The 
Georgia Review (1977): 830-850. Web. 
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 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000) 2. 
294 
 
 
 
Of course, Bauman’s conceptualization of the modernity cannot easily be 
substantiated. We lack the conceptual tools to judge the contemporary “lightness” 
of being against the mobility, tempo and momentum of previous ages. The art the 
historian Aby Warburg may perhaps be of some assistance here as he followed a 
similar path in his Mnemossyne Atlas. When he proposes that there is a fluidity of 
Dionysian emotions (connecting ancient mythology to Dürer’s northern gods and to 
the re-emergence of antiquity in modernity), he does not show only from whence 
cultural memory emanates, but also how it flows, connecting image to image.
167
 
 
Alas, my pairing the seemingly worn out socio-political mantra of globalization 
with the question of how we are to conceptualize thinking and cognition in a world 
that is being restructured by a revolutionizing digital technology, is not an obvious 
approach. As the hyperlinks of the Web portend not only “the end of the line” but 
also “the end of authority”, they mirror significant aspects of globalization (such as 
decentralization and local emancipation).
168
 Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind 
that the drive towards the best possible world needs to be continually scrutinized. 
As optimization is inherent to open-ended systems, the current drive towards 
synthetic knowledge enhancement is Trojan horse. It is however a short step from 
knowledge enhancement to human enhancement. Whatever the knowledge is to 
mean in the 21
st
 century, we have to be clear that Wilhelm von Humboldt’s notion 
of Bildung is neither consonant with the enterprise toward maximal knowledge 
extraction, nor with global ludology, gamification, or other aspects of the 
entertaining educational economy. If the search for “life extension” and “mind 
enhancement technologies” and the struggle to attain an “embodied virtuality” 
(Hayles) are humanistic efforts, remains to be seen.
169
  Harmonizing one’s heart 
with one’s mind is an unquantifiable intellectual pursuit. Friedrich Schiller`s ideas 
that education and knowledge are to be continually examined in terms of their 
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usefulness towards Menschwerdung (personal transformation and ethical 
improvement) cannot yet be assessed by the artificial intelligence of machines. 
Humanistic and aesthetic ideas are also difficult to judge and value in themselves, 
in a human-machine system, especially in the rapidly emerging collaborative 
learning environments. In the final analysis, whatever knowledge is to mean in a 
split-window world of reality and virtuality, if we are mindful of Schiller’s and 
Kierkegaard’s counsel that we must overcome the cowardice of our hearts to “see” 
beauty, we need not worry that humanism gets lost in translation. To truly know 
with the heart, Blaise Pascal tells us, requires blood, sweat and tears in real life.  
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Rob van Kranenburg 
 
Essay on sharing every ‚thing’ 
- to share is to validate  
 (Tara Petric) 
 
 
I raised the issue of animism at Ubicomp 2002 in a discussion with researchers and 
nobody understood that. That fact and my experience at an earlier Conference in 
Jonschoping on Intelligent Information Interfaces (i3) - where a speaker said that in 
ten years time everyone would have a Bluetooth ring and point at a tree when 
walking in the woods and a screen would pop up! and you would get information 
about that tree and I looked around and everyone seemed to be happy with that - 
led to my work in the past fourteen years of building Council - 
theinternetofthings.eu - as a way of gaining agency and becoming an influence in 
the actual building of it. As you know, this is happening and happening fast. I am 
working in an FP7 EU project
170
 with the key stakeholders and advise Conferences 
worldwide on going more towards internet of neighborhoods then smart cities.
171
 
So far I know we are choosing between Scylla and Charibdis. I see no way of going 
back towards non-wireless or non-IP connectivity. So we can either try to help to 
build an inclusive smart city for everyone or lay back and do nothing and then it 
will be a world of 500 smart cities and Mad Max in between. I have come to 
believe that this monitoring of items, resources and processes will lead to 
incredible transparency, less to zero corruption, energy management and stop 
wasting of food (50%) and water. But I realize these last arguments resemble 
Cisco’s a lot. 
 
Ten years ago I wrote : 
 
"Every new set of techniques brings forth its own literacy: the Aristotelian protests 
against introducing pencil writing, may seem rather incredible now, at the ti
                                                 
 
170
 Sociotal.eu 
171
 As founder of Council, theinternetofthings.eu 
me it meant nothing less than a radical change in the structures of power 
distribution. Overnight, a system of thought and set of grammar; an oral literacy 
dependent on a functionality of internal information visualization techniques and 
recall, was made redundant because the techniques could be externalised. 
Throughout Western civilization the history of memory externalisation runs 
parallel with the experienced disappearance of its artificial, man made, character. 
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An accidental disappearance, however much intrinsic to our experience, that up till 
now has not been deliberate. This then is the fundamental change and the design 
challenge that we are facing in ubicomp; the deliberate attempt of a technology to 
disappear as technology. In what respect will it alter our notion of the self as a 
more or less stable identity? Will it not provoke an identity building on the ability 
to change roles in communication environments? What kind of privacies lay hidden 
in our new connectivities ? In a mediated environment -  where everything is 
connected to everything -  it is no longer clear  what is being mediated, and what 
mediates.” 
 
So yes it is extremely important how we approach questions of magic, agency, a 
scripted serendipity (internet of things second hand ‚magic’) in a database reality of 
‚Google Now’ and whether it will be possible at all for the younger generations to 
approach any non-tagged or non-micro-processored object thereby losing the very 
notion that that object itself resonates and ‚is’ or ‚acts’, being removed thus twice 
from what we have until perceived as reality. We also have to find a way to 
compensate for that loss and investigate what can be gained and what can be won 
in such a world. 
 
The key element for me is that normality has been defined so strict that a lot of 
human behavior is falling outside of it, or at least people that have less to none 
filters are feeling as if they do not belong ‚here’. Probably everybody at one point 
or another has these feelings of estrangement, but I believe that there is a group of 
people that feels like this on a daily basis and as a default.  
 
They have no boundaries and find it difficult to create or have a notion of ‚self’. 
They have to deliberately make markers on and around such a ‚self’, but the truth is 
that they don’t really understand that need to pull strict boundaries between ‚self’ 
and ‚others’. They have grown up believing in a way that there always is a camera 
on them, or always someone or something present. The concept of ‚alone’ to them 
is not existing. In my opinion this is easily explained through the notion of the 
tribe.  
 
From early dawn of men we run in packs and survive in teams of about 30-50. In 
every tribe you would need some people who would go out, look around and bring 
things and ideas back home. These early innovators were balanced by other 
intelligences and ideally there had been a balance between the outer ends of manic 
boundary less and extremely focused semi autistic and the in between skillets that 
build and maintained a notion of the ‚real’, ‚reality’ and ‚normality’ that was able 
to sustain basic humans needs and functions. To each his place in the tribe, ideally. 
If however such a situation arose every body (literally) felt well. The seer was 
listened to and the mason build as he saw fit, thus timely shelter from the storm. 
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From time to time, the specialists start to build such intricate elements or the 
innovators bring back home such far fetched ideas that the skillsets in the middle 
start to adjust what is ‚normal’ and what is ‚strange’ and an evolutionary process 
starts changing the Zeitgeist, the ‚fashion’, the ‚customs’, in short: the ‚real’. And 
sometimes this process would be a rupture, a real break; war and invading tribes 
bringing such new world views that a new normal was imposed and the old 
forgotten but in stories of grandmothers and the artifacts of the time. Once, in a 
while such a rupture became an ontological change as in the ‚death’ of God for 
certain tribes. More often the notion of the normal was kept to till it was impossible 
to keep at the cost of burning even more seers as witches, wizards, heretics, 
Cathars, hippies, hackers, or any other minority group it could lay their hands on. 
 
We are now witnessing such an ontological change, a rupture in what we perceive 
as normal. The Internet, Augmented Reality, the Internet of Things are all 
technological toolsets that have been far removed from the first tools that men used 
to chisel stone. The first chivel to be used on stone was a stone. It only later 
became a chisel. But it still did fit in someone’s hand. The feedback was intense 
and obvious. It was Heidegger who saw that through mechanical engineering and 
the Industrial Revolution it was no longer a hand applying force but a machine and 
hands overseeing that machine. This was the start of the substantiation of the space 
with before that had been of visible mediation and cause and effect. He realized 
that there was nothing we could do, only wait as the famous last line in Sein und 
Zeit goes. He also realized that it was a particular part of the tribe slowly taking up 
the notion of ‚the normal’. It was the specialists who had been crafting and 
dissecting and splitting things up into smaller and smaller building blocks that at 
first made no sense but slowly began to offer the possibility of recreating their 
visions as a layer on top of what the old notion of normal was not hurting it at all 
but slowly perfecting it, smoothing the edges of every perceivable human act. They 
offered convenience. 
 
The specialist intelligence - an engineering toolset - began eating itself as it found 
that it had no more real boundaries. After automating work, leisure, administration, 
governing, it succumbed briefly to the notion of the ‚Living Lab’ but soon realized 
that the last territory it had to conquer was the space in between driving to work 
and back home: everyday life and living. Like a grin trying out faces it tried out all 
human forms of organization till it found the space in between where love lives and 
hope and shame and fear.  
 
As this intelligence could always count on the support of the middle as it was the 
perfect middle, the epitaph of normal: who does not want to feel safe, happy, 
secure?”, the first steps towards the ultimate disciplining of the body, home, street 
as ‚smart city’; cameras everywhere, automated entrances to public transport, 
elimination of cash money, energy management as a way to fight Climate Change, 
children playing within line of sight of caretakers, banning of smoking (with 
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emerging debate on banning it in cars and homes), were not seen as invading a 
private space to such an extent that it was a rupture with ordinary liberal capitalist 
society.  
 
One of the defining qualities of the specialist is that he needs protection. As his or 
her gaze is on the detail, someone has to watch his back. Industry and states 
provided this protection alongside with the briefings and the funds. This, however, 
is about to change. The obsessive worry and attention to perfectionist detail has, as 
we have seen with the NSA revelations, lead to an ever growing paranoia of 
security services as pillars of the state that can no longer be stilled by any piece of 
data or any snippet of information. Equally the full monitoring schemes are driving 
the costs of hardware, software and infrastructure so down that sharing and 
collaboration through open source is fostering the realization that what the SAP, 
Siemens and Cisco’s of these world are doing is not rocket science. Their bloated 
balances are the result of decades of isolating data in IP, patents and copyright.  
 
Ben van Lier showed at IoT Rotterdam (IoT day) how the Shannon paradigm of 
communication allowed the engineers to port ‚meaning’ onto a different plane that 
not had to be considered in their work. This explains the huge speed and 
convergence of efficiency intrinsic system and applications only. It also explains 
that we feel somehow ‚stuck’ in ‚selling’ the platform to citizens who can not 
articulate their need and do not see the offered services as something so amazing in 
the age of their own daily app agency with smartphones and companies like 
Google, and Facebook gradually spilling over into the real world objects. That 
means that only in the recent decade we realized ‚meaning’ had too be patched 
back on as semantic interoperability. 
 
There is a parallel process running alongside this specialist expertise running amok, 
ocd’ing on itself in ever stronger attempts to gain control over the ‚happenings’ of 
life, as we have seen to the extent of defining the ‚normal’ as that sphere where 
every tiny detail is in process and every object on the planet is individuated either 
in a giant Object Name Server (GS1) or in IP to every edge (IPSO alliance) or any 
combination of this together with RFID and NFC resulting in every object and item 
being digitally approachable in the distributed local grid as well as in the ‚Cloud’. 
That parallel process is the awakening of a combined and shared intelligence of 
that other outer end on the spectrum; the manic mind. It has been fueled by and has 
itself helped to build that open white line engulfing the planet: tcp/ip where still no 
King, Tyrant or Tycoon can make bytes go faster (at least for the moment). In 
under twenty years any mind capable of sharing has shared and fueled sharing as a 
new default. To keep to yourself the minimum of necessity and share all other 
resources with other so no one needs to be in want.  
 
So now I want to make the case that this sharing is the new default and that this is 
facilitated by that very framework the specialists have build. 
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Stories of cooperation, self organization and sharing have been removed from the 
real as literary modes, not even science fiction, no: tales of wonder. A miracle! 
Albert Nolan writes: "the best example of Jesus’ attempts to educate the people to 
share what they had, was the miracle of the loaves and fishes (Mk 6: 35-44 parr). 
This incident was interpreted by the early Church and by all the evangelists as a 
miracle of multiplication- although this is never explicitly said by any of 
them...The event itself was not a miracle of multiplication; it was a remarkable 
example of sharing":  
 
"Jesus was preaching to a large gathering of men in a lonely place. It was time to 
stop for a while to eat. Some had no doubt brought food, others not. He and his 
disciples had five loaves and two fish, but they suggest that the people be told to go 
and ‘buy themselves something to eat’. Jesus says, No, ‘You give them something to 
eat yourselves.’ They protest but he tells the people to sit down in groups of fifty 
and taking out the bread and the fish he tells his disciples to ‘share it out’. (p.51) 
Now either Jesus told the others who had brought food to do the same within their 
group of fifty or else they, seeing Jesus and his disciples sharing their food, began, 
of their own accord, to open their food-baskets and to share the contents. The 
‘miracle’ was that so many men should suddenly cease to be possessive about their 
food and begin to share, only to discover that there was more than enough to go 
round. There were, we are told, twelve baskets of scraps left over. Things do tend 
to ‘multiply’ when you share them. The first Christian community on Jerusalem 
made the same discovery when they tried to share their possessions...This then is 
what selling all your possessions means; giving up the surplus and treating nothing 
as your own. The result will always be that ‘none of their members was ever in 
want’ "(Acts 4:34. Jesus before Christianity, The Gospel of Liberation, Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1977 p.141) 
 
Psychologists specialized in the behaviour of larger groups of people try to explain 
the relative ease with which one is able to exert influence over masses by assuming 
"a causal force which bears on every member of an aggregate, and also for each 
individual there is a large number of idiosyncratic causes” (Stinchcombe, 1968: 67 
-68n) He continues:  
 
"Now let us suppose that the idiosyncratic forces that we do not understand are 
four times as large as the systematic forces that we do understand.... As the size of 
the population increases from 1 to 100, the influence of the unknown individual 
idiosyncratic behaviour decreases from four times as large as the known part to 
four tenths as large as the known part. As we go to an aggregate of a million, even 
if we understand only the systematic one-fifth individual behaviour as assumed in 
the table, the part we do not understand of the aggregate behaviour decreases to 
less than 1 percent (0.004)."  
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This shows how top down power works and why scaling itself has become such an 
important indicator in such a system of 'success'. Imagine you want to start a 
project or 'do something' with your friends or neighbours, say 5 people. This means 
that you have to take into account before you do anything - state a goal, negotiate 
deliverables, or even a first date on which to meet for a kick-off - that all five 
people relate to huge idiosyncrasies and generic forces that have to be aligned or 
overcome before you can even say 'Hello'. This shows how difficult it is to 'start 
something'. It also explains why you are always urged to get 'bigger' and why you 
need to 'grow'. It is only then and through the process of getting bigger itself that 
the management tools can operate, lying in waiting for you to 'discover them'. To 
be decisive, to make a difference, to set about a course for change, is in no need of 
'growth', nor in ‘scaling’. 
 
Understanding the nature of these social relations in the above terms show how 
difficult it is to script moments of systemic change, as hierarchical systems by the 
very fact that they are top down can concentrate on managing systematic forces 
relatively effortlessly. That which they cannot predict or control remain lone 
dissident, strange or abnormal voices, or 'sudden events'.  
 
With the internet these idiosyncrasies have been able to organize and raise their 
weight in the ratio, and the internet of things will allow these even further, bringing 
the sensor network data sets individuals can handle to them on their devices. This 
acceleration of weak signals into clusters, organized networks and flukes cannot be 
managed anymore by formats that are informed by and that inform systematic 
forces as the nature of these forces has changed. That is the main reason why we 
can be here today. We are the new elite, it has to be said, and the quality of our 
leading or non leading will determine the chances for children that are growing up 
this very moment to either acquire as much as possible in terms of human and 
machine relationships as they want and need, or to be handicapped physically and 
crippled mentally by totalitarian systemic religious and capitalist beliefs of a 
particular subset of human beings. 
 
The smoothness of TCP/ip, WWW, REST and API's that the younger generations 
are growing up in will make anything that is not running as smoothly seem 
'abnormal'. So logically soon the entire workings of the current decision making 
structures on the planet will be seen as 'abnormal' as the force of tales of 
collaboration itself is claiming more and more bandwidth of the 'normal'.  
 
The resources, that are invested in these cat and mouse fights will not longer be 
able to draw on the investments that have backed them for the past five hundred 
years, ever since the birth of the modern nation state. Large groups of citizens will 
soon stop paying taxes for several reasons. The first is that all the jails are full, 
there is no longer any stick. The second is that the transparency and open data 
movements are showing how badly we have been governed and how un-objective 
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decision-making systems in our democracies are. Most important however is that 
the web has facilitated sharing data, information and knowledge.  
 
But the question remains, can we organize, and can we organize to win? In my 
opinion winning would mean not only breaking the state-corporation in its self-
assigned provider of normality and numbering (passports and IP), but building a 
global country called ‘country’ that encompasses all intelligences, whether human, 
animal, hybrid and machine like. In the words of Smari McCarthy, winning means 
breaking the client-server model in technological terms (tcp/ip as open backbone 
plus intelligence at the edges in the neighbourhoods), in societal terms (full 
equality of machines, humans, animals and hybrids and concentrated hot or 
coldspots where every entity is free to move to and leave from) and in 
psychological terms (embracing all human diversity, from voice hearers
172
 to angel 
children, mongoloid to spina bifada, from bipolar to autist). 
                                                 
 
172 http://www.intervoiceonline.org/ 
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